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ABSTRACT 
It is widely agreed that a society must guarantee a social minimum to all its members. Yet, the 
organisation of social protection within the European Union (EU) is insufficient to protect all 
Europeans effectively against the risk of poverty and social exclusion. Against this backdrop, this 
thesis investigates whether a European universal basic income (EUBI) is, if at all, a worthwhile 
policy to address the problem of poverty in the EU.   
The central claim of the study posits that there are strong reasons to consider a partial EUBI as a 
desirable instrument for EU-wide poverty alleviation. Under this scenario, the EU works as a 
complementary welfare layer offering systemic support to its Member States’ welfare models whilst 
respecting the diversity of national social protection arrangements. At the same time, as an 
instrument of pan-European solidarity, the EUBI provides substance to EU social citizenship. 
The method used is problem-oriented and interdisciplinary, combining insights from political 
theory, political economy and EU studies writ large. After having layed out the various dimensions 
underpinning the problem of poverty in the EU and clarified the contours of the solution under 
scrutiny, the thesis confronts the EUBI with a series of challenges, ranging from normative issues 
associated with the unconditionality of the basic income and the pursuit of social justice in the EU, 
to the institutional hurdles pertaining to the legal feasibility of the proposal, via the macroeconomic 
difficulties related to the diversity of interdependent economies. 
Overall, this contribution examines an idea which remains unexplored in EU studies and proposes 
a new approach to European anti-poverty strategy. It also bridges the gap between EU social policy 
and basic income literatures, beyond established boundaries of research compartmentalisation. As 
such, it prepares the ground for further fine-tuned research in the areas covered by this 
comprehensive multi-dimensional analysis. 
 
   1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The European Union and its social self 
It is widely agreed that a society must guarantee a social minimum to all its members, understood 
as the bundle of resources that a person needs in order to lead a minimally decent life in a given 
society (White 2015). The notion of social minimum thus appeals to the ways in which a society 
approaches the question of social justice and organises its system of solidarity. More particularly, it 
points to how a political community collectively understands and addresses the multifaceted 
problem of poverty and, in turn, to the set of institutions and policies that socially guarantees access 
to a socio-economic floor and ensure social inclusion to all members. With this in mind, in this 
thesis, I investigate whether a European universal basic income (EUBI), understood as a modest 
monthly cash payment distributed unconditionally to all Europeans as a top-up of national social 
benefits, constitutes a worthwhile policy to address the problem of poverty in the EU.1 But before 
turning to the main question at hand, it is useful to provide some elements of context. 
In the European Union, the right to a minimum level of resources based on some standard of 
decency is proclaimed by the Union’s law. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter 
the Charter) states that ‘[i]n order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises 
and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all 
those who lack sufficient resources’ (art. 34(3)). The recently adopted European Pillar of Social 
Rights (hereafter the Social Pillar) reaffirmed that ‘[e]veryone lacking sufficient resources has the 
right to adequate minimum income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages of life, and 
effective access to enabling goods and services’ (art. 14, EU 2017). The EU’s commitment to social 
protection2 is also asserted in its general mission statement according to which the Union shall aim 
at ‘full employment and social progress’, ‘combat social exclusion’, and ‘promote social justice and 
protection’ (art. 3(3) TEU). Furthermore, Europe 2020, the vehicle for the EU policy agenda for a 
‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, has made the fight against poverty one of its main social 
policy objectives with the aim of reducing the number of people living in poverty and social 
exclusion by 20 million by 2020. In light of this, although the European Social Model (ESM) 
remains a poorly defined and polysemous concept, ‘there can be little doubt that it encompasses 
                                                 
1 I use the noun ‘Europeans’ to point to all citizens and legal residents of the EU. Similarly, I often use the adjective 
‘European’ to refer to EU-related matters and the word ‘citizens’ to refer to both nationals and residents, except when 
stated otherwise. 
2 Whilst the terms ‘social protection’ are sometimes used in EU law as a synonym of social assistance in contrast with 
social security, I use the expression to encompass both insurance and assistance schemes. 
   2 
the need to guarantee a decent minimum standard of living for all’ (Figari, Matsaganis and 
Sutherland 2013: 3).  
However, access to the social minimum is not effectively guaranteed for all Europeans. One in 
four Europeans is still at risk of poverty or social exclusion, that is, experiencing one of the three 
following forms of poverty: income poverty, severe material deprivation, or living in a low work 
intensity household (Eurostat 2018a). Moreover, despite important disparities across Member 
States (MS) and a timid recovery overall mostly reflected in the improvement of economic growth 
and employment rates since 2013, the overall European social map remains particularly worrisome, 
such that the prospects for the poverty target look rather dim (SPC 2017). 
This is particularly puzzling as it points to the continuing inability for the EU and its MS to protect 
citizens against the risk of poverty and social exclusion. This problem stems from various sources, 
ranging from the social impact of the global financial and economic crisis and the crisis of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) followed by measures of budgetary austerity, to changing 
labour market dynamics affecting both individuals’ economic security and welfare states capacities 
to respond to a series of ‘new’ challenges (e.g. ‘atypical’ forms of employment, ageing populations, 
disruptive technological change, globalisation of labour). It is also the result of long-standing 
difficulties pertaining to the organisation of social protection within the constraining environment 
of the multi-tiered European polity, an issue which became particularly salient with the political 
choices made in response to the euro crisis. In other words, the problem of poverty in the EU 
must be seen in light of the so-called ‘social deficit’ of European integration3, understood as the 
imbalance between its social and economic dimensions. 
For EU scholars, the development of a ‘Social Europe’ is characterised by a well-known puzzle: 
the process of European integration (along with economic globalisation) had a ‘destructuring’ 
impact on European welfare states that has not been matched by equivalent compensation 
measures – a ‘restructuring’ – at the supranational level (Ferrera 2005). Moreover, the development 
of problem-solving capacities in social matters at the European level has been constrained by the 
structural asymmetry between the effectiveness of ‘negative’ integration (the removal of barriers to 
trade) and the political hurdles to foster ‘positive’ integration (the creation of common regulatory 
and distributive instruments at the supranational level), which is particularly difficult in the field of 
social protection given the diversity of welfare models in the EU (Scharpf 1999, 2002). This led 
many to consider that the construction of the EU followed a neoliberal trajectory favouring a 
                                                 
3 Simply put, European integration points to the process of transfer of national sovereignty to the European 
supranational authority (Milward 1992: 4). 
   3 
market-making rather than a market-correting approach of integration and marked by preference 
for economic liberalisation, the deregulation of labour markets and a residual approach of social 
protection considering the ‘modernisation’ of welfare systems through the prisms of financial 
viability and labour market flexibility (see Whyman et al. 2012: ch. 5 for a review). More recently, 
the reforms of economic governance in the EMU in response to the crisis, primarily focused on 
‘sound’ public finance and ‘structural reforms’ oriented towards welfare retrenchment, further 
reinforced the marginalisation and the subordination of social objectives to economic ones (Ferrera 
2014; Scharpf 2015; Crespy and Menz 2015a, 2015b; Copeland and Daly 2015). The effects of 
‘austeritarianism’ (Hyman 2015) combined with the lack of instrument to address the structural 
defects of the monetary union (see e.g. De Grauwe 2018) proved to be negatively pro-cyclical (De 
Grauwe and Ji 2017) and increased social imbalances between MS (Andor 2017), putting a halt to 
the so-called ‘convergence machine’ that the EU used to be (EC 2017b: 8). The overall impact is 
also socially regressive, as shown by the deterioration of unemployment and minimum income 
benefits both in terms of coverage and financial adequacy (Bouget et al. 2015; Marchal, Marx and 
Van Mechelen 2016). 
This state of affairs is not only problematic for individuals who suffer its social consequences. It 
also raises concerns about the future of the European project itself for two main reasons. First, it 
is widely acknowledged among scholars that upward social and economic convergence is a 
functional necessity for an operational EMU and the pursuit of further integration (see e.g. 
Vandenbroucke 2017d, De Grauwe 2018). Second, according to researchers investigating the so-
called ‘populist backlash’, the EU’s market-making bias (along with fears of cultural dilution) fuels 
an anti-European sentiment, thereby eroding political support for the EU (Buti and Pichelmann 
2017; De Vries 2018). What was already valid two decades ago is thus truer than ever: ‘it is no 
longer possible to evade the debate on Europe’s social identity at the risk of putting at stake the 
overall integration project itself’ (Maduro 2000: 2).  
This is why the Juncker Commission proclaimed its ambition for a ‘triple-A on social issues’ 
(Juncker 2014) and its intention to put social matters ‘on an equal footing’ with economic aspects 
in the European Semester (i.e. the framework for the coordination of economic policies across the 
EU) (Thyssen 2014). Yet, whilst some consider that the shift of the European Commission’s post-
crisis management towards more ‘progressive’ reforms focused on ‘social investment’4 reveals a 
‘socialising of the European Semester’ (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2015), others argue that non-binding 
                                                 
4 Social investment refers to ‘activation’ policies designed to strengthen people’s skills and reduce social risks to support 
their employment and social participation, in areas such as education, training, healthcare, childcare. See e.g. EC (2013). 
   4 
social objectives remain trapped in an unfavourable trade-off with the binding rules of fiscal 
discipline (Crespy and Vanheuverwzijn 2017; Crespy and Schmidt 2017). Similarly, the freshly 
adopted Social Pillar offers a positive signal of the EU’s will to address its social deficit (EU 2017a), 
but it is often seen as a mere repackaging of rights existing in the Charter and has mostly been met 
with scepticism so far given its reliance on soft law instruments and its incorporation in the 
Semester; worse even, if the Pillar proves to be unenforceable and ineffective, it risks creating 
further resentment and disillusion towards the European project (Sabato and Vanhercke 2017). In 
short, despite noticeable initiatives, the EU’s response produced ‘high hopes but low yields’ 
(Vanhercke, Sabato and Bouget 2017). Furthermore, given that ideological and implementation 
biases inherited from the past are still at the heart of European socio-economic governance, it 
appears unlikely that ‘things will be different this time’, unless new radical iniatives are adopted 
(Schmidt 2015). 
Undoubtedly, the challenges ahead extend beyond the sole social situation – some refer to the 
multifaceted set of economic, social and political difficulties faced by the EU as a ‘poly-crisis’ 
(Youngs 2018: ch. 1) –, but I contend, as put by De Wispelaere and Cassassas, that ‘the key problem 
behind Europe’s malaise […] is the economic disenfranchisement of large parts of its population 
in the winner-takes-all-society’ (2016: 284). Even if one argues that it is not the central issue, few 
would deny that reconnecting with the EU’s promise of prosperity requires addressing its welfare 
conundrum in general and guarantee an effective access to the social minimum at the very least.5 
This view is also at the heart of Europeans’ preoccupations since respondents to a recent special 
Eurobarometer survey on the Future of Europe consider unemployment and social inequalities as 
the EU’s main challenges (EC 2017d). Results also emphasise the importance interviewees attach 
to the EU’s social dimension: a very large majority (83%) of interviewees hold that free-market 
economy should go together with a high-level of social protection while (despite noticeable cross-
country differences) 45% of interviewees hold that social equality and solidarity should be 
emphasised to face major global challenges, 64% of them consider favourably the harmonisation 
of social welfare in the EU and 60% support more European-level decision-making in dealing with 
social security issues. 
Against this backdrop, proposals in the field of social protection have mainly focused on 
establishing a ‘European Social Union’, a union of welfare states supplemented by systemic support 
                                                 
5 On other radical initiaves suggested to address the EU’s multi-layered crisis, see e.g. Schmidt (2015) on policies, 
politics and processes to reform E(M)U governance, Youngs (2018) on how to improve the EU’s political legitimacy, 
and De Grauwe (2018) on how to complete the economic integration of the EMU. It must also be added that some 
of these proposals (e.g. the mutualisation of national debts) may also have indirect positive effects on social matters 
but this extends beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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at EU level (Vandenbroucke, Barnard and De Baere 2017). For instance, some advocate the 
establishment of a common European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS) to complement 
national schemes in times of economic downturns (Andor 2017; Dullien 2013, 2017; Beblavý, 
Marconi and Maselli 2015; Vandenbroucke 2017a, 2017b, 2017d). The idea of a European 
involvement in minimum income protection by setting binding minimum standards in each MS 
and supporting national schemes through a dedicated European fund has also gained much interest 
(EP 2010; EESC 2013; ETUC 2015; Van Lancker 2010, 2015; Marx and Nelson 2013; Peña-Casas 
and Ghailani 2013; Peña-Casas and Bouget 2014; Vandenbroucke et al. 2014). These proposals 
should be welcome as they would, if implemented, have an undeniable positive impact with respect 
to the status quo. However, in this thesis, I take a fundamentally different outlook on the European 
Union’s social self as my focus is on another more radical proposal – not necessarily incompatible 
with the propositions above – which remains much less explored, and to which I now turn. 
2. The main question 
The universal basic income (UBI) – a periodic cash payment paid by a political community to all 
its members on an individual basis, without conditions of resources or work requirement – seems 
to present a real interest in contemporary debates about social justice and welfare state reforms 
(see e.g. Van Parijs 1992, 1995; White 2003; Raventòs 2007; Wilderquist et al. 2013; Standing 2017; 
Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017). Whilst the discussion remains mostly centred on its 
justification and design at the national level, a few scholars argued in favour of its establishment at 
EU level (Van Parijs 2012a, 2012b; Viehoff 2016; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 230-241). 
Their positions on the matter differ but they all consider a partial (i.e. insufficient to ensure 
subsistence) pan-European UBI supplementing national social benefits as a desirable policy for 
more social justice throughout the EU. My central aim in this thesis is thus to provide a critical 
assessment of the prospects for a (partial) European universal basic income (EUBI) as a policy 
response to the problem of poverty in the EU.  
The notion of poverty is appreciated as a multidimensional concept which incorporates the related 
concerns of economic insecurity, social exclusion, and lack of access to fundamental rights. In 
short, ensuring a decent life for all requires both resource adequacy and the effective capacity to 
participate in society. This said, a focus on poverty does not mean that the wider notion of 
inequality is not taken into account. First, these are related concerns as the understanding one has 
of poverty depends on the particular conception of social justice one takes. An anti-poverty strategy 
may thus well constitute a strategy of inequality reduction (e.g. by raising the social minimum 
through redistribution). Nonetheless, the focus on poverty makes particular sense at European 
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level given the EU’s objectives in terms of poverty reduction and its competence of support of its 
MS in the field.  
Taking this into consideration, then, the problem of poverty in the EU indicates a failure which 
can be expressed as follows: the organisation of social protection within the EU is insufficient to 
protect all Europeans effectively against the risk of poverty and social exclusion. With this in mind, 
the thesis asks: to what extent, if at all, is the EUBI a worthwhile policy to address the problem of poverty in the 
EU? To answer the research question, the approach adopted is methodologically negative. This 
means that the thesis starts by identifying a problem, then considers a potential solution and argues 
that it deserves attention, before critically investigating that solution by ‘testing’ it against a series 
of challenges potentially devastating to the proposal. Whereas the problem is framed in a rather 
pragmatic way, the challenges faced by the policy proposal are multifaceted, ranging from questions 
of normative desirability and economic soundness to the practical constraints of its institutional 
feasibility. Against this background, the thesis postulates that the objections considered are 
insufficient to dismiss the EUBI as a worthwhile policy to respond to the problem at hand. 
The thesis breathes new life into discussions on EU social policy in which the UBI remains 
disproportionately under-represented. The approach undertaken responds to a suggestion made 
recently by some EU scholars who argued that, in face of the devastating state of Social Europe, 
researchers should investigate other roles for the EU, including that of a ‘complementary 
distributive welfare state’ (Crespy and Menz 2015b: 203). Whilst the proposals for a more pro-
active EU role in social protection mentioned above also focus on the EU as an additional welfare 
layer, this thesis takes a radically different perspective on the matter. Indeed, scholars dealing with 
a European unemployment insurance or a European minimum income primarily consider the EU 
as a vehicle facilitating inter-state solidarity and typically support the provision of targeted and 
conditional forms of social benefits based on means-tests and work requirements. By contrast, the 
EUBI is an instrument of interpersonal redistribution which involves a direct link between the EU 
and its citizens, and it is distributed to all Europeans regardless of their financial or occupational 
status. The focus on a pan-European social policy aiming at providing additional income security 
also suggests a new approach to European anti-poverty strategies that has wider implications since 
it contributes to other academic discussions related to social justice in the EU and economic and 
legal dimensions of European integration. 
In addition, even if the idea of an EU-wide UBI is not completely new, the basic income literature 
has little regard for it in comparison with its national counterpart which enjoys many contributions 
from political theorists examining its ethical justifiability and from social theorists, political 
   7 
scientists and economists analysing it as a concrete public policy (see Widerquist et al. 2013 for a 
review). Furthermore, compared to existing propositions for an EUBI (coined by their proponents 
as a ‘Euro-dividend’ (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017d: 230-241) or ‘EU minimum’ (Viehoff 
2016)), this thesis proposes a more comprehensive approach dealing with multidimensional 
challenges to the idea. In view of this, the dissertation also seeks to contribute to the basic income 
literature by proposing a thorough investigation of the policy at supranational level. Overall, this 
contribution seeks to bridge the gap between EU social policy and UBI literatures through a 
problem-based interdisciplinary method. As such, it also provides an original attempt at dealing 
with complex and multifaceted social problems in the EU by moving beyond some of the 
established boundaries of research compartmentalisation. 
3. Method 
This allows me to turn to the methodological approach used for this enquiry, which rests on what 
I call a problem-based interdisciplinary research framework relying on a combination of the toolkits 
provided by public policy analysis, problem-led approaches and interdisciplinary learning. I briefly 
present them in turn. 
First, since the central focus of the dissertation is on one particular policy idea, the EUBI, the 
investigation must rely on the methodology used in policy analysis. At it most general, policy 
analysis is a process of inquiry aiming at the creation and analytical assessment of policy-relevant 
knowledge. In short, it refers to ‘the critical investigation of potential solutions to practical 
problems’ (Dunn 2017: 3). Policy analysis is partly descriptive because it relies on the literature to 
explain the causes and consequences of existing policies to provide an understanding of what is. It 
is also normative as it refers to value judgments about what ought to be. ‘This normative commitment 
stems from the fact that analysing policies demands that we choose among desired consequences 
(ends) and preferred courses of action (means)’ (Dunn 2017: 4). The analysis thus aims at producing 
policy-relevant knowledge regarding policy problems, observed policy outcomes and performance, 
expected policy outcomes and preferred policies, all of which are interdependent. Since the research 
aims at analysing both how things are and suggesting courses of actions, it is based on an integrated 
policy analysis, that is, one that links retrospective analysis (i.e. the study of policies already in place) 
with prospective analysis (i.e. the production of knowledge before the implementation of a new 
policy) in a continuous manner. In short, the approach combines an analysis of policy with an 
analysis for policy. 
Second, the analysis rests on a problem-based approach. The notion of problem is seen as negative, one 
that is indicative of a deficit state that needs to be addressed. It is, in the first instance, ‘a reflexive 
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term that calls for an explication of who is considering what as a problem and why’ (Schmidt 2011: 
258). It is also inherently future-oriented, in that it embodies a call-for-action. Furthermore, 
problem-led research claims to have social utility through its prism on problem-structuring and 
through the suggestion of a potential way out of the deficit state. Nonetheless, its objective remains 
modest as it aims ‘to offer advice on possible solutions to problems […] not [to] solve the problem 
itself’ (Schmidt 2011: 259, emphasis added).6 Taking this into account, a problem-led approach 
combines the analysis of an initial problematic state, through a problem-structuring phase, with the 
exploration of a potential solution in order to attain a final ameliorated state. This ‘target state’ can 
be defined in positive terms or in negative terms, which I roughly envisage as two sides of the same 
coin. The former considers the proposal desirable to reach a world in which the initial problem has 
been tamed (i.e. a situation in which poverty is reduced and access to sufficient resources is more 
effective) while the latter considers it desirable to avoid a dystopian future characterised by an 
exacerbation of the problem at hand (i.e. a situation in which the introduction of the EUBI has 
helped to avoid a reinforcement of the trends affecting economic security). 
Once the correspondence between the features of the problem and the expected benefits of the 
potential solution has been established, one must evaluate whether the proposed solution is able 
to overcome the barriers that hinder the transformation of the present state into the final state. 
The analysis thus relies on a negative argumentative strategy examining one set of potential 
disconfirmers after the other. In other words, the prospects for establishing the EUBI as a 
potentially desirable and valid proposal are evaluated through its ability to overcome a series of 
objections (i.e. the barriers). These challenges proceed by ‘descending’ from the most abstract to 
the most concrete, that is, from normative discussions pertaining to social justice to more practical 
(legal) feasibility constraints surrounding the proposal’s implementation. At each level, the 
challenge selected is arguably the chief objection the proposal needs to pass, in the sense that it 
may be the most difficult one to defeat and potentially the most devastating one to the proposal. 
Therefore, I do not claim that this enquiry provides an exhaustive study of all potential barriers the 
proposal might face. Rather, the study more modestly aims to prepare the groundwork for further 
fine-grained research by taking a more global approach of the main dimensions that need to be 
considered before digging deeper in each dimension addressed. 
                                                 
6 The modest notion of ‘problem-led’ or ‘problem-based’ approach is preferred to the more ambitious notion of 
‘problem-solving’ because every solution generates new kinds of problems. This approach chosen thus captures the 
idea that the proposed path might have substantial ameliorative outcomes but that, in a dynamic, complex and always 
evolving world, these may not be definitive and permanent (Horn and Weber 2007: 6). 
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Third, the kind of problem that is examined cannot be confined within the boundaries of one 
discipline. Interdisciplinarity is the process of answering a research question by creating a dialogue 
and common grounds between various disciplinary insights and integrating them through an 
iterative process, to create a more comprehensive understanding of the problem examined (Repko 
2012).7 The practice of interdisciplinarity does not require one to master each discipline but, rather, 
to achieve ‘disciplinary adequacy’, meaning ‘knowing the discipline’s defining elements and 
important insights relevant to the problem’ (Repko 2012: 60). The choice for interdisciplinarity, 
then, is justified when a problem is fundamentally multifaceted and complex (Repko 2012: 7, 85). 
‘Interdisciplinary studies is a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a 
topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline, and draws on 
the disciplines with the goal of integrating their insights to construct a more comprehensive 
understanding’ (Repko 2012: 16).  
In the literature on interdisciplinarity, ‘poverty’ and ‘the future of the social welfare system’ are 
typically seen as ‘big’ (Weinberg 1972) or ‘wicked’ problems (Conklin 2006; Horn and Weber 2007), 
or as ‘social messes’ (Akhoff 1974). According to the literature, ‘wicked’ problems are characterised 
by the following properties: they are difficult to clearly define such that there is no unique ‘correct’ 
view of the problem and that different views point to contradictory solutions; they embody 
multiple value conflicts and face ideological, cultural, political and economic constraints; they are 
multi-causal and have many interdependencies with other problems; they are socially complex in 
the sense that they involve a multiplicity of actors and different levels of governance, and require 
changing individual behaviour; they are surrounded by uncertainty and great resistance to change, 
and they often lead to unexpected consequences; they are sometimes characterized by chronic 
policy failure and the problem-solvers are often out of contact with the problems and/or with 
potential solutions. Addressing the already multifaceted and not easily definable problem of 
poverty at the European level adds another layer of complexity given the tensions inherent to the 
process of European integration and, more particularly, the upscaling of social policy instruments 
at the supranational level. Moreover, the policy proposal in focus, the UBI, is often problematically 
used by scholars to point to different proposals, it embodies multiple ideological, cutltural and 
economic constraints, it has never been implemented (whether at the national or supranational 
level) and is thus characterised by uncertainty regarding its potential consequences. In other words, 
even the suggested solution itself breathes in complexity.  
                                                 
7 Interdisciplinarity is thus more ambitious than multidisciplinarity, which consists in improving the understanding of a 
topic by juxtaposing different disciplinary insights, but less ambitious than transdisciplinarity, which aims at the creation 
of a new form of knowledge with its own content and methods by transcending the boundaries of existing disciplines. 
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In this regard, there is no doubt that the subject at hand is inherently complex and can legitimately 
be considered as a ‘wicked’ problem that cannot be addressed adequately using the established lines 
of compartmentalised research. It demands, instead, the kind of holistic thinking typically provided 
by interdisciplinarity (Newell 2001: 2). This is why the thesis combines insights from political 
theory, economics and political science focused on European studies. Overall, the interdisciplinary 
learning process is about integrating these disciplinary insights, through feedback loops interacting 
dynamically to inform one another, to create ‘common ground among them to construct a more 
comprehensive understanding’ (Repko 2012: 263). 
4. Key arguments 
In this thesis, I defend the view that the EUBI, a partial EU-wide basic income distributed to all 
Europeans, offers a worthwhile response to the problem of poverty in the EU. This defense is not 
predicated on the preliminary introduction of the UBI at national level but, instead, on the idea 
that each Member State guarantees a social minimum for all. Moreover, the perspective adopted 
may be attractive for scholars, policymakers and citizens taking a specific outlook on the issue at 
hand. If you are favourable to the European project and hold a conception of social justice which 
requires generous redistributive social policies from the well-off to the less advantaged, if you reject 
neoliberalism and conceptions of the UBI as an instrument to scrap the welfare state, then the 
EUBI offers a promising vehicle for a ‘more social Europe’ that should be attractive to you. If you 
disagree with this premise, you are welcome to read on, but the discussion developed in this thesis 
might not be appealing to you personally. 
Bearing this in mind, then, after having structured the problem and discussed some preliminary 
claims about the basic income in general and the EUBI in particular, I turn my attention to the 
critical analysis of the proposal by testing it against a series of objections, to which I refer as the 
challenges of reciprocity, solidarity, stabilisation and feasibility (see outline in next section). I argue 
that none of these challenges provides a knock-out blow against the EUBI. Nonetheless, each of 
them offers an opportunity to fine-tune the analysis of the proposal’s dimensions, leading to the 
following claims.  
The key argument I develop is that there are positive reasons to consider that the EUBI would 
support the EU’s fight against poverty in a tangible way. Under this scenario, the EU works as a 
complementary welfare layer offering systemic support to its Member States’ welfare models by 
taking a distributive role in direct relation with its citizens, whilst respecting the diversity of national 
social protection arrangements. Such a multi-layered social model thus aims to secure a social 
minimum to all its citizens through a multi-tiered approach: the EUBI acts as supplement of 
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national (or regional or local) social benefits for those on entitled to them or as a complement to 
other sources of income for the others. This is important as the risk of poverty and social exclusion 
does not only affect those who are excluded from the labour market; it also concerns a growing 
number of people subjected to the effects of various precarisation trends even when they hold a 
job. Thanks to its defining characteristics – its individual, universal and unconditional features–, I 
argue that the EUBI mitigates some of the shortcomings of existing national last-resort safety nets 
(in terms of coverage, take-up and adequacy), and provides additional economic security to those 
facing precarious labour contracts and chronic insecurity on the labour market, thereby 
contributing to the reduction of in-work poverty. These effects might remain limited in EU 
countries with the most advanced welfare states given the modest amount of the EUBI, but it can 
reasonably be claimed that the EUBI would still make some improvement with respect to the status 
quo. In MS with less elaborated welfare states, it is likely to play a more significant role in the 
provision of the means for subsistence to the least advantaged. As such, it would support EU 
objectives of social cohesion and flesh out the Social Pillar.  
Furthermore, I claim that the EUBI has more to offer than its contribution to financial adequacy 
and extended coverage of those in need, although these are central in anti-poverty strategies. As a 
universal policy, it avoids the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor and thereby 
improves the social bases of self-respect. As an unconditional and regular income flow, it provides 
an incentive for employment or social participation writ large in a non-paternalistic way, whilst 
reducing the stress stemming from feelings of insecurity. It may also reduce the push factors for 
migration or provide an instrument to effectively enjoy the freedom of movement proclaimed by 
EU treaties. Again, these arguments need to be qualified as their strength depends on the amount 
of the EUBI and the set of national policies which act in conjunction with it. But if these arguments 
hold, the EUBI’s emancipatory value exceeds its monetary value, and provides a tangible response 
to poverty in its various dimensions. 
To these central claims, two contingent ones can added. First, depending on the funding scheme 
chosen, the EUBI may play a role of macroeconomic stabilisation in face of asymmetric economic 
shocks thanks to the fiscal transfers it would involve, although this is not its primary aim. This is 
particularly relevant in the Eurozone as it is widely agreed among economists that a common fiscal 
capacity is one of the functional requirements of monetary integration. Second, by offering a ‘caring 
face’ to the EU, the EUBI may improve the political legitimacy of a project often seen, rightly or 
not, as the very reason behind politics of welfare retrenchment at the national level and the increase 
in inequalities and poverty. 
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To these consequentialist considerations, I add one of a principled kind. The EUBI would be 
distributed to all European citizens and legal residents as a recognition of their membership of the 
EU political and economic order. Its purpose is to provide, along with national welfare states, a 
social minimum enabling them to have the standard of living necessary to participate actively in 
society as citizens and residents of the EU. As such, the proposal embodies a materialisation of EU 
social citizenship. It is important to note, however, that I do not understand the EUBI as a 
distinctive legal right attached to citizenship but, rather, as an entitlement as a matter of policy. In 
short, the EUBI provides a means to guarantee the social right to a decent standard of living. 
This said, a few nuances need to be added. First, the EUBI is not the panacea. I make no claim 
whatsoever that the EUBI constitutes a proposal sufficient in its own right to eradicate poverty 
nor to solve all ills affecting social welfare in the European Union. To the contrary, I consider that 
the EUBI demands a package of measures including a set of public services (e.g. education, 
healthcare, social care, etc.), labour market regulations (e.g. a decent minimum wage, working time 
reduction, (enforcement of) equal pay for men and women), fiscal reforms at national and 
European levels, etc.8 The EUBI thus offers a way to support rather than replace a broader policy 
package. Whilst this thesis focuses on the EUBI only, its worth depends on the ideological and 
institutional social environment in which it is placed and the broader policy mix in which it 
operates.  
Second, I do not claim that the EUBI would be the most efficient policy in each of the fields in 
which I consider that it might have an added-value. For instance, there may be more efficient 
instruments of macroeconomic stabilisation in the Eurozone, such as a common European 
unemployment insurance scheme. However, even if the EUBI scores lower than other specific 
measures when taken in isolation, its strength comes from the fact that it scores relatively well 
when considering a wider range of social objectives altogether.  
Third, given its unconditionality, it offers a rather simple way for the EU to get involved in social 
protection without facing the conundrum of harmonisation of very diverse social models. 
However, again, the introduction of minimum requirements for national social policies (which 
points to ‘convergence’ rather than ‘harmonisation’ per se) may be necessary to unfold the real 
potential of the EUBI. 
Finally, my focus on the EU is justified by both problems and opportunities made possible in its 
unprecedented and unique form of regional integration. However, despite the absence of similar 
                                                 
8 See for instance, the list of fifteen proposals made by Atkinson (2015) to tackle inequality and poverty. 
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institutions, there may be a case for a worldwide universal floor, as argued for instance by Pogge 
(2007). The EUBI may thus be seen by those holding a cosmopolitan view of justice as a laboratory 
for the kind of measure and institutional framework necessary to achieve it at global level. As for 
the national level, I show that there is a case for a national UBI (chapters two and three) but I do 
not endorse the UBI unconditionally: each proposal must be studied in light of its ideological 
justifications and the socioeconomic context for which it is designed. The specific characteristics 
of the UBI may arguably point welfare state reforms in the right direction, one in which policy 
innovations cement and expand the place of principles of universalism, unconditionality and the 
individualisation of social rights to make social protection more emancipatory, more inclusive and 
more effective. 
5. Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided in three parts. The first part is devoted to the problem-structuring phase, the 
second to the presentation and discussion of the potential solution, and the third one to addressing 
a number of challenges. With this in mind, the detailed outline of each chapter runs as follows. 
Chapter one is a long chapter in which I set the scene and frame the problem. I describe, analyse 
and articulate the various dimensions associated with the problem of poverty in the EU. I start 
with an overview of the scope and depth of poverty and other interrelated social problems across 
EU Member States before analysing various trends affecting the ‘precariat’. I then look at the 
dynamics of European integration, highlight its neoliberal bias, and its impact on welfare states’ 
redistributive capacities. I also zoom in on existing instruments of minimum income protection 
and identify a series of weaknesses affecting their performance in poverty alleviation. Finally, I 
establish a diagnosis according to which the current organisation of social protection in the EU is 
insufficient to respond to the problem of poverty and social exclusion, and argue that the EUBI 
deserves further attention as a potential solution. 
Chapter two then constitutes the second step of this dissertation: the exploration of the policy 
instrument considered as a potential solution. It aims to provide the ‘basics’ of the universal basic 
income necessary in a discussion too often trapped in confusion, and to justify my focus on the 
UBI for its advantages as an anti-poverty policy. After a series of preliminary clarifications, I 
establish a taxonomy of the UBI and its close competitors. I then confront them according to the 
aims of a social minimum: providing basic economic security whilst fostering social inclusion and 
individual emancipation to ensure a decent life in a given society. I conclude that the UBI fares 
better than its rivals when considering this conjunctive set of social goals and that it should be 
further tested to be envisaged as a distinctively European instrument. 
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The next four chapters then focus on a series of key challenges to the idea. Chapters three and four 
address two objections drawing from the political theory literature and concerned with the 
demands of social justice. Chapter five deals with a major objection stemming from the economic 
literature focused on macroeconomic stabilisation. Chapter six deals with the issues surrounding 
its legal feasibility. Each barrier faced by the EUBI allows me to fine-tune my assessment of its 
prospects. 
In chapter three, I start with ‘the challenge of reciprocity’, according to which the UBI is morally 
objectionable because it fails to satisfy a principle of reciprocal contribution. I provide an 
ecumenical defense of the UBI to show that the objection is not decisive, whether one takes a 
reciprocity-based conception of justice or not, such that some may endorse the basic income as a 
second-best or first-best policy.  
In chapter four, I turn to the ‘challenge of solidarity’ which posits that the EU lacks certain 
preconditions necessary for the pursuit of social justice at the supranational level. Hence the EUBI 
should be abandoned. I address three different versions of the objection, focused on common 
identity, political coercion, and social cooperation, and show that they are not decisive. I then 
defend a sufficientarian account of EU justice and argue that the EUBI would be desirable to 
preserve national redistributive capacities and strengthen EU social citizenship simultaneously. 
In chapter five, I turn to ‘the challenge of stabilisation’, which states that what the EU needs is 
economic stabilisation, not redistribution. I show that the EUBI would have a stabilisation effect, 
although it would be less efficient than other instruments, such as the European unemployment 
benefit scheme (EUBS). Then, I argue that stabilisation is necessary but insufficient if the aim is to 
resorb the EU’s social deficit and address the problem of poverty: macroeconomic stabilisation is 
first and foremost a functional requirement of the EMU, and an instrument such as the EUBS 
would only have limited and unsatisfactory social effects. I argue, then, that the EUBI offers a 
promising route to pursue the objective of social cohesion and to flesh out the European Social 
Pillar. I show how an EUBI of 200€ is already able to make significant improvement in the EU’s 
anti-poverty strategy and illustrate the scope of its cross-country redistributive effects. 
In chapter six, I address ‘the challenge of feasibility’ which is concerned with the legal difficulties 
that may impede the EUBI’s implementation. I distinguish between the legal options and 
constraints of the payment side of the EUBI and those pertaining to its financing side. I argue that 
there are possibilities to institute the EUBI within existing treaties before presenting alternative 
legal possibilities based on differentiated integration or, ultimately, treaty change. 
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Finally, I conclude this dissertation with a review of the key elements learned along the way and 
suggest avenues for further research on the matter. 
6. Working assumptions and definitions 
Before proceeding to analytical undertakings, it is necessary to say more about my understanding 
of social justice and poverty in order to clarify the theoretical basis underpinning the discussion. 
6.1. Social justice 
The term ‘justice’ as found in the political philosophy literature tries to answer the question ‘What 
is a just society?’ The aim of justice, then, is to specify what each member of a society can rightly 
claim and expect from society in these conditions: ‘To ask whether a society is just is to ask how it 
distributes the things we prize – income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, 
offices and honours. A just society distributes these goods in the right way; it gives each person his 
or her due’ (Sandel 2009: 19).  
In this thesis, I endorse a liberal egalitarian conception of justice. It is liberal in the sense that it 
recognizes with equal respect different individual conceptions of the good life, in contrast with 
perfectionist conceptions of justice which rely on a comprehensive moral doctrine (see e.g. Wall 
2012). It is egalitarian in the sense that equality is seen as a baseline for the distribution of the justice-
relevant goods from which any departure must be justified. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, 
then, the primacy of justice – the priority of the right over the good – provides the collective 
institutional framework in which individual options can be made compatible (Arnsperger and Van 
Parijs 2003: 11). The subject of justice is, in Rawlsian terms, the basic structure of society, that is, the 
way in which the main political, legal, economic institutions fit together to shape the prospects of 
citizens living under the authority of a political order (Rawls 1971: 7-11; 2001: 10-12, 52-57). Thus, 
what matters is the justice of institutions and the distribution of benefits and burdens they bring 
about. In short, and at the risk of oversimplification, justice means social justice or distributive justice. 
For this thesis’ purposes, I take Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness (1971, 2001) as point of 
departure for a workable account of social justice in modern pluralist societies. According to him, 
the currency (or metric) of justice is provided by an index of multi-purpose goods, the ‘primary 
goods’, constituted of basic rights and liberties9, opportunities, power, income, wealth and the 
social bases of self-respect, are those necessary for one to pursue her life plans (Rawls 1971: 92; 
                                                 
9 These include political liberties such as the right to vote and to hold public office, freedom of speech and assembly, 
the liberty of conscience, but also the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest. (Rawls 1971: 
61, 2001: 44, 58) 
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2001: 58-59; Rawls later added leisure time to the list, 2001: 179). These can be separated into two 
categories: basic rights and liberties (‘constitutional essentials’) which fall in the domain of political 
justice, and resources and opportunities which fall in the scope of ‘basic justice’, that is, matters of 
substantive distributive justice relating to the basic structure of society that are not covered by a 
constitution (Rawls 1993: 227-230). In this dissertation, I say little about constitutional essentials 
and concentrate on matters of basic justice which are of primary interest when considering the 
question of a European social minimum.  
The criterion for the repartition of primary goods, then, is provided by his two principles of justice 
(Rawls 1971: 60, 302 and 2001: 42-43). The first principle guarantees an ex-ante strictly egalitarian 
(and as extensive as possible) distribution of basic rights and liberties (principle of equal liberty). The 
second principle (itself separated in two principles) focuses on the potential economic and social 
inequalities that might arise ex-post as a result of equal liberties.  
The principle of fair equality of opportunity goes beyond formal requirements of legal non-discrimination 
based on race, gender, age, etc. and requires neutralizing the influence of social backgrounds on 
people’s abilities to attain positions of social advantage. It posits that inequalities of income, power, 
social status, etc., are justified only if they are the consequence of a fair competition for the access 
to the social positions that provide these advantages. The difference principle, then, holds that social 
and economic inequalities are just only if they are to the benefit of the least-advantaged. It 
articulates a concern for equality with a principle of efficiency, based on the consideration that 
economic reality is not a zero-sum game. It offers a criterion of selection between all the different 
social arrangements possible and achievable: the expectations of the least-advantaged regarding 
their social positions (as specified by their access to an index of primary goods over the course of 
their lives) in each potential situation should be maximized. In other words, the situation with the 
highest index of primary goods for those who have the least of them should be selected according 
to a maximin principle (i.e. a maximisation of the minimum).10 The fact that inequalities should 
benefit the worst-off is a necessary condition to allow greater advantages to the well-off, following 
a ‘priority among equals’ axiom (Ravallion 2016: 90). Finally, whilst the difference principle is 
obviously more demanding than the provision of a minimal standard of living beneath which no 
one should be allowed to fall, Rawlsian justice does require such a social minimum (Waldron 1986: 
                                                 
10 To be more exact, it is based on the leximin criterion, which is a sequential version of the maximin principle, i.e. a 
lexicographic refinement. Once the situation of the worst-off has been considered, we turn to examine the situation 
of the group ‘above’. 
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25). ‘For it is reasonably obvious that the difference principle is rather blatantly violated when that 
minimum is not guaranteed’ (Rawls 2001: 162).11 
6.2. Poverty 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I understand poverty as a multifaceted concept, but to clarify 
the constitutive dimensions of poverty, it is necessary to provide a brief review of the literature. 
Economists typically rely on a welfarist approach which measures poverty with reference to income 
inadequacy, where income is used as a money-metric of utility, or with reference to the lack of 
purchasing power required to pursue a bundle of consumption goods (i.e. a consumption floor) 
deemed essential for all individuals (Ravallion 2016: 131-136). It can be measured in absolute or 
relative terms. Absolute measures of poverty consider that the poor are those whose income fall 
below a fixed threshold. These are typically used to describe ‘extreme’ poverty in so-called 
‘developing’ countries: a situation in which an individual’s (or household’s) inability to cover her 
essential physiological needs (e.g. food, water, clothing, shelter) poses a direct threat to life. 
Comparatively, poverty in so-called ‘developed’ countries (such as those in the EU) is generally 
defined according to a relative perspective which allows the minimum to vary in relation to the 
income of others living in the same community. In other words, it considers the minimum level of 
resources that is socially necessary, by attaching importance to relative deprivation (i.e. the idea that 
people care about their income relative to that of a reference group). 
The human development perspective of poverty criticized income-centred views and other 
resources-based variants (including Rawls’ focus on primary goods) for regarding resources as 
valuable in themselves and not for the contribution they make to a person’s personal development 
and well-being (see Ravallion 2016: 82-91, 131-136; Hausman et al. 2017: 126-144 for a review). In 
Sen’s words, a prominent advocate of this view, they are ‘commodity fetishists’ (1987:19).12  
According to him, what matters, instead, is one’s capability to function or, in other words, one’s 
ability to make use of resources to achieve what one wants to be or do. Capabilities can be about 
the ability to achieve elementary things such as being adequately nourished or being in good health, 
or more complex ones such as having self‐respect or taking part in the life of the community (Sen 
1992: 40). Poverty should thus be defined as a deprivation of ‘basic capabilities’ (Sen 1992: 109), 
that is, as the inability to choose valuable ‘doings or beings’ considered essential to human life 
                                                 
11 On Rawls’ take on the social minimum, see also Rawls (1971: 275ff; Rawls 2001: 127ff) and Waldron (1986). 
12 Note that Rawls argues that his approach takes basic capabilities into account: ‘the index of those goods is drawn up 
by asking what things, given the basic capabilities included in the (normative) conception of citizens as free and equal, 
are required by citizens to maintain their status as free and equal and to be normal, fully cooperating members’ (Rawls 
2001: 168-169). For a comparative discussion of Sen’s and Rawls’ approach of poverty, see Zwarthoed (2009). 
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(Alkire 2002: 156).13 Although this approach has significantly improved economists’ and 
international institutions’ understanding of the dynamics of poverty, it faces difficulties similar to 
welfarist theories because of its reliance on subjective preference satisfaction. 
Human rights approaches focus on the way cardinal values of dignity, citizenship and freedom are 
undermined or misapplied for those in situation of poverty, by establishing a link between material 
deprivation and its impact on fundamental civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights 
(Roman 2012). Poverty affects human dignity when it implies social stigmatisation, through the 
lack of access to essential social rights such as healthcare, education or housing, and, in its most 
extreme forms, through the reification of individuals (e.g. human trafficking). It undermines the 
exercise of political citizenship when one is unable to participate in a society’s decision-making 
processes, and the exercise of social citizenship when access to social rights such as the right to 
work (and those mentioned supra) is insufficient. A lack of resources may also impact individual 
freedom when legal rules formally acknowledged to everyone are applied with differential 
treatments in reality (e.g. poor households face higher risks of imprisonment because of a lack of 
resources, Roman 2012: 95-97). Moreover, it is widely accepted among EU scholars and policy 
makers that poverty relates to social exclusion (see e.g. Anderson 2015: 185-186 on the semantic shift 
operated in EU discourses since the 1970’s). The term points to the marginalisation of individuals 
from political, social and economic activities (including employment) – or in more dynamic terms 
to a a process of social disaffiliation (Castel 2000) – that a lack of resources may create.  
Taking all the above into account, I understand poverty, at its most general, as being ‘the result of 
a series of factors of insecurity, whose effect is to undermine the security of existence and 
development of the individual’ (Roman 2012: 99, my emphasis). In short, protecting individuals 
against poverty entails, in its broadest sense, ensuring ‘a sense of security to all’ (Pestiau: 4). More 
specifically, I consider that the definition used by the Commission (2004: 10) provides a suitable 
working basis:  
People are said to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so inadequate as to preclude 
them from having a standard of living considered acceptable in the society in which they live. 
Because of their poverty they may experience multiple disadvantage through unemployment, low 
income, poor housing, inadequate health care and barriers to lifelong learning, culture, sport and 
recreation. They are often excluded and marginalised from participating in activities (economic, 
social and cultural) that are the norm for other people and their access to fundamental rights may 
be restricted. 
                                                 
13 Sen does not provide a clear account of ‘basic’ capabilities. See Nussbaum (2003) for a list of central human 
capabilities and Alkire (2002) on an operational definition for pursuing capabilities. 
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This definition points to a sufficiently broad understanding of poverty encompassing material and 
social needs, but also the fact that poverty poses a threat to fundamental rights. It also appeals to 
the notion of a right to a minimum level of resources based on some standard of decency – a social 
minimum – the disposal of which is considered as a necessity for social participation. In Marshallian 
terms, this definition points to poverty as a lack of access to the social rights attached to citizenship: 
‘By the social element [of citizenship] I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the 
life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall 1950: 149). 
As such, it is also consistent with my liberal egalitarian conception of justice for which primary 
goods, in which income and wealth act as ‘all-purpose means’ needed to achieve a wide range of 
ends, are ‘what free and equal persons need as citizens’ (Rawls 2001: 60, my emphasis), (Rawls 2001: 
58-59).  
Moreover, this definition considers that the social minimum must ensure adequacy of both 
disposable income and other (economic, social and cultural) resources. Such a social floor thus 
needs to include access to employment, and to various forms of welfare services. Yet, 
notwithstanding the important role of social services, such as healthcare, social care, education and 
social housing in anti-poverty strategies,14 this thesis is primarily concerned with economic security 
from the angle of income adequacy as it studies how the EU may be involved in poverty reduction 
through EU-wide social transfers. Therefore, for simplicity, the social minimum can be recast as a 
socially guaranteed income that a person needs in order to lead a minimally decent life in a given 
society. However, a focus on income need not entail giving up on poverty’s multidimensionality 
since I aim to make the link between economic security on the one hand and employment, social 
inclusion and access to fundamental rights on the other hand.  
Finally, I take it that the European ‘standard’ poverty line, or at-risk of poverty threshold, set at 60% of 
the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers provides an acceptable 
account of ‘adequacy’ or ‘decency’.15 This poverty line is not a mere ‘survival line’ because it goes 
beyond absolute measures of material deprivation by incorporating a concern for one’s relative 
position in society and thus provides an income-equivalent approach of social inclusion. As such, 
this threshold also reflects the impact of disparities in levels of living, or inequalities, on poverty. 
                                                 
14 For instance, some studies have shown that public services such as health, education and housing are two times 
more efficacious in reducing inequalities than monetary transfers (Amar et al. 2008). 
15 Methodologies using ‘reference budget standards’ seem more consistent and generally provide different values (often 
higher) for measuring an adequate level of resources but they are not yet used by European institutions. For simplicity, 
then, I stick with European indicators. On reference budgets, see Storms et al. (2013) and Penne et al. (2016), and the 
platforms http://www.referencebudgets.eu/ and http://improve-research.eu/. 
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In other words, it points to the interconnections between individuals’ fortunes as ‘what happens at 
the top of the distribution affects those at the bottom’ (Atkinson 2015: 25). In short, the condition 
of those who are ‘out’ (i.e. marginalised) depends on the situation of those who are ‘in’ (Castel 
1995: 30). Addressing the problem of poverty, then, is also about addressing the quality of social 
ties within a society or, in other words, its social cohesion. With this in mind, I turn to the problem 
of poverty in the EU.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY IN THE EU 
1. Introduction 
In this thesis, I am concerned with the prospects for a European universal basic income as a policy 
response to a problem. The objective of this chapter is thus to establish a diagnosis of this problem, 
such that this chapter constitutes the first step of this dissertation’s methodological approach, 
namely the problem-structuring phase which combines descriptive and analytical dimensions. It is 
not my intention to provide an exhaustive approach of every parameter and causal links that might 
impact poverty in all its constitutive dimensions. Rather, I organise the bundle of interrogations 
that underlie the problem of poverty in the EU as a set of interrelated challenges. The first one 
corresponds to the poverty side of the problem: the state of affairs and the factors that produce 
new dynamics of precarisation. The second one corresponds to the social protection side. It refers 
to the conundrum associated with its organisation in the EU and the impact of economic 
integration on social rights. At policy level, it is concerned with the shortcomings of existing last-
resort safety-nets. Altogether, these interdependent dimensions point to the inability of the 
European Union as a whole to mitigate the risk of poverty and social exclusion for each and every 
one living within its boundaries. The problem of poverty in the EU can thus be understood as a 
failure, or deficit state, that needs to be addressed and which can be framed as follows: the 
organisation of social protection within the EU is insufficient to protect Europeans effectively against the risk of 
poverty and social exclusion. This diagnosis will then provide the basis for the discussion of the EUBI 
as a potential policy response to address this failure. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In section two, I begin with an overview of the main social 
indicators associated with poverty and social exclusion. This state of affairs reveals the scope of 
disparities across Member States in poverty levels and the poor prospects of the EU target overall. 
It identifies the most vulnerable populations, namely young people, children, women and lone 
parents in particular. It also highlights the positive impact of social transfers on the depth of 
poverty but its current insufficiency to lift people out poverty. It shows that, if employment is a 
major route for poverty alleviation, it remains insufficient given the importance of in-work poverty. 
Finally, it reveals the important imbalances between Member States in terms of income disparities. 
In section three, I focus on a series of (global) transformations associated with the emergence of 
insecure and precarious socioeconomic situations due to ongoing economic trends and neoliberal 
policies. I focus in particular on the conjugated impact of labour market flexibility, technological 
change and rising inequalities on multidimensional forms of economic insecurities. This section 
thus emphasises the major challenges producing new forms of precarious situations which put a 
   22 
rising and heterogenous group of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion.  Having clarified 
some of the hurdles on the poverty side of the equation, I then proceed to examine the social 
protection dimension of the problem or, more precisely, its place within the European Union and 
its process of integration. Section four is thus dedicated to understanding the conundrum of Social 
Europe which encompasses a series of complex puzzles associated with the tensions inherent to 
European integration. To make sense of this complexity, I consider three main axes: the challenges 
posed by the diversity of European welfare models to European social integration, the structural 
asymmetry between market-making and market-correcting forms of European integration, and the 
limits and bias of European governance and anti-poverty strategies. This section highlights the 
neoliberal bias of EU integration and its problematic impact on welfare states’ capacities to pursue 
generous and efficient redistributive policies of social protection. In section five, I zoom in on 
minimum income schemes as these constitute last-resort protection instruments essential in anti-
poverty strategy. I highlight their shortcomings in terms of adequacy, coverage and take-up, and 
assess their impact on poverty reduction and the trends underlying their recent evolution. In section 
six, I come back to the three constitutive parts of the problem of poverty to establish a diagnosis 
of the negative state of affairs and argue that it calls for innovative solutions. I briefly consider 
some proposals currently discussed by academics and policy makers and the claims made by 
proponents of an EU-wide basic income. In section seven, I conclude that the EUBI deserves 
attention as a potential response to the problem of poverty in the EU. 
2. Poverty and social exclusion: state of play16 
2.1. The risk of poverty increased overall 
The overall European social map points to a worsening of the main social indicators since the 
launch of the Europe 2020 strategy. The prospects of reaching the poverty and social exclusion 
target of lifting 20 million people out of poverty before 2020 are very low: there are currently 1,7 
million more people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) than in 2008, for a total of 
118,8 million people, which represents 1 in 4 Europeans experiencing one of the three following 
forms of poverty or social exclusion: income poverty, severe material deprivation, or living in a low 
work intensity household (figures of 2016).17 Nearly one third (32,5%) of all those considered at 
                                                 
16 This section relies on Eurostat (2018a, 2018b) and SPC (2017). 
17 The indicator used by EU institutions is the at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rate (AROPE). It is constituted 
by three sub-indicators, each reflecting a different definition of poverty. The at-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP) measures 
the percentage of people with a disposable income below the poverty threshold set at 60% of the national median 
equivalised income after social transfers. The second indicator measures the percentage of persons that are severely 
materially deprived (SMD), that is, those experiencing a deprivation of at least 4 out of a list of 9 items: they cannot 
afford to pay rent or utility bills, to keep home adequately warm, face unexpected expenses, eat meat, fish or a protein 
equivalent every second day, a week holiday away from home, a car, a washing machine, a colour TV, or a telephone. 
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risk of poverty or social exclusion are affected by more than one of these dimensions (about 39 
million people) and one in twelve by all three forms (9,2 million). Disparities remain important 
across member states with performances varying from more than a third of the population 
threatened by the risk of poverty or social exclusion in Bulgaria (40,4%), Romania (38,8%) and 
Greece (35,6%), and the lowest figures found in Denmark (16,7%), the Netherlands (16,7%), 
Finland (16,6%) and Czech Republic (13,3%). Overall, the EU is drifting away from its target. 
Compared to the total population, those who face a greater risk of poverty or social exclusion are 
young people between 18 and 24 (31,3% in 2015), followed by children (26,9%) and the elderly 
(17,4%). Looking at gender poverty gaps, women are more likely to experience poverty or social 
exclusion than men (24,4% compared to 23% in 2015). In terms of household composition, single 
parents show higher risk of poverty or social exclusion than other households’ types, with 50% of 
them at risk in 2015 and a proportion double the average. 
Compared to monetary poverty rates, the AROPE measure has significantly increased the number 
of Europeans considered to be poor or socially excluded (from 80 million to 120 million according 
to 2008 figures) and has the advantage of not associating poverty solely with income adequacy but 
also with a measure of extreme poverty and exclusion from the labour market. Among these three 
sub-indicators, the most widespread form of poverty remains monetary: the at-risk-of-poverty 
(AROP) rate, calculated as the percentage of people below the poverty line after social transfers, 
affects 17,3% of the EU population (86,6 million) while the two other sub-indicators, namely severe 
material deprivation and  low work intensity households respectively affect 8.1 % of EU residents 
(40,3 million, equivalent to half the AROP rate) and 10.6 % of EU citizens aged 0 to 59 (39,6 
million people). Overall, the at-risk-of-poverty rate has significantly increased over the last decade 
in the EU and, even more sharply in the Eurozone. Moreover, the AROP indicator rose in nearly 
all EU member states (except for LV, the UK and FI), with significant variations across countries. 
Today, eight member states (RO, LV, LT, ES, BG, EE, EL, HR) still have one fifth or more of 
their population at risk of income poverty, and the lowest figures (between 9,5 and 12,5%) are 
found in FI, SK, DK, NL, CZ. Taking a fixed reference to avoid variations of overall income 
affecting the poverty rate, the situation is more worrisome, with 18,5% of the EU-28 population 
                                                 
Finally, the third indicator expresses poverty in terms of the quantity of (quasi-)jobless households, that is, people aged 
between 0 and 59 living in households where the adults (18-59) worked 20% or less of their total work potential during 
the past year. Note also that national targets can be set by Member States according to their preference: they can choose 
one, two or a union of the three indicators or even suggest one of their own (Copeland and Daly 2012: 279). 
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estimated at-risk of poverty (anchored in 2008 poverty threshold levels), and figures reaching up 
to 48% in Greece, 35,1% in Cyprus and 29,9% in Spain in 2015.18 
2.2. Social spending is essential but remains insufficient 
It must also be noted that the at-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers (pensions excluded from 
social transfers) is significantly higher with more than a quarter of the EU-28 population affected. 
This shows that social transfers play a significant role in reducing poverty (a decrease of 8,7% of 
monetary poverty in 2015). This is also highlighted by Crepaldi et al. (2017: 48) who show a 
correlation between overall social expenditure and AROPE levels such that countries (e.g. LU, DK, 
AT, NL, DE, FR, SE, FI, BE) spending the most on social protection tend to have the lowest risk 
of poverty or social exclusion, while those (LV, RO, BG, EE, HR) spending the less have the 
highest AROPE levels. In fact, this reflects a major and robust finding widespread in poverty 
studies of the last decade. There is a strong empirical relationship between a country’s overall level 
of social spending and measures of inequality, inequality reduction and relative poverty, as noted 
by Marx, Nolan and Olivera (2014: 18): ‘Notable in these analyses [in comparative poverty research] 
that no advanced economy achieved a low level of inequality and/or relative income poverty with 
a low level of social spending, regardless of how well that country performed on other dimensions 
that matter for poverty, notably employment’. 
Nevertheless, the depth of poverty measured by the poverty gap, which indicates the extent to which 
the incomes of those at risk of poverty fall below the poverty threshold in average (or in other 
words, the scale of transfers necessary to bring those below the poverty threshold over it), attained 
24,8% in 2015, with increasing figures in half of the member states (and sometimes substantially, 
with 5% or more in EL, ES, IT, PT, RO) and an overall increase of 3% since 2008. Similarly, the 
on-going rise in the share of the population suffering from persistent poverty risk19 with an overall 
evolution from 8,6% in 2008 to 10,9% in 2015 remains another major issue of concern, which is 
particularly affecting the young people below 18 (when looking across age groups) and single 
parents (when looking at household composition). The data thus shows that while social transfers 
are essential in poverty alleviation strategies, they remain insufficient to eradicate the problem. I 
will come back to this in section five with a focus on minimum income schemes. 
                                                 
18 Since the AROP indicator is a relative figure based on the median income, it can fluctuate with variations in income: 
a person living in Greece might be considered at risk of poverty in 2008, have a similar situation in 2016, but be 
considered above the poverty threshold in 2016 given the overall deterioration of earnings. This is why the AROP rate 
can also be measured with figures anchored in a year of reference (Eurostat). 
19 The persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate measures the percentage of the population which has an equivalised household 
disposable income below the poverty threshold for the current year and at least two out of the three previous years. 
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2.3. Return to employment: a determinant but limited route 
Besides, it is a well-known fact that employment reduces the risk of poverty and social exclusion 
because work provides an income and is a major means for social integration. In 2015, two-thirds 
of unemployed people in the EU and 43,7% of other economically inactive people (students, 
people taking care of their home and family, people facing long-term or temporary sickness or 
disability, retired people) were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, while the proportion of 
employed people facing the same risk was only at 12,5%. However, unemployment levels remain 
important and the rise of the working poor shows that being employed does not prevent one to 
fall into poverty. 
Looking at unemployment figures first, while there was a slight decline of the unemployment rate 
for all age-groups in the EU and for both genders (with a stronger decrease for men), it is still not 
sufficient to reach the pre-2008 figures: the total unemployment rate in percentage of the active 
population is at an average of 8,6% for the whole of the EU and 10% for the Eurozone in 2016, 
with a respective rise of 1,6% and 2,4% since 2008. Disparities are, again, very important, with 
figures reaching up to 23,6% in Greece and 19,6% in Spain (a respective rise of 15,8% and 8,3%) 
and most member states showing a rise of their unemployment rates, except for Poland, Hungary, 
the UK, Malta and Germany. Youth unemployment rates are also particularly worrying with 1 in 6 
active young people unemployed (an average of 16,9%) in the EU and 18,8% of them in the Euro 
area in 2017, almost double the average figure for the total unemployed population.20 Figures are 
high in France (22,3%), Portugal (23,9%), Italy (34,8%), Spain (38,7%) and Greece (43,6%) in 
particular. While figures were systematically higher in the EU-28 than in the Euro Area before the 
crisis, they were very close between 2008 and 2010. Since then, the Eurozone rate overtook the 
EU-28 rate with a gap at a relatively high level. The share of young people who are not in 
employment, education or training (NEET) does not substantially affect those aged between 15 
and 19 years old (only 6,1% of them in 2016) since most of them are still in education, but it still 
shows strong signs of youth exclusion for the population between 20 and 34 years old, with a figure 
reaching up to 18,3% in 2016 compared to 16,5% in 2008, and a decrease since the peak of 20,1% 
reached in 2013. 
Moreover, as already mentioned finding a job does not necessarily translate into escaping the risk 
of poverty. Even when employment levels were increasing (up 8% between 1995 and 2010), 
poverty rates still rose or remain stagnant. Between 2010-2011, it was estimated that only 50% of 
                                                 
20  Youth unemployment rates measure the share of unemployed young people aged between 15 and 24 years old as a 
percentage of youth labour force, that is, those who are without work and available for work. 
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those who were unemployed, lived in a poor household and entered into employment managed to 
exit from poverty, a figure explained by the quality of the job (type of contract, working hours and 
wages) and household composition (Thévenot 2017: 427-430). Thus, looking at in-work poverty 
(the share of persons who are at work and have an income below the poverty threshold), the EU-
27 and the Eurozone average show an increase of 1% (from 8,6% to 9,6%) and 1,5% (from 8,1% 
to 9,5%) respectively between 2008 and 2016. Ten Member States (EL, PT, PL, LT, LV, AT, SE, 
IE, BE, FI) have lower figures than in 2008 while all the others show a rise of the number of 
working poor (including the countries which displayed a decrease of their total unemployment rate, 
except for Poland). This data shows only one side of the quality of jobs, namely income security, 
but as will be shown in the next section, it is the rise of multidimensional forms of economic 
security that is puzzling.  
In terms of gender disparities on the labour market, the gender employment gap remains important 
with the share of working age men in employment exceeding that of women by 11,6% in 2016, 
while the proportion of women working part-time remains significantly higher with an EU average 
of 31,4% in 2016 compared to that of men (8,2%). In terms of the gender pay gap, women’s gross 
hourly earnings were still 16,2% on average below that of men in the EU. Overall, women face 
underrepresentation in the labour market, lower earnings and a higher at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-
exclusion rate. 
2.4. Income disparity matters 
Finally, since ‘[t]he different parts of the income distribution story cannot be separated’ (Aaberge, 
Atkinson and Sigstad 2017: 121), poverty cannot be isolated from the broader question of 
inequalities. In the matter, the EU remains the less unequal part of the world with an average Gini 
coefficient of 0,3 compared to 0,4 in the USA (OECD data).21 Looking at the S80/S20 income 
quintile share ratio, the EU average is at 5,2 in 2016, which means that the total (equivalised 
disposable) income received by the top 20% of the population is 5,2 times more than that received 
by the bottom 20%. The EU average has remained broadly stable over time but the dispersion 
between MS is widespread and follows an upward trend. Compared to pre-crisis levels, income 
inequality is also rising within many EU countries, and in particular in most Southern European 
and some Central and Eastern European countries due to an intensification of wage polarisation 
and labour market segmentation combined with less redistributive tax-and-transfer systems, high 
                                                 
21 The Gini coefficient measures to what extent a country’s income distribution deviates from perfect equality: 0 
meaning that everyone has the same income (perfect equality) and 1 means full inequality, where only one person 
possesses all income. 
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levels of unemployment and in certain instances, the effect of fiscal consolidation (SPC 2017: 82). 
During the same period, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Latvia and the UK in particular saw 
substantial reductions of income inequalities, according to this indicator. Yet, these figures do not 
allow on their own to see how the evolution of income poverty rate is influenced by other variations 
along the income distribution curve such as the ‘squeezing of the middle’ and the ‘racing away’ of 
the top 1% in particular (Aaberge, Atkinson and Sigstad 2017), which show more worrying trends, 
that will be discussed in section 3.4. 
2.5. The poverty target is not in sight 
Overall, this section revealed the following key findings. The social map shows a disparate picture 
with countries performing differently according to the various indicators surveyed and displays a 
gap along the north-south divide, in particular.  The most vulnerable groups are young people, 
children and women depending on the indicators surveyed. Trends show a rise in the depth and 
the persistence of poverty and an increase of labour market exclusion affecting young people in 
particular, as well as the persistence of gender inequalities. Findings also highlight that securing 
access to a job is not sufficient in itself to escape monetary poverty and that disparities of income 
are rising. Moreover, while this section revealed the positive effect of redistributive mechanisms of 
social transfers on poverty alleviation (as shown by the difference between the poverty gap and the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate), it also exposed the fact that making social transfers sufficiently inclusive 
and pitched at an adequate level remains a key issue across the EU (as shown by the rise of poverty 
risk among the unemployed). 
In face of this situation, according to the last Annual Report of the Social Protection Committee 
(2017: 10), ‘improving the performance of social protection systems in terms of poverty prevention 
and reduction as well as social investment will be essential to achieve the 2020 poverty and social 
exclusion target and contribute to upward convergence in the EU’. This said, a critical stance on 
the poverty target itself remains necessary as it remains inferior to that of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) of the United Nations(UN): the EU poverty targets amounts to a 
decrease of about 17% of the AROPE rate between 2010 and 2020 whereas the UN target – to 
which all EU Member States have subscribed – aims at reducing the share of the total population 
living in poverty in all its dimensions, according to national definitions, by at least half between 2015 
and 2030 (UN 2015: 15). In short, even if the EU managed to attain its own objectives, it would 
still need to intensify its commitment to reach more ambitious objectives. 
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3. The rise of economic insecurity 
Whilst the previous section sought to establish a global vision of the situation, in this section my 
aim is to analyse some of the current trends that underlie some of the worrying figures identified 
above. I do not discuss certain well-known pressures associated with changing demographics (i.e. 
population ageing and declining fertility rates) and early retirement, deindustrialisation, increased 
activity rates of women, changing family structures and gender roles, etc., all of which are said to 
erode the sustainability of welfare states (see Glennerster 2010 for a review). Instead, I focus on 
current novel processes of precarisation producing situations characterised by multidimensional 
forms of economic insecurity, a notion that captures well the various characteristics of poverty put 
in evidence in the introduction. The concepts of ‘precarisation’, ‘precarity’ and ‘precariat’ have been 
defined in various, sometimes incompatible, ways but ‘they have typically been connected with 
insecure, volatile or vulnerable human situations that are socioeconomically linked to the labour-
market dynamics’ (della Porta et al. 2015a: 1). In short, precarity points to the risk of poverty 
associated with economic insecurity.  
Although precarisation is a global phenomenon, it is a novel ongoing process that penetrates EU 
countries as well, albeit in varying degrees. Overall, it points to contemporary circumstances 
marked by ‘massive unemployment and the insecurity of many, the failure of traditional networks 
of social protections to deal with these conditions, the proliferation of individuals who occupy the 
position in society of ‘supernumeraries’, either ‘unemployable’, unemployed or employed only 
precariously and intermittently’ (Castel 2003: xiii). The dynamics producing precarious situations 
are commonly traced back to the field of forces underlying the transformations of capitalism, 
themselves typically associated with neoliberal policies affecting labour market regulation and 
welfare state reforms, thereby reproducing various forms of uncertainties and insecurities (Standing 
2011, 2014; della Porta et al. 2015a, 2015b). Although its definition is a matter of debate given its 
high ideational plasticity, I take it that ‘neo-liberalism today entails belief in competitive markets 
enhanced by global free trade and capital mobility, backed up by a pro-market, limited state that 
promotes labour-market flexibility and seeks to reduce welfare dependence while marketizing the 
provision of public goods. As such, neo-liberalism can be seen as representing a theory that 
combines both cognitive and normative ideas about a specific type of capitalist organization of the 
economy’ (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013: 6). 
Against this backdrop, this section analyses the main trends and factors that together explain the 
precarisation of a rising number of individuals and address the problematic relation between labour 
market dynamics and poverty in particular. I start by focusing on the precariat, understood as a 
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class-in-the-making affected by multidimensional forms of insecurity. I then turn to the various 
factors that shaped the emergence and the continuous rise of economic insecurity, namely labour 
market flexibility, technological change, and the rise of inequalities. 
3.1. The precariat 
The term ‘precariat’ is a neologism based on a contraction between ‘precarity’ and ‘proletariat’ to 
refer to a specific socioeconomic category that does not fall into old industrial social classes 
categories and which is characterised by multidimensional forms of insecurity (Castel 2003, 2011; 
Standing 2011, 2014). It must be noted before proceeding further that there is an ongoing debate 
in the sociological literature about the validity of the precariat as a distinct class category and 
whether it should be understood as an aggregate set, a ‘multitude’, referring to something else than 
a class per se (see della Porta et al. 2015a for a review). However, even those who contend its 
objective class characteristics agree with the fact that a growing and heterogeneous group of people 
face a combination of multifaceted processes leading to the threat of marginalisation, social 
exclusion and deprivation (see e.g. Savage et al. 2013). Since what interests me is not the existence 
of a class per se but, rather, the dynamics giving way to new forms of precarious situations, I 
consider the precariat as a gateway to enter the analysis of these trends. With this in mind, this 
section draws on the work of Guy Standing (2011, 2014) in particular to present the various 
characteristics of the precariat and, subsequently, the various factors that can explain its advent. 
The precariat can be defined as a fragmented social class-in-the-making, in which individuals (to 
which Castel referred as the ‘supernumeraries’)  lack (or benefit very insufficiently from) the seven 
forms of labour security inherited from the post-Second World War industrial period (Standing 
2011: 16-17): a) labour market security refers to adequate income-earning opportunities on the labour 
market (which is associated at the macro level by a government’s commitment to “full 
employment”); b) employment security points to the protection against arbitrary dismissal such as 
regulations on hiring and firing; c) job security concerns the ability or opportunity to retain a job 
position as well as barriers to involuntary skill dilution and prospects for upward income and status 
mobility; d) work security refers to the protection against social risks such as accidents and illness at 
work thanks to regulations on health and safety, limits on working hours, etc.; e) skill reproduction 
security points to the opportunities to acquire skills through internships and employment training, 
and to be able to effectively make use of them; f) income security concerns the guarantee of a stable 
and adequate income protected by wage indexation and social security provisions for instance; g) 
representation security, finally, refers to the existence of a collective voice in the labour market through 
labour unions and the guarantee of a right to strike. Furthermore, the precariat’s social income 
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structure22 (the support from a variety of sources one can anticipate in case of need) is characterized 
by its vulnerability given its dependence on relatively low and/or variable wages, its lack of access 
to firm benefits, insufficient (if any) community support or private savings and few (if any) 
entitlements to state benefits. Precariatised people also lack work-based and occupational identity, 
the former referring to a sense of belonging to a solidaristic labour community and the latter to a 
sense of occupational meaning and a sense of career. 
The precariat is heterogeneous because it regroups relatively high- and low-skilled people, young 
and old individuals, men and women, migrants, etc. When not unemployed, they are often in part-
time employment, temporary forms of labour, ‘mini-jobs’, internships, etc. While the fragmentation 
of this socioeconomic group points to the existence of a variety of precariats, affected by the 
various forms of insecurity in different degrees, they share ‘a sense that their labour is instrumental 
(to live), opportunistic (taking what comes) and precarious (insecure)’ (Standing 2011: 22-23). 
Another common feature is the fact they are ‘denizens’ in the sense that the precarity of their 
situation impedes on their capacity to enjoy the full set of citizenship rights, including civil, cultural, 
social, economic and political rights. A precariatised individual thus lacks effective access to at least 
one of them.  
However, sharing commonalities does not mean that it is a class-for-itself. It has internal divisions, 
such that people blame each other for their situation. This is well exemplified by discourses 
opposing nationals and migrants or ‘hardworking’ low-wage earners and ‘lazy’ welfare recipients. 
The precariat is also characterised by anger, stemming from the lack of opportunities and relative 
deprivation, as well as a sense of passivity and despair, anxiety associated with chronic insecurity, 
low self-esteem and alienation. The mix of these feelings feeds fear, frustration, lack of empathy 
and resentment, which might partially explain the rise of populist discourses. 
Finally, the precariat is a class-in-the-making because it is growing. While precarious forms of 
employment accounts for a minority of the stock of existing jobs, in terms of fluxes (i.e. new job 
creations) they are preponderant (Castel 2011). In this sense, there is a significant risk that insecure 
and unstable forms of employment become the dominant norm on the labour market, making so-
called ‘a-typical’ jobs very much less so, such that the precariat might become a permanent feature 
of labour structures, and result in an ‘exit from the bottom’ of the salariat (Castel 2011). The 
                                                 
22 Standing (2011: 19) defines social income as being constituted by six elements: self-production (the goods and 
services directly produced that are consumed, exchanged or sold), money wage received from labour, the value of 
family or local community support, enterprise benefits, state benefits, and private benefits derived from investments 
and savings. Each of these can be more or less secure. For example, wages can be fixed by a long-term contract or be 
variable, and state benefits can be universal or discretionary. 
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combination of stagnant mass unemployment and labour market segmentation (marked by an 
aggravation of the dualization between high earners occupying comfortable positions and low-
wage earners in precarious activities on the other end) would also put an increasing pressure on 
systems of solidarity, in particular when they rely on a contributory basis as in the Continental 
model (see section 4.2.). But the precariat is growing as a result of a number of economic trends 
and political decisions, to which I now turn. 
3.2. Labour market flexibility 
The common link between the variety of people affected by precarity lies, beyond the similarity of 
insecurities they face, in the dynamics produced by global transformations of capitalism: 
What is at stake in these events, which are ultimately generated by economic processes of globally 
integral capitalism and mediated by locally specific governmental practices, is not just the particular 
form, mode, and degree of using labour power in the market, but actually the fate of living labour, 
social co-operation, and (form of) life itself. […] In other words, precarity and precarization, above 
all, mean the colonization of life by market forces […]. (della Porta et al. 2015a: 10) 
Guy Standing agrees with this perspective. For him, the rise of the precariat originates in a ‘global 
transformation’ of the world economy towards its ‘disembeddeding’ from society since the 1970’s 
(Standing 2011: ch. 2). He argues that, besides the direct impact of global trade which has increased 
deindustrialisation and offshoring, neoliberal policies of deregulation to ensure market efficiency, 
competitiveness and economic growth have rolled back fiscal policy as an instrument of 
progressive redistribution, reducing the capacities of welfare states to tackle inequalities and 
guarantee economic security. In particular, he identifies the pursuit of labour market flexibility, 
widely seen by the tenants of neoliberal policies as the required corollary of global competition, as 
the main direct cause of the emergence and growth of the precariat. While these trends are less 
intense in Europe than in other parts of the world (thanks to a more rigid approach of wage setting 
for instance), EU Member States are not exempt of them.  
Labour flexibility affected the rise of the precariat in various ways. Numerical flexibility, associated 
with the capacity to hire and fire employees, affected employment security, while functional 
flexibility, characterised the firm’s capacity to organise the division of labour between tasks, 
positions and workplaces at the lowest cost possible, increased job insecurity. Another requirement 
of global competitiveness, wage flexibility, affected both the level of income, income insecurity 
(because of a shift from fixed to flexible and less predictable pay) and the structure of social income. 
Labour flexibility (along with the international integration of labour markets through trade and 
offshoring and technological progress, see infra on this latter point) has led to ‘job market 
polarisation’, that is, the propensity for the economy to replace a series of well protected middle-
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class and middle-skilled jobs with a combination of low-wage service jobs and highly-skilled and 
highly-paid professional jobs. Moreover, a process of ‘tertiarization’ of labour, which points to ‘a 
combination of forms of flexibility, in which divisions of labour are fluid, workplaces blend into 
home and public places, hours of labour fluctuate and people can combine several work statuses 
and have several contracts concurrently’ (Standing 2011: 64), has led to changes in occupational 
structures and loss of control on the part of employees. Overall, the ‘contractualisation’ of labour 
resulted in labour re-commodification and in the subsequent erosion of the seven forms of labour 
security mentioned supra. These trends were accentuated by the global economic and financial 
crisis because the recession it triggered put an additional pressure on firms to cut costs and led 
governments to support labour flexibility measures and labour subsidies to reduce unemployment.  
In a context of stagnant wages and the rise of a-typical forms of employment, unemployment traps 
(see chapter two) became widespread, leading to the tightening of entitlement conditions, the 
expansion of means-testing and cuts of benefits because to ‘make work pay’. The contractualisation 
approach, (which also affected the public sector by contracting out a number of services and cutting 
public sector wages, employment status, benefits and pensions), expanded to systems of social 
security, such that the unemployed has to respect the obligations stipulated in a contract as well as 
a greater risk of sanctions in case of non-compliance. This also implies that the unemployed are 
affected by tertiarisation: ‘they have multiple ‘workplaces’ – employment exchanges, benefit offices, 
job-search training offices – and have to indulge in a lot of work-for-labour – filling in forms, 
queuing, commuting to employment exchange, commuting in search of jobs, commuting to job 
training and so on. It can be a full-time job to be unemployed, and it involves flexibility’ (Standing 
2011: 81). Finally, the perception of unemployment has changed: while it was mostly seen in the 
past as the result of economic and structural factors, the emphasis is now associated with individual 
responsibility, as unemployment is perceived as a lack of employability, personal failings, or 
excessive expectations on the job market. 
3.3. Technological progress 
The rise of precarious employment and of unemployment is also explained by current trends in the 
development of information and communication technologies, the automation of previously man-
held activities, developments in artificial intelligence and the ‘rise of the robots’ (Ford 2015).  These 
changes may bring positive aspects for some, thanks to the rise of productivity, the new work 
opportunities brought by digital tools, teleworking and flexi-time, and a potential re-balancing of 
work and leisure time. For others, however, they are a source of insecurity as they risk accelerating 
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the spread of non-standard employment, such as that already in the ‘gig’ economy, with contracts 
lacking the labour securities mentioned supra and replacing an important amount of jobs.  
As noted by the European Commission (2017b: 17), ‘[w]orking life is being radically transformed 
by the combined effect of technological progress, globalisation and the growth of the services 
sector. Indeed, entire sectors of the economy are being reshaped through the collaborative 
economy and online platforms. The workforce has to cope with an increased pace of change for 
acquiring new skills, adjusting to new business models, or adapting to shifting consumer 
preference’. And the new realities of the labour market are evolving at a fast pace: 72% of the 
European active population is now employed in the services sector compared to 67% a decade ago, 
1 in 6 Europeans telework while they were 1 in 14, 44 million work part-time and 22 million hold 
temporary job contracts while they were respectively 33 million and 18,5 million ten years ago (EC 
2017b: 17). The future trends concerning tomorrow’s work life bring important challenges, as 
recognised by the Commission itself:  
Work will become increasingly focused on output and outcomes rather than physical presence in a 
specific location, with more opportunities for people to work as free-lancers and combine several 
jobs at the same time…This is emblematic of increasingly diverse and irregular working patterns 
and working conditions that end the prospect of a traditional career. In its place are new forms of 
contracts, greater geographical mobility and more changes in jobs and working status…While new 
types of contracts can be a stepping stone to the world of work, there is also a risk of increasing 
labour market polarisation, with evidence of rising wage inequalities and people with low skills 
trapped in low quality jobs with few prospects of advancement. (EC 2017b: 17) 
These changes are also accompanied by new social risks such as stress, anxiety, depression, ‘burn-
out’ and ‘bore-out’, technological addictions, etc. These risks affect a population larger than the 
precariat, but the impact of digital life and multitasking which are known for their negative impact 
on long-term memory consolidation process, attention span, productivity and capacity to reason, 
might have even more important implications on the ‘precaritised mind’, more subject to short-
termism and lack of time, lack of occupational control and careerless perspectives (Standing 2011: 
31- 33). Studies in behavioural economics corroborate this risk by showing how a lack of basic 
economic security impacts cognitive functions and long-term-oriented decision making (Mani et al. 
2013; Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). 
Moreover, the hybridisation of labour market statuses and types of contracts brings additional 
strains for social protection systems, both in terms of status and effective access, to cover social 
risks (Spasova et al. 2017: 7). Besides the lack of a suitable definition for non-standard and self-
employed people at both national and EU levels (Spasova et al. 2017: 11), those in non-standard 
forms of employment generally have the same statutory access to social benefits as those in 
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standard employment, except for a significant proportion of them who are on temporary agency 
contracts, civil law contracts or zero-hour contracts, as well as on-call workers, casual and seasonal 
workers, while the self-employed may be completely excluded or only able to opt in voluntarily to 
essential insurance schemes (Spasova et al. 2017: 8). Yet, there are, in effect, important problems 
of coverage as the criteria for eligibility should be adapted to the situation of both forms of 
employment. According to experts, a lack of or limited access to social protection can be unfair, 
because non-standard workers and self-employed face a comparatively higher risk of poverty, 
inefficient, because it may imply high social costs, and produce distorting effects on the labour 
market that hinder employment opportunities (Spasova et al. 2017: 8-9). 
Finally, the amount of jobs at risk of replacement by the automation wave is potentially huge, for 
both blue and white collars this time, contrary to previous industrial revolutions which were mostly 
affecting low-skilled jobs (Ford 2015). According to Frey and Osborne (2013), about 47% of 
American jobs might be replaced in the next twenty years. Using the same methodology, the 
Bruegel think tank evaluated that, in the EU, about 54% of jobs might be replaced during the same 
period. Using a different methodology, another study proposes a much more conservative figure, 
with 9% of the jobs in 21 OECD countries at risk of replacement (Arntz et al. 2016). According to 
Ford (2015), whatever the scope of its impact, the fruits of this new automation wave, considered 
as a fourth industrial revolution brought by information technology, will be very unevenly 
distributed. The owners of this new capital will be the immediate winners, wages risk stagnating or 
falling, impacting the purchasing power of those in employment, while current systems of social 
security benefits would be unsustainable. 
3.4. Inequalities 
The reference to the uneven distribution of wealth allows me to turn to a third major trend affecting 
economic security in addition to and in correlation with labour market flexibility and disruptive 
technological changes, namely inequalities. Important inequalities in wealth distribution impact the 
extent of poverty and insecurity given the inextricable link between what happens at the top of the 
distribution the situation of those at the bottom (Atkinson 2015: 25). As a recent Oxfam report 
highlighted (Hardoon 2015), in 2014, the world’s wealthiest 1% owned nearly half of global wealth, 
while the other half going to the 99% is almost entirely owned by the richest 20%, leaving only 
5,5% of global wealth for the remaining 80%. Globally, not only is the gap particularly important, 
it is also widening. 
One possible explanation can be found in Thomas Piketty’s major book Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century (2015), in which he disputes the validity of the Kuznets’ curve, according to which 
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economic growth was mechanically associated with a decline of inequalities. Instead, he argues that 
the long-term trend characterising the evolution of wealth in developed economies is based on the 
following law: the rate of return on capital (denoted by r) exceeds the rate of growth (denoted by 
g), such that r>g. In the absence of adequate regulation and redistribution, then, the owners of 
capital get richer faster through accumulation than the rest of the population relying on the growth 
of national income, wealth is further concentrated through time (the growth of inherited wealth is 
faster than that of earned wealth), and the share of capital in the national income rises relatively to 
labour income. But the implications for the distribution of wealth is also about the nature of 
technological change, which may be biased in favour of capital. 
According to the last report on wages of the International Labour Organisation (ILO 2016: 15-16), 
the average productivity-wage growth gap in the world’s developed economies shows how the rise 
of productivity since the 1980’s has not been met by equivalent wage growth, contrary to the 
correlation between the two variables that existed until the mid-1970’s. In other words, real wages 
have stagnated (except for a recent upward trend in EU countries showing economic recovery 
from the crisis)23 while technological progress increased the value of workers’ hourly output. In 
parallel, an overall decline of the share of labour income compared to capital in the national income 
has been observed between 1995 and 2014 reflecting the faster growth of productivity than average 
labour compensation and an increase in returns to capital relative to labour, a trend greater in 
Europe (and Latin America) than in the rest of the world (ILO 2016: 17-20). This is explained by 
experts as the result of ‘a combination of factors including globalisation, skills-biased technology, 
the weakening of labour market institutions and the growing pressure from financial markets to 
shift surpluses generated by large businesses towards investors’ (ILO 2016: xvi).  
During the same period, wage inequality has also widened significantly and is, in many countries, 
correlated with the decline of labour share in national income (ILO 2016: 21-24). Looking at wage 
distribution, wages evolve gradually decile by decile and then jump sharply for the top 10 per cent, 
and in particular for the top 1 per cent. The top decile in Europe receives 25,5 per cent of the total 
wages in average, while the bottom 50 per cent receive a bit less than 30%. Looking at the 
dispersion of wages centile-by-centile in Europe in 2010, the top 1% receives the largest share of 
total wages by far compared to other centiles, amounting to about 6% of total wages. Overall, the 
report shows that wages inequality is not only determined by individuals’ skills-related 
                                                 
23 Between 2012 and 2015, the EU average real wage growth was at 1,7%, showing a sign of recovery after the crisis, 
but experts remain sceptical about whether wage growth will be sustained or if a return to wage stagnation is more 
probable (ILO 2016). 
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characteristics (e.g. education level or age), but crucially depend on other factors such as gender24, 
enterprise size, type of contract and the kind of sectors and emphasises the recurrent correlation 
between greater wage inequality, greater household inequality and falling labour shares. 
It also highlights that real estate and financial sectors are over-represented among high income 
earners. In a context of financialisation of the economy, itself highly dependent on the progress of 
information technology (with automated algorithms now accounting for two-thirds of stock market 
trades), the growth of financial sector has been accompanied by increased focus on rent seeking, 
thereby siphoning profits and wealth from other parts of the economy and reallocating its proceeds 
to top earners in the income distribution (Ford 2015: 55-56, Atkinson 2015: 163-166). In addition, 
changing pay norms also play a role. As noted by Atkinson (2015: 108), ‘the switch between regimes 
where pay is largely governed by pay scales to regimes where pay becomes largely determined on 
the basis of individual performance’ has further accentuated ‘the upward tilt in top earnings’.  
Overall, labour flexibility in the context of the globalisation of labour, the automation wave and 
the rise of inequalities might be operating in an intertwined fashion, producing the disruptive forces 
on labour markets already evoked. In parallel, the redistributive role of welfare states has been 
unwinding: while it could offset market income inequalities to almost 60% between mid-1980’s 
and mid-1990’s in OECD countries, its proportion declined to about 20% by the mid-2000’s 
(Atkinson 2015: 67). In the absence of sufficient regulation and redistribution, poverty and 
economic insecurity are also the result of institutional choices and policies towards the scaling back 
of tax-and-transfer policies. Undoubtedly, the various dynamics at play do not affect social welfare 
everywhere in the EU to the same extent given the wide diversity of welfare regimes in the EU. 
However, to paraphrase Castel’s understanding of the ‘new social question’,25 ‘the processes that 
produce these situations are comparable, in the sense that they are homologous in their dynamics 
but different in their manifestations’ (Castel 1995:22, my translation). Even the social democratic 
welfare model (see section 4.2.1.) is affected. Despite being an inspiring model for many and still 
doing comparatively better than other models in Europe (it displays the lowest income inequality 
levels in the world), the Nordic regime faces important difficulties since the economic crisis with 
stagnating productivity growth, rising unemployment, pressures on lower wages and growing wage 
                                                 
24 The report highlights that ‘women make up on average 50–60 per cent of workers in the three lowest pay deciles; 
this share falls to about 35 per cent among the best-paid 10 per cent of employees, and further to 20 per cent among 
the highest-paid 1 per cent of employees’ (ILO 2016: xvii). 
25 Historically, the ‘social question’ expression was used to refer to social problems such as the exploitation of the 
proletariat associated with the emerging industrial society at the end of the 19th Century. The ‘new’ social question was 
then used at the end of the 20th Century to designate the financial and ideological crisis of the welfare state faced with 
the growth of unemployment and the emergence of new forms of poverty and social exclusion (Castel 1995; 
Rosanvallon 1995). 
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dispersion inequality, decreasing labour union membership levels, and diminishing compensation 
levels which are now closer to the OECD average (Dølvik et al. 2014). While social problems are 
multiple and multifaceted, behind the diversity of empirical realities, there is some form of unicity 
with respect to current economic and social restructurations which create new forms of precarity 
and insecurity and, thereby, a significant risk of expansion of the proportion of Europeans at risk 
of poverty, whether in or out of work. 
4. The conundrum of social protection in the EU 
Section two showed that the social map is particularly worrisome and the EU’s objective of poverty 
reduction far from attained. Section three described some of the hurdles associated with the 
emergence of specific forms of poverty, understood as multidimensional and multi-causal forms 
of economic insecurity. It also emphasised that current economic dynamics and political choices 
do not only change the nature of poverty, they reinforce its risk. If one holds, as I do, that ensuring 
a sufficiently broad coverage and generous levels of social protection are necessary to address these 
problems, then it is important to look at the other side of the issue, namely the organisation of 
social protection within the EU polity. In this section my aim is to explain why the social protection 
dimension is in itself part of the problem of poverty in the EU. 
This section thus addresses what I call the conundrum of social protection. It is a conundrum in 
its own right because of the complexity associated with the place of social protection within the 
European project and the conflictual dimensions inherent to the pursuit of a ‘Social Europe’. To 
make sense of this complexity, then, rather than seeing Social Europe as a scientific concept 
providing an objective account of reality, I understand this elusive notion as a gateway to describe 
the various constitutive elements of the European social dimension and examine the tensions 
inherent to the process of European integration. I start by clarifying a useful analytical distinction 
between negative and positive integration. Then, I identify these tensions along three main axes of 
analysis. The first one is horizontal and points to the challenges posed by the salience of social 
policy in national politics and the diversity of national social models. The second one is vertical. It 
relates to the impact of European economic and social integration on national welfare states. 
Finally, I zoom in on the EU’s strategies of poverty alleviation and highlight its progress and limits. 
For analytical simplicity, I distinguish between national and European levels, but it is important to 
mention that the design of social policy in the EU is the result of complex and imbricated processes 
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of Europeanisation26 and policy transfer27 embedded in a system of multi-level governance 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001). As a conceptual framework, the multi-level governance approach 
apprehends the EU as a polycentric system in which political authority is dispersed into a complex 
web of interaction extending both horizontally and vertically among a multitude of public and 
private actors acting at European, national, regional, local levels. Instead of seeing states and 
supranational institutions as singular monolithic entities, this approach posits that European 
integration depends on many factors, from the role of actors to strategic, normative and discursive 
variables which form and influence decision-making processes at various administrative levels 
(Saurugger 2010: 237). Bearing this in mind, I now turn to the distinction between negative and 
positive integration. 
4.1. Negative and positive integration 
References to neoliberalism remain useful to point to a series of processes and principles that made 
their appearances since the 1980’s, such as ‘liberalisation, privatisation, commodification, regulatory 
reforms’ or ‘individual responsibility, competition, and enterprise’ (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013: 7). 
It is also pertinent to highlight a series of hypotheses underpinning the concept, such as the 
confidence in market efficiency, the desirability of free trade and capital mobility, the rejection of 
Keynesian interventionism in favour of supply-side economics and ‘monetarism’, the defence of 
labour market flexibility and cost competitiveness, and the commitment to welfare retrenchment 
when social benefits are perceived as a disincentive to market participation (Schmidt and Thatcher 
2013: 5, based on Hay 2004). 
However, when considering more specifically the process of European integration, the analytical 
distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ integration introduced by Scharpf (1999) is particularly 
helpful to understand the pro-market bias of European integration. These terms both refer to 
policies aimed at the development of an integrated economic space beyond national borders but 
‘negative integration refers to the removal of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other barriers to 
trade or obstacles to free and undistorted competition [while] positive integration, by contrast, refers 
to the reconstruction of a system of economic regulation at the level of the larger economic unit’ 
(Schaprf 1999: 45). All measures of negative integration pertain to a market-making logic. The 
                                                 
26 Europeanisation refers to ‘processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, 
identities, political structures and public policies’ (Radaelli 2003: 30). 
27 Policy transfer is concerned with ‘the exchange of ideas, policies and policy instruments between different political 
systems across the world’ (Bulmer et al. 2007: 4). The literature highlights the role of the EU as a ‘transfer platform’ 
(Radaelli 2000b: 26) and explains its ‘transfer potential’ in its multi-level character combining both ‘upstreaming’ and 
‘downstreaming’ approaches of Europeanisation in a ‘joined-up’ manner (Bulmer et al. 2007: 6). 
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enforcement of the four economic freedoms proclaimed by the Treaties (i.e. free circulation of 
goods, people, capital and services) provide the classic example of negative integration involved in 
the construction of the common market through the removal of barriers to trade. Comparatively, 
those of positive integration can be both market-making (e.g. creation of new harmonised 
standards) or market-correcting, taking either a re-regulatory form (e.g. regulations of working 
conditions) or re-distributive one (e.g. the European Social Fund). In terms of political ideologies, 
negative integration points to a neoliberal conception of capitalism while positive integration is 
associated with regulated social market economy. Finally, positive and negative integration often 
come in pair in practice as the destructuring of national regulatory system is often associated with 
some re-regulation at the supranational level. As noted by Crespy (2016: 9), it is thus ‘the ‘thickness’ 
of such re-regulation (clarity of EU legislation and legal security, capacity to constrain economic 
actors, ability to actually serve users’ interests and protect their rights, effectiveness of 
implementation on the ground, etc.) and the existence or absence of common policy instruments 
(regulatory bodies, sources of funding etc.) which eventually determine whether a specific policy 
contributes rather to positive integration or negative integration’. However, negative integration is 
inspired by the theory of international trade, according to which free trade produces economies of 
scale and competition leads to a decrease of market prices. The resulting welfare gains thus make 
the upgrading of a re-regulatory system not only unnecessary but obstructing and distorting the 
development of the single market. 
With this in mind, Scharpf argues that there is a fundamental asymmetry between negative and 
positive integration essentially because of the institutional logics underpinning European 
integration. With the ‘constitutionalisation’ of competition law enshrined in the Treaties, non-
majoritarian actors – the European Commission (EC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – 
are able to use the supremacy and direct effect of EU law to promote a market-making agenda. On 
the other hand, positive integration demands a high level of agreement between Member States 
which differ in their ideological, economic and institutional characteristics. When MS prefer 
maintaining their own institutional arrangements, the pursuit of positive integration may be 
hindered by a ‘joint decision trap’ (Scharpf 1988). If at the same time, national arrangements are 
weakened by the combined pressures of negative integration and economic competition, ‘the 
overall result would be a general loss of problem-solving capacity in the multi-level European polity 
and, hence a loss of output-oriented democratic legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999: 83). Scharpf thus argues 
that ‘the institutional capacity for negative integration is stronger than the capacity for positive 
integration, [such that] interventionist policies and the interests they could serve are systematically 
disadvantaged in the process of European integration’ (Scharpf 1999: 49). In the event of such an 
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asymmetry between positive and negative integration, MS ‘find themselves under the conditions of 
a ‘competition among regulatory systems’’ (Scharpf 1999: 43). As we will see, Scharpf’s argument 
holds in the case of EU social policy. 
Keeping the nuances highlighted above in mind, when considering the social dimension of EU 
integration, I simplify and use market-making and negative forms of integration synonymously to 
refer to policies promoting market efficiencies. Similarly, I use market-correcting and positive 
forms of integration as equivalent to policies promoting social protection. In the field of social 
policy, then, Scharpf’s argument points to the asymmetry between the pursuit of European 
integration through policies promoting market efficiencies and those promoting social protection 
(Scharpf 2002, 2010). I call the imbalance between economic and social objectives the social deficit 
of European integration. To provide the background for its assessment, I focus first on the 
challenges posed to positive integration in social protection. 
4.2. The challenge of diversity  
Social policy has a crucial role in national politics. As the largest area of government activity in 
modern European democracies, it provides an important source of legitimacy. To illustrate, in 2016 
government expenditure on social protection accounted for 19,1% of the EU-28 GDP and 41,2% 
of total government spending, among which social transfers in cash and in kind represent the 
largest part (Eurostat 2018b). The organisation of ‘social sharing’ thus constitutes an important 
‘institutional stabiliser’ in the sense that it bonds citizens with each other and with the state as a 
separate entity (Ferrera 2005: 14).  In other words, social policy is tied with processes of democratic 
legitimacy and national identity. As a result, MS are reluctant to transfer more of their social 
obligations to the supranational level as this would put at risk the political base of their legitimacy. 
To this original difficulty, one must add the ideological, economic and institutional characteristics 
which pose a major barrier to the development of new problem-solving capacities at the 
supranational level. To understand why, this section presents the challenge of diversity. It starts 
with a description of the various ideal-type welfare regimes that constitute the horizontal dimension 
of Social Europe, before turning to the barriers posed by their diversity to the pursuit of positive 
integration in the social field. 
4.2.1. National social models 
The European social model (ESM) is often used to highlight a ‘common core of values’ based on 
a commitment to social cohesion, social dialogue and social protection (Council 2000: 4), or to 
show its superiority to the neoliberal free-market US model (Whyman et al. 2012: 1). As such, it 
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points to the distinctive characteristics of an espace social européen which harbours more 
comprehensive redistributive mechanisms inspired by egalitarian philosophy, provides a particular 
place to social partners, has the highest levels of social protection and displays the lowest level of 
social inequalities in the world. However, whilst the ESM may provide an ideal type useful for 
heuristic purposes,28 the reality of its constitutive elements is particularly diverse. To illustrate, 
government spending on social protection varies between 9,9% in Ireland and 25,6% in Finland.  
Similarly, the quality of life varies significantly throughout the EU. Taking the EU-28 average as 
reference (=100, 2017 figures), GDP per capita (in PPS) varies from 49% in Bulgaria to 253% in 
Luxembourg (Eurostat 2018b).  
To make sense of the institutional dimensions behind these figures, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
typology provides the standard point of departure, which has been refined in a large body of 
literature on comparative welfare state research such that European MS may now be classified into 
at least five distinct ideal-type welfare regimes: the social democratic (or Nordic), the conservative 
(or Continental), the liberal (Anglo-Saxon), the Southern European and the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) models (see Arts and Gelissen 2010 for a review). Despite important cross-
country variations within each of them, these regimes provide an insight of the diversity at the heart 
of Social Europe. 
In the liberal model (IE, UK), the market plays a central role in the provision of private welfare 
schemes, the family a marginal one, and the state a residual last-resort one characterised by modest 
social insurance and highly targeted means-tested social assistance (Castles 2010). It is also 
historically marked by a ‘strong male breadwinner’ model (Lewis 1992). The individual is 
considered responsible for meeting his own needs, such that entitlement rules are strict, and 
transfers often associated with social stigma. Anglo-Saxon countries generally have low 
decommodification and high stratification levels, and the role played by labour unions is relatively 
weak. They also tend to have lower unemployment levels coupled with a higher share of the 
population with low wages and precarious labour contracts. 
The social democratic regime (DK, SE, FI) is marked by a minimal role for the market and the 
family and an extensive role for the state, which provides universal cash benefits and services in 
kind mainly through general taxation (Kautto 2010). Given the important role played by high 
compensation levels and the broad coverage of universal social insurance, last-resort social 
                                                 
28 For instance, Dannreuther (2014: 332-333) suggests that it provides an analytical tool against which the integration 
of member state performance can be evaluated and Whyman et al. (2012: 2-7) consider it as an idealised form of reality 
that can be used by progressives to advance their social agenda towards further social integration. 
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assistance mechanisms only play a minor role. The Nordic regime is based on a dual-earner model 
with high female labour force participation, low gender inequalities and more autonomy for women 
overall thanks to individual taxation and the provision of social care services. Labour unions display 
comparatively high membership levels and social partners play a key role in labour market 
regulations. Overall, the social democratic model combines flexible labour markets and a large 
institutionalised welfare state providing economic security (a combination referred to as 
‘flexicurity’) and a strong place for collective bargaining. 
The conservative regime (FR, BE, AU, DE, LU, NL) relies primarily on the state, responsible for 
correcting market failures, and the family, responsible for caring functions while labour unions play 
an important role in labour market regulations and the administration of social security (Palier 
2010). Social insurance is the primary source for social rights with access to benefits dependent on 
labour market status and past earnings and financed by social contributions such that universal 
coverage can only be attained in situations of full employment. With the fragmentation of the 
system according to professional sectors or status, inequalities on the labour market tend to be 
reproduced, and the regime shows medium levels of decommodification. Historically based on the 
male breadwinner model (the ‘family wage’), it displays higher gender inequalities than the Nordic 
regime. Since the 1970’s, parts of social security were privatised, new policies of social care 
introduced, and the role of the state reinforced with the introduction of non-contributory and 
means-tested social assistance schemes focused on the ‘activation’ of the inactive population. Social 
insurance remains central, but the model has undergone ‘a shift away from systems aimed at income 
and status maintenance towards employment and market-friendly systems’ leading to a dualization 
of welfare between insured ‘insiders’ and activated ‘outsiders’ relying on social assistance (Palier 
2010: 614). 
The Southern European welfare regime (IT, ES, EL, PT) developed later as a distinct model 
combining elements from all three previous regimes: Scandinavian universalism with healthcare 
systems, continental corporatist fragmentation with contributory pension systems and a key role 
for labour unions, and the minimal residual role of the liberal state in social assistance (Ferrera 
2010). Historically marked by ‘strong familialism’, the (extended) family plays an important role as 
‘social shock absorber’, and a strong gender bias in favour of men remains. Since the 1990’s, 
reforms aimed at making labour markets more flexible and less segmented, social insurance systems 
more homogeneous and more sustainable, and safety-net more inclusive, with measures such as: 
attenuation of generous pension levels, improvement of social assistance schemes (e.g. with the 
introduction of minimum income schemes), expansion of family benefits and social care services, 
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policies to promote gender equality. But with the crisis, the traditional insider/outsider cleavage 
has been exacerbated hitting the young, women and immigrants particularly.  
Finally, some have argued that new MS from Central and Eastern Europe may be regrouped under 
a new welfare regime marked by a hybrid layering of inherited communist universalism (education 
and healthcare), revived pre-communist Bismarckian social insurance (pension and unemployment 
benefits) and liberal market-oriented elements (flexible wages and labour contracts) influenced by 
globalisation, international financial institutions and Europeanisation (Omerstein 2008; Cook 
2010). CEE countries have state-financed and more or less generous social assistance schemes, and 
unemployment benefits with low duration and wage replacement rates. They also inherited a ‘dual 
breadwinner, double burden’ communist welfare model offering women-friendly policies in 
employment and social care, and supporting unequal domestic division of labour simultaneously, 
but a trend towards a ‘refamiliarization’ of health and education along with high unemployment 
and economic insecurity have increased women dependency on men’s incomes, even if there is 
important heterogeneity between countries (Cook 2010: 673-674, 683). Overall, CEE countries 
have become less statist and redistributive, more welfare retrenched and stratified, more liberal and 
market-oriented but retained important elements of state provisions and universal entitlements. 
On average, social protection is generally much lower compared to other European models. 
4.2.2. Barriers to positive integration 
Against this backdrop, it is easy to see how finding agreement on the direction of positive 
integration in social policy faces major difficulties. I distinguish between political, operational and 
(a new set of) economic difficulties. First, given national institutional differences, and the social 
philosophies that underpin them, trying to find a uniform EU-wide model is likely to produce 
major opposition in MS undertaking the necessary reforms, a risk national leaders are not ready to 
take given the importance of social policy in terms of legitimacy: ‘uniform European solutions 
would mobilise fierce opposition in countries where they would require major changes in the 
structures and core functions of existing welfare state institutions, and member governments, 
accountable to their national constituencies, could not possibly agree on European legislation 
imposing such solutions’ (Scharpf 2002: 651).  
Even for those taking a similar stance on social objectives, difficulties may be substantial. Positive 
integration in the social field is generally associated with the political project particularly salient 
during the Delorsian era understood as ‘the provision at the European level of substantial re-
regulatory and redistributive measures that aim to ameliorate the material consequences of the 
operation of market capitalism, inspired ideologically by northern European tenets of social 
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democratic ideology’ (Crespy and Menz 2015a: 3). Scharpf argues that political forces favouring 
such a view of Social Europe face a dilemma: 
to ensure effectiveness, they need to assert the constitutional equality of social-protection and 
economic-integration functions at the European level – which could be achieved either through 
European social programmes or through the harmonisation of national social-protection systems. 
At the same time, however, the present diversity of national social protection systems and the 
political salience of these differences make it practically impossible for them to agree on common 
European solutions (Scharpf 2002: 652). 
To find ways to circumvent this dilemma, the EU opted for a new mode of soft governance in the 
field of social protection. The open method of coordination (OMC) is a voluntary process founded 
on the definition of common benchmarks and objectives, the exchange of ‘best practices’ and the 
elaboration of national strategies to improve convergence. It can be seen as a compromise between 
‘doing nothing’ and setting unacceptable binding provisions in the absence of political will to 
transfer competences in highly sensitive areas such as social protection (Anderson 2015: 31). The 
use of non-binding instruments to overcome political barriers reveals the difficulties to find 
consensus on the upscaling of social policy instruments at the supranational level.  
Moreover, whilst the difficulty was already significant in the early 2000’s, the accession of new MS 
with generally less generous social models further reinforced the unlikeliness of a political 
consensus on an EU-wide social model. This is exemplified by the different reactions taken by MS 
to the free movement of citizens from CEE countries with 12 countries out of 15 shielding their 
labour market through transitional ‘opt-out’ clauses, or by the rejection of the European 
Constitution by French and Dutch electorates partly because they feared that deeper integration 
would undermine their social models (Anderson 2015: 220). Some have explained that since the 
1990’s citizens became more aware of the impacts of EU intrusion in social policy (see next 
section), which raised the political salience of EU integration in domestic debates and constrained 
national leaders’ margin of manoeuvre at EU level. According to them, in this context the pursuit 
of EU integration evolved from ‘a permissive consensus to a constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2008).  
Second, finding an operational basis for the upscaling of social instruments is particularly difficult 
when considering welfare state variations in terms of their basis for benefit entitlement (citizenship, 
residence, labour or family status), the basis for their calculations (need, previous earnings and 
contributions, flat rate, regressive or progressive rate), their funding (general taxation, social 
contributions, indirect taxes) and the responsible entity for the schemes’ administration (labour 
unions, state, private sector…). National strategies against poverty thus differ in the kind of 
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instruments used but also in the way they prioritise employment for people less attached to the 
labour market, as well as the different levels of governement involved. Certain countries tend to 
have a strong centralisation of the welfare state while others have subsidiarised the governance of 
social protection at local or regional levels (e.g. Germany or Belgium). The principle of subsidiarity, 
which holds that matters are best handled at lowest level, also takes a central place in the EU 
governance: ‘the Union shall only act if the objective of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level’ (art. 5(3) TEU). As will be explained later, this principle 
takes a particular place in social protection, in which the EU acts mainly in support of national 
systems. Besides the political reasons attached to the respect of national sovereignty in social policy, 
this principle is also justified on the basis that the local context matters given the fact that MS face 
different kinds of pressures at different levels. Taking all these elements into account and adding 
to it the wide differences in poverty rates, developing a one-size-fits-all approach may be both 
inappropriate and ineffective. However, this does not mean that the EU cannot take an important 
role in setting general principles or a more active role in redistruting resources to ensure that, for 
instance, the right to social assistance be tangible and effectively enforced, as noted by 
Vandenbroucke et al. (2013: 275): 
the nexus of rights and obligations makes it difficult to operationalise the right to social assistance 
at EU level without some reference, albeit implicit, to the importance of the local context, notably 
with regard to the labour market. […] That is not to say the general principle of a right to social 
assistance may not be formulated as hard legislation, justifiable before courts […] but the tangible 
meaning of that right for citizens’ daily lives will crucially depend on judgments about 
implementation in specific contexts.   
Yet, as will be shown in the next section, one of the problems at EU level concerns the lack of 
hard legislation in EU social policy to ensure that local institutions do enforce social requirements, 
albeit according to local context. Another one stems from the fact that ensuring a social minimum 
may be more difficult in MS with less mature welfare states, which means that these may need 
financial support. In other words, cross-border redistribution may be necessary, which also raises 
normative questions about the very meaning of solidarity at EU level (see chapter four). In short, 
the operational complexity (and its translation in legal terms) render the establishment of a full-
fledged uniform European welfare state not only difficult to realise but potentially undesirable, 
whereas middle-grounds (regulatory and redistributive) solutions still demand to overcome hurdles 
associated with the political barrier. The issue of financial solidarity just mentioned also poses a 
difficulty of an economic kind, which allows me to turn to a third and last point. 
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Finally, the diversity of social models has economic implications, which themselves challenge the 
prospects of further positive integration. For a long time, the EU worked as a ‘convergence 
machine’ between European economies. However, since the outburst of the global financial and 
economic crisis, the process of convergence literally stopped (EC 2017b: 8). The 2008 crisis and 
the subsequent euro crisis actually amplified economic and social disparities between countries, in 
particular between the north and the south of the monetary union (Andor 2017). Socioeconomic 
imbalances do not only reveal the differences in outcomes produced by member states’ distinctive 
institutional logics, political preferences and market-correcting effectiveness in response to the 
economic shocks. In an economically integrated area which lacks certain instruments at the 
supranational level, they may also be caused or amplified by a combination of factors such as capital 
flows, financial distrust, budgetary austerity, etc. (De Garuwe 2018). In these circumstances, 
national social benefits, which play an essential counter-cyclical role of shock absorption in 
economic downturns, may be insufficient to maintain standards of living on the long run or they 
may suffer the consequences of ‘internal devaluation’ (e.g. by cutting wages and public spending), 
thereby further increasing social imbalances (e.g. unemployment and poverty rates).  
To ensure national resilience in face of economic shocks and constrain the risk of contagion 
between members of the currency union, there is widespread agreement that the EMU is 
incomplete and requires, among other things, a fiscal union, for instance in the form of a European 
unemployment benefit scheme supporting national benefits (Beblavý Marconi, and Masselli 2015; 
Andor 2017; EC 2017b; Vandenbroucke 2017a, 2017b, 2017d; De Grauwe 2018). However, if 
members of the currency union wish to pool some of their resources, some argue that they must 
increase institutional symmetry to ensure mutual trust and avoid problems of moral hazard 
(Vandenbroucke 2017a, 2017b). Paradoxically then, it is when further integration may be most 
desirable to safeguard national social protection systems in times of crisis that social imbalances 
(partly created by the lack of solidarity) render the political agreement on a mechanism of solidarity 
between MS more difficult to achieve. 
4.3. The social deficit of European integration 
Despite these difficulties, which explain that no unique EU-wide welfare model developed at the 
supranational level, the EU still developed a wide array of competences in the social field affecting 
national systems of social protection both positively and negatively and which are best understood 
in parallel with the impact of negative integration. In this section, I turn therefore to the vertical 
tensions involved in Social Europe that characterise the EU’s social deficit. I evaluate the impact 
of negative integration on national systems of social protection, the development of EU social 
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policy and the recent changes operated in EU governance since the crisis. I argue that integration 
in the social field remains ancillary to economic integration and biased towards market-making 
purposes. 
4.3.1. Destructuring of national systems of social protection 
Historically, the place of social protection in the European Union was founded on the division of 
labour between the logic of ‘market opening’ at European level through negative integration and 
the logic of ‘closure’ underpinning national practices of social sharing (Ferrera 2005: 92). In short, 
trade would trigger economic growth and EU welfare states would be able, as a result, to provide 
a generous system of social security. At EU level, social policy provisions remained mostly 
concerned with the rights of workers in order to promote and facilitate the mobility of labour and 
included equal pay for men and women, provisions concerning paid holidays and the creation of 
the European Social Fund (ESF) to promote employment and worker mobility.  
However, the founding fathers’ welfare compromise gradually became untenable as the process of 
economic integration based on the constitutionalisation of the four freedoms for market-making 
purposes (along with economic globalisation and other endoneous developments) significantly 
altered and remodelled traditional national boundaries of social sharing. The expansion of EU law 
eroded national sovereignty (i.e. their legal authority) and autonomy (their capacity to exert de facto 
control) over social protection systems in order to comply with the requirements of market 
compatibility (Ferrera 2005: 120, based on Liebfried and Pierson 1995). More specifically, the 
supranational legal order affected domestic capacity to define who is entitled to social security (in 
compliance with the free movement of workers, nationals of other MS must also be admitted to 
social security), its spatial control over consumption (benefits are transportable across the single 
market and beneficiaries are able to consume services in other MS), the exclusivity of coverage 
over national territory (for instance, posted workers may reside temporarily in a country while 
remaining dependent of another member state’s welfare regime), the control over access to the 
status of benefit producer (in compliance with the freedom of service, foreign providers may access 
some areas of welfare systems such as in the case of healthcare services), and control over 
administrative case adjudication (the beneficiary status such as ‘being sick’ or ‘disabled’ may be 
decided by other national agencies) (Ferrera 2005: 120-121). Moreover, with the 
transnationalisation of capital and the free movement of firms across the single market, national 
control over traditional economic foundations of domestic redistribution (i.e. tax bases) was also 
altered (Ferrera 2005: 206). In short, the four freedoms allowed a combination of new exit and new 
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entry options such that EU welfare states became ‘semi-sovereign entities, irreversibly embedded in 
an institutional framework characterised by a systematic pro-market bias’ (Ferrera 2005: 121). 
4.3.2. Restructuring at supranational level 
Besides the ‘destructuring’ pressures operated by European economic integration through negative 
integration on national welfare states, some ‘restructuring’ of social policy took place at the 
supranational level (Ferrera 2005: ch. 6). Despite the weakness of its legal base, the expansion of 
supranational competences in social policy has been significant.29 The development of EU social 
law progressively led to an important register of social rights for individuals which they may enforce 
in national courts (Keleman 2011). The EU regulates access to employment and social security 
beyond national borders and severely restricts national prerogatives to pursue exclusionary or 
discriminatory rules in social protection. As such, EU integration in the social field has created a 
‘new opportunity structure’ guaranteeing the cumulability and exportability of social rights in a 
novel social citizenship space confounded with its external borders (Ferrera 2005: 207). There is, 
however, a notable exception which reveals the persistence of an asymmetry between workers and 
non-workers’ right of free movement: European law allows the restriction of the freedom of 
movement if someone lacking sufficient resources risks becoming ‘an unreasonable burden’ for 
the host member states’ social assistance scheme (Directive 2004/38/EC: recital 10).  
Nonetheless, on the whole the reconfiguration of both spatial and membership dimensions of 
citizenship goes beyond a mere transnationalisation of rights as the EU has equipped itself with a 
series of objectives and principles set in its primary and secondary law, which organises the 
allocation of competences and decision-making procedures into what some have referred to as a 
‘European social constitution’ (Ferrera 2017: 49). For instance, the EU aims at promoting the well-
being of its citizens through a ‘social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress’, it ‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination’, and promote ‘social justice and 
protection’, ‘solidarity between generations’ and ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (art. 3 
TEU). The EU also recognises the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as having the same 
legal value as the Treaties (art. 6(1) TEU).30 The Charter includes a range of social ‘rights’ or 
‘principles’ under its heading IV entitled ‘Solidarity’ which was included precisely to avoid 
                                                 
29 Falkner (2010: 293) estimated that, in 2009, the EU had issued no less than 80 directives and regulations in the fields 
of health and safety, working conditions and non-discrimination either through the community method or social 
dialogue. 
30 The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been greatly inspired by the legal activity of the Council of Europe and in 
particular by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Concerning fundamental social rights more 
specifically, the Union’s law owes a lot to the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter and European Code of 
Social Security, as well as to the International Labour Organisation’s Convention n°102 on minimum standards of 
social security (art. 151 TFEU; Preamble of the Charter). 
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sacrificing social standards in the pursuit of economic objectives (De Schutter and Dermine 2017: 
120). Similarly, the incorporation of the Horizontal Social Clause in the Treaty of Lisbon seeked to 
rebalance the social and economic dimensions of the EU (De Schutter and Dermine: 120, fn 48).31 
The social constitution also sets the distribution of competences. The EU can act in various ways 
according to the different fields of social policy but in social protection proper, the EU supports 
and complements the activities of its MS with respect to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.32 For instance, the EU shares competence with its MS in the field of ‘social security 
and social protection of workers’, and can adopt directives setting minimum standards through a 
unanimous vote in the Council (art. 153(2)(b)), a competence never exercised in practice. In the 
fields of ‘combating social exclusion’ and ‘the modernisation of social protection systems’ (art. 
153(1)(j) and (k) TFEU), it can only take measure to ensure the coordination of member states 
policies while the adoption of directives of harmonisation is prohibited (art. 2 and 156 TFEU). 
The development of EU’s restructuring nevertheless remains limited and its governance biased 
towards market-making objectives. The literature on EU social policy emphasises the significant 
expansion of the EU’s role despite a weak treaty basis but also the partial and peacemeal 
developments of Social Europe on an ad hoc basis to economic integration (Lange 1992; Hantrais 
2007). Even the significant improvements made during the Delorsian social agenda of the 1990’s, 
which drastically increased the legislative activity in the social field and made major advancement 
in the development of euro-corporatism (Goetschy 2006) did not manage to re-equilibrate the 
social and economic dimensions of European integration (Menz 2015). Moreover, given its 
extremely limited financial means, the role of the EU in social policy is mainly regulatory (Liebfried 
and Pierson 1995; Majone 1996). Its budget represents only about 1% of the GDP of the EU (in 
comparison the US federal budget is about 20% of its GDP), out of which 30% is allocated to the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 35% to Cohesion Policy, which is mainly concerned with 
inter-regional disparities. The European Social Fund (ESF) represents only 10% of the EU’s total 
budget, it is mainly dedicated to supporting labour mobility and employment and thus remains 
focused on funding the training of workers and their relocation (Anderson 2015: 30). Compared 
to the conventional role of social policy at national level which is typically redistributive, the EU 
                                                 
31 The clause states the following: ‘in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into 
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social 
protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health 
(art. 9 TFEU). 
32 The principle of proportionality states that ‘the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’ (art. 5(4) TEU). 
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thus sets the bounded regulatory framework in which MS continue to exert their role of taxation 
and redistribution.  
The EU’s governance of social policy followed a market-making bias. Many scholars argue that, 
thanks to the entrepreneurial activism of the Commission and judicial activism of the Court of 
Justice, the development of social policy was mainly ‘left to judges and markets’ and favoured a 
neoliberal market-making agenda (Leibfried and Pierson 2000; Leibfried 2005; Höpner and Schäfer 
2010; Falkner 2010; Scharpf 2010). For instance, Crespy (2016) shows how the EU competition 
law (negative integration) and liberalisation directives (market-making positive integration)  led to 
an important trend of marketisation of welfare services, a trend futher amplified in the context of 
austerity politics.33 Political economists also argue that with its more active role in social policy 
governance since the 1980’s the EU developed following a ‘neoliberal trajectory’ mainly directed 
at both ‘reforming’ the supply-side of Europe’s economies to foster international competitiveness 
and labour market flexibility and ‘modernising’ Western Europe’s welfare states to ensure their 
financial sustainability (Whyman et al. 2012: 62). This neoliberal trajectory was structurally ‘locked-
in’ with the constraints imposed by the EMU (Whyman et al. 2012: 82), a trend further reinforced 
since the crisis. Overall, the strategy of convergence-through-modernisation of national systems of 
social protection seems to point, at least in terms of objectives, to the liberal model: 
Utilising a range of approaches – from legally-binding regulations and directives to 
recommendations and the voluntary OMC – the EU aimed to influence the development of Western 
Europe’s welfare states in a direct as well as structural sense. More specifically, the EU aimed to 
steer Western Europe’s welfare states towards the market liberal model in terms of objectives (i.e. 
improved competitiveness, labour market flexibility, increased means testing, lower social 
expenditure, reduced welfare benefits to ensure ‘work pays’, etc.) if not outcomes (eroded 
entitlements, increased inequality and poverty, more means testing, etc.). (Whyman et al. 2012: 82) 
What this citation highlights is not that all national welfare states actually converged towards one 
model – national diversity remains very wide and the literature on Europeanisation emphasise the 
‘filtering’ effect of EU policy by domestic institutions (Cowles et al. 2001) – but, instead, that the 
combined pursuit of negative integration and market-making forms of positive integration (i.e. re-
regulation through liberalisation and ‘modernisation’) points towards a model of welfare 
retrenchment, at least in terms of objectives and possibly at different speeds and in varying degrees 
according to national characteristics. Overall, given the pro-market bias of European process of 
integration, it is likely to have the least effect on social protection systems in countries in which the 
state plays a minor role compared to the market – they may actually profit from the creation of 
                                                 
33 ‘Welfare services are understood here as an encompassing notion covering all services which are deemed essential 
with regard to public interest and social cohesion (communications, transport, energy, post, culture, education, health 
and social care, housing, etc.) provided by public, private or mixed undertakings.’ (Crespy 2016: 3) 
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competitive markets in previously shielded areas – and be costlier for more coordinated economies 
with highly regulated and redistributive social models and more inflexible markets (Scharpf 2010: 
233-235). 
4.3.3. Social Europe and the euro crisis 
Few would deny that the crisis prompted a period of welfare retrenchment and a worsening of the 
place of social objectives in EU integration, leading some to argue that Social Europe went from 
its historic ‘add-on’ status to that ‘dependence-upon’ economic objectives (Copeland and Daly 
2015). The economic and financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting sovereign debt crisis of 2010-
2011 led to a series of reforms in EU governance which reinforced the marginalisation and the 
subordination of social objectives to the economic dimension, itself characterized by ‘an ideological 
straightjacket in which ‘sound’ public finances at the national level are the over-riding priority’ 
(Copeland and Daly 2015: 141). In other words, the crisis prompted an era of ‘austeritarianism’ (i.e. 
the enforcement of austerity in top-down fashion, Hyman 2015) during which the ECJ and the 
Commission further promoted a pro-market integration strategy and embraced neoclassical fiscal 
orthodoxy based on deflationary macroeconomic priorities. The ‘new European economic 
governance’ principally aimed at reinforcing the stability of the Eurozone by putting in place new 
mechanisms for monitoring and coordinating member states’ macroeconomic policies and apply 
sanctions when necessary (Degryse 2012: 6). With the introduction of the new European Semester34 
in early 2011, the EU strengthened its tools for macroeconomic surveillance (such as the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)) with the primary 
aim to enforce fiscal discipline and reduce deficits, based on the requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP).35 In this context, the accent was put on ‘structural reforms’ presented as 
vectors to economic and social ‘modernisation’ dominated by a logic of welfare retrenchment, 
based on curbing spending and reducing labour costs (Crespy and Vanheuverzwijn 2017), as 
illustrated for instance by the systematisation of a strategy of wage restraint (Dufresne 2015).  
These policies have been particularly socially regressive. Scholars emphasised the dramatic and 
lasting impact of austerity on economic and social rights in many MS already fragilized as a result 
                                                 
34 The European Semester ‘is essentially a yearly cycle of surveillance supervised by the European Commission, 
combining a hardening of the deficit rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (with stringent procedures potentially 
involving financial sanctions) and a continuing soft coordination of economic and social policies. The focus lies on the 
country-specific recommendations (CSRs) whereby the European Commission advises each Member State on how it 
should reform its economy and welfare state under the multilateral control—and formal endorsement of—all the other 
EU Member States gathered in the Council’ (Crespy and Vanheuwerzwijn 2017: 1). 
35 The SGP, reformed in 2011 with the ‘six pack’ which includes the MIP, provides a set of rules requiring that budgets 
be balanced or in surplus, and a number of quantitative references such as a budget deficit not amounting to more 
than 3% of the GDP and public debt to no more than 60% of the GDP. 
   52 
of the economic crisis: the right to work, the right to social security and social protection, the right 
to education and the right to health, all were significantly eroded (Ghailani 2016). With the rise of 
social discontent to austerity politics, the Commission operated a ‘double shift’ in governance and 
policy away from austeritarianism towards more ‘progressive’ structural reforms, with a loosened 
enforcement of fiscal discipline and the emergence of discourses focused on upward convergence 
and social investment (Crespy and Schmidt 2017). Some highlighted the progressive ‘socialising’ of 
the European Semester marked by the inclusion of more social indicators in the monitoring of the 
social scoreboard as well as the involvement of social stakeholders in its process (Zeitlin and 
Vanhercke 2015). For others, however, the increased discursive salience of social investment 
remains trapped in an unfavourable trade-off: optional country-specific recommendations urging 
member states to develop social investment are in tension with those in favour of welfare 
retrenchment which can lead to sanctions (Crespy and Vanheuverwzijn 2017). It seems that ‘insofar 
as social considerations enter the picture, they appear as side constraints, rather than as ends 
macroeconomic governance should pursue for their own sake’ (De Schutter and Dermine 2017: 
119).  
Overall, the Euro crisis played a role of catalyser, amplifying already existing trends through a 
process of ‘fast-forward Europeanisation’ understood as ‘the intensification of ‘hard’ mechanisms 
of Europeanisation … even under the form of apparently less binding pressures and, second, the 
broadening of domestic policy implications of EU decisions’ (Graziano and Ladi 2014: 122). These 
developments are fundamentally averse to the upscaling of market-correcting instruments. Indeed, 
the influence of the Scandinavian flexicurity model declined (Mailand 2015) while the new German 
model of austerity-based competitiveness relying on non-cooperative competition at the expense 
of social standards imposed itself as the new reference (Crespy and Menz 2015b). The already 
enshrined institutional asymmetry between negative and positive integration has been accentuated 
by the political driving forces in favour of further market-making policies, deliberately chosen by 
national governments, and reinforced by the current rules-based governance of the EU, which is 
captured by the fiscal compact-social retrenchment straightjacket in the Eurozone in particular.  
The governance of social policy is thus marked by a hybrid model between adversarial 
intergovernmentalism and functional ‘integration by stealth’ (Crespy and Menz 2015b: 208). 
In this context, Social Europe is characterised by a ‘double bind’: Member States are reluctant to 
transfer more of their welfare state obligations to the supranational level as this would put at risk 
the political base of their territorial legitimacy, while they cannot reverse the process of European 
economic integration, which is particularly constraining in the EMU given the rigidity of EU 
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macroeconomic rules and fiscal constraints (Hemerijck 2014). Politically this is untenable: 
‘[b]etween rising anti-austerity popular sentiments and the EU’s inquisitive expert calls for 
overnight fiscal consolidation, a ‘political vacuum’ emerged at the heart of the European integration 
project, reinforced by widening competitive divergences and social imbalance between the 
prosperous north and vulnerable south’ (Hemerijk 2014: 149). In economic terms, the euro crisis 
provides valuable lessons: ‘the implicit long-term consensus that macroeconomic policy can be 
determined at the supranational level in a currency union, in accordance with the efficient market 
hypothesis, while social policy is best left to the policy space of the national state, is both naïve and 
wrong’ (Hemerjik 2014: 153). Whilst the joint adoption of the Social Pillar embodies an admission 
that more efforts should be put in rebalancing economic and social European constitutions, as yet 
another non-binding instrument it remains unpromising to resorb the current lexicographic 
ordering of EU negative and positive integration. As noted by Sabato and Vanhercke (2017: 93), 
‘in order to make the Pillar effective, an essential further step is needed: turning the rights stated 
on paper into effective and enforceable rights, guiding action at both EU and Member State level 
and ensuring that every European citizen has access to them’. In short, resorbing the social deficit 
demands at the very least that the EU plays a more active role in ensuring effective access to the 
social minimum for all EU citizens. 
4.4. The limits of EU anti-poverty strategies 
It is one thing to argue that the EU needs to be more active, it is another to specify the approach 
taken in poverty relief. It is thus necessary to close this section with a focus on the EU’s anti-
poverty strategies. I start with a brief overview of the place of poverty and social exclusion on the 
EU policy agenda, before assessing the outcomes of EU governance in the field. 
4.4.1. Poverty and social exclusion on the EU agenda 
EU involvement in the fight against poverty and social exclusion started in the 1970’s. Economic 
stagnation resulting from the oil shocks and the rise of unemployment which marked the end of 
thirty years of sustained economic growth, led the Council to adopt the Social Action Programme 
(SAP) in 1974 (Anderson 2015: 187-188). Among the SAP’s goals were the improvement of living 
and working conditions, which contained the basis for the first European poverty initiatives, known 
as ‘Poverty 1’ (1975-1980), and emphasised the ‘European’ dimension of poverty. Its success led 
to the adoption of ‘Poverty 2’ (1985-1989) with the EU co-financing actions in Member States and 
then to ‘Poverty 3’ which embodied a shift as it defined its policy agenda in terms of ‘social 
exclusion’, thereby stating that poverty needs not only to be addressed in terms of resource 
adequacy but also ‘by means of measures for social integration and integration into the labour 
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market’ as confirmed by the 1989 Council Resolution on ‘combating social exclusion’ (par. 6). The 
Council’s Recommendation on ‘common criteria concerning sufficient resources’ (Council 1992a) 
then emphasised the importance of adequate income support systems in order to reach this 
objective, and its Recommendation on the ‘convergence of social protection objectives and 
policies’ (Council 1992b) highlighted the need to establish a ‘convergence strategy’, laying the 
foundations for the use of coordination methods in the social field. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997) then incorporated the ‘combating of social exclusion’ among its objectives (art. 136 TEC) 
and provided the EU with a competence to undertake action in support of its MS in the combat 
of poverty and social exclusion (art. 137(1) TEC, now art. 153 TFEU). According to Ferrera et al. 
(2002: 229-230), the subsequent Commission’s White Paper on ‘modernising social protection’ (EC 
1999) is of crucial importance as it defined a ‘common political vision of Social Protection in the 
European Union’ based on a strategy of coordination and four main goals: to make work pay and 
provide income security, to ensure the sustainability of pensions, to promote social inclusion and 
to ensure the quality and sustainability of healthcare. During this period, the accumulation of 
knowledge and expertise provided by the Commission’s poverty programmes as well as its 
sponsoring of a number of NGO’s dedicated to poverty alleviation leads to the creation of the 
European Social Platform in Brussels in 1995, which now regroups around 40 NGO’s active in the 
social field, among which the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) is a major actor.  
The Lisbon Strategy signed in 2000, founded on the overly ambitious objective of making the EU 
the most competitive economy in the world by 2010, made soft law instruments embodied in the 
OMC the centrepiece of its reform agenda in favour of the ‘modernisation’ of social protection. 
Its approach equates with the embrace, by European leaders of the social democratic family at the 
end of the 1990’s, of the ‘Third Way’ ideology of liberalised social democracy: a political project 
trying to combine centre-right economics with centre-left social policies marking a paradigm shift 
in welfare and labour market reforms in favour of an ‘active social state’ (Giddens 1994, 1998; 
Cassiers 2005). The strategy thus marked the stepping stone of what would then remain the EU’s 
approach, combining employment growth, competitiveness and social cohesion with an emphasis 
on the financial sustainability of social policy and, in the fight against poverty and social exclusion, 
a focus on the ‘activation’ of inactive groups (i.e. making the receipt of social benefits conditional 
on active work search and commitment to employment opportunities or training programmes 
proposed). This approach, now known as the ‘social investment’ strategy (EC 2013), is based on 
move away from the redistributive welfare state to the ‘investment state’, and takes social policy as 
‘a productive factor’ (Hemerijk 2015: 242) that needs to be tuned in to face ‘new social risks’ (the 
emancipation of women, changing family structures, and the transition to a knowledge economy) 
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by investing in human capital, easing the life-courses transitions, and strengthening the link 
between social protection and the labour market, thereby coping with both rising budgetary 
constraints and mass unemployment (see e.g. Hemerijk 2006, 2014, 2015; Vandenbroucke, 
Hemerijk and Palier 2011). This emphasis in European policy discourse on ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ was 
well illustrated by the Kok report (2003) and confirmed with the 2008 Commission 
Recommendation on ‘active inclusion’ (EC 2008) which emphasised further the employment route 
as the way out of poverty. After showing disappointing results and in the wake of the global 
economic and financial crisis, the Lisbon Strategy was replaced in 2010 by a new growth strategy, 
Europe 2020, founded on a stronger and more complex governance structure with simpler goals 
(a ‘smart’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘sustainable’ growth), but still based on the OMC. However, in contrast 
with the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 made important changes in terms of governance as the 
poverty target was fully incorporated in the European Semester. At the level of MS, national reform 
programmes (NRP) and country specific recommandations (CSR) thus take an integrated view of 
a number of thematics, such that past results and future priorities in terms of poverty reduction are 
assessed alongside other budgetary and macroeconomic aspects (Copeland and Daly 2015: 145). 
Europe 2020 also introduced a ‘joint commitment’ level through one of its ‘flagship initiatives’, the 
European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion, introduced to deliver on the ambitious 
EU-wide promise to lift 20 million people out of poverty by 2020. 
4.4.2. Assessment of EU anti-poverty strategies 
Despite first developing in a ‘patchy and unsatisfactory’ way (Ferrera et al. 2002: 236), the EU’s 
commitment to the fight against poverty and social exclusion gradually became a central concern 
on its policy agenda. On the positive side, the EU made significant progress in the Europeanisation 
of social policy at the discursive, stakeholding and measurement levels (Anderson 2015: 203-204). 
First, the EU forged a common understanding of poverty and social exclusion and a set of common 
objectives, even if these often remained vaguely defined. Second, the EU gradually involved an 
important number of stakeholders in the policy process, from social partners to NGO’s via 
structures regrouping experts (e.g. the Social Protection Committee (SPC) and the Network of 
Independent Experts on Social Inclusion). Third, the use of the OMC favoured the collection of a 
large quantity of data and information on national situations and strategies to fight poverty, leading 
to the development of common indicators. In this framework, the OMC represents an innovative 
way to address the difficulties posed by positive integration and made MS accountable to the EU 
through reports and action plans to address poverty. As such, the OMC procured a ‘nurturing’ 
approach for policy learning (Ferrera et al. 2002: 232) and a highly institutionalised framework for 
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the EU’s pursuit of its strategies (Armstrong 2010: ch. 2), which became even further integrated 
with the Europe 2020. 
Nevertheless, results remain weak and governance instruments insufficient: the ‘naming and 
shaming’ approach of soft governance did not work well, and the lack of hard legislation and 
sanctions did not allow for an effective commitment to the set objectives at national level 
(Anderson 2015: 204-206). In contrast with macroeconomic objectives, social inclusion goals 
remain open to interpretation as illustrated by the political compromise underlying the poverty 
target. Indeed, in its attempt to accommodate member states’ diversity, the EU allowed its overall 
objective of poverty reduction to be disaggregated at national level (see fn 17, p.22) into competing 
and ineffective definitions of social exclusion, which ultimately led to policy incoherence (Copeland 
and Daly 2012). As a result, the target soon proved to be both ‘ungoverned and ungovernable’ 
given its low political priority, the lack of binding instruments and its ambiguous place in the overall 
strategy (Copeland and Daly 2014).  
Furthermore, the strategy at the center of the EU’s approach, mainly based on the strengthening 
of labour activation policies, is problematic in itself. In its 2008 Recommendation (EC 2008), the 
Commission understands ‘active inclusion’ as the combination of three pillars, namely access to 
quality services, adequate income support and inclusive labour markets, which can be separated 
into non-labour market inclusion and income adequacy on the one hand and the idea of ‘inclusion 
through employment’ on the other hand (Armstrong 2010: 279). Besides the difficulty to 
understand whether ‘inclusion’ should be understood in its ‘societal’ or ‘economic’ dimension, this 
duality points to an ‘activation dilemma’ as it is unclear ‘whether the objective of activation policies 
is to place obligations on individuals to take up paid work (albeit with support and incentives) or 
whether it refers to a right of individuals to adequate minimum resources and the removal of 
obstacles to participation (economic and societal)’ (Armstrong 2010: 279).  
Looking at the holistic ‘societal participation’ dimension first, it is notable that the 
Recommendation takes the 1992 Council Recommendation on adequate resources as ‘reference 
points’, that its first recital justifies it out of respect for human dignity and the right to social and 
housing assistance proclaimed by article 34(3) of the Charter, and that it urges MS to ensure that 
activation policies ‘respect the implementation of fundamental rights’ (art. 3). As noted by 
Armstrong (2010: 283), this rights-based approach, extended to quality social services, is consistent 
with a ‘social citizenship paradigm’ which received broad support by other key stakeholders. Two 
resolutions of the European Parliament (2009, 2010) reaffirmed the necessity to have adequate 
minimum income schemes not only as an instrument to fight poverty and social exclusion but also 
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to ensure full participation in society independently of a person’s capacity to take part in the labour 
market. This has also been at the heart of the European Anti-Poverty Network’s (EAPN) advocacy 
for a Framework Directive on adequate and accessible minimum income schemes in Europe (Van 
Lancker 2010, 2015), a proposal supported by the European Committee of Regions (2011), the 
European Economic and Social Committee (2013) and the European Trade Union Confederation 
(2015). The EU’s official support of ‘the right to adequate minimum income benefits’ and ‘effective 
access to enabling goods and services’ was reiterated with the joint adoption of the Social Pillar 
(art. 14, EU 2017). However, this rights-based approach was never translated into a legally binding 
measure. 
Thus, despite the Commission’s remarkable attempt at striking a balance between the two different 
social policy approaches mentioned above – a dissonance made possible by non-binding forms of 
legislation, its governance of anti-poverty strategies favoured a restricted form of ‘economic 
inclusion through activation’ over its wider societal participation dimension. Although already 
present before 2008, this approach was reinforced with austerity politics. Indeed, in response to 
the crisis, the new EU economic governance made fiscal consolidation its top priority followed by 
policies promoting ‘growth and competitiveness’, such that poverty reduction has mostly been 
addressed via increasing employment levels and strengthening labour market conditionality 
(Copeland and Daly 2015: 149). Looking at the Commission’s Communication on Country Specific 
Reports (CSR) (2017d), the EAPN also highlights the bias of the Commission’s priorities: 
what has not changed is the main objective of budget consolidation and restructuring, with little 
evidence so far of mainstreaming distributional or social impact on poverty and inequality, or 
concrete proposals on how to promote fairer distribution or redistribution. While social investment 
is more clearly acknowledged, it is primarily related to leverage of private investment, rather than 
public investment in quality social protection and social infrastructure. Neither is explicit reference 
made to the new European Pillar of Social Rights or for the need to guarantee social standards. […] 
EAPN will expect increased Commission proposals for Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) 
in 2017 to reduce poverty reduction, through integrated, rights-based strategies, which ensure access 
to adequate income support and social protection, quality services and jobs, and additional tailored 
strategies for key at-risk groups. (EAPN 2017: 4) 
Whilst fighting poverty and social exclusion through labour market inclusion is of crucial 
importance, it is insufficient to ensure better social inclusion outcomes. First, as we have seen in 
previous sections with the number of working poor and the rise of multidimensional economic 
insecurity associated with labour market dynamics, ensuring access to employment does not 
guarantee that one will not be at risk of poverty. Paradoxically then, when access to quality jobs 
(for the low-skilled in particular) is scarcer, activation policies are becoming more stringent. Second, 
many people living in poverty may not have access to work because of illness, disability or because 
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of caring obligations, such that poverty needs to be addressed beyond the sole activation 
perspective. Third, the strengthening of conditionality of social benefits to ensure activation also 
translates into problems of coverage and non-take-up, as will be illustrated in the next section on 
minimum income schemes. Fourth, besides behavioural constraints (i.e. availability for work, 
training etc.), the tightening of conditionality is also fostered via the rise of selectivity (i.e. making 
the means-test more stringent) in order to make social spending more cost-efficient. This is also 
problematic: ‘While in theory low or moderate levels of social spending could produce low poverty 
rates if resources were well-targeted, the reality remains that almot no advanced economy achieves 
a low (relative) poverty rate, or a high level of redistribution, with a low level of social spending’ 
(Marx, Nolan and Olivera 2014: 19). As paradoxical as it may seem, some research studies have 
shown that more selective systems have a smaller redistributive impact than universal ones (Korpi 
and Balme 1998). Finally, some have also criticised the employment-centred social investment 
strategy not only for its limited results, but for actually being partly responsible for dispointing 
poverty trends (Cantillon 2011), providing evidence that there is ‘a linkage between stagnating or 
increasing poverty trends and shifts in expenditures to new welfare state programmes’ (Van Vliet 
and Wang 2015). For all these reasons, the employment route through activation policies favoured 
by the EU’s social investment approach offers a limited approach in anti-poverty strategy. 
Overall, given current constraints, the EU anti-poverty governance is in effect most consistent with 
a liberal model of social protection. Poverty is seen as a pathology that needs to be addressed via 
the development of labour market skills in accordance with the demands of competitiveness in the 
global economy, it favours minimalist rather than comprehensive forms of public intervention, and 
a targeted and highly conditional safety net rather than universal coverage. Whilst Esping-
Andersen’s (1990: 37) analysis highlighted that the quality of social rights lies, among other things, 
in the welfare state’s capacity to decommodify labour (i.e. the degree to which individuals can 
uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation), the EU anti-
poverty strategy is, according to Scharpf (2002: 658), ‘about facilitating ‘recommodification’ of the 
labour potential of persons who are threatened by ‘social exclusion’ – which is understood to mean 
primarily exclusion from the labour market’. A similar argument is made by Crespy (2016: 4) when 
she notes that the trend towards the marketisation of social services is marked by ‘a re-
commodification through the transformation of social relationships between providers and citizens 
redefined as customers’ (Crespy 2016: 4). The EU governance of anti-poverty strategy is thus 
centred on economic forms of inclusion where social policy is a productive factor for gowth and 
competitiveness, rather than a broader rights-based approach associated with a social citizenship 
paradigm. In other words, it prefers a market citizenship connected with the status of worker to a 
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broader social citizenship approach. This is problematic since living at risk of poverty constitutes 
a factor of disability for successful development at school, in the workplace or in family life, even 
in rich countries. Ensuring access to the social minimum and reinforcing welfare states’ 
redistributive capacities are thus not only essential parts of an effective social investment strategy, 
they should be its priority (Cantillon 2011: 445). 
5. Minimum income schemes in focus 
Now that a series of trends affecting the risk of poverty and social exclusion have been broadly 
circumvented and the constraints and limits associated with the organisation of social protection 
in the EU identified, this section zooms in on minimum income schemes (MIS). A focus on 
minimum income protection makes sense as ‘adequate income protection against severe financial 
poverty is arguably the first duty of the welfare state’ (Marx, Nolan and Olivera 2014: 26). As last-
resort social safety nets, MIS play a major role, if not in lifting people out of poverty, at least in 
reducing its intensity, as well as socioeconomic shock absorbers and counter-cyclical instruments 
to boost demand and consumption (Frazer and Marlier 2009). While it was long assumed that MIS 
would become marginal (if not unnecessary) as welfare states were growing, the rise of mass 
unemployment, along with welfare cutbacks in social security arrangements and changed 
demographics, significantly increased the importance of MIS as safeguard measures against the lack 
of financial resources and poverty risks in the last decades (Marx and Nelson 2013: 7). Their 
essential role was particularly highlighted by their cushioning impact during the first years of the 
economic crisis (SPC 2014). Moreover, ‘minimum income protection also marks the ground floor 
of other income maintenance provisions; minimum social insurance levels and minimum wages are 
almost always above the level of the social safety net. In that sense [MIS] also tell us something 
about the generosity of other income maintenance provisions’ (Marx, Nolan and Olivera 2014: 26). 
This section is thus dedicated to the assessment of MIS throughout the EU. I start by identifying 
five main families across the EU before assessing their strength according to three main parameters, 
namely adequacy, coverage and take-up. Finally, I look at their overall impact on poverty. 
5.1. Five broad families 
Looking at the existing schemes in EU member states, nearly all of them have national schemes 
except for Spain which has different schemes in all its regions, Italy which has schemes in only 
certain regions, and Greece which is currently experimenting a pilot scheme (which should reach 
full implementation during 2018). These schemes are very diverse, as we will see, but they 
nevertheless share a number of common features such as the fact they are all statutory last-resort 
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schemes, financed by taxes and based on a subjective right (individuals must apply to schemes), 
they require (in varying degrees) that people be available for work and actively looking for one, are 
based on a means-test, and provide different amounts given household’s situation (Peña-Casas and 
Bouget 2013: 135). Thus, MIS can be regrouped under an ideal-type, the guaranteed minimum 
income (GMI), which can be defined as a household-based, means-tested and work-conditional 
social assistance scheme providing a last resort safety net for those not eligible for social insurance 
(Frazer and Marlier 2009: 15). 
Looking at their variations, experts have identified five broad groups of minimum income 
protection arrangements (Frazer and Marlier 2016: 14). In the first one, member states (BE, CH, 
CY, CZ, DK, EE, ES [Basque country], FI [Basic Social Assistance], IS, IT [Bolzano, Friuli Venezia 
Giulia, Molise, Sardegna, Valle d’Aosta], LU, NL, SE, SI, SK) have relatively simple and 
comprehensive schemes open to all those with insufficient means to support themselves. The 
second one (AT, EL, ES [Asturias, Cantabria, Castile-Leon, Navarre, Rioja], HR, HU, LT, PT) is 
characterized by simple and non-categorical with rather restricted eligibility and coverage of people 
in need of financial assistance, due to the low level of the means-test. The third group regroups 
countries (DE, FI [Additional Financial Plan], IT [Basilicata, New Social Card, Puglia, Sicilia, 
Trento], LV, PL, UK) with general schemes of last resort with additional categorical benefits which 
altogether cover most of those in need of support. The fourth group comprises member states 
(FR, IE, MT, RO) which have developed a complex network of different, often categorical, and 
sometimes overlapping schemes which cover most of those in need of support. Finally, in the last 
group, member states (BG) have limited, partial or piecemeal arrangements which are restricted to 
narrow categories of people and fail to cover all those in need. It must also be noted that some 
countries provide minimum income protection for those out of work only (DK, HR, IE, MT, PT, 
SK), while most of them provide income support for those in need whether they are in or out of 
work (Frazer and Marlier 2016: 20). Of course, to evaluate the role of MIS, these should be placed 
in the wider context of member states’ overall social protection arrangements. Experts stress, for 
instance, that a GMI works most effectively when it is a residual scheme in an overall 
comprehensive and effective system of social protection (Frazer and Marlier 2009: 16-17). 
5.2. Assessment 
However, the role of MIS in protecting against the risk of poverty also greatly depends on the 
scheme’s inherent features. MIS thus vary both across and within the families identified supra 
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according to a wide variety of characteristics36 but to assess the quality of MIS’s impact on poverty, 
experts generally identify three main parameters: the breadth of coverage, the adequacy of 
payments, and the rate of take-up (Frazer and Marlier 2009, 2016; Van Lancker 2015, 2017; 
Crepaldi et al. 2017). Except when stated otherwise, the main findings presented here are those 
evidenced in the last report of the European Social Policy Network (Frazer and Marlier 2016). 
Table 1 at the end of the section provides a summary of country-by-country evidence. 
5.2.1. Adequacy 
Starting with the level of payments and their adequacy, the generosity of transfers rarely exceeds 
the ‘standard’ poverty line (AROP), it falls short of it in most cases and often by far, with many 
member states having schemes below what is considered as an ‘absolute’ poverty line, set at 40% 
of the median income, which is also characterised as an ‘extreme poverty threshold’ (Frazer and 
Marlier 2016).37 It must also be noted that countries displaying the best adequacy levels all come 
from the family with simple and comprehensive schemes – even if that is not sufficient since many 
of the other members of that family fall in the ‘somewhat inadequate’ category – while the other 
four families are divided between ‘somewhat inadequate’ and ‘largely inadequate’ categories. In 
terms of recent evolutions, little change has been observed since 2009, even though experts found 
positive trends in eight countries (AT, CY, EE, FI, HR, MT, PL, and SI) and a decrease of 
generosity levels in five others (BE, DK, HU, SE, UK).  
Looking further back in time, Van Mechelen and Marchal (2013) show that, between the early 
1990’s and 2009, the adequacy of social assistance benefits has continuously deteriorated, in 
particular in Nordic and CEE countries, at least in relative terms compared with the development 
of average wages and median equivalised household income. ‘Declining benefit generosity, they 
note, is often seen as a partial explanation for why poverty in Europe has not decreased over the 
past decade and why the Lisbon agenda failed in making any progress on the relative income 
poverty dimension’ (Frazer and Marlier 2016: 28). 
 
                                                 
36 These include eligibility conditions (rights-based or a discretionary approach), the level of payment, governance 
arrangements between national, regional, and local (centralised vs decentralised approach), the existence of 
mechanisms for periodic review and the methods used for uprating levels of MIS, the strictness of conditionality rules 
such as participation in activation measures, whether payment is time limited or not, the arrangements (if any) for 
transitions from unemployment benefits to MIS and from MIS to employment, and the link with other kinds of 
complementary social benefits (e.g. housing benefits). See Frazer and Marlier (2009, 2016); Van Lancker (2015, 2017) 
and Crepaldi et al. (2017) for more detailed cross-country comparisons. 
37 I provide a general overview here, but adequacy may also be assessed according to the cost of basic food baskets, 
reference budgets, or a comparison of GMI and minimum wage levels, and classifications may vary when looking at 
different types of households. See Frazer and Marlier (2016) for more details. 
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5.2.2. Coverage 
Turning to the extent of the schemes’ coverage, a majority of member states have eligibility 
conditions that guarantee a fairly comprehensive coverage of those at risk, while in some countries 
coverage remains extremely limited (e.g. Croatian GMI reaches only 12% of the population 
concerned). Again, countries falling into the first group generally fare better along with three 
countries (FR, IE, MT) of the fourth group which have a complex network of schemes. On 
changing dynamics, the last decade saw a positive evolution in the breadth of coverage in seven 
countries (AT, BE, CY, FI, LU, MT, SI) and a deterioration in six others (DK, FR, HU, PT, RO, 
UK).  
Moreover, studies show that young people, long-term unemployed, working poor, homeless 
people, migrants and asylum seekers, who are generally the ones hit the most by the crisis, are 
among those groups most frequently considered not being effectively covered by minimum income 
support schemes. Among the causes for bad coverage outcomes, findings reveal these are often 
related to increasingly stringent eligibility conditions38 and the use of sanctions. Experts argue, 
therefore, that social safety nets should be made less tight because ‘eligibility rules limit coverage 
by design, either by introducing categorical conditions that exclude potential beneficiaries or by 
setting the income threshold for entitlement too low’, such that a significant share of the working 
age population is ineligible to minimum income protection even when their resources are below 
the absolute poverty line (Figari et al. 2013: 12). Finally, while experts tend to agree, as already 
mentioned, that coverage and adequacy should be positively correlated with one another (in a 
continuum from residual to comprehensive social arrangements) to be most efficient, they found 
that the two dimensions are in fact weakly and negatively correlated: except in some cases offering 
both good coverage and generous payments there seems to be an implicit trade-off between them 
in most member states with some opting for a combination of narrowly targeted but relatively 
generous schemes and some, for the opposite (Figari et al. 2013: 12). 
5.2.3. Take-up 
Take-up rates, understood as the percentage of those entitled to benefits who do not effectively 
benefit from them, are difficult to assess as comprehensive data in the field is often scarce but the 
                                                 
38 Eligibility conditions are generally associated with the level of poverty one is in (i.e. based on a means-test), age, 
nationality, residence and activation measures. More specifically, conditionality rules are generally based on the 
following : registering with public employment service; signing an integration/insertion contract or employment plan; 
engaging in job search activities; accepting job offers; participating in activation measures whether training, personal 
development or community service; having used all possible entitlements to other social security benefits; selling or 
making use of one’s own assets (e.g. selling or renting a property); and keeping the benefits administration informed 
of any changes in personal circumstances (Frazer and Marlier 2016: 17) 
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evidence available shows that it is a clear matter of concern as non-take-up ranges from 20% to as 
much as 75% in some cases (Van Lancker 2015). More specifically, experts found reasonable take-
up levels in seven countries (BG, DK, EE, IE, MT, NL, SK) and only partial ones in all other 
member states. Even countries with fairly simple and comprehensive schemes often have 
important rates of non-take-up. Moreover, non-take-up is in certain cases (e.g. BE, FR) particularly 
high in the poorest households (i.e. with an income below the 40% median income poverty 
threshold). Recent evolutions show some positive improvements since 2009 in four member states 
(AT, BG, FI, MT) and a deterioration of take-up in six others (BE, CY, HU, RO, SI, SK), which is 
probably explained as an outcome of the economic crisis and changing rules in eligibility and 
selectivity conditions. Overall, the Eurofound (2015: 15) study points that the vast majority of even 
the most conservative estimates of non-take up are above 40 %, suggesting that the phenomenon 
is of considerable magnitude and that it is a problem persistent in time. It also highlights that non-
take-up is more likely among groups who experience social isolation, have migrated to another 
country, are ‘new to need’, are at risk of higher stigmatisation, or experience financial difficulties 
while owning a home (Eurofound 2015: 17). Non-take-up is thus problematic not only because it 
means that many of those who need income support do not have access to it but also because it 
creates further inequalities within vulnerable groups.  
Experts highlight that the main causes for non-take-up are the following (Frazer and Marlier 2009, 
2016; Van Lancker 2015, 2017; Crepaldi et al. 2017):  
- unknown rights because of a lack of awareness of the rights themselves or a lack of information 
on the procedure to claim the rights, or because of the complexity of the system;  
- unclaimed rights ‘by constraint’ happen when real or perceived costs (whether financial, material, 
cognitive, physical or psychological)39 associated with access to MIS exceed its potential benefits; 
- unclaimed rights ‘by choice’ when the beneficiaries are not ready to accept the conditions, whether 
these are linked to activation measures, rigid means-testing or controls perceived as stigmatising 
and humiliating; 
- unobtained rights and administrative obstacles when the right was claimed but not obtained, which is 
generally linked with bad administration or significant discretionary administrative powers. The 
use of a means-test, in particular, is often pointed at as a prime reason for persistent and 
significant rates of non-take-up as well as lack of coverage as it can be badly calibrated, set too 
low, discouraging given its complexity, or considered as stigmatising (Atkinson 2015: 211).40 
When recasting the risk factors according to the different levels involved, namely the individual, 
the administration, the design of the scheme and society as a whole which encompasses social and 
                                                 
39 Financial costs refer to the need to contribute to a complementary healthcare system or when the level of payment 
is too low for the efforts demanded; material and cognitive costs are associated with the difficulties involved in complex 
procedures; physical costs mostly relate to accessibility issues (for those living in rural areas, or those faced by older 
people) and psychological costs are associated with the fear of social stigmatisation and shame (Van Lancker 2015: 24). 
40 Another problem of means-testing concerns the risk of a poverty trap. I come back to this in chapter 2. 
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legal norms (Eurofound 2015: 25-26), one realises that improving take-up is a multidimensional 
issue which may imply much more than the reform of the schemes themselves (e.g. automaticity 
of rights) and may need to involve all stakeholders to address social norms about the ‘deserving’ 
and ‘underserving’ poor for example. 
5.3. Impact on poverty 
Concerning the overall impact of MIS on at-risk-of-poverty-rate, experts found that, given the low 
levels of generosity, it has limited or partial impact in most cases and a positive one in only three 
countries (IE, NL, UK), while the situation since 2009 has deteriorated in more countries (BE, BG, 
CZ, DK, ES, HU, LT) than in those in which it has improved (AT, EE, MT, PL, SI). Besides, MIS 
more frequently have a positive impact on reducing the depth of poverty, since it is assessed as 
strong in seven member states (AT, BE, CY, IE, LU, PT, UK), partial in most of them but still 
ineffective in six countries (ES, LT, LV, HU, PL, SK). Again, evolution has been negative in more 
countries (CZ, DK, ES, FI, HU, LT, PT, RO, UK) than it has been positive (AT, CY, EE, MT, 
SI). These poor results can be explained by the following reasons: benefits levels are lower than 
the standard poverty line (AROP threshold) and often below the ‘extreme’ poverty line, they are 
considerably lower than the net minimum wage, they fail to take into account housing costs, there 
are high levels of non-take-up, and there is a low proportion of GDP spent on MIS. MIS are thus 
not sufficient on their own to lift people out of poverty, but they nevertheless represent a crucial 
means for most of the poor households who benefit from them (Peña-Casas and Ghailani 2013: 
33). 
Finally, what are the common tendencies observed? Two main trends characterise the evolution of 
MIS in recent decades, namely the deterioration of their relative generosity and an increase of the 
conditionality, towards more activation by establishing a stricter link between minimum income 
provisions and work requirements (Peña-Casas and Ghailani 2013: 30-32). The crisis, in particular, 
increased pressure on national schemes by raising the number of GMI claimants. A rise of gross 
GMI levels was observed between 2008 and 2010 in the immediate response to the economic shock 
but efforts towards expansionary and supportive measures remained short-lived, and were soon 
followed by more restrictive measures in the austerity tide since 2010 not in a clear cut of benefits 
but in more technical measures, such as cancelling indexation, tightening the means test, and 
abolishing or lowering other additional benefits, as well as further activation requirements in a 
weakened labour market (Marchal, Marx and Van Mechelen 2016). In a study focused on the period 
between 2010-2016, besides a continuation or reinforcement of the trends above, four other ones 
were identified (Crepaldi et al. 2017: 54-55). A first one, still unclear in its effects, concerns an effort 
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to simplify complex and fragmented schemes into one general programme. Another is related to 
the reorganisation of the governance of MIS: in many countries there is a tendency towards 
decentralisation while others, conversely, emphasise a more centralised regulation. To a lesser 
extent, the last trend concerns a ‘pay back’ welfare approach (or workfare), such as in the NL, 
where social assistance recipients must compensate their benefits on a quid pro quo basis by doing 
voluntary work in exchange, for instance. Against this backdrop, while increasing the level of 
benefits is a necessity, it is not enough. The reduction of coverage and the reinforcement of means-
testing intended to improve the degree of targeting actually contributed to increasing inequality: 
‘Errors of one kind – making unjustified payments – may have been reduced, but errors in the 
opposite direction – failure to reach those in need – were increased’ (Atkinson 2015: 206). This led 
many, such as Atkinson, to conclude that ‘we shall make progress towards tackling poverty only if 
we adopt a different approach’ (Atkinson 2015: 206). 
 
 
Table 1: Assessment of MIS by country 
 
 
Source: based on Frazer and Marlier (2016: 35-36) 
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6. Addressing the problem 
The various sections of this chapter now need to be brought together into a global view of the 
problem at hand. In this final section, my aim is thus to establish a diagnosis of the problem of 
poverty in the EU, and to examine recent proposals to address it, including the idea of a pan-
European basic income. 
6.1. Diagnosis 
Section two showed that MS vary significantly in their poverty levels but that it remains worrying 
in all its dimensions throughout the EU. It also showed that social spending is a key factor in the 
reduction of poverty and inequalities. The poverty target is not only far from achieved, its ambition 
remains very modest in comparison to the scope of the challenge at hand. Section three showed 
that current economic and social restructurations associated with labour market flexibility, 
technological change and inequalities point towards new forms of economic insecurity with a risk 
of expansion of poverty, whether one is attached to the labour market or not. It highlighted that 
these dynamics are partly due to certain political choices favouring neoliberal policies such as labour 
flexibility and welfare retrenchment. Section four highlighted that the various tensions in EU 
integration can be summed up along two main conflictual lines affecting social protection: the 
balance between national and supranational competences for social-policy making and the 
opposition between two political projects, namely a regulated social market economy and a 
neoliberal conception of capitalism with a residual model of social protection. It emphasised the 
challenges posed by the diversity of national systems of social protection, the neoliberal bias of EU 
integration, and the insufficiency of labour market inclusion as an answer to poverty. As such, it 
seems that the current approach of social protection at EU level participates in, rather than 
addresses, the dynamics identified in relation to the precariat whilst the lack of instruments of 
solidarity at E(M)U level may further reinforce social imbalances between MS. In other words, it 
does not provide the environment nor the tools to offer a coherent and efficient response to 
economic insecurity beyond the sole employment route. Finally, section five showed that, despite 
playing a crucial role in anti-poverty strategies and important variations between EU countries, 
minimum income schemes still fall short of providing sufficiently broad, adequate and accessible 
last-resort safety nets. The tightening of activation policies is one of the major sources of these 
difficulties identified, thereby confirming the problematic bias of EU anti-poverty approach.  
Overall, rather than expanding social protection and guaranteeing its MS the effective capacity to 
address poverty, the EU pushes in the opposite direction. Against this backdrop, the problem of 
   67 
poverty in the EU can be defined as follows: the organisation of social protection within the EU is insufficient 
to protect all Europeans effectively against the risk of poverty and social exclusion. 
This state of affairs is not a fatality. The structural asymmetry of EU integration suggests that the 
EU is inclined but not bound to be neoliberal. As highlighted by new institutionalist approaches of EU 
integration, ‘institutions matter’ whether these are conceived as organisations, as formal structures 
(e.g. constitutions, laws and regulations) or as informal structures such as norms, conventions and 
ideologies.41 The power of ideas and interests also has a structuring role in power relations and a 
mediating role in the political process (Palier and Surel 2005). In the EU, ‘the prevailing of pro-
market policies is also due to the fundamental political and ideological weakness of the coalitions 
of actors promoting a more regulated capitalism as a means to foster social cohesion’ (Crespy 2016: 
6) in face of the ‘broad ideational context where competitive markets are seen as most effective 
means for the allocation of resources’ which itself stems from the ‘global neoliberal restructuring 
of capitalist economies’ (Crespy 2016: 64). History has shown that EU integration is not a linear 
and deterministic process – as illustrated by Britain’s exit for instance – such that unexpected 
events, new political coalitions and alternative ideas may have the power to influence the future of 
the European project. With this in mind, how should we go about addressing the problem? 
6.2. Proposals 
The status quo is not an option, as it means that economic integration, regulatory competition and 
monetary constraints will continue to exert their pressure, possibly leading to further rationalisation 
of national welfare systems and more resentment towards the European project. Not only will it 
be untenable for economic and political reasons, it is also a dystopian future best avoided if one is 
concerned, as I am, with social justice and hence, with guaranteeing a social minimum. Framed in 
more positive terms, then, the target state should be one in which the multi-tiered European polity’s 
capacity to offer effective social protection in face of multidimensional poverty is improved and 
the tensions of EU integration reduced.  
I consider three ideas suggested by EU scholars to address the current negative state of affairs in a 
systemic way, that is, by developing a more active and distributive role for the EU in social 
protection: a European unemployment insurance, a European guaranteed minimum income and a 
European universal basic income. 
 
                                                 
41 On the various institutionalist variants (rational choice, sociological, discursive, and historical), see e.g. Aspinwall 
and Schneider (2001). 
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6.2.1. European unemployment benefit scheme 
The first proposal, which has become particularly popular among politicians and academics, is the 
European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS).42 The basic idea of the EUBS is to organise 
E(M)U-wide support to national unemployment insurance schemes, that is, to establish a public 
inter-state insurance mechanism. By providing a macroeconomic stabilisation and counter-cyclical 
mechanism to respond to economic asymmetric shocks, it aims at supporting national shock 
absorption capacities in times of crisis and respond to the challenges of social imbalances between 
EU countries. This idea is particularly relevant because expenditure on unemployment benefits is 
typically anti-cyclical as unemployment rates tend to rise in economic downturn, and it would 
provide a quick and automatic way to support income when recession kicks in. It is also generally 
associated with the establishment of compulsory minimum requirements regarding policy inputs 
and procedural standards to improve national schemes and convergence across social protection 
systems in order to avoid risks of contagion (Vandenbroucke 2017a, 2017b). The EUBS would 
mark a major change in EU governance passing from its sole focus on increasing symmetry through 
‘sound’ public and flexibility/mobility of productive factors (mostly labour) to financial solidarity 
between MS. As such, it would participate significantly to the resorption of the social deficit of EU 
integration and provide a more ‘caring face’ to the Union. 
However, its scope would remain limited to address the problem of poverty for the following 
reasons. Althouh conceivable at EU level, it is first and foremost seen as as a functional requirement 
of monetary integration in the EMU to ensure its economic viability.  Its social effects would mostly 
depend on the conditions that would trigger activation of the mechanism, but it is not aimed at 
addressing poverty per se: it would only kick in when unemployment rates reach a threshold 
considered unacceptable for both national and EU stability. Moreover, the design of minimum 
standards is apprehended only from the perspective of the current activation straightjacket which, 
as was highlitghed, is problematic. Finally, it would have no impact on those at risk of poverty 
while in employment or those excluded from the labour market. 
6.2.2. European guaranteed minimum income 
The second idea is the EU-wide guaranteed minimum income (EGMI). Nearly two decades ago, a 
very ambitious proposal of the kind was made by Schmitter and Bauer (2001). They suggested an 
EU-wide Eurostipendium targeted at EU citizens considered in ‘extreme poverty’, that is, whose 
                                                 
42 See European Commission (2017c), Andor (2013, 2014a and 2017), Andor et al. (2014), Beblavý, Gros and Maselli 
(2015), Beblavý, Marconi and Maselli (2015), Claeys, Darvas and Wolff (2014), Dullien (2013, 2017), Lellouche and 
Sode (2014), Vandenbroucke (2017a,b,c,d and forthcoming), Vetter (2014). See also Moro (2016) for a survey of the 
literature. 
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income is less than a third of the average income throughout the EU. The amount would be 
uniform throughout the EU for symbolic reasons rather than based on national definitions of 
poverty and paid out of a dedicated European fund. As noted, in response, by Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght (2001), it would face major difficulties concerning the needs of harmonisation and 
serious risks of country gaming. 
More recently, faced with the scope and the depth of poverty as well as with problems of adequacy, 
coverage and take-up of MIS, experts highlighted the need to improve their performance by 
establishing a common and integrated framework at the European level and an active role in its 
governance by the EU (Peña-Casas and Gailani 2013; Peña-Casas and Bouget 2014; Van Lancker 
2010, 2015). Rather than being directly involved in the management of the GMI, in this case the 
EU’s role would be to ensure the gradual harmonisation of a series of criteria (a common 
methodology for defining adequacy, the establishment of automatic uprating mechanisms, as well 
as common approaches towards coverage, monitoring and evaluation, etc.) and the implementation 
of concrete measures to improve adequacy, coverage and take-up. It would also involve setting up 
a European Minimum Income Fund (EMIF) in order to support MS in reaching adequacy levels, 
cushion asymmetric shocks between countries ‘but first and foremost [play] a social justice role vis-
à-vis the people of Europe’ (Peña-Casas and Bouget 2014: 153).  
This idea would thus switch the current focus on labour inclusion to a wider societal participation 
approach by rendering the right to a minimum level of resources more accessible. It would also 
improve the coherence and the effectiveness of EU action in combating poverty and develop its 
social citizenship dimension. In combination with the EUBS, the EU social dimension would make 
major progress on two functional dimensions of social policies: stabilisation and redistribution. If 
this is accompanied by hard legislation (e.g. a directive setting minimum requirements for adequate 
MIS), the new EU social constitution would drastically improve the situation with respect to the 
status quo. However, the EGMI is also not without problems given the complexity associated with 
the harmonisation of national systems, from the diversity of poverty rates across MS which would 
demand important redistribution to the nexus of rights and obligations associated with national 
schemes, notwithstanding the fact that some MS do not even currently have one (Vandenbroucke 
et al. 2013). In face of the limits or difficulties of the two first proposals, a relatively less explored 
idea may bring a new perspective on the problem at hand. 
6.2.3. European universal basic income 
Some advocated a European universal basic income (EUBI) as an ‘apparently more radical [but] 
actually more realistic’ idea to combat poverty on an EU-wide basis (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 
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2017: 235). The EUBI would be distributed by the EU to all Europeans without strings attached 
and supplement national welfare states rather than replace them. Considering the puzzles 
underlying the problem of poverty in the EU, the EUBI presents, at least prima facie, interesting 
features to address the rise of economic insecurity and the shortcomings of social protection 
schemes, and an attractive instrument to address the conundrum of social protection.  
Thanks to its universal coverage and its unconditionality, the universal basic income is generally 
defended as a policy capable of addressing the twin problems of poverty and unemployment as 
well as the shortcomings of existing social protection schemes by coping better with the insecurity 
on flexible labour markets and avoiding the administrative downsides of means-testing or the 
stigma attached to activation policies (see Widerquist et al. 2013 for a review). It is also advocated 
to address gender inequality, both in the private sphere and on the labour market, as a mechanism 
of redistribution of the benefits of technological progress, and as a way to improve individuals’ 
autonomy overall and, thereby, their access to fundamental rights and their social participation. As 
such, the appeal of the basic income stems from its transformational capacity, that is, its apparent 
ability to score relatively well on a large variety of desiderata associated with what a social minimum 
is meant for: providing a decent standard of living considered necessary to actively take part in a 
given society.  
As a European policy, the EUBI’s attractiveness derives, according to its advocates, from its capacity 
to address the tensions involved in European integration. Nearly two decades ago some already 
argued that ‘[t]he latent tensions between competition and cohesion which threaten to undermine 
the wider European project will inevitably require redistribution, between core and peripheral 
nations, between regions and individuals’ and that the EUBI would be ‘one possible vehicle for the 
harmonisation of social security and the creation of an effective mechanism for redistribution on 
a pan-European basis’ (Quilley 2000: 176). As such, some defended it as a right attached to 
European citizenship (Ferry 2000) and others as a way to provide EU citizens with ‘a just minimum’ 
necessary to reduce the deficit of social justice caused by European integration (Viehoff 2016). Yet 
others defended it as an instrument of interpersonal redistribution necessary to support national 
systems of social protection on a systemic level and act as a macroeconomic stabiliser in the EMU 
whilst providing a vector of political support for the European project (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017: 230-241). The EUBI’s unconditionality is seen as facilitating an active EU role 
in social protection: it bypasses the difficulties of harmonisation whilst respecting both the principle 
of subsidiarity and Member States’ welfare diversity (Van Parijs 2006a: 7). In practice, the EUBI 
may be distributed on a per capita basis or be categorical. For instance, some have advocated a 
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European child basic income guarantee (Atkinson 2011) or explored the prospects of a universal 
basic pension (Atkinson et al. 2002; Goedemé and Van Lancker 2009; Vandeninden 2012). 
7. Conclusion 
This first chapter has sought to establish the diagnosis of the problem, understood as the 
continuing inability of the EU to provide effective protection against the risk of poverty. This 
ascertainment has led key commentators to argue that the idea of a European universal basic 
income should be taken seriously. I agree. While the established diagnosis may lead to various 
proposals, this thesis thus proposes to explore the ‘problem resolution’ by analysing the prospects 
of the EUBI which seems able, at least prima facie, to address a wide range of social issues that take 
place within a European context characterised by complex and multi-level interdependencies. Is 
the EUBI a promising route to guarantee a social minimum to all Europeans? To examine its 
potential, the first step consists in clarifying what the universal basic income is and is not, and what 
its main advantages are over its close competitors, before confronting it to a series of objections 
and exploring it further as a distinctive European policy.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 
1. Introduction 
This chapter constitutes the second step of the problem-oriented approach adopted in this 
dissertation by focusing on one particular public policy which may offer a solution to the problem. 
The universal basic income (UBI) – in short, basic income – is a periodic cash payment paid by a 
political community to all its members on an individual basis, without conditions of resources or 
work requirement. It is a persistent idea in discussions regarding social welfare reforms in Europe 
and elsewhere, which re-emerged recently in the context of austerity politics. In face of the 
dominant policy line of social welfare retrenchment, cutbacks of public expenditure and tightening 
of eligibility conditions for welfare recipients, the UBI is typically presented as a radically alternative 
route capable to provide a robust social floor to combat poverty and guarantee social inclusion in 
an emancipatory way by reinvigorating the principle of universalism at the heart of social 
citizenship.  
In light of this, my aim is in this chapter is to provide a clear understanding of the UBI – what is it 
and what is it not? – and clarify why it is a desirable policy in face of the problem of poverty and 
economic insecurity highlighted in chapter one. I adopt a critical stance towards what is commonly 
accepted in the basic income epistemic community by organising, synthetizing and evaluating 
policy-relevant knowledge, such as policy assumptions and definitions, policy alternatives, and 
policy arguments. For the purpose of this discussion and given the available literature on the 
subject, I consider the UBI as a national social policy for now (unless specified otherwise). 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section two, I provide the ‘basics’ of the discussion. I 
contextualise the basic income within the historical genealogy of the broader ‘stakeholding 
paradigm’ and the reasons for its recent topicality, I establish my perspective on the proposal as a 
worthwile policy entitlement in reaction to the current state of affairs rather than a distinctive 
constitutional right, I clarify some semantic aspects to avoid the trap of fuzziness which, too often, 
blurs the discussion, and end by justifying my focus on a basic income in cash rather than in kind. 
In section three, I propose a taxonomy of the UBI and other social minimum alternatives. I provide 
a clear definition of the UBI and its constitutive characteristics in contrast with the guaranteed 
minimum income (GMI) before presenting the main features of other ‘basic income-like’ 
proposals, namely the participation income (PI), the negative income tax (NIT) and the universal 
basic capital (UBC). In section four, I compare these different schemes. I do not defend the UBI 
from a particular conception of social justice. Assuming a UBI set at subsistence level, I argue 
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instead that it provides a better way than its competitors to achieve some important goals of social 
protection, namely economic security and social inclusion, whilst being more emancipatory. 
According to this conditionally prescriptive approach, the UBI emerges as a strong candidate to 
address the problem of poverty which then needs to be further ‘tested’ before envisaging it as a 
European-wide policy, as explained in the conclusion. 
2. The ‘basics’ of the basic income 
The basic income is part of the emergence of the stakeholding paradigm, a relatively new social 
paradigm in welfare theory based on the notion of Universalism, which tries to articulate market 
efficiency with state interventionism by granting ‘stakes’ to individuals to enable them to participate 
in the economy on an equitable and secure basis (Dowding et al. 2003a: 3). In this section, I aim to 
clarify the place of the basic income within this broader stakeholding paradigm and provide the 
fundamentals necessary to pursue the discussion. I start with an outline of the historical genealogy 
of the idea as it is typically presented in the literature and highlight the reasons for its recent 
topicality, before taking a critical look at this historical construction and establishing my views of 
the UBI as a policy potentially desirable in face of the given context. Then, I distinguish between 
the UBI and other related proposals generally associated with the basic income ‘label’ to avoid 
semantic confusion. I close this section with a justification on my focus on a basic income in cash 
rather than in kind. 
2.1. Historical background 
In contemporary contributions on the subject, the basic income is generally proposed as the next 
step in the evolution of models of social solidarity, after the move from Christian charity to public 
assistance and from social assistance to social insurance (Raventós 2007; Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2005, 2017; Standing 2017). This is well captured by Van Parijs (1996b) when he 
suggests that the basic income constitutes a new model founded on fairness which represents a 
stronger form of solidarity than that of the Bismarckian model of insurance and the Beveridgean 
model of assistance. He calls it the Painean model in reference to Thomas Paine’s (1796) proposal 
for a universal basic endowment (see infra). Following this logic of evolution, the genealogy of 
basic income is generally separated in two main parts: its ‘historical antecedents’ (Raventós 2007; 
Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2005) or its ‘prehistory’ on the one hand, and its ‘history’ on the other 
hand (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).  
According to basic income advocates, the idea’s historical antecedents are to be found in Vives’ 
conception of public assistance, in the introduction of the Poor Laws under the Elizabethan era in 
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England, in the development of social insurance from Condorcet to Bismarck, and in the evolution 
of social assistance from Beveridge to our days (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2005: 7-12, 2017: ch. 
3). As for the history of the proposal, its origin is often traced back to Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) 
despite a very tenuous link between his writings and the idea,43 but it is generally agreed that 
Thomas Paine’s basic endowment proposal in Agrarian Justice (1796) is the first radical and 
unambiguous ancestor of the idea. Paine (1796: 10) proposes ‘to create a National Fund, out of 
which there shall be paid to every person, when arrived at the age of twenty one years, the sum of 
fifteen pounds sterling, as a compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural inheritance, by 
the introduction of the system of landed property, and also, the sum of ten pounds per annum, 
during life, to every person now living, of the age of fifty years, and to all others as they shall arrive 
at that age.’ He also suggests what can be understood as a basic pension (i.e. a categorical basic 
income for pensioners): ‘the sum of ten pounds per annum, during life, to every person now living, 
of the age of fifty years, and to all others as they shall arrive at that age’ (Paine 1796: 10). Paine 
justifies his proposal on the grounds that the earth and all that comes out of it is the common 
property of the human race. Those who, through private property, acquire the benefits of it owe a 
dividend to the rest of the community. Paine’s ‘ground-rent’ as he calls it, contains all essential 
features of the UBI except for the fact that it is paid only once at maturity rather than at regular 
intervals.  
Following Paine, others have proposed universal basic capital grants such as Thomas Skidmore 
(1829) or Paul Voituron (1848), but it is Thomas Spence (1797) who is the first to consider a regular 
payment provided at municipal level. Inspired by Charles Fourier’s (1803, 1836) defence of an 
obligation-free but means-tested ‘minimum of abundant subsistence’ to be provided in kind, 
Joseph Charlier (1848), is then first to propose an unconditional ‘territorial dividend’ distributed in 
cash at a national scale. Despite coming from various schools of thought and proposing different 
schemes, all of them have the same point of departure: the surplus rents created by the individual 
property of natural lands and resources should be equally distributed to all to cover everyone’s 
absolute needs. And they are all precursors of a new paradigm of Universalism termed the 
‘stakeholding paradigm’ in the literature (Dowding et al. 2003b). 
 
                                                 
43 One of More’s fictional characters argues that ‘Instead of inflicting these horrible punishments, it would be far more 
to the point to provide everyone with some means of livelihood, so that nobody is under the fruitful necessity of 
becoming, first a thief, and then a corpse.’ (More 1516: 44). But nothing here points to something resembling a UBI. 
It might just as well be possible to assume that More is referring to some kind of conditional minimum income scheme. 
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2.1.1. Three contemporary waves 
After these early proposals in the 18th and 19th Centuries which can be seen as tentative ways to 
respond to the conflicts associated with the emergence of industrial capitalism, a succession of 
waves has marked the evolution of the idea in public debates in the contemporary history, since 
the beginning of the 20th Century. The first wave is to be found in the period between the two 
world wars. It is marked by ‘a coincidence of ripples’ (Widerquist 2016: 1) with support for the idea 
coming sparsely in Great-Britain in the writings of the philosopher and Nobel of literature Bertrand 
Russell (1920), of the engineer Dennis Milner and his wife Mabel Milner (1918) who founded the 
‘State Bonus League’, and of another engineer, Clifford H. Douglas (1924), who advocated a ‘social 
credit’ in the form of a monthly ‘national dividend’ for each household. The economist George 
D.H. Cole (1929) later proposed a ‘social dividend’ and seems to be the first to use the term ‘basic 
income’ in English, since it was already coined in Dutch (basisinkomen) a year before by the first 
Nobel of economics Jan Tinbergen (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2005: 17). The famous 
economist James Meade (1935) also defended the ‘social dividend’ to mitigate the problems of 
unemployment and poverty while Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams (1943) suggested a similar proposal to 
build ‘a new social contract’. 
The second wave started in the 1960’s in the United States and Canada as a consequence of rising 
concerns over structural and technical unemployment (Standing 2017: 15) and focused on the 
negative income tax variant of the idea (see infra). It was led by welfare rights’ activists, futurists 
and leading economists, both from the left and libertarians (Widerquist 2016: 2). For example, 
Martin Luther King (1967) endorsed the idea, which he referred to as a ‘guaranteed income’, the 
right-libertarian Milton Friedman (1962 and 1968) proposed a household-based negative income 
tax set at a low level and replacing all other welfare policies while the liberal James Tobin (1966) 
defended his variant of a ‘credit income tax’ to reconfigure part of existing schemes. During that 
same period, President Nixon proposed his Family Assistance Plan, a variant of the negative 
income tax which did not pass the Senate vote in 1972 (Widerquist 2016: 2). Senator George 
McGovern, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination supported by Tobin and yet 
another famous economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, unsuccessfully founded his campaign on his 
‘demogrant’, a yearly UBI for all Americans (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 91). The 1960’s 
and 1970’s also saw the first large-scale social experiments in the USA and in Canada (Levine et al. 
2005; Widerquist 2005; Forget 2011, 2013) as well as the creation of the Alaska Dividend, which is 
the only basic income programme currently in practice at state level in industrialised countries 
(Widerquist and Howard 2012). With declining political prospects for the ‘basic income guarantee’, 
the second wave ended in the 1980’s. 
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While the idea started to fade away in North America, it began to rise gradually in Europe and 
elsewhere, with a focus on a genuine UBI, this time. Although a few isolated contributions appeared 
already in the 1970’s (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 95-98), the third wave can be said to start 
in 1986 with the creation of the Basic Income European Network (BIEN) (which later became the 
Basic Income Earth Network thanks to the expansion of the debate in the rest of the world), a 
transnational network led by academics advocating a basic income (Standing 2017: 16). Mostly 
confined in the academic realm, the debate grew substantially for thirty years with contributions in 
philosophy, politics, sociology and economics (see Widerquist et al 2013 for an overview).  
2.1.2. A fourth wave? 
It is only after the 2008 financial crisis that the basic income discussion firmly took off, marking 
the beginning of a fourth wave, much bigger in scope than the previous ones. Some have argued 
that this period only marks the take-off of the third wave (Widerquist 2016). It is true that the 
problems which spurred this trend and gained in intensity were generally the same as in the 1980’s 
and one can argue that already existing problems of mass economic insecurity, rising inequality and 
labour displacement through the rise of robotics and automation simply became more visible and 
more urgent to tackle. Yet, I contend that four mutually reinforcing elements justify the existence 
of a separate wave. First, there is a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ 2008, since the economic and financial 
crisis shed light on the limits of the global financial system, on the problems of private and public 
debt accumulation, as well as on the need for welfare reforms in a context of rising poverty and 
market vulnerability. The crisis is followed by the beginning of a new political turn marked by an 
era of austerity which reinforced this rupture. It is against this background that the UBI emerged 
as an alternative to welfare retrenchment. This is the view taken by Jurgen De Wispelaere, a known 
advocate of UBI, when he explains the reasons behind the recent ‘elevation’ of the idea: 
 [T]he interest in basic income could be seen as an attempt to square the austerity circle: the need 
for a policy that combines robust minimum income protection with the modernisation of welfare 
programme complexity, while retaining a strong focus on labour market activation and human 
capital-building as per the ‘social investment’ agenda. Instead of focusing on the decommodifiying 
effect of basic income – separating income from work – policy makers are emphasising its ability to 
combat poverty, unemployment and bureaucracy traps. In this perspective, basic income is not 
viewed as a utopian alternative to the welfare state, but to the contrary, a key instrument in its long-
term survival by allowing the minimum income floor to be mainstreamed and modernized. (De 
Wispelaere 2017: 25-26) 
Second, the recent re-emergence of the idea has managed to attract and gather support across the 
political spectrum. By regrouping an ideological melting pot – better coined in French as ‘auberge 
espagnole idéologique’ (Moatti 2015: 6) – regrouping libertarians, conservatives, liberals, Keynesians, 
ecologists, anti-capitalists, etc. under a façade of unity using the same basic income ‘label’ (see 
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section 2.3.), the diversity of policy proposals (projects actually widely diverge when one takes a 
closer look at the objectives of welfare reform that underlie them, their ethical foundations, or the 
modalities of policy implementation) paradoxically acted as a driver of the last wave’s success 
(Widequist 2016). In other words, the fuzziness of the basic income discussion has contributed to 
its development and democratisation, if not in depth, at least in breadth. This is why many argue, 
paraphrasing Victor Hugo’s famous words, that the basic income is ‘an idea whose time has come’ 
(Reed and Lansley 2016). It must be noted, however, that this is also a source of weakness. 
Conceived as an abstract proposal – what Walter Van Trier (1995) refers to as the ‘minimal model’ 
– that is, one supposedly freed from ideological justifications, the basic income might be able to 
attract a range of political support far broader than many other social policy proposals. But the 
very fact that other political groups might support the idea is equally a source of opposition, as one 
political camp might associate the idea with a ‘trojan horse’ coming from its opponents (this is a 
typical view on the Left, as shown in the next section). Moreover, the moment an actual 
implementation becomes possible such that basic income supporters have to choose between 
alternative proposals, the pro-UBI consensus will disappear to leave place to divergences as wide 
as the political spectrum that supports it (Reed and Lansley 2016: 21). 
A third reason is found in the development of the new means of communication. In particular, the 
emergence of social networks made it possible for the idea to travel fast easily and gain visibility. 
The democratisation of knowledge, accompanied by the opportunities rendered possible by 
technological innovations, provided a favourable environment for activism. The most notable 
illustrations of this new momentum include citizens initiatives in Switzerland and at EU level, the 
creation of multiple local, national and supranational activist networks, a massive rise of 
publications on the subject and the launch of new experiments across the world. The recent 
politicisation of the UBI reached a climax with the French socialist (and unfortunate) candidate’s 
proposal for a UBI policy reform in the 2017 presidential elections (Hamon 2017).  
Finally, the last element explaining this unprecedented political, media and public interest is found 
in the most recent launch of a series of basic income-related experimental projects, which gave to 
2017 the title of ‘year of the pilots’.44 It is also notable that, while North-American experiments of 
the 1970’s mainly tried to test whether the UBI would negatively impact the labour supply, it is 
precisely the contrary that is at the center of current experiments sparheaded by Finland and The 
                                                 
44 On the Finnish pilot, see Kangas (2016), Kangas, Simanainen and Honkanen (2017) and Kela (2017). On the Dutch 
experiment, see Groot and Verlaat (2017) and Mc Farland (2017b). See also B-MINCOME (2017) and McFarland 
(2017a) on pilots in Spain, Kaplan (2016) for Italy, Segal (2016) and Basic Income Ontario (2017) for Canada, Altman 
(2016) for the US and Roberts (2017) for Scotland. Pilots are also under examination in France (Percheron 2016). 
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Netherlands, mainly aim to study whether and how a basic income (or closely related policies) may 
actually favour a return to employment.45 
2.2. The UBI as a policy instrument 
2.2.1. Escaping the teleological view 
Whilst I consider it both legitimate and fruitful to locate the basic income in the long-term history 
of responses to the social question, the framing of the historical backdrop into a double genealogy 
‘prehistory / history’ is weakened by a teleological vision of its advent (Denuit and Sabaté 2018). 
This is not to say that the UBI is an instrument at the service of a final cause defined by a 
perfectionist conception of the good life. Rather, ‘teleological’ is meant here in the sense that the 
the historical narrative employed transforms what is a contemporary political project into the 
inescapable and ineluctable advent of the essence of a generic basic income. Indeed, the historical 
approach often taken – ‘the historical sketch of the context in which the idea has emerged and into 
which it will have to fit if it is ever to be realised’ (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 69, my emphasis) 
– seems to portray the UBI as the logical, necessary, and ultimate state of a long historical evolution 
of social minimum policies. Such a view supposes, implicitly, that the UBI has always been the 
finality of systems of social protection, that it has always had a definite essence which has grown 
independently of the construction of the welfare state.  
The integration of a great variety of projects – such as Paine’s view of a common ownership of 
natural resources, Fourier’s utopian socialist proposal or Friedman’s free market perspective, into 
a single historical construction tending towards the dawn of the basic income is vulnerable to 
certain critics. It is sometimes argued that basic income advocates have constructed their own 
mythology ex post and uprooted from the pregnancy of social struggles (Alaluf 2014; Alaluf and 
Zamora 2017). In Against the basic income46, Daniel Zamora writes: 
In reality, as any political idea, the basic income has endowed itself with its own mythology, 
constructed, of course, a posteriori, and claims today an idealized history dating back to the sixteenth 
century. The reconstruction of a filiation more than dubious from an intellectual point of view – 
not to say totally fictitious – is, indeed, a way to build in legitimacy ideas that are more recent that 
one would like to make it seem… Far from constructed stories, the idea of basic income could only 
emerge through the questioning of post-war institutions of social security and the social project they 
carried (Zamora 2017: 13-14, my translation). 
                                                 
45 On North-American experiments in the 1970’s, see Robins (1985), Burtless (1986), Ashenfelter and Plant (1990), 
Hum and Simpson (1991), Levine et al (2005), Widerquist (2005), Forget (2011, 2013), and Simpson, Mason and 
Godwin (2017). See also Marinescu (2017) for a review of different kinds of basic income-like experiments. 
46 My translation of the French title Contre l’allocation universelle. 
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The long-term historical approach deployed by basic income supporters is thus, according to 
Zamora, a way to provide an illusion of permanency that hinders any genuine ‘historicisation’ in 
the recent past. For him, it is intrinsically linked to the gradual emergence of neoliberalism as shown 
by its intimate relationship with the concept of negative income tax, supported by Milton Friedman 
to bring the social institutions of redistribution to the minimum, minimorum, and its rising success 
since the 1980’s. Rather than being the ultimate version of a long development of social institutions, 
it is the logical alternative to their suppression in times of crisis, a way to build trans-partisan 
bridges, abandoning the left-wing - right-wing divide articulated along the choice between ‘more 
state’ or ‘more market’, in the name of a meritocratic logic based on a philosophy of equal 
opportunities which substitutes the social struggle against inequality for the eradication of absolute 
poverty (Zamora 2017: 28-33). As such, the basic income is an idea which periodically emerged in 
times of economic and social regression and support for austerity since 1945, as its recent return 
in public debates is supposed to demonstrate. 
While Zamora’s critical approach might be right in the parallel made between the cycle of crises 
and the contemporary waves of interest in basic income, considering it solely as a neoliberal 
instrument designed to call the post-war social model into question is both reductive and truncated. 
But to resist the argument, the UBI must not be portrayed as the generic version of a welfare state 
2.0 which essence has always been there, waiting to germinate. Such a view is, as was shown, 
vulnerable to the idea that it masks, in fact, its ‘true’ neoliberal ambitions. Instead, by detaching the 
historical problematisation from its telos and by insisting on the basic income’s relevance to the 
contemporary crisis of the welfare state, the UBI can emerge as an instrument of response to 
neoliberal dynamics of welfare retrenchment and rising conditionalisation of social assistance 
(Denuit and Sabaté 2018). Such a response can then be apprehended with all the various normative 
and practical dimensions that underpin different views of the basic income, which often drastically 
differ and have considerably different consequences whether one approaches it ‘from the left’ or 
‘from the right’ (Gorz 1987). As noted by Fitzpatrick, ‘the character, significance and effects of a 
basic income would depend substantially upon the nature of the ideological social environment 
within which it was implemented’ (Fitzpatrick 1999: 5). This is also emphasised by De Wispelaere 
and Stirton (2004: 267) who note: ‘It is a mistake to assume that a universal basic income would 
operate in something resembling an institutional vacuum. To the extent that fine-tuned distinctions 
also produce distinctive outcomes, both normative and empirically driven research ought to take 
differential design features seriously’. 
 
   80 
2.2.2. An entitlement as a matter of policy 
In light of this, my understanding of the UBI’s political relevance in contemporary debates on 
social welfare is primarily a reactive one, desirable for the broad range of social objectives it might 
help achieve (Fitzpatrick 1999: 46). In other words, I consider that the UBI is of particular interest 
to this dissertation’s purposes as a potential policy reponse to the social ills and their particular 
ideological and institutional context, as presented in chapter one. 
This is important as it means that my perspective on the UBI fundamentally differs from those 
who hold that basic income constitutes a distinctive legal right (see De Wispelaere and Morales 
2016 for a discussion). I contend that such an approach confounds a means with an end. My point 
of departure assumes entitlement to the UBI as a matter of policy. This means that I examine it is as 
a policy instrument that offers a suitable way to guarantee social rights attached to citizenship. In 
other words, I do not consider that there is a right to the universal basic income but, rather, a 
universal right to a decent standard of living (i.e. to the social minimum), to which the (E)UBI may 
contribute thanks to its ‘preferential relation to the conjunctive set of social rights or social goals 
[welfare state institutions are] under obligation to promote’ (De Wispelaere and Morales 2016: 11). 
It is thus in the sense of a policy entitlement that I shall refer, in loose terms, to ‘a right to the UBI’ 
or a ‘a citizenship-based right’. 
It is now necessary to conclude this section with two final clarifications, before turning to the 
precise contours of this particular policy and confronting it to other closely-related proposals. The 
first one is semantic and is required in light of the fuzziness of the debate mentioned earlier. The 
second concerns my position on the on-going debate opposing two different views on the 
provision of universal and unconditional social transfers, namely whether these should be made in 
cash or in kind. 
2.3. The basic income ‘label’ 
The term ‘basic income’ seems to be used as a ‘label’ or a brand pointing towards somewhat 
different proposals. I do not use the term label to point to the existence of an overarching type 
giving way to various tokens in a vertical fashion but, rather, to highlight the interchangeable use 
of the same ‘stamp’ as a synonym for many different names, in a horizontal way. It points, from 
the outside, to proposals generally considered to be akin to each other, but which can nevertheless 
differ in fundamental aspects. The merge of terminologies under the basic income label, fuelled by 
advocates and opponents alike, is a source of confusion that I now want to avoid, before 
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proceeding further. I do not claim to provide an exhaustive view of the terms used in the literature 
but clarify briefly those that are most commonly employed in contemporary discussions.  
Without surprise, I start with the most common name, the basic income. It is often used in opposition 
to the conventional forms of conditional and selective minimum income protection. This is why 
the basic income is also often called unconditional basic income or universal basic income. The former is 
used to highlight the absence of any behavioural or income conditions for entitlement. The latter 
emphasises the fact that the payment is distributed equally to everyone regardless of household 
composition and financial situation. The term social dividend points to the same proposal in design 
but insists on the collective character of wealth. It conveys the idea of an individual right of 
inheritance of the wealth accumulated by society, a claim in the redistribution of the proceeds of 
natural resources, knowledge accumulation and technical innovation, or other external assets such 
as jobs. The terms universal dividend or state bonus are (or were) used to refer to a similar 
understanding, while the term demogrant suggests a link between democracy and income security.47 
In a similar vein, some use the terms citizen’s income, citizenship income, or citizen’s wage either as a 
generic term similar to the basic income (such that it regroups many variants), or to stress the link 
between citizenship and the right to a decent standard of living capable of ensuring social and 
political participation, in opposition to conditional forms of transfers. In this former sense, the 
term citizenship is used by some in a broad way, such that all living in a political community are 
considered participating in the life of the polis. For others, it is meant in a literal sense as a right 
attached to nationality.  
In the 1970’s, experiments conducted in North America referred to a guaranteed annual income in the 
form of a negative income tax (NIT), that is, a form of guaranteed income without work requirement 
but (generally) dependent on the household’s financial status and paid as a tax credit at the end of 
the fiscal year. The basic income guarantee, a popular term in the United States, is yet another name 
often used interchangeably to refer to both a basic income and a negative income tax. Similarly, the 
term basic income is also often used somewhat imprecisely to refer to other ideas which supposedly 
belong to the ‘same family’ of proposals, including the negative income tax but also the idea of a 
lump-sum capital grant, termed universal basic capital (UBC) or stakeholder grant, and the participation 
income (PI), an income distributed if a condition of social participation is met. 
                                                 
47 In French, the English translation of universal basic income, revenu universel de base is more and more popular but the 
older expression allocation universelle has the advantage of capturing this double meaning of universal payment and 
individual stake on the commons. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, I refer to the universal basic income (UBI) because it is a popular 
term in European policy debates, it insists on serving the purpose of basic economic security and 
captures well the ‘social dividend’ or citizenship-based dimension, often used as a justification for 
it, through its emphasis on universality. For simplicity, then, I shall continue to use the terms basic 
income and UBI interchangeably. Finally, to contrast the UBI with other proposals imprecisely 
coined under the basic income label, I use the expression basic income-like as an umbrella term for 
all schemes considered relevant in the basic income epistemic community because of some essential 
features they share with the UBI, such as the absence of work-related requirements or their 
universal coverage (i.e. UBC, PI and NIT). Before looking at the UBI and basic income-like 
proposals more closely, I turn to one last preliminary clarification. 
2.4. Why not in kind? 
There is an ongoing debate opposing those who favour a basic income in cash and those who 
defend universal transfers in kind or, in more appropriate terms, universal basic services (UBS). 
This discussion is not so much about the basic income versus the provision of public services as 
they currently stand since the UBI as a replacement of the entire welfare state is an option only 
envisaged in right-libertarian versions of the basic income (see e.g. Murray 2006). Rather, the debate 
is about whether the answer to current problems of the welfare state should be based in priority on 
the provision of a universal income or on the improvement of the quality of existing universal services 
(Bergmann 2004) and their extension to other services such as transport and telecommunications 
(Portes, Reed and Percy 2017), or housing, water and energy (Liegey et al. 2013). 
In-kind provisions are defended on various grounds (see e.g Hausman et al. 2017: 154-158 for a 
discussion). For instance, some contend that a mild paternalistic approach is more efficient to reach 
those in need and make sure that their basic needs are actually met, whilst ensuring optimal 
spending of public resources (Portes, Reed and Percy 2017). By providing free education, for 
example, a government avoids the risk of parents’ sub-optimal spending on their children’s 
education (Vanderborght 2014: 215). By contrast, a presumption in favour of cash, so as the 
argument goes, respects liberal neutrality by allowing each individual as much choice as possible 
with respect to its goals and projects, maximises individual freedom by providing what ‘a rational 
man wants whatever else he wants’ (Rawls 1971: 92) and thereby allocates resources in an efficient 
way, that is, one capable of satisfying a wide range of preferences in a context of limited information 
(Vanderborght 2014: 217). For many, this is valid insofar as some prior essential goods have been 
provided for (e.g. a legal system of rights and entitlements, basic systems of education and 
healthcare). Thus, universal income and universal services need not be incompatible. Indeed, some 
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UBS proponents consider them as complementary (Liegey et al. 2013; Portes, Reed and Percy 
2017). Similarly, many UBI advocates hold, as noted by Vanderborght (2014: 219), that ‘the 
introduction of a universal benefit in cash is, of course, fully compatible with the maintenance and 
even the reinforcement of universal benefits in kind, such as free basic education, free healthcare 
or free access to public services in general’. 
Against this backdrop, I do not consider in-kind and in-cash policies as mutually exclusive. 
However, besides the fact that I wish to analyse a particular proposal made by other scholars – that 
of an EU-wide basic income – my focus on the UBI rather than UBS derives from three other 
interrelated reasons. First, income plays a key role in poverty reduction (which includes income 
adequacy) as also recognised by critiques of resourcist approaches, such as Sen who writes: ‘the 
[notion of poverty as capability inadequacy and poverty as lowness of income] cannot but be 
related, since income is such an important means to capabilities’ (Sen 1999: 90). A focus on income 
is also an appreciation of the conflicting nature of money as a medium of exchange in a monetized 
world. While recognizing that money is not necessarily in itself a source of the kind of socialisation 
deemed essential for individual development, it is nevertheless essential when threats of money 
loss, whether perceived or real, impact relations of socio-economic dependence (Haagh 2015: 51). 
Second, I am concerned with the role the EU can play to address the problem of poverty. Whilst 
an EU-wide provision of in-kind benefits may not be impossible in abstracto, it seems to be far more 
irrealistic than a European-wide basic income. Third, the strength of a universal and unconditional 
income lies in its potential capacity to contribute to a wide range of social objectives, from 
supporting economic security and social inclusion at individual level to the support of national 
welfare systems on a systemic level, offering thereby an interesting approach of the puzzles inherent 
to the social dimension of European integration. For similar reasons, I do not consider proposals 
such as wage subsidies or job guarantees which are focused on augmenting wages or favouring 
employment levels.48 My interest is, rather, in the role the EU may take in the provision of a social 
minimum guaranteed by transfers. 
3. A taxonomy of the UBI and its alternatives 
Now that the basics of the discussion are set, the next step is to define the characteristics of the 
UBI and other basic income-like schemes in order to justify the reasons behind my focus on the 
                                                 
48 Wage subsidies focus on the recruitment of low-paid and low-skilled workers by providing incentives to employers. 
For a comparative approach of the UBI and wage subsidies, see van der Veen (2004) and Van Parijs and Vanderborght 
(2017: 44-45). The job guarantees refers to the state playing the role of ‘employer of last resort’. Some hold that it 
should be considered in priority to the UBI, although they are complementary rather than competing proposals 
(Harvey 2005) while others content that the UBI is superior and more desirable in securing both economic security 
and the ‘right to work’ (Standing 2005; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 46-48). 
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UBI rather than one of its close competitors. This section thus aims to establish a taxonomy of the 
forms of the kinds of social minimum relevant to our purposes, before turning to a comparative 
approach in the next section. 
Why taxonomise? A taxonomy offers a number of advantages (Bailey 1994: 11-14). It helps to 
reduce complexity as it allows the condensation of information into simplified tables to provide a 
descriptive tool facilitating the researcher’s understanding of how a policy proposal fares according 
to one dimension or the other. It also helps to identify the similarities among and the differences 
between the cases considered. Finally, by establishing an exhaustive list of dimensions relevant for 
comparative purposes, a classification allows the researcher or policy maker to study the superiority 
of one scheme over the others. The approach undertaken rests on a conceptual and 
multidimensional classification, in the sense that proposals are separated according to conceptual 
characteristics rather than empirical ones. It relies on Weber’s (1947) notion of the ideal type (i.e. an 
extreme representation of the dimensions considered), which serves as the ultimate criterion type 
by which any empirical case can then be confronted. Ideal types serve as yardsticks to establish 
multidimensional classifications and to facilitate comparisons between concrete cases by measuring 
their deviation from the exemplar. As such, the taxonomy plays the role of a heuristic device 
advancing understanding through the identification of key theoretical characteristics of types, the 
description of their similarities and differences, and the reduction of complexity thanks to a 
structured system of classification. To establish the taxonomy, I start by identifying the various 
dimensions according to which the schemes selected will then be distinguished before classifying 
the social minimum ideal-types according to these dimensions. 
3.1. Identifying the dimensions 
The operation of division of proposals into distinct categories relies on a specific basis for 
distinction, referred to as the fundamentum divisionis (Marradi 1990: 132). Drawing from De 
Wispelaere and Stirton (2004)’s suggestion, it is possible to identify eight principal dimensions or 
fundamenta divisionis that one should take into consideration: Universality, Individuality, 
Conditionality, Adequacy, Uniformity, Frequency, Duration and Modality.49 Some have been 
touched upon in my definition of the UBI but a few elements need to be added here for clarity: 
within each of these overarching dimension, I identify opposite pairs of properties to help further 
differentiate proposals. 
                                                 
49 This section relies on De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004). However, they consider seven principal dimensions as they 
treat frequency and duration as one dimension whilst, for clarity, I separate them into two distinctive ones. 
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The first dimension, ‘universality’, points to the scope of the population covered. In a broad sense, 
a policy is universal if it covers all members of a political community (or all members of a sub-
category of the population), irrespective of income or wealth consideration or other forms of 
targeting. It can be seen in opposition to selective measures which target a specific subset of the 
population according to specific criteria, the means-test in particular. Another pair opposes a broad 
and a narrow understanding of citizenship: all residents (broad) or citizens only (narrow).50 At a 
European level, these considerations remain valid: a universal policy could include all legal residents 
within the EU or target EU citizens only. 
‘Individuality’ refers to the assessment unit considered, which generally distinguishes between 
individuals and households. In most countries, the standard unit is the household, even though its 
definition may vary. For instance, whilst common residence is generally taken as reference, 
households can also be defined according to spending patterns, blood ties or marriage, or sustained 
dependence relationship. 
The third dimension, ‘conditionality’, refers to the restrictions imposed on eligibility. Five different 
characteristics should be considered here. A first pair concerns the nature of conditionality, which 
distinguishes between constraints on resources (i.e. means-testing) and behavioural constraints. For 
classificatory purposes, I oppose means-tested versus non-means-tested and work-conditional 
versus non-work-conditional. Based on the stringency of these conditions, the scheme will be more 
or less inclusive. A second pair thus opposes narrow to broad conditionality. The level of 
inclusiveness of the social minimum is linked to the first dimension of universality, as the broader 
the set of conditions, the more inclusive (or the less selective) the social minimum will be. One 
should also distinguish between ex ante and ex post conditionality. Ex ante conditionality refers to 
the set of criteria that a person must satisfy to be eligible whereas ex post conditionality refers to the 
(behavioural) conditions a person must satisfy in order to retain eligibility. Strict and weak 
conditionality refer respectively to a clear institutionalisation of the rules and duties or to a certain 
level of administrative discretion in the enforcement of the conditions. Finally, conditionality can 
be formal or hidden (or implied). Formal conditionality points to the official restrictions on eligibility. 
Hidden conditionality concerns the way external contingencies might introduce incentives or 
discrimination between recipients. For example, if the amount of the UBI is adjusted according to 
macroeconomic performances (e.g. indexed on the growth of GDP), its level will decrease if 
productivity falls or if voluntary unemployment rises. Such a system thus introduces an incentive 
                                                 
50 One may also ask: are these citizens also residents or would they be entitled to the benefit even if they lived abroad? 
For now, I assume, for simplicity, that they are residents in the political community concerned by the proposal. 
   86 
to contribute to national production to maintain collectively a sufficient level for minimum income 
support. However, these two last characteristics (strict vs weak and formal vs hidden) can only be 
adequately assessed at the level of fine-grained proposals. 
‘Adequacy’ refers to the level of support and whether it is sufficient to cover the basic economic 
and social needs of its beneficiaries, approximated by the standard poverty line (AROP). In other 
words, a social minimum is full if it is set at subsistence level (or above) or partial if it is not.  
‘Uniformity’ points to the fact that the amount distributed can be the same for all (uniform) or can 
vary according to some differentiation criteria (differential). For instance, there can be different levels 
for different sub-sets of the population, according to household composition or age discrimination. 
Discrimination of this sort constitutes a form of ex-ante conditionality. The level of the social 
minimum can also be constant or degressive as other sources of income are earned. It is degressive 
when support is progressively lowered in proportion to new income inflows until it reaches a 
certain threshold. At this cut-off point, the social minimum provided by transfers may be 
completely withdrawn. 
The ‘frequency’ dimension distinguishes between proposals in favour of a one-shot payment (i.e. 
recipients receive a capital stock at a certain age), and those who favour a regular flux of income. 
Regular payments can themselves be distinguished according to the timing of payments, such that 
it can be paid on a weekly, monthly or annual basis.  
The ‘duration’ of payments can also be permanent or temporary. A time-limit can be linked to age 
discrimination, such that a child allowance stops when arriving at maturity for example. Making 
the social transfer temporary can also be considered as a way to combat free-riding and produce 
an incentive for active job search. In this sense, duration plays the role of a hidden condition. Here, 
I refer to a temporary proposal when it is pre-established that its payments follow a time-constraint. 
The last dimension, ‘modality’, refers to three main sub-properties. First, a social minimum can be 
introduced according to a residual or an institutional conception of welfare policy (Groot 2004: 4). A 
residual model is based on the principle of self-reliance: basic institutions (family and market) are 
capable of satisfying the basic needs of the population and the state intervenes only when these 
institutions fail. By contrast, an institutional system recognizes that basic institutions are incapable 
of providing for the population’s basic means and institutionalises a socially guaranteed income 
floor below which nobody can fall. The second aspect points to the institutional design of the 
support scheme. The latter can be complementary to other social insurance and social assistance 
schemes or in-kind provisions, or it can be (partly) substitutive such that it replaces (part of) other 
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social benefits. Finally, it consists in the distinction between a transfer that is done ex-ante which is 
done without any information about disposable resources and a transfer payment done ex-post, 
which is based on the result of the means-test. 
 
 
Table 2 regroups all these pairs under their overarching dimension. The first range in colour shows 
the main fundamentum divisionis for each dimension. The other properties in pairs can be used to 
distinguish proposals at the ideal-type level but most of them become essential when identifying 
and comparing specific proposals for policy design and implementation in a particular institutional 
setting. 
3.2. The UBI 
Before looking at how these various dimensions apply to basic income-like proposals, I start with 
a definition of the UBI and a clarification of its main characteristics. The basic income shares the 
fact that it is paid in cash rather than in kind and on a regular basis (be it weekly, monthly or 
annually) with existing forms of social safety net, represented at the ideal-type level by the 
guaranteed minimum income (GMI). However, it is typically defined as a radical departure from 
the GMI since its main properties are the opposite of the GMI’s means-tested, work-conditional 
and household-based features. I use the following working definition:  
The UBI is a periodic cash payment paid by a political community to all its members on an individual 
basis, without conditions of resources or work requirement. 
This definition contains three essential characteristics: it is universal, unconditional and individual. 
It is universal in the sense that it is granted to all members of a political community but the 
definition of such a political community can vary. Generally, the UBI is proposed at the level of 
Table 2: Dimensions and properties of the taxonomy 
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the nation-state. However, I consider here that the UBI is paid by a juridical-political entity that 
can be organised at a smaller level such as a region or municipality, or at a higher supranational 
level such as the European Union (Van Parijs 2006b: 9-10; Raventós 2007: 9). Similarly, there are 
more or less inclusive conceptions of what membership and universality mean.51 For some, only 
citizens can be considered as members of the political community and the basic income is a right 
attached to citizenship (see e.g. Ferry 1995, 2000). For others, it includes long-term legal residents 
and exclude citizens living abroad, or rely on a condition of fiscal residence, which excludes 
undocumented migrants, diplomats and people working in supranational organisations not 
subjected to national personal income tax (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 9). Whether 
universality is understood in a more or less inclusive conception, it is what gives the UBI the 
distinctive characteristic of a citizenship-based transfer since it is distributed to all citizens qua 
citizens, that is, in virtue of their membership of a political community, in contrast with other 
principles such as desert or need.52 The basic income also has a passive and an active citizenship-
based dimension: its passive ingredient rests on the fact that a formal status (nationality or legal 
residence) is sufficient for entitlement; its active dimension points to the unconditional provision 
of means to act as full citizen.53 
Universality can also be used in a broad or narrow sense according to the age dimension. While a 
broad understanding of universality considers that the UBI should be given to all from ‘cradle to 
grave’, it may be restricted to categories of the population (e.g. adults, active population, young 
people, or children only). In an even narrower sense, the UBI can be restricted according to a 
sectorial approach; an ‘agrarian’ basic income for example would be distributed to farmers only. I 
shall consider here that, in principle, the UBI is a lifelong payment and use the expression 
‘categorical UBI’ to refer to a proposal restricting the universality of payments to a certain age 
category or specific sector. Most fundamentally, the UBI is universal in the sense that it is paid 
irrespective of the financial situation. It is not designed to target a specific subset of the population 
living under a certain threshold of resources but distributed to rich and poor alike (at least ex ante, 
since according to the funding scheme, high income earners may be net contributors ex post).  
                                                 
51 Of course, the broadest understanding of universality includes all human beings but in the absence of a global form 
of government, a worldwide UBI (arguably) remains a distant possibility. 
52 Access to a social minimum can be justified according to different principles such as desert (i.e. because of previous 
efforts and contributions, one is entitled to benefits), need (i.e. living below a certain threshold of resources is a 
sufficient condition) or, for lack of a better word, citizenship (i.e. everyone must be guaranteed certain resources to act 
as a full member of society). For instance, the principles of desert, need and citizenship respectively govern social 
insurance benefits, social assistance benefits and the provision of free public services. 
53 My understanding of ‘active citizenship’ differs from that of Fitzpatrick (1999: 15) for example, for whom it points 
to the duty to reciprocate in return for the benefits received. Chapter three is dedicated to this issue. 
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This is linked with the second essential feature of the UBI, its unconditionality. The UBI is 
unconditional in two main aspects. First, in the sense already mentioned that it is granted without 
any condition of resources (i.e. recipients do not have to show proof that their income is below a 
specified threshold to benefit from it). Contrasting with minimum income schemes which operate 
ex post on the basis of a prior assessment of the recipient’s resources, the UBI is distributed ex ante 
without means-testing. The second meaning of unconditionality refers to the absence of 
behavioural conditions. The GMI typically requires beneficiaries to accept training, accept a job or 
prove willingness to work to be eligible for payment. By contrast, the UBI is obligation-free. I 
distinguish resource constraints from behavioural constraints but employ the term unconditional 
to point more specifically to the absence of behavioural obligations, as it is widely used in the 
literature. 
The UBI’s reference unit for payment is the individual. The UBI is paid to each individual rather 
than to the household as a whole. The level of payment is also constant, uniform and paid 
irrespective of the household’s size and composition. Minimum income beneficiaries, on the 
contrary, receive different amounts if they are living alone, if they have dependents or if they simply 
share a roof, and payments can be degressive or time-constrained. The combination of its three 
essential features – individuality, universality and unconditionality – make the UBI a preventative 
social policy in contrast to existing policies, which operate in an ameliorative way (Dowding et al. 
2003a: 3). 
As concerns the ‘adequacy’ dimension, the level of the UBI is a matter of controversy and was not 
included in the definition on purpose. For some, the term ‘basic’ refers to the satisfaction of basic 
needs such that the UBI should be pitched at a sufficient level – the subsistence level – to provide each 
individual with a decent or adequate standard of living (see e.g. Barry 2001, Raventós 2007 for a 
defence of this view). For others, ‘basic’ means ‘basic economic security, not total security or 
affluence’ (Standing 2017: 3). According to this view, the UBI could start at a level insufficient to 
meet one’s basic needs, be complemented by other conditional benefits and be gradually increased. 
For yet others, the UBI can either fall short or exceed what is considered adequate, the relevant 
criterion being instead that the UBI should be pitched at the ‘highest sustainable level’ (see Van 
Parijs 1995: ch. 2 for a discussion). I refer to a ‘full’ UBI (or subsistence UBI) when it is set at the 
subsistence level (or higher) and to a ‘partial’ UBI when its amount is set underneath that level.  
With respect to the last four dimensions, the UBI is a permanent rather than temporary policy, and 
it typically involves uniform constant payments transferred on a regular basis. However, it can 
involve differential payments according to age segmentation, but these would remain constant and 
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uniform in each category. If the UBI replaces most existing social transfers (whether assistance or 
insurance schemes), it can be considered as a substitutive policy. A partial UBI added to the existing 
welfare provisions (and replacing only some of them which are no longer considered relevant) 
would on the contrary be a complementary policy. It is institutional rather than residual as it 
evacuates the principle of self-reliance and provides all individuals with basic social security on the 
basis of citizenship (whether understood in broad or narrow terms). 
3.3. Basic income-like proposals 
As already emphasised, my concern is with those kinds of social minimum that are guaranteed by 
transfers. I consider here the participation income (PI), the negative income tax (NIT) and the 
universal basic capital (UBC). The choice of selection of these schemes rests on their intention to 
provide minimum income security to all individuals, including those who fall outside the labour 
market and for their relevance in the basic income literature, which considers them ‘akin to the 
UBI’ (Raventòs 2007), as its ‘cousins’ (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017) or as one of ‘the many 
faces’ of basic income (De Wispelaere and Stirton 2004). 
The Participation Income (PI), proposed by Anthony Atkinson (1993, 1996, 2011, 2015), does not 
rely on means-testing and takes the individual as assessment unit. It relies on a work-test based on 
a broad criterion of social participation (i.e. a form of ex-ante conditionality) which includes 
people working as an employee or self-employed, absent from work on grounds of sickness or 
injury, unable to work on grounds of disability and unemployed but available for work, [but also] 
people engaging in approved forms of education or training, caring for young, elderly or disabled 
dependents or undertaking approved forms of voluntary work, etc. The condition involves neither 
payment nor work; it is a wider definition of social contribution. (Atkinson 1996: 68) 
In Atkinson’s perspective, the PI should not replace social security but complement it (i.e. it is an 
institutional and complementary type of scheme). It can be full or partial, it is paid on a regular 
basis and it is permanent so long as the social participation criterion is met. Concerning the age 
dimension, the PI is aimed at adults only in Atkinson’s version while children are entitled to a child 
UBI. It can be based on a broad or narrow understanding of citizenship but Atkinson does not 
stipulate what his preference is for. 
The Negative Income Tax (NIT) is a socially guaranteed income capable of completing or replacing 
other sources of income by paying a premium or bonus in the form of a refundable tax credit. For 
the Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman (1962, 1968), the NIT is designed to replace all social 
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transfers (i.e. a substitutive policy)54 but it can also supplement other social welfare provisions (i.e. 
a complementary policy). Since the fiscal unit is currently based on the household, NIT advocates 
often take the same reference but recent proposals that fit under this ideal type rely on the 
individual (see e.g. de Basquiat and Koenig 2014). It requires a prior assessment of the households’ 
or individual’s fiscal declaration, as would any other means-tested fiscal regime, and is thus 
calculated and distributed ex post. It is thus selective in this resource-conditional sense, but is not 
based on any behavioural constraints such that it provides a guaranteed universal floor 
unconditionally when resources fall below a certain threshold. This is why some have referred to it 
as an instrument of ‘universal means-testing’ (Fitzpatrick 1999: 75). Its amount is not uniform since 
it is inversely proportional to other incomes earned (i.e. it is a degressive measure). The NIT is a 
regular and permanent cash payment as long as the means-test requires it. 
The Universal Basic Capital (UBC), also often called basic endowment, basic capital grant, 
stakeholder grant or citizen’s stake is a universal grant of money paid to all citizens (generally 
focused on a narrow conception of citizenship) on an individual basis at their maturity (Dowding 
et al. 2003b; Ackerman and Alstott 1999 and 2006; Paxton et al. 2006).55 Defined as a ‘seed’ capital, 
it involves a one-shot uniform payment which amount is generally substantial and paid ex ante given 
the absence of means-test. It may rely on broad forms of conditionality related to education 
requirements or the absence of criminal background for instance (as in Ackerman and Alstott 
1999), but it is non-work-conditional. 
Table 3 summarizes all the characteristics of all ideal types according to the different pairs identified 
within each fundamentum divisionis. As this synthetic table shows, certain dimensions have not 
been categorically defined. For example, I have not associated the different types of social 
minimum with a specific choice regarding recipients (i.e. between a broad and a narrow 
understanding of citizenship), nor have I settled for a full or partial version of each scheme, which 
leaves the question of the complementarity or substitutivity open as well. These characteristics 
depend on the justification associated with the scheme and the institutional context of 
implementation. The signs > and >> represent a sub-category whereas the / shows that both 
properties can be found within proposals. 
 
                                                 
54 Friedman’s NIT scheme consists of a flat rate tax credit, coupled with a linear income taxation. Roughly, he proposes 
to implement a single system juxtaposing a negative income tax for the lower incomes and a progressive income tax 
for those above a certain income level (the break-even point) (Friedman 1962: 12) 
55 For example, in Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott’s (1999) proposal, each citizen would receive a stake of $80,000 
at age 21 funded out of a wealth and inheritance tax.  
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This taxonomy shows that schemes that are generally considered akin to one another such as NIT 
and UBI might actually be very different according to their ideal-type dimensions. For example, 
the NIT shares a lot with the GMI in terms of its means-tested, degressive, temporary and ex post 
features. Even though, as mentioned earlier, ideological and institutional contexts matter a great 
deal in the appraisal of a policy’s outcomes, the classification helps understanding how the desirable 
goals and prescriptive characteristics of a policy can be fine-tuned for implementation purposes. 
In other words, it enables one to appreciate how different features might produce different 
outcomes when implemented. 
4. Why settle for the UBI? 
Now that the differential features of the social minimum alternatives are clear, I aim to confront 
the UBI with its close competitors. It is not my intention to provide an exhaustive discussion of 
the arguments confronting how one scheme might fare better than the others according to each 
dimension highlighted in the taxonomy. Rather, the differences in the schemes’ characteristics 
underlie the broader comparative discussion which aim is to clarify why the UBI makes particular 
sense to address issues of economic insecurity and the deficiencies of social safety nets identified 
in chapter one.  
I separate this discussion in two main steps. I start with a comparison between the GMI, which as 
a safety net with certain shortcomings is part of the problem of poverty in the EU, and the UBI, 
Table 3: Main properties of social minimum ideal-types 
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considered as a potential solution. Then, I confront the UBI with basic income-like schemes as 
these may be considered as alternative solutions. I do not claim that the UBI would be the natural 
instrument to pursue a particular conception of justice. Instead, I argue that it can offer a better 
way than its rivals to achieve key goals of social protection, namely economic security and social 
participation, consistent with my understanding of the social minimum as the means necessary to 
guarantee a life in dignity in a given society. My approach is thus conditionally prescriptive: if one 
considers a certain set of goals desirable, then one should find the policy solution embodied in the 
UBI attractive. Assuming that all schemes are set at adequate level for now, I contend that, thanks 
to its constitutive characteristics, the UBI offers a promising avenue to ensure economic security, 
thanks to its effectiveness in terms of poverty relief and its relation to employment as well as social 
inclusion writ large, whilst doing so in a non-stigmatising and more emancipatory way. More 
particularly, I argue that the strength of the UBI stems from its capacity to score well when 
considering these desiderata as one conjunctive set. Finally, I only focus on the ‘receiving side’ of 
the basic income and its impact on people living in poverty and do not examine financial feasibility 
concerns for now. 
4.1. UBI vs GMI 
I start by evaluating the claims of UBI advocates favouring the basic income over the GMI in terms 
of poverty relief before looking at their comparative capacities for a return to employment and 
social participation writ large. I then turn to the psychological aspect of economic security in a 
context of uncertainties. The emancipatory power of the UBI is underlined in each dimension. 
4.1.1. Poverty alleviation 
The primary aim of an anti-poverty instrument is to close the poverty gap, measured by the amount 
of transfers required to ensure that people living under the poverty line are able to meet or exceed 
that threshold. In other words, it is about being effective in reaching those most in need. Then, it 
must be efficient, such that the proportion of resources mobilised to reach the goal contributes to it 
without waste. Intuitively, then, a policy such as the GMI, which is organised in order to best 
identify those in need and takes the financial situation of their household into consideration, seems 
more efficient than one distributing money to everyone. However, UBI advocates have emphasised 
a number of reasons to justify why it would be ‘better for the poor to give to the rich’ (Van Parijs 
2006b: 14). 
The first reason advanced is that the UBI is a more effective instrument to reach those in need 
than the GMI, whilst being less stigmatising (Fitzpatrick 1999: 52-53; Van Parijs 2006b: 14; 
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Raventós 2007: 122; Vanderborght 2014: 212; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 17). This is 
because the selectivity dimension of the GMI relies on means-testing and operates ex post, which 
lead to certain problems. As was shown in chapter one, a stringent means-test may lead to bad 
coverage. Eligibility conditions, administrative complexity and ignorance of rights also impact the 
rate of take-up such that people entitled to social benefits may fall through the net. Controlling and 
monitoring the level of disposable resources of claimants also takes time and may involve delays 
of payment. In face of this, a universal basic income is more effective as it avoids problems of ill 
design: by granting an income automatically (i.e. without means-test and ex ante) to all on an 
individual basis, those unreached because of eligibility conditions or because of unclaimed rights 
are not failed anymore. As such, it provides a firm and stable basis for economic security. Moreover, 
thanks to the system’s simplification, social workers may be relieved from their dual (and often 
schizophrenic) role of control on the one hand and support on the other, which allows them to 
focus exclusively on the latter (to the extent that administrative simplification does not entail a loss 
of job) and reduces the risk of administrative discretion. In addition, the effectiveness of the UBI 
may also stem from its political resilience on the long term (Vanderborght 2014: 214). Research 
has shown that some degree of redistributive inefficiency (called ‘the Matthew effect’) may provide 
wider and more robust political support towards the needier (Korpi and Palme 1998). According 
to this claim, universal schemes are more resilient against a potential backlash than selective ones 
because they are more inclusive (in particular because they involve the middle class) whilst a scheme 
with eligibility conditions tend to assign different statuses to different members of society and, 
thus, emphasise redistribution from the well-off to the least-advantaged, making it more politically 
salient. 
The UBI also avoids (real or perceived) problems of social stigma. The rate of non-take-up was 
also explained by the refusal to accept the conditions of the GMI, whether these relate to the 
means-test or the work-test, considered as stigmatising and humiliating. Precisely because it is a 
citizenship-based social transfer, the UBI does not rely on any notion of need or desert respectively 
associated with means-testing and activation measures. People in need do not have to prove how 
poor they are and there is no administrative distinction made between the ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving poor’ (i.e. those who put efforts in their activation agenda and those who ‘take 
advantage’ of the system). Furthermore, the individual nature of the UBI avoids interference with 
a household’s privacy (i.e. controls of home and/or possessions) which is often perceived as 
humiliating. The individuality of the UBI does not penalise cohabitation, contrary to the GMI 
which level typically differs according to household composition, given the economies of scale 
possible for a larger group. However, considering that loneliness ‘pays’ with the GMI (i.e. levels of 
   95 
transfers are higher for someone living alone), the UBI may promote more social bond and 
additional purchasing power for those with the least of it. Finally, the UBI’s individuality is gender 
neutral. Recalling that women were among the groups more vulnerable to poverty (see chapter 
one), the UBI may thus provide the means for women to be financially independent from their 
partners, compared to a household-based scheme inherited from the male-breadwinner model.56   
4.1.2. Access to employment and social participation 
Besides the superiority of the UBI over the GMI in terms of effectiveness, scholars have claimed 
it also provides efficiency gains as its universality solves another deficiency of means-testing and 
the degressivity of the GMI: the risk of poverty (or unemployment) traps (Fitzpatrick 1999: 25-27, 
56; Van Parijs 1995: 36, 1996; Raventós 2007: 119-121, 124-125; Standing 2011: 82-83, 2017: 77; 
Vanderborght 2014: 213; Atkinson 2015: 209-210; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 19).57 The 
poverty trap defines situations in which a return to employment or an increase of working hours is 
not followed by a net increase in disposable earnings, because of the suppression or reduction of 
social benefits and the impact of taxes associated with the remunerated activity, as well as other 
costs induced by the uptaking of activity such as transport or childcare.58 The main hypothesis is 
thus that means-tested schemes have built-in disincentive mechanisms which push a rational 
individual to remain unemployed if wage levels are not satisfactory enough. In technical terms, 
these point to the ‘withdrawal rates’, or effective marginal tax rates, of means-tested benefits which 
may go as high as 100 per cent (i.e. for extra 1€ earned, 1€ of benefit is withdrawn). Given that 
employment is a major source of exit from poverty, the advantage of the UBI over the GMI thus 
stems from the fact that the former is cumulative while the latter is not. In other words, when 
accepting a low-paid or part-time job with the GMI, an individual loses its social benefit whilst 
(disregarding subsequent retrieval through taxation) the UBI is retained in full and can be topped 
up at will with other earnings, thereby offering incentives to seek work and ‘make work pay’. As 
                                                 
56 This is, however, a contentious debate to which I come back in chapter three. See also Widerquist et al. (2013: 141-
186) for a review of the different positions. 
57 UBI advocates have also made claims in relation to the UBI’s cost efficiency (Fitzpatrick 1999: 53; Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017: 18; see also Pereira 2017 for a comprehensive discussion). Whilst the gross cost of the UBI would 
be considerable, they argue that the net cost would be significantly lower. This is due to savings on administration 
expenditure thanks to the system’s simplification and the automation of payments, the substitution of certain social 
benefits by the UBI, and the redistributive effects of a UBI funded out of a progressive income tax for instance. 
However, the cost efficiency argument cannot be made in abstract terms as it depends on the modality of the scheme 
(i.e. whether it is introduced as a complementary or substitutive measure), and its funding scheme. Also, while efficiency 
gains may come from simplification, UBI advocates would be best advised not to underestimate the administrative 
hurdles associated with the scheme’s implementation (De Wispelaere and Stirton 2011, 2013). For a comprehensive 
discussion of the UBI vs the GMI in terms of their comparative efficiency, see also Van Parijs (1992b). 
58 To be more precise, one may distinguish between three forms of traps. People ‘trapped’ in welfare but not looking 
for work (e.g. for health reasons) are concerned by the ‘inactivity trap’ while those looking for work are concerned by 
the ‘unemployment trap’. The ‘poverty trap’ encompasses them both and also includes those who are in employment 
but do not augment their working time because their earnings are topped up by means-tested benefits (Purière 2012). 
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such, the UBI is considered more efficient to lift people out of poverty traps because it offers a 
stable form of employment subsidy given to the potential employee rather than to the employer. 
The hypothesis underlying the poverty trap must be nuanced in practice. For instance, studies on 
the specific case of minimum income schemes in France reveal that this rational explanatory model 
is weak (Dubet and Vérétout 2002; Guillemot, Détour and Zajdela 2002; Zajdela 2009; Purière 
2012). They show that unemployed people rarely refuse a job solely for financial reasons, as 
employment is considered by welfare claimants as a source of self-worth and well-being. Inactivity 
thus comes from other ‘good reasons’ such as the bad quality of employment opportunities at the 
lower end of the labour market. These studies emphasise that, rather than being located on the 
supply side of labour, the trap is on the demand side: inactive people are ‘trapped’ in welfare in 
significant respects because of the prospects of poor quality jobs. Nevertheless, pointing out the 
fact that the GMI creates a poverty trap does not amount to asserting that people never take jobs 
when they pay less than social benefits nor that other reasons might better explain why people 
remain ‘trapped’ in welfare. Rather, it reflects one of the reasons often used for not raising the 
levels of the GMI – it would increase the risks of making more people ‘dependent’ on welfare – 
which is particularly problematic given the widespread inadequate levels of existing minimum 
income schemes in the EU, and reveals the poor opportunities related with means-testing in face 
of the expenses and risks associated with precarious job markets. 
Whilst the poverty trap is associated with the degressivity of the GMI, its behavioural conditionality 
is also problematic as it may force people into employment despite poor prospects at the lower 
end of the job markets, with the effect of keeping people in poverty despite being in employment. 
By contrast, the UBI’s unconditionality offers the possibility of an ‘exit option’ or a ‘right of non-
entry’ in the labour market in face of badly paid or poor-quality jobs (Fitzpatrick 1999: 131-132; 
Birnbaum 2012: 197-198; Widerquist 2013b; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 21-27).59 So as the 
argument goes, the UBI provides individuals with more bargaining power and potentially oblige 
employers to improve pay and working conditions, or automate work, in case of a lack of demand 
for the jobs they supply. This argument should not be overemphasised, in particular for vulnerable 
workers, as it heavily depends on the structural conditions of labour markets such as the 
maintenance of minimum wages, the power of labour unions for collective voice, the availability 
                                                 
59 I come back to the unconditionality of the UBI in more details in chapter three. 
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of jobs at the lower end of the labour market, which are the ones easily affected by automation 
trends (see Birnbaum and De Wispelaere 2016 for a discussion).60  
Nonetheless, the key strength of the UBI lies, in comparison with the GMI, in the conjunction of 
two forms of unconditionality which ‘gives more options to those who have the least of them’ 
(Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 22): the absence of means-test provides the capacity to ‘say 
yes’ to jobs not attractive financially but potentially so for other reasons (e.g. because they are 
socially useful or provide experience) and the absence of work-test provides ‘the power to say no’ 
to unattractive or demeaning jobs (Widerquist 2013b). The UBI thus provides the kind of 
economic security and enhanced freedom of choice that allows a voluntary return to employment. 
This enhanced freedom also means that the nature of the activity may be chosen. While the 
activation agenda associated with the GMI pushes for work in the traditional economic sense, the 
unconditionality of the UBI also empowers people to reduce their working time and to choose 
their activity, from access to education and training (an important feature in a skill-oriented 
economy), to other forms of entrepreneurial activities or voluntary work. In this sense, by cutting 
the link with the labour market, the UBI may be seen as an instrument of ‘de-commodification’ of 
human labour (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 27) and as a seed capital able to unleash people’s 
entrepreneurship capacities, ‘by better buffering the self-employed, worker cooperatives, and 
capital labour partnerships against the risk of uncertain and fluctuating incomes’ (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017: 24). As such, it also provides the flexibility to securely move between different 
kinds of activities and statuses according to life events and choices, a non-negligible dimension in 
face of the uncertainties faced by the precariat in particular. Overall, these claims lead Van Parijs 
and Vanderborght (2017: 26) to argue that the UBI offers a way to combine ‘greater security’ with 
the development of ‘a desirable form of flexibility’, making it ‘an intelligent emancipatory form of 
“active welfare state”’. 
4.1.3. The wider effects of economic security 
The particular characteristics of the GMI and the UBI may also lead to different consequences in 
relation to psychological security. Recent research in behavioural economics, known as the ‘theory 
                                                 
60 The maintenance of firm minimum wages, for instance, is a crucial point. In their absence, the GMI would be 
superior to the UBI because it provides a ‘reservation wage’ which obliges employers to offer market wages above its 
level. The value of the basic income, in contrast, may simply be captured by employers now able to lower their wages 
by the equivalent amount. In practice, however, the strength of the GMI as a reservation wage must be nuanced given 
the current strengthening of activation policies to push people into employment in combination with stagnant or 
decreasing wage levels to increase competitiveness, this may not hold in practice. It is also worth mentioning that some 
see the UBI as a way to introduce further flexibility on the labour market by replacing the minimum wage which is said 
to create rigidities and distortions between supply and demand (Groot 2004), but this constitutes an undesirable option 
given the precarisation trends highlighted in chapter one. 
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of scarcity’, has shown the impact of poverty on cognitive functions (Mani et al. 2013; Mullainathan 
and Shafir 2013). The general idea is that when people ‘have less than what [they] feel [they] need’ 
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013: 4), they may develop a ‘scarcity mindset’ that impacts decision-
making capacities. It has been observed that people living in poverty make poor decisions and thus 
perpetuate their situation of poverty because ‘poverty-related concerns consume mental resources, 
leaving less for other tasks’ (Mani et al 2013: 976). This psychological mechanism impacts similarly 
the workaholic who forgot the birthday party of her children and the person living in financial 
difficulty who needs to make long-term plans. Time is scarce for the former, money is scarce for 
the latter.  Living in poverty thus captures the attention and obliges one to deal with short-term 
issues, possibly under important stress levels, and involves trade-off thinking. This impedes the 
mental bandwidth available which, in turn, affects economic decision-making and behaviours.  
Similarly, demanding conditional social benefits might have a negative effect on cognitive functions 
because fulfilling their requirements may create an additional tax on the mental bandwidth 
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013: 149-151). For instance, a properly designed childcare policy may 
decrease the mental tax. Likewise, a basic income which provides constant economic security 
without any condition might thus decrease the feelings of scarcity and have ‘freeing effects’ on the 
‘mental bandwidth’ with executive functions now available for other activities, such that a UBI 
would not only impact poverty relief in material terms but also improve decision-making processes 
(de Bruijn and Atonides 2016: 24-25).61 
This could also improve personal resilience for those in the precariat who deal with ‘chronic 
insecurity’ and multidimensional uncertainties (Standing 2017: 88). A regular, permanent and 
uniform source of income provides a sense of security which lowers the psychological fears 
associated to a change of status from unemployed to worker (which may also explain the 
unemployment trap). These involve for instance the fear of not being able to adequately respond 
to the demands of the new job and to face again, if it is lost, the risks of complex and possibly 
stigmatizing administrative procedures, as well as potential delayed payments and, thereby, an 
interruption of earnings perceived (Standing 2011: 82).  
Speaking of uncertainty, the fastly evolving dynamics of technological progress has led some to 
argue in favour of a basic income as an essential component in a jobless future (Ford 2015; Mason 
2015; Srnicek and Williams 2015). Although the net effects on jobs remain unclear (see chapter 
                                                 
61 The scarcity theory is one of the theoretical models mobilised by researchers in the Dutch pilots which seek to test 
the behavioural impact of a reduction of conditionality on social assistance recipients (Verlaat and de Bruijn 2016; 
Groot and Verlaat 2017). 
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one, section 3.3.), the UBI may indeed offer the kind of security necessary in face of the 
uncertainties attached to job replacement – for blue and white collars alike – and the associated 
risk of poverty – for the precariat in particular – whilst providing the kind of flexibility necessary 
to adapt to fragmented careers, a way to redistribute the gains of productivity produced by 
automation, digitalisation and robots, and offer a more equitable access to leisure. 
In addition, universal forms of economic security may also have positive social outcomes at both 
individual and community levels. For instance, one of the negative income tax experiment of the 
1970’s, the MINCOME experiment in Dauphin, showed important health effects: overall 
hospitalisation rates fell by 8,5% among the treated group relative to controls over the treatment 
period, with an important decrease of hospitalisation rates related to accidents and injuries and to 
mental health diagnoses in particular (Forget 2011, 2013). These effects, much larger than expected 
considering the number of families eligible for income support (a third of the families in Dauphin), 
pointed to the importance of positive effects at community level: with everyone involved in the 
experiment (‘saturation site’), social interaction may have influenced social attitudes and individual 
behaviour even among those who did not qualify, potentially reinforcing the direct effects of a 
guaranteed income.62 Considering that the UBI may have advantages over a negative income tax in 
terms of security (see section 4.4.), this may also provide serious arguments in favour of the 
effectiveness of the UBI over the GMI not only in combating the depth and persistence of poverty 
(in and out of work), but also its related effects on wider social considerations at both individual 
and community levels. 
To conclude this section, it must be said that the effectiveness of the GMI – and thus its 
comparative strength – may be significantly improved in practice by reducing work-conditionality, 
making the means-test more inclusive and individualising benefit entitlement. Thanks to the 
available technology, the GMI may also be automatised, thereby reducing substantially the rate of 
non-take-up. This is certainly desirable given the shortcomings of MIS identified in chapter one 
but it amounts, in effect, to a ‘basic income trajectory’ (Quilley 2000: 183) towards the universality, 
individuality, unconditionality and automaticity of the UBI which indirectly corroborates its 
superiority. 
 
                                                 
62 Similarly, North American experiments showed positive effects in education matters with higher test scores for 
children in the poorest families or on adults in continuing education and anti-school-dropout effects (Levine et al. 2005: 
100) as well as improved nutritional adequacy and a reduction of low birth weight in most vulnerable groups (Salkind 
and Haskind 1982). 
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4.2. UBI vs basic income-like schemes 
The superiority of the UBI over the GMI does not settle its case. Indeed, it is generally 
acknowledged in the basic income community that other forms of stakeholding would also improve 
the status quo because they also provide more inclusive forms of economic security and widen the 
option span available to individuals. Yet, as the taxonomy showed, they differ in significant respects 
which, I contend, strengthen the case for the UBI. I now confront the UBI to the NIT, UBC and 
PI in turn.  
4.2.1. UBI vs NIT 
The NIT and the UBI both operate without behavioural constraints, which is why they are often 
associated under the basic income label. Some of the arguments justifying the superiority of the 
UBI over the GMI also apply to the NIT. The latter simplifies administrative procedures and 
reduces the stigma that merit-based work-conditionality may trigger (Fitzpatrick 1999: 93-94, 96). 
Moreover, under certain assumptions, both schemes can be shown to produce equivalent post tax-
and-transfer distribution and the same effective marginal tax rate, such that it is also less prone to 
the unemployment trap.63 This is true if (i) the reference unit of the NIT is the individual, (ii) the 
UBI is funded through a personal income tax, and (iii) taxation is linear (flat tax) (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017: 32-36).64 Under these conditions, the NIT might be cheaper to administer 
than a scheme involving upfront payment to those with high incomes and taxing it back later 
(Solow 2001: xv). However, even under these conditions, both schemes might not produce the 
same advantages, according to my desidera set, as economic security, social inclusion, and absence 
of stigma do not only depend on ‘how much’ is distributed but also ‘how’ transfers are made 
(Fitzpatrick 1999: 95). 
The key difference is the method of payment used. Contrary to the UBI, the NIT still involves a 
means-test and thus operates ex post on the basis of a screening of disposable resources. This means 
that it still involves some uncertainties associated, for instance, with risks of administrative time-
lags and delayed payments. To provide the same source of security as the UBI, the NIT would 
require a system of advance payments to avoid a waiting time until the end of the fiscal period (Van 
                                                 
63 See Van Parijs (1992a: 3-5; 1995: 37, 57; 2006b: 15-16); Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 32-35). For a 
comprehensive study, see Atkinson (1995). For an econometric simulation model of their distributive outcomes, see 
also Tondani (2009) and Honkanen (2014). 
64 Note also that a flat tax-based negative income tax is not neutral from a normative perspective. Fitpatrick (1999: ch. 
5) places it in the ideaological family of the ‘radical right’ mainly influenced by a rationalisation agenda. In practice, this 
is also shown by the recent French proposal made by de Basquiet and Koenig (2014), inspired by Friedman’s view the 
minimal state, which has been fiercely criticised by Clerc (2015) for its poor redistributive effects towards the worst-
off. 
   101 
Parijs 2001: 11-12; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 38). This demands setting up a procedure 
to identify those who can be expected to be below the break-even point at this later stage, which 
involves costly procedures that may offset some of the efficiency claims favouring the NIT. 
Furthermore, as was argued before, the unemployment trap does not only stem from rational 
calculations about expected earnings, it is also a matter of uncertainty about work opportunities, 
such that transfers made ex ante also make a difference from the perspective of a return to 
employment (or other forms of activities). Additionally, with or without a system of advance 
payment, the NIT still requires targeting those in need and still involves a difference of statuses 
between ‘worker’ and ‘claimant’. It may thus remain vulnerable to problems of social stigma and 
non-take-up, even if these can be expected to be significantly lower than in the case of the GMI. 
Against this backdrop, the NIT already scores lower than the UBI in terms of its overall economic 
security and emancipatory power. As pointed out by Van Parijs (1995: 36), the NIT ‘takes the form 
of a contingent form of corrective transfers rather than a sum of money on which one can fully 
bank simply because it is tangibly there’. In this sense, the NIT appears as a limiting case of the 
GMI. 
It may also involve other limits. Whilst the UBI is individual by definition, this is not necessarily 
the case with the NIT as illustrated by its concrete proposals (e.g. Friedman 1962, 1968) and 
experiments involving NIT (see Levine et al. 2005 for a review). Putting aside the fact that a 
household-based NIT would not be fiscally equivalent to the UBI, this also means that it would 
not be able to address intra-household inequalities, still require intrusion into households’ privacy 
(including potential controls) and penalise cohabitation. Moreover, the NIT is based on income 
taxation, by design. Therefore, it is an adequate candidate for national tax-and-transfer reform but 
much less for an EU-wide transfer. Income definitions, tax bases and tax rates differ widely across 
the EU. As highlighted in chapter one, harmonisation of the sort would face major (political and 
operational) barriers to positive integration. The UBI, by contrast, can more easily be funded out 
of other sources such as indirect taxes or carbon taxes. To sum up, according to the goals of social 
protection identified supra, the characteristics of the NIT render it both less desirable and less 
suited as an EU-wide anti-poverty instrument. 
4.2.2. UBI vs UBC 
UBI and UBC share most of their characteristics. Both are institutional, individual, universal, and 
unconditional policies which operate ex ante given the absence of means-test. One major 
distinction, however, must lead us to prefer the UBI if the overall objective is economic security. 
What distinguishes them is the frequency dimension: the UBI is given on a continuous and regular 
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basis, the UBC is a one-shot basic endowment given at maturity. Under the (disputable) assumption 
of perfect capital markets, it is true that both schemes are convertible, at least in principle. A UBC 
may be converted into a basic income if it is actuarialised to produce a flow of equivalent annuities 
(if its level is sufficient to provide a full UBI).65 Similarly, the UBI may be used as mortgaged or 
borrowed against to create a bigger capital available immediately. However, this possibility is 
resisted by many advocates who consider, for ‘mildly paternalistic concerns’ (Van Parijs 1995: 47) 
or according to a principle of ‘reasonable precaution’ (van der Veen 2003: 151), that the UBI should 
not be mortageable.66 A regular stream of income should be preferred to a lump sum capital for 
one main reason: the risk of stake blowing. 
Whilst a substantial stake received at maturity may open up significant opportunities to invest in 
the future, these may easily be squandered or lost whether voluntarily or unvoluntarily. As noted 
by Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 31), ‘lifetime opportunities [are] powerfully affected by 
intlellectual abilities, parental attention, school quality, social networks, and many other factors’. In 
this sense, a midly paternalistic approach embodies a concern with economic security throughout 
a lifetime rather than simply ‘at the start’ (Van Parijs 1995: 47). In response, Ackerman and Alstott 
(1999: 47, 48) criticise the UBI as a ‘fancy name for a restraint on alienation’ and as a tool encouraging 
a mere ‘short-term consumerist perspective’. However, as pointed out by Pateman (2004: 96), ‘by 
breaking the link between income and the labour market [the UBI] would allow individuals, if they 
so wished, to abstrain from the race to accumulate ever more material goods and help combat the 
identification of freedom with consumerism’. 
In fact, this shows how the UBC and the UBI differ in their underpinning cultural approaches, as 
highlighted by van der Veen (2003). The UBI ‘builds on the [mostly European] foundations of a 
universalistic minimum income guarantee’ and ‘is fundamentally oriented to mastering the 
subsistence constraint’, while the UBC fits well within ‘the American dream of emancipation 
through entrepreneurship’, based on a ‘‘starting gate’ conception of responsible action’ (van der 
Veen 2003: 150, 164). If one is concerned, as I am, with designing an inclusive social protection 
scheme providing both economic security and emancipation for all throughout the lifetime, then a 
regular stream is clearly preferable to a lump-sum grant. 
 
                                                 
65 The amount of the UBC is often far below an equivalent full UBI when converted into annuities. See e.g. the 
calculations of van der Veen (2003: 161) on the basis of Ackerman and Alstott’s (1999) proposal. 
66 For a series of more nuanced positions and proposals, see the contributions in Dowding et al. (2003b). For a detailed 
comparative approach, see also Fitzpatrick (2007). 
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4.2.3. UBI vs PI 
I end this comparative approach with the participation income because it may produce similar 
outcomes to the UBI such that it is not as easy to discard as a candidate, according to my desiderata 
set. In terms of characteristics, the PI is also an institutional policy, paid regularly on an individual 
basis and without means-test. Atkinson’s proposal constitutes a response to the failures of means-
testing and would thus, just as the UBI, be much more effective than the GMI in reaching those 
in need and avoiding the poverty trap. As an individual policy, it is also a gender-neutral and non-
intrusive policy in terms of privacy and living arrangements.  
The main difference between them has to do with their entitlement basis. The UBI is paid to every 
individual according to citizenship whilst the PI is conditional on ‘social participation’, such that it 
operates ex post if one satisfies this prior behavioural constraint. Putting aside for now the normative 
justifications and problems associated with these two different approaches of citizenship (see 
chapter three), it must be said that, in effect, both schemes are very close to one another. Indeed, 
the particularly broad conception of the PI’s behavioural conditionality also means that it allows 
one to retain eligibility whether one is seeking for work, in education, in a voluntary activity or in 
a more traditional job (as long as the portfolio of activities keeps people busy for ‘say, a thirty-five-
hour week’, as Atkinson (2015: 219) recently clarified). As such, ‘[i]n reality, few people would be 
excluded’ (Atkinson 2015: 221). In principle, then, the PI thus seems to retain many advantages of 
the UBI: it is socially inclusive, provides a firm economic floor to nearly everyone, except the 
voluntarily inactive, which can be topped up at will. 
The difficulty, however, stems from the administrative complexity of the social participation test, 
which involves a trilemma, as argued by De Wispelaere and Stirton (2007) and recognised by 
Atkinson himself (2015: 220-221). The PI scheme must simultaneously be able to (i) remain 
sufficiently inclusive, (ii) differentiate between those satisfying the requirement and those who do 
not, (iii) and overcome the challenges associated with the economic and human costs of its 
administrability. According to De Wispelaere and Stirton, then, the PI will inevitably fail according 
to one of these three conditions. One possible resolution strategy would consist in making the 
participation requirement less inclusive to ease the costs of administration, but such a scheme 
would resemble to the GMI and its problems. A second route consists in considering that the third 
condition must always give way if it conflicts with the first, producing huge administration costs 
and poor programme efficiency to guarantee inclusiveness, but it might quickly become 
economically untenable. A third strategy consists in loosening the requirement of social 
participation to avoid administrative complexity, thereby transforming the PI into a UBI. As a 
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result of these challenges, a PI scheme might either create pressure to reinstate more conventional 
forms of behavioural constraints or prompt further steps towards a genuine UBI. This last scenario 
explains why, rather than considering it as a true rival, many basic income advocates consider the 
PI as a ‘second-best’ solution and as way for the UBI to enter ‘through the back door’ (Barry 2001; 
Goodin 2001; Offe 2001; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).  
In sum, the UBI and PI may lead to similar results in terms of economic security and social 
inclusion, but the UBI appears to be less intrusive, simpler and less costly to administer, providing 
it with certain adavantages. Moreover, the simplicity of the UBI is not negligible if the purpose is 
to institute an EU-wide instrument of social support. Indeed, given the barriers to positive 
integration highlighted in chaper one, the PI’s complexity seems less promising as an EU-funded 
scheme designed to support national systems of social protection. 
4.3. Limits and nuances 
Overall, the discussion showed that the UBI may provide a robust floor of economic security, 
whether one is in or out of work, in a way that addresses the problems of poverty and social 
exclusion beyond the sole employment route in a non-stigmatising way. It was also argued that the 
basic income may have other ‘freeing’ psychological effects and wider positive social outcomes. 
The conjunction of these expected outcomes seems to provide the UBI with an emancipatory value 
greater than its monetary value. Some of the competitors of the UBI may also produce similar 
positive consequences but I showed, by focusing on their main divergences, that the UBI retains 
significant advantages over them, according to the threefold desiderata set of economic security, 
social inclusion, and individual emancipation. As such, the comparison revealed why UBI is 
attractive for many as an instrument of national welfare state reform.  
However, I made no claim that the UBI should be adopted anywhere and under any circumstance 
as there are a series of limits that I did not deal with. Indeed, it must be repeated here again that 
the effects of the UBI in terms of individual developmental opportunities cannot be isolated from 
the wider institutional system in which the basic income is introduced, such as the quality and scope 
of labour market regulation and the level of development of other welfare services and transfers 
(Haagh 2015). Moreover, I have not addressed questions of sustainability. It is unclear what the net 
effects of the UBI on labour supply would be: between those who would rely on the UBI to enter 
employment and those who may use their exit option. Similarly, the behaviour of net contributors 
   105 
remains uncertain.67 Furthermore, I have not addressed the limits to adequacy. I assumed that all 
schemes were set at subsistence level to compare them on an equal footing and at their ‘full 
capacity’. But the claims made in reference to a full UBI may not apply to a partial one. For instance, 
a partial basic income may not fully realise all claimed benefits such as an effective bargaining power 
and ‘exit option’ on the labour market, decommodifying effects, and a wider span of option 
choices. Worse even, if it is proposed as a fully substitutive measure (i.e. a partial UBI replacing all 
social benefits, not only those equivalent to its amount), it may have undesirable externalities as it 
may force low-skilled people into low-paid and precarious jobs to complete their modest UBI and 
reach an adequate level of disposable income.68 Fourth, opposition to the UBI often stems from 
adequacy concerns expressed in terms of limits to its affordability: assuming a basic income funded 
out of income taxation and given welfare states’ financial constraints, it is often argued that the 
institutionalisation of UBI would face an impossibility theorem, according to which a national basic 
income is either set too low to be socially acceptable or too high to be economically feasible (as 
expressed by Groot 2004: 116-117). 
Nonetheless, these different limits do not play the same role in the assessment of the UBI as a 
national or as distinctively European policy. Notwithstanding the potential of the UBI as an 
instrument of national reform, my aim is to examine it at EU level, as a measure of support of 
national social protection schemes as they currently stand. As such, a socially acceptable level must 
be appreciated by considering national social benefits in conjunction with the EUBI as a 
complementary measure, and a partial European-wide UBI supplementing national schemes may 
still conserve to a certain extent some of the advantages of a full UBI. I outline why a partial UBI 
would be desirable in the European context in chapter four and come back to the expected positive 
outcomes of a partial EUBI in chapter five. It is sufficient for now to keep in mind why the UBI 
makes particular sense to address the various dimensions of poverty and its related social ills 
identified in chapter one. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to clarify what the UBI is and is not and to assess how it fares in 
comparison with the conventional type of last-resort safety net that exist in EU countries (GMI) 
                                                 
67 Claims made on sustainability grounds refer to the risk of a downward spiral associated with the reduction of the 
labour supply of net contributors and its negative impact on GDP growth. See Groot (2004: 116-117) and Van Parijs 
and Vanderborght (2017: ch. 6). 
68 See e.g. De Wispelaere and Birnbaum (2016) for a discussion on the effectiveness of exit options according to 
different economic conditions. See Alaluf (2014) on the risks of the UBI to foster precarity on the labour market. In 
contrast, a partial UBI considered as a complementary measure (i.e. an additional pillar to the existing social security in 
replacement of benefits only up to its amount and completed by conditional schemes to reach adequacy) may provide 
significant improvement in comparison to the status quo. See e.g. Defeyt (2017) for a proposal of this kind in Belgium. 
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as well as with other close competitors (NIT, UBC and PI) often suggested as desirable policies 
for welfare state reform and associated, sometimes too emphatically, with the basic income ‘label’. 
According to the conditionally prescriptive stance adopted, the UBI emerged as a superior solution 
to its rivals to achieve the goals of economic security and social inclusion in an emancipatory way. 
To assess its prospects as a response to the various dimensions of the problem of poverty in the 
EU identified in chapter one, it is now necessary to see how the idea fares with respect to a series 
of ‘tests’ that will allow me to show its respective strengths and weaknesses and, from one challenge 
to the next, assess the prospects of the UBI at European level. 
The first challenge draws from the political theory literature and still assumes a national UBI. The 
attractiveness of the UBI as a policy capable of ensuring a social minimum in an emancipatory way 
has also been discussed at the level of theories of justice. Among those who developed its ethical 
justifications, Van Parijs’ (1995) real-libertarian theory of ‘real freedom’ provides the most articulate 
and tailor-made ethical defense of the UBI. Others have opposed it on the grounds that its 
unconditionality hits what they hold to be a fundamental requirement of justice, namely the duty 
to reciprocate through labour participation. Turning to the ‘challenge of reciprocity’, then, will 
allow me to spell out how the UBI may be approached from different ethical views of the social 
rights element of citizenship.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CHALLENGE OF RECIPROCITY 
1. Introduction 
Up to this point, I argued that the UBI is well placed to achieve a certain set of goals essential to 
guarantee a minimally decent life. Before envisaging it as a European-wide policy, it is necessary 
for the proposal to pass a first barrier which has to do with the very nature of the proposal. 
Notwithstanding its potential benefits, many consider that the UBI is ethically problematic because 
of its unconditionality, as illustrated by Elster’s view: ‘[the UBI] goes against a widely accepted 
notion of justice: it is unfair for able-bodied people to live off the labour of others’ (Elster 1986: 
719). In other words, what I call the ‘challenge of reciprocity’ stipulates that the UBI is morally 
objectionable because it violates a notion of fairness grounded in reciprocity: by cutting the link between 
the right to a minimum income and labour market participation, the basic income fails to satisfy a principle of 
reciprocal contribution considered by many as a fundamental requirement of justice. 
I make no claim that this objection exhausts the scope of ethical challenges to the basic income, 
but I consider it to be strongest normative one as key liberal egalitarian thinkers seem to think that 
the UBI breaks down if one holds contribution and reciprocity as primary normative values. My 
central aim in this chapter is thus to show that their objection is not decisive. Rather than arguing 
that the UBI is required (or even permitted) by a certain conception of justice, I provide an 
ecumenical defense of the basic income against the objection. In other words, I argue that whether 
one takes a reciprocity-based or a non-reciprocity-based conception of justice there are good 
reasons to hold that the challenge of reciprocity does not provide a knock-out argument against 
the UBI’s desirability. Then, insofar as the UBI cannot be ruled out at national level, it is possible 
to envisage it at EU level. 
Before turning to the outline of this chapter, some preliminary remarks are necessary. The 
reciprocity-based objection to the basic income has been extensively discussed in the last twenty 
years and the literature offers a wide range of ethical justifications for the UBI (see Widerquist et 
al. 2013 for a review). It is thus fair to question the need to enter that debate again. However, I 
consider that a dissertation on the UBI cannot simply ignore the challenge posed by reciprocity, as 
it is considered by many political theorists as ‘a fundamental background requirement of justice, 
that is to say, a requirement that must institutionally constrain the pursuit of any set of social policy 
objectives’ (van der Veen 1998: 141-142). Moreover, reciprocity underpins the moral core of 
welfare state contractualism, according to which there is ‘no benefit without work’, and the work 
ethos that prevails in existent EU welfare states. Therefore, responding to the objection is not only 
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necessary from a moral point of view, it is also a political imperative since public attitudes towards 
income support policies are correlated with ideological beliefs (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003) 
among which the notion of reciprocity plays a major role (Leon 2012). 
With this in mind, this chapter runs as follows. In section two, I present two reciprocity-based 
conceptions of justice, namely Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ and White’s ‘justice as fair reciprocity’, 
spell out what the duty to work entails in practice and come back to the challenge of reciprocity. 
The next sections provide reciprocity-based and non-reciprocity-based responses to the challenge 
at hand. In section three, I present the ‘extended’ reciprocity answer which holds that reciprocity 
may be seen in a wider sense either to encompass one’s contribution to society’s cultural capital, 
or as a form of self-restraint necessary for gainful exchange in a system of fair cooperation. 
Considering this answer unsatisfying, I argue that the objection is not decisive from the standpoint 
of reciprocity-based justice given the ‘reciprocity-friendly’ effects of the UBI in comparison to 
work-conditional income support. In section five, I show that under current circumstances 
enforcing the work-test produces greater injustices than it helps avoiding. Despite its vulnerability 
to the objection, then, the basic income should be endorsed as a second-best policy. In section six, 
I argue that there is a tension between self-respect and reciprocity such that if one holds self-respect 
as a primary normative value and recognises the capacity of the UBI to provide the social bases of 
self-respect in ways that work-tested schemes cannot, the exigence of reciprocity must be dropped. 
In section seven, I turn to a positive justification of the UBI which holds that material 
independence, which is best secured by the basic income, is lexically prior to demands of 
reciprocity, as argued by republican theorists. In section eight, finally, I look at another positive 
case for the UBI justifying it as the best way to distribute ‘reciprocity-free’ resources owed as a 
matter of entitlements and distinguish between left-libertarian and real-libertarian versions. Section 
nine concludes. 
2. Reciprocity-based justice and the duty to work 
Stated in its most general form, reciprocity points to the norm that ‘[r]eturns are expected: good 
for good received, hostility for hostility’ (Becker 1986: 73). In a literal and mechanical reading, it 
thus corresponds to a principle of quid pro quo return embodied in the popular adage ‘an eye for an 
eye’. In a more sophisticated approach defended by Becker, it is specified as a moral virtue 
according to which, as individuals, ‘[w]e ought to be disposed, as a matter of moral obligation, to 
return good in proportion to the good we receive, and to make reparations for the harm we have 
done’ (Becker 1986: 3). In this sense, reciprocity is a fundamental requirement of moral theory for 
individuals to develop as rational agents, to preserve a ‘capacity for balanced exchanges’ (Becker 
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1986: 133), and ‘to sustain the sort of equilibrium necessary for productive social intercourse’ 
(Becker 1986: 82).69 In other words, reciprocity is an action-guiding principle and reciprocal 
relations are desirable in all kinds of social interactions. 
However, conceptions of reciprocity might differ according to the circumstances in which these 
social interactions take place. As pointed out by Sangiovanni, ‘[s]pecific conceptions of reciprocity 
vary by the kinds of social relationships they are intended to regulate’ (2007: 27). For those 
concerned with social policy, as I am, what matters is a conception of reciprocity that intends to 
regulate social relationships between all members of a political community. Rather than looking at 
reciprocity as a personal virtue required by a comprehensive moral theory, it points to reciprocity 
as a guiding principle for social institutions, that is, derived from a conception of justice. 
The core feature of reciprocity-based theories of justice is the assumption that individuals are 
entitled to a fair share of society’s product only to the extent that they contribute to it. How one 
specifies this contribution requirement will thus determine the scope and content of distributive 
justice: who is entitled to social benefits, who is bound by duties of contribution, and what is the 
size of the share one is entitled according to some metric of justice (Page 2007: 226-227). While 
there are many ways in which theories of justice give a foundational value to the notion of 
reciprocity, one reciprocity-based account of justice is of particular relevance in the literature on 
the universal basic income. It is what Allan Gibbard (1991) has referred to as ‘justice as fair 
reciprocity’, which suggests that a fair distribution of the social product follows from reciprocity in 
social production, according to ‘a sense of fair play’. In this sense, reciprocal relationships are a 
matter of mutual respect and the contribution requirement is determined by considerations of fairness, 
such that individuals ought to make similar contributions to the shared social product. Roughly 
put, the contribution ethic at its heart stipulates that ‘everyone must do her bit’.  
2.1. Justice as fairness 
John Rawls’ theory of ‘justice as fairness’ provides an example of this view (Rawls 1971). According 
to it, society should be seen as a fair scheme of social cooperation in which fellow citizens should 
be regarded as free and equal, and treated fairly. The idea of society as a fair system of cooperation 
is justified because it is a mutually beneficial venture for those taking part in it. Individuals have an 
‘identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would 
have if each were to live solely by its own efforts’ (Rawls 1971: 4). The principles of justice, which 
regulate the way the main social institutions (i.e. the basic structure) ought to shape the prospects 
                                                 
69 In Becker’s view, ‘productive’ refers ‘to goal fulfilment in general’, such that a productive life is one that provides a 
sense of self-esteem (Becker 1986: 83). 
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of individuals living under a political regime, specify what constitute the fair terms of cooperation 
and a fair distribution of the benefits produced. Rawls assumes that one’s social position can be 
measured by an index composed of essential primary goods necessary for one to exercise moral 
powers and pursue one’s own conception of the good (Rawls 1971: 92; 2001: 58-59). Under a fair 
system of cooperation, then, all members of society have an equal claim to the common benefits 
corporately produced, and any depart from this baseline of equality can only be justified to the 
extent that an unequal distribution would be to the benefit of the worst-off (i.e. those with the 
lowest index of all-purpose goods, such as income and wealth), as specified by his difference 
principle (see introduction, section 6.1.).  
Conversely, citizens have corresponding duties of reciprocity to share the burdens of social 
cooperation. In other words, they are not to gain from the cooperative venture without doing their 
‘fair share’ in return (Rawls 1971: 112). How should this fair share be conceived? According to 
Rawls, social cooperation is always productive because without it, ‘there would be nothing 
produced and nothing to distribute’ (Rawls 2001: 61). Provided that the terms of cooperation are 
seen as fair, then, this implies that ‘all are willing to work’ (Rawls 2001: 179). This precision is 
important for basic income advocates. Rawls’ difference principle was criticised for allowing 
minimum income entitlement to those who are poor (and thus qualify as members of the worst-
off group) because they decided to live a life of leisure, such as surfers (Musgrave 1974). Rawls 
responded by adding leisure in his index of primary goods, considering that it roughly produces a 
virtual income equivalent to the disposable income generated by the same time spent working 
(Rawls 1988: 257; Rawls 1993: 181, ft. 9; 2001: 179). Despite the different interpretations that can 
be made (see infra, section 6.2.), Rawls’ intention is clear: those who want to claim a share of the 
social surplus must be willing to work, and those who want a life of idleness ‘must somehow 
support themselves’ (Rawls 2001: 179). Against this backdrop, Rawls took a negative stance 
towards the UBI, even if he never directly mentioned it. 
2.2. Justice as fair reciprocity 
Stuart White’s theory of ‘justice as fair reciprocity’ provides another example of reciprocity-based 
justice (White 2003a). It shares Rawls’ strong contributionist ethic (among other things) but his 
own approach, which elevates Elster’s intuition against the UBI into a theoretical framework, is 
particularly useful to spell out the normative justification underlying the reciprocity-based objection 
to the basic income. The rest of this section thus mostly relies on Whites’ conception of justice as 
fair reciprocity (in short ‘fair reciprocity’), which he summarises as follows:  
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‘(i) Citizens are properly possessed of various social rights; (ii) these rights are instrumental to an 
ultimate distributive goal that is radically egalitarian; and (iii) where these rights work to secure 
citizens a sufficiently generous share of the social product, and sufficiently good opportunities, 
citizens have definite, potentially enforceable obligations to make a productive contribution to the 
community in return.’ (White 2003a: 17) 
For White, fair reciprocity is a fundamental expression of democratic mutual regard: ‘citizens who 
have democratic mutual regard for each other would, as an expression of their regard for other 
citizens as their equals, want to share [the costs of the benefits they commonly enjoy] and not 
offload them onto others’ (White 2003a: 61).  In other words, free-riding is morally objectionable 
because it expresses a lack of respect for fellow citizens, and the duty to reciprocate is there to 
constitute a valuable relationship, one of mutual recognition as equals. Against this backdrop, fair 
reciprocity entails a ‘commitment to substantive economic reciprocity’ (White 2003a: 49), which 
itself demands the mutual provision of a productive contribution (as in Rawls’ theory). In other 
words, fair reciprocity means fair economic reciprocity. 
2.2.1. The reciprocity principle 
Against this backdrop, it is possible to spell out a first version of White’s reciprocity principle: ‘if 
one willingly enjoys the fruits of one’s fellow citizens’ labours, then, as a matter of justice, one 
ought to provide some appropriate good or service in return’ (White 2003a: 49). Yet, it remains 
unclear how ‘doing one’s fair share’ (in Rawls’ view) or ‘providing an appropriate return’ (in White’s 
view) should be interpreted. To understand, it is useful to come back to Becker’s work. According 
to him, a reciprocal exchange must be both fitting and proportional (Becker 1986: 106-117). The 
fittingness requirement refers to the commensurability of the good provided in return for a benefit 
received. For socially produced goods, which one benefits from by way of people’s participation 
in social institutions, ‘what is fitting is reciprocal participation in those institutions’ (Becker 1986: 
114). This stems from the fact that reciprocal exchanges are also meant to sustain institutions; a 
refusal to participate would undermine the very institutions from which the benefit arose in the 
first place.70 A fitting return for jointly produced goods should thus be defined according to the 
specific purpose of the institution in which they were produced.  
The proportional requirement refers to what can be considered as an appropriate quantity for the return. 
One way consists in equalising the benefits: the recipient must provide a return of the size 
equivalent to the benefit received (Becker 1986: 111). Another possibility is to equalize the 
                                                 
70 Besides his defence of reciprocity as an intrinsically valuable demand of justice, White develops a similar instrumental 
argument: ‘Where people do in fact have an expectation of substantive economic reciprocity, institutions and policies 
that violate these expectations will tend to provoke feelings of alienation and resentment. This will in turn weaken the 
effectiveness and stability of the relevant institutions and policies’ (White 2003a: 74). 
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sacrifices, or the costs, made: the recipient must make a sacrifice equivalent to the ones made by 
others with comparable abilities and resources who benefited in a similar way, and it ‘must be 
perceived by those people as proportionate’ (Becker 1986: 115). According to Becker, ‘cost 
reciprocity’ should be preferred to ‘benefit reciprocity’, despite being a ‘second-best solution’, since 
equalising benefits in the case of jointly produced goods (e.g. public health or education) might 
impose a considerable inequality of sacrifice between parties (Becker 1986: 111-113).71 It follows, 
from these two conditions, that a fair share can be understood, in its most general form, as 
a fitting and proportional return for the benefits provided by social institutions we want to sustain 
through reciprocity. It is fitting because it is calculated to fulfil the purpose of reciprocating in the 
given case (i.e. by determining how much it will cost to sustain the institutions and by raising shares 
to generate that amount). It is a proportional return in the sense that it represents the same sacrifice 
other participants are expected to make. It is, in that sense, a mutual but indirect exchange of 
commensurate benefits. (Becker 1986: 115)72 
While Rawls hardly elaborated how ‘each is to do his part’ (Rawls 2001: 179), White follows 
Becker’s approach when he argues that fair reciprocity demands that ‘people who willingly share 
in the social product […] ought to make a return for this in the form of a relevantly proportional 
productive contribution of their own’ (White 2003a: 50, my emphasis).73 Drawing from the 
distinction between benefit reciprocity and cost reciprocity, two main conceptions of what a 
‘relevantly proportional productive contribution’ mean can be identified. ‘Perfect reciprocity’ 
means strict proportionality (if not strict equivalence) in value74 between entitlements to social 
resources and contributions made to it, while ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’ demands less than perfect 
reciprocity (Warren 1994). White follows many other egalitarian thinkers and adopts the latter 
view75 such that entitlement to a share of the social surplus demands a productive contribution 
proportional to one’s productive ability to avoid brute luck inequality, provided that institutions 
are otherwise just (White 1997: 318-319, 2003a: 49-59). With this in mind, the reciprocity principle 
can now be restated as follows: 
[W]here the institutions governing economic life are otherwise sufficiently just, e.g. in terms of the 
availability of opportunities for productive participation and the rewards attached to these 
opportunities, those who claim the generous share of the social product available to them under 
these institutions have an obligation to make a decent productive contribution, suitably 
proportioned and fitting to ability and circumstances, to the community in return. (White 2003a: 59) 
                                                 
71 The terms ‘benefit reciprocity’ and ‘cost reciprocity’ are not used by Becker (1986), they are borrowed from Page 
(2007: 228). 
72 By ‘indirect’ Becker simply means ‘through participation in social institutions’ in contrast with a direct exchange 
between individuals. 
73 I take it that by ‘relevantly’ White means ‘fittingly’. 
74 Note that ‘value’ can be understood in market-based (i.e. competitive prices) or Marxist terms (i.e. a labour-value 
based on the working time necessary for production). See Warren 1994 for a discussion. 
75 He calls it ‘baseline reciprocity’ (White 1997: 319) or the ‘fair-dues conception’ of reciprocity (2003a: 49-51). 
   113 
A decent productive contribution, White specifies, must be understood as a ‘reasonable effort’ to 
contribute which is partly dependent on the share of the social product one claims and partly on 
one’s relative capacity to produce benefits in return (White 2003a: 62). Non-reciprocation, then, 
violates a norm of ‘reasonable mutual advantage’: citizens have, as a matter of dignity, the right to 
expect a reasonable effort on the part of others and a failure to do so amounts to their exploitation 
(White 2003a: 62). In short, for fair reciprocity, the duty to contribute attached to social rights is 
the expression of democratic mutual regard. 
2.3. The duty to work 
So far, I have sought to explain how and why reciprocity-based theories of justice, and fair 
reciprocity in particular, require a mandatory participation in the form of a productive contribution, 
proportionate and fitting to ability and circumstances, as expressed by the reciprocity principle. But 
what counts as a social obligation to work in practice deserves more attention. 
2.3.1. Defining the obligation 
By social obligation, I understand an act required (as opposed to merely desirable or permitted) 
from all members of the community which imposes the obligation (Becker 1980: 35, fn 1). ‘Work’ 
or ‘labour’ (I use these terms interchangeably) point to a positive effort that is sustained through 
time (rather than momentary) and designed to accomplish a purpose, that is, to yield a product 
(Becker 1980: 44). As a social obligation, its purpose needs to be (at least potentially) socially 
beneficial. A failure to do so would simply fail to satisfy the purpose of reciprocity. In other words, 
it cannot be self-regarding and must be recognized as valuable by fellow citizens. A ‘productive’ 
contribution is one that produces socially recognized benefits, which is typically understood in an 
economically productive sense.  
However, it is useful to distinguish between a narrow and a broad view of what counts as socially 
beneficial work. A narrow view is an employment-centred conception of the contributive 
requirement, which is the kind of productive contribution that is at the core of existing welfare 
contractualism and only considers an income-producing work to count as socially beneficial. Such 
paid work is generally said to encompass market-generated employment, self-employment and 
public-sector employment. Besides, there is also a presumption that some forms of disability 
exempt people from their obligation to work. Similarly, a person receiving education is temporarily 
exempted because she is preparing and qualifying herself to fulfil her obligation at a later stage. 
And those who have contributed in the past and now retired are also relieved of their duty. Overall, 
the narrow view takes it that the kind of cooperation that produces the social surplus (and thus 
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justifies redistributing its benefits to participants) means economically productive, directly 
measurable and taxable forms of labour.  
The broad view integrates the narrow view of formal labour market participation but considers that 
it is not the only relevant sort of socially beneficial work: it should be extended to other informal 
and less measurable forms of participation.76 Thus, it also includes unpaid work such as keeping a 
household, taking care of others incapable of meeting their needs by themselves (e.g. infirm 
individuals or children) or doing volunteer work.  
It is not clear which view is endorsed by Rawls but White defends the broad approach of acceptable 
forms of ‘civic labour’ (White 2003a: ch. 5). Under fair reciprocity, the elaboration of a ‘basic work 
expectation’ is a context-specific political practice based on a democratic consensus (White 2003a: 
125). Just as the different forms of acceptable labour have to be recognised as socially acceptable, 
the appropriate quantity of work, such as a socially defined number of hours of work (when 
suitable), can be set through political deliberation by taking into account the specific criteria such 
as the community’s level of resources, technological development, and demography. The 
appropriate level of output of labour should also be specified. 
Until now, I have considered the duty to work as a general requirement for all sharing in the social 
product, which means that a mandatory participation should ideally be equally enforced on the idle 
rich living out of his inheritance and the idle poor benefiting from the state’s assistance. But what 
about special benefits, that is to say, benefits only available upon request? Under a conception of 
justice based on fair reciprocity, social benefits should be granted on the basis of a work-test, to 
avoid the risk of free-riding. The basic work expectation, or reasonable effort, in such a case should 
be understood as a disposition for reciprocation. In the case of income support, the contribution 
requirement would thus be satisfied (in its narrow form) if the recipient of the benefit demonstrates 
her willingness to make a reciprocal productive contribution by making a conscientious effort to find 
appropriate employment. Assuming that background conditions are considered sufficiently just 
(see section 5), then, fair reciprocity supports a work-tested kind of income support consistent with 
welfare contractualism (White 2003a: 134), with such a contract defined as follows: ‘social rights 
are one side of a contract between citizen and state on the other side of which stand certain 
responsibilities: these are centrally related to work, and the citizen must perform them as a 
condition of enjoying the benefits secured by these rights’ (White 2003a: 12). 
                                                 
76 Whether returns on capital count as a productive contribution is a problematic concern as it does not necessarily 
constitute a productive activity but merely the act of ‘gatekeeping’ a productive asset. White reject some forms of 
capitalist income but accept others. See White (2003a: 118-124) for a discussion. 
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2.3.2. A non-perfectionist justification 
The defence of the work-test presented so far must be contrasted with its justification on 
paternalistic grounds, which are themselves derived from a perfectionist conception of the so-
called ‘work ethic’ (Barry 1997) or, in more precise words, ‘the ethics of paid work’ (van der Veen 
1991b; Groot 2004: 38). Such a view considers that there is nobility in labour, that work is virtuous 
for both material and psychological reasons. So as the argument goes, work is valuable in that, 
besides earnings, it allows the development of skills, provides a sense of self-esteem, social contacts 
and social recognition, all of which are considered essential for personal development and social 
participation.77 Consequently, non-reciprocation, that is idleness, is a bad considered harmful which 
should be discouraged or even penalized. A paternalistic approach thus justifies the enforcement 
of the work requirement on the grounds that it would be in the welfare recipients’ best interest.78 
While these work-related arguments might have instrumental value, the obligation embedded in 
fair reciprocity is not based on the endorsement of a specific conception of the good life but on 
the ideas of liberal neutrality (non-perfectionism), mutual regard and fairness. The introduction of 
a work-test as a condition for granting social benefits relies on a duty to work conceived as an 
independent demand of justice, from which follows the idea of welfare contractualism. It is thus 
because the basic income allows one to escape a social obligation that it has been opposed from 
the standpoint of fair reciprocity, not because it allows one to lead a supposedly unrewarding 
workless life. Bearing all the above in mind, I can now come back to the challenge of reciprocity. 
2.4. The objection 
It would be incoherent to say that the contributors to society’s enterprise, in generating a social 
surplus, have – as defenders of a UBI suggest – the obligation to share it with those who have not 
contributed. What do the latter have to do with it? If we earth people should discover Martians 
unwilling to trade or collaborate with us, do they nonetheless have a claim too? (Phelps 2001: 55) 
Edmund Phelps’ provocative comment expresses well the reciprocity-based objection to the UBI. 
Let’s recall that the basic income is unconditional, that is, obligation-free. If social justice demands 
reciprocity, then it seems straightforward to conclude that a distributive programme which grants 
social resources to all irrespective of any (willingness to make a) productive contribution is 
incompatible with that view of justice. More specifically, if granted at subsistence level, the UBI 
offers the opportunity to stop working and remain idle, an ‘exit option’ which allows one to enjoy 
                                                 
77 Note that Groot (2004: 39) makes another distinction, which he calls the ‘neutral work ethic’. Such a view does not 
grant intrinsic value to work but maintains that those who do not work shall bear the consequences. In short, ‘those 
who shall not work, shall not eat’. 
78 See also Mead (1992) for a defence of this view. 
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the benefits of the social product without doing what fair reciprocity considers as a fair share in 
return.79 The UBI produces an injustice as it violates the demand of justice expressed in the 
reciprocity principle: someone who remains idle takes unfair advantage of those who contribute to 
the benefits of social cooperation.  
This objection has been extensively discussed in the literature under the names of reciprocity, 
exploitation, the Malibu surfer problem, free-riding and parasitism (Widerquist 2013a: 80). These 
semantic variations point to various nuances. The reciprocity-based objection refers to the act of 
receiving a payment without satisfying a basic work expectation in return and exploitation refers to 
the act of inflicting a burden on fellow citizens by depriving them of their rightful share (White 
1997). The UBI is, in this sense, ‘a recipe for the exploitation of the industrious by the lazy’ (Elster 
1986: 719). The ‘Malibu surfer problem’ refers to Rawls’ negative stance towards the UBI: those 
who choose a life of full-time leisure instead of working, such as those who surf all day in Malibu, 
are not entitled to public resources and must find a way to support themselves (Rawls 1988: 257; 
1993: 181, ft. 9; 2001: 179). Those who fail to satisfy sheer reciprocity are free-riders (i.e. they 
benefit without contributing) while those who have an exploitative behaviour are said to be 
parasitic to others because they inflict harm on others who have to contribute more in order to 
support those who remain idle (van Donselaar 2008). Despite these nuances, the various terms 
employed in the literature point to closely-related ideas which are often treated together. 
Encompassing both the problems of free-riding and parasitism, the reciprocity challenge to the 
UBI is grounded on the basic income’s failure to satisfy the reciprocity principle leading to 
exploitative consequences: 
Those who willingly enjoy a decent minimum of the economic benefits of social cooperation 
without satisfying their [basic] work expectation violate the principle of baseline reciprocity, and 
thereby take unfair advantage of – i.e. exploit – those citizens who do satisfy this expectation; 
payment of a substantial UBI is therefore unjust because, by completely detaching the receipt of a 
decent minimum of the economic benefits of social cooperation from the satisfaction of a [basic] 
work expectation, it makes possible exploitation of this kind. (White 1997: 320) 
According to White’s ‘exploitation objection’ (White 1997, 2006), the violation of sheer reciprocity 
(i.e. the absence of productive contribution) necessarily implies exploitation of workers: a refusal 
to cooperate imposes a cost on those who do. It is assumed that at least some revenue composing 
the UBI will have to come from taxing workers’ earnings. Otherwise put, with a basic income the 
workers’ after-tax income will necessarily be lower than in its absence. Such exploitation rests 
                                                 
79 If a significant number of people stop working, this might also pose a problem of economic affordability and 
institutional sustainability but my concern here is not with such empirical consequences. It is, instead, with the UBI’s 
ethical implications. Nevertheless, this concern might be relativised if the UBI is set at sustainable level (see van der 
Veen 1991b and Van Parijs 1995). 
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implicitly on the combination of four assumptions: (i) the taxation of other external assets (e.g. 
through a land tax, a carbon tax, a tax on robot, etc.) does not provide enough revenue to fund, on 
its own, a basic income; (ii) in the absence of fair reciprocity, workers benefit from the full proceeds 
of their efforts; (iii) in the absence of redistributive taxation of income, wages perfectly reflect the 
full value of a worker’s efforts and (iv) after-tax earnings in the presence of a basic income 
programme are less than without it (Widerquist 1999: 394). Each of these assumptions could be 
challenged (see Widerquist 1999: 394-400 for a discussion) but let’s assume that they are valid. 
From this, it can also be assumed that, in the case of a system of income support based on 
conditional transfers, workers would be better off, at least in terms of revenue maximisation, in the 
absence of such system. Recipients of conditional benefits are thus exploiting workers in a similar 
way, but the very presence of a work-test makes it legitimate. I take it from this that there is 
exploitation only to the extent that there is a violation of the reciprocity principle: exploitation is 
illegitimate because it is a consequence of non-reciprocation. Any response to the objection must 
thus primarily be concerned with the absence of a reciprocal contribution as this is where the 
injustice primarily lies, according to fair reciprocity. 
How can it be fair then to provide ‘something for nothing’? In the next sections, I present a first 
potential but unsatisfying answer to the objection before arguing that those for whom reciprocity 
is a requirement of justice have good reasons to consider the UBI favourably as a ‘second-best’ 
solution to work-conditional income support. Then, I turn to alternative conceptions of justice 
according to which the reciprocity-based objection is not even valid because the UBI amounts to 
a redistribution of reciprocity-free external assets and thus qualifies as a ‘first-best’ income support 
policy. 
3. The answer of ‘extended’ reciprocity 
One way to argue that the reciprocity-based objection is not decisive consists in claiming that the 
obligation to contribute should be wider in scope than what the broad version accepts. Drawing 
from McKinnon (2003: 153-154), I refer to this conception as the ‘extended’ view of reciprocity, 
of which two different versions, a basic and a subtle one, can be distinguished. 
3.1. The basic version 
The basic version responds to the reciprocity objection by considering that the Malibu surfers 
satisfy their social obligation in virtue of their contribution to society’s cultural capital by sustaining 
a sports’ sub-culture (McKinnon 2003: 153). Yet, the argument seems to face important limits in 
terms of what counts as a contribution to society’s cultural capital. What is the cultural capital 
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preserved and promoted by the PlayStation addict, for example? If the duty to contribute is 
understood as the production of an effort that is necessarily socially beneficial, it seems very 
ambitious (if not totally far-fetched) to stretch the notion of reciprocity to that extent. While the 
broad perspective of the contributive requirement values forms of labour that are unpaid but 
economically productive and valuable to others, the basic version of extended reciprocity values 
hobbies that might be considered as self-regarding. From the point of view of fair reciprocity, this 
answer seems far too weak to satisfy the reciprocity principle and counter the objection. 
3.2. The subtle version 
The subtle version of extended reciprocity considers that the notion of activity-based reciprocity 
should be substituted for the notion of ‘gainful exchange for reciprocity’ (Jordan 1998: 64). 
According to this view, besides making a contribution for the sake of collective production and 
consumption, there is another side to reciprocity and cooperation, understood as restraint of 
competition. For example, under scarce job opportunities, the efficiency wages enjoyed by those 
on the labour market, the insiders, are protected only to the extent that unemployed people, the 
outsiders, refrain from offering their workforce for a lower salary because they believe that they 
might find better jobs at a later stage (Jordan 1988: 71). Typically, an unemployment insurance 
scheme restrains competition and safeguards minimum wages and good labour conditions. In this 
sense, by refraining to engage in competition with fellow members on the job market, the Malibu 
surfer or the PlayStation addict relieves them from downward pressure on wages. 
A gainful exchange for reciprocity thus includes both active and passive forms of contribution: 
'[r]eciprocity demands participation, involvement, activity and inclusion, if not in the formal labour 
market then at least in socially useful work of some kind. Restraint demands that this should not 
undermine the remaining institutional protections that uphold the living standards of insiders’ 
(Jordan 1988: 77). The subtle version encompasses a broad conception of the contributive 
requirement underlying the reciprocity principle, completed by what could be termed ‘reciprocity 
as restraint’. If active contribution and restraint on rivalry are two sides of the same coin, both 
necessary to uphold a fair system of cooperation, then, according to this view, the basic income 
would not violate reciprocity, since it would be considered partly as a reward for activity-based 
reciprocity and partly as a pay-off for reciprocity as restraint. 
However, this answer to the reciprocity objection is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it is 
unclear how the UBI will actually constitute a fair form of restraint. By removing the poverty trap, 
it is in fact removing the reservation wage that protects salaries on the labour market (see also fn 
60, p. 97). Moreover, if not set at a level considered high enough to cover basic needs, the UBI 
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might actually increase competitive pressures at the lower end of the market. It seems that only a 
substantially high UBI set above the poverty line accompanied by a high labour tax rate might 
refrain competitive pressures and force employers to improve job pay and labour conditions. The 
UBI’s satisfaction of some extended notion of reciprocity is thus highly dependent on the capacity 
of a set of policies to produce the desirable outcomes for restraint to count as a valid form of 
contribution.  
Second, a reciprocal contribution must be fitting and proportional, and civic labour (in its narrow 
or broad conception) does not include self-restraint because, by definition, it demands a positive 
effort to accomplish a purpose and to yield a product. If reciprocity as restraint might be sufficient 
for a conception of justice based on gainful exchange, it is not for fair reciprocity, which demands 
active participation. As McKinnon (2003: 154) puts it, ‘the claim that those who do nothing, while 
others are active, are contributing – furthermore, contributing in a way that generates entitlements 
– stretches credibility’. Overall, these two versions of extended reciprocity are unsatisfying answers 
to the reciprocity objection, at least from the standpoint of fair reciprocity. I now turn to a more 
promising answer. 
4. The reciprocity-friendly answer 
If fair reciprocity is about ensuring that everyone contributes to the social product, another way to 
defend the UBI against the objection consists in claiming it would achieve this objective better than 
via the enforcement of a work-test. In this answer, I take an ‘all-things considered’ approach in the 
sense that the UBI’s moral cost and moral gains are placed on an equal footing: the UBI does 
violate reciprocity and thus produces an injustice, but its unfairness is outweighted by the goodies 
it produces. In other words, the UBI is vulnerable to the objection as it allows some to free-ride, 
but thanks to its effects, the UBI would be a superior solution compared to work-conditional 
schemes to support the demands of the work ethos at the heart of fair reciprocity. 
4.1. Work-incentives 
In the case of a partial basic income, two main situations can be distinguished. If it is introduced 
as a substitutive policy, it has a strong incentive for work – and is thus reciprocity-friendly – but 
that may be at a significant moral price if it results, for instance, in more market vulnerability for 
low-skilled workers (see chapter 2, section 4.3, esp. fn 68). In the case of a complementary partial 
basic income, the policy is added to existing welfare state conditional schemes. Despite not being 
adequate by itself, in this case the UBI would either be completed by income from work or by 
conditional social assistance top-ups such that, either way, it would demand some form of 
   120 
contribution: actual productive contribution in the former case and disposition of reciprocation 
through employment search in the latter. As such a partial basic income is obviously a reciprocity-
friendly policy. 
A full UBI may also go some way in meeting the demands of fair reciprocity, despite the possibility 
of an exit option and its associated moral cost, through a series of reciprocity-friendly effects, that 
traditional work-conditional forms of income support do not have. Drawing on arguments 
mentioned in chapter two, it may have a ‘work-incentive effect’. Thanks to the removal of the 
unemployment trap, the UBI may enlarge the scope of work opportunities, in particular for less-
skilled people and members of the precariat. As such, it supports an actual contribution (rather 
than a disposition to reciprocate) more effectively than conditional schemes, through a rewarding 
rather than sanctioning approach, as recognised by White himself in later writings (2006: 7). 
Moreover, by offering a stable and regular income flow it would facilitate self-employment and 
new forms of work in the so-called ‘autonomous sphere’ (Ferry 1995), and by providing incentives 
for working-time reduction, it would also redistribute employment opportunities from labour 
market insiders to outsiders (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 48-50). In addition, the UBI may 
have a ‘social wage effect’, as its economic security would allow one to improve qualifications, 
engage in community work or in care work.  
To make a case for a reciprocity-friendly UBI, the positive effects must outweigh the risk of exit. 
Whilst the net effect of the UBI on employment participation remains uncertain, the risk of exit 
may only concern a tiny minority: despite limits to their generalisability, basic income-like 
experiments showed that absence of work-conditionality had a limited impact on labour, revealing 
a minor reduction in employment levels and working hours, and it is likely that these results were 
overestimated given problems of misreportings (Burtless 1986; Robins 1985; Ashenfelter and Plant 
1990).80 The income effect (i.e. the supplement of income inducing a reduction in work effort) and 
the substitution effect (i.e. the substitution of work for leisure because work becomes less lucrative) 
were both very modest (Hum and Simpson 1993). On the whole, few adverse effects were found 
and when there was a negative work response, it was often to engage in the kind of activities that 
would support the broad view of civic labour (such as education or care work), because it reinforces 
the UBI’s ‘social wage effect’. 
                                                 
80 These experiments are necessarily limited in the information they provide for any generalisation at national (or 
supranational) level: they are time-constrained, may have problems of sample representativity, do not involve net 
contributors, take place at local rather than national level and typically involve a NIT. In these circumstances, it is 
difficult to measure economy-wide effects and overall behavioural change. Yet, in terms of work-inconditionality, NIT 
and UBI are sufficiently similar for experimental purposes, and experiments can reassure in one major respect: so far, 
no mad rush for idleness. 
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4.2. Intra-household reciprocity 
Thirdly, another often neglected reciprocity-friendly dimension should be taken into consideration. 
The UBI may have an ‘empowerment effect’ in intra-household reciprocity by restoring balance in 
gender-related division of labour as men often fail to do their fair share in the domestic work and 
live off women’s labour (Pateman 2004). The UBI would thus shed light on an overlooked aspect 
of the problem of reciprocity which typically considers remunerated labour (i.e. a narrow view), by 
expanding it to the widespread non-remunerated sphere of labour that is mostly undertaken by 
women: domestic labour and voluntary work (i.e. broad view) to reveal the free-riding of men. By 
providing women with the means to escape financial dependence upon men, the UBI would thus 
reduce this domestic exploitative situation. Again, this must be nuanced as there are strong 
concerns that the UBI may actually reinforce the gender bias at home by simply providing them 
with a ‘housewife wage’ (Orloff 1990; Robeyns 2000, 2001). It is unclear whether the UBI would 
have a net positive effect on women unless it is accompanied by other measures meant at liberating 
women from gender role expectations (Robeyns 2001: 103), but the feminist case for the UBI is 
broader than intra-household reciprocity (see in section 7.4.). 
Overall, despite these nuances, there are solid arguments to consider that the UBI’s positive effects 
on contribution would (arguably) offset the moral cost of making non-reciprocation possible and 
be a more reciprocity-friendly policy than work-conditional schemes. This case for the UBI against 
the objection is even stronger if one holds a broad view of civic labour. According to this 
concessionary view, thus, the UBI may be seen as a second-best policy. 
5. The circumstantial answer 
Just like the reciprocity-friendly one, the circumstantial answer concedes that the UBI is vulnerable 
to the challenge of reciprocity. However, in this case, the objection is not decisive because, under 
current circumstances, the enforcement of a work-test would create more harm than good such 
that the moral gains produced by the UBI are lexically prior to the obligation of reciprocity. In other 
words, the background injustice that prevails in real-life economic circumstances demands that the 
work-test be dropped, and the UBI adopted as a second-best policy. As Barry (2001: 66) puts it: 
‘[f]rom this point of view, the Malibu surfers are a drawback, but one worth putting up with the 
advantages that are inseparable from the unconditionality of a basic income’. 
5.1. A fair work-test in real-life circumstances? 
Let’s recall that, under the reciprocity principle, demands of reciprocity can be made insofar as 
institutions are otherwise sufficiently just. According to White, a society can enforce the obligation 
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to work once it has abolished ‘the proletarian condition’ such that workers are relieved from the 
constraint of selling their labour-power under conditions of market vulnerability and they are free 
to commit to an ethos of democratic mutual regard, because institutions satisfy a number of core 
requirements that ensure fair background economic conditions (White 2003a: 86-94). In other 
words, making income support conditional on (the willingness to) work is itself conditional on the 
fairness of the wider economic system. A fair work-test can only be enforced to the extent that the 
institutions guarantee (i) that citizens satisfying the obligation to work receive a share of the social 
product that is sufficient to escape brute luck poverty (income adequacy), (ii) that they have adequate 
opportunities to work (participation adequacy), (iii) that different forms of contribution be equitably 
valued as required by the broad conception of the social obligation (participation equity), and finally, 
(iv) that the obligation apply equally to all (contribution equity) (White 2003a: 134-135). 
In reality, as was shown in chapter one, existing income support systems generally fall short of 
being adequate, most people do not have a real opportunity for self-realisation in work, and the 
enforcement of the work-test rests on a narrow conception of what counts as a socially recognized 
contribution. As for the contributive obligation, it only applies to those claiming social benefits. 
Enforcing the work-test in unjust background conditions may thus further exacerbate injustices by 
reducing the workers’ bargaining power, obliging them to accept inadequate income or 
inappropriate forms of employment, induce loss of dignity or additional stress in order to retain 
eligibility, etc.  
White’s own evolution on the matter reveals two different possible responses (White 2003a, 2017). 
The first view considers that society must advance towards the conditions necessary for a fair work-
test by introducing the policies and institutions that are lacking to satisfy the requirements of fair 
reciprocity. Such a reform programme will inevitably be ambitious in both size and content as it 
implies reforming the education system, the labour market, the system of wealth redistribution, etc. 
to establish the kind of multi-dimensional civic minimum demanded by fair reciprocity (White 
2003a: ch. 9). While these reforms are undoubtedly necessary, there is a very significant political 
risk that a long list of policy prescriptions designed to establish a just conditionality might never 
see the light. Worse even, the current context of austerity is likely to make it even more difficult to 
meet the requirements of fair reciprocity.  
The second view thus assumes that unjust conditions are likely to remain in the foreseeable future 
such that unfair conditionality might exacerbate the problems the very first option tries to address 
in parallel (White 2017). Consequently, moving away from conditionality might be a preferable 
solution. Instead of keeping an unfair work-test and trying to reduce the injustice of background 
   123 
conditions in parallel, the work-test should be dropped in order to allow for the improvement of 
background circumstances. According to this perspective, the introduction of a full UBI (or even 
a partial one) would significantly reduce the harmful consequences of unjust conditionality. 
Yet, for this argument to hold, three conditions must be met. First, it must be shown that the 
introduction of a UBI is more politically likely than instituting the full conditions of fair reciprocity. 
The current dominant policy line of welfare retrenchment and the strengthening of activation 
policies seems unfavourable to both scenarios. However, given the scope of the package of 
demands necessary for demands of fair reciprocity to apply, and for the sake of pursuing the 
normative argument, I assume that dropping the work-test and introducing a UBI is a more likely 
possibility. Again, this does not mean that the UBI cannot be part of such a necessary progressive 
package, but it rests on the assumption that making income support unconditional is a matter of 
urgency under real-life constraints. Second, it must also be shown that, on balance, the UBI would 
avoid greater injutices than it would generate, and third, that there is no alternative policy capable 
of producing similar moral gains to the UBI while avoiding the moral cost of free-riding. I evaluate 
these two dimensions in turn. 
5.1. The moral gains of economic security 
Besides the moral gains of the UBI as a reciprocity-friendly policy, the UBI may produce other 
effects, desirable from the standpoint of fair reciprocity, that would, on balance, offset its moral 
cost. In other words, it might prevent greater injustices, by removing asymmetries of power that 
cause unfair bonds of dependence between individuals.  
In specifying the background conditions of justice, fair reciprocity demands that a society ensures, 
inter alia, adequate protection against market vulnerability and exploitation, that is to say, market 
security, and a real opportunity for self-fulfilling work throughout their lives, or self-realisation 
(White 2003a: 90). As was shown in chapter one, the various forms of economic insecurities that 
characterise the precariat show that under current circumstances these demands are not met. In 
chapter two, I argued that the UBI embodies a form of economic security that provides additional 
bargaining power on the labour market, in particular for less-endowed individuals, and opens up 
new possibilities for self-realisation thanks to its double unconditionality (absence of means-test 
and absence of work-conditionality), allowing one to say ‘yes’ to a self-rewarding activity and ‘no’ 
to bad working conditions. 
I come back to these arguments relating to one’s independence later (section 7) but for now it is 
sufficient to show that demands of fair reciprocity may be seen in light of a trade-off (White 2006a: 
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5). On the one hand we have a society which enforces the work-test (no violation of reciprocity) 
but does not ensure adequate protection against market vulnerability and exploitation nor the 
capacity for self-realisation. On the other hand, we have a society with the UBI which allows a 
violation of reciprocity (but may be more reciprocity-friendly overall) and which reduces the 
unfairness of market vulnerability and lack of self-fulfilling opportunities. On these grounds, it 
seems clear that the second option – a society with the UBI – avoids injustices that are greater than 
those it creates. In short, its moral gains offset its moral costs.  
5.2. Basic income or participation income? 
Yet, for the circumstantial answer to the objection to hold, it must be shown that the UBI should 
be preferred to another policy instrument capable of providing equivalent benefits at an inferior 
moral cost, that is, without violating the obligation of reciprocation. One proposal in particular 
stands out as a more attractive solution: the participation income (PI).81 As was already explained 
in chapter two, the PI would have similar benefits to the UBI while embracing a broad conception 
of mandatory participation. In practice, then, only those choosing a life of self-indulgence, such as 
the Malibu surfer or the PlayStation addict, would be ruled out. Because it does not provide an exit 
option for all able-bodied people, it is not vulnerable to the reciprocity objection, at least to the 
extent that the contribution requirement is understood in its broad form, as is the case in White’s 
conception of reciprocity-based justice. In other words, the participation condition would be 
‘intrinsically justified’ as it ‘conveys a positive message about ‘reciprocity’’ (Atkinson 2015: 221). In 
short, the PI provides broadly equal advantages at a lower moral cost. 
However, as shown in chapter two, the PI involves important administrative difficulties. But whilst 
I emphasised the superiority of the UBI mostly in terms of effectiveness to tackle poverty, these 
administrative hurdles have a moral side as well. Indeed, enforcing the participation-test implies an 
assessment of the nature and quantity of activities considered as ‘socially useful’, as well as a 
continuous monitoring of beneficiaries, which could become very intrusive. For example, it would 
risk corrupting the basis of volunteering by obliging associations to control their volunteers’ 
attendance and work hours, while assessing whether one is self-employed or doing care work would 
demand an incredible level of intrusiveness in the domestic sphere (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 
2017: 213). It is unclear whether the PI would score higher than the UBI in terms of reciprocity-
friendly outcomes and opportunities for self-realisation. To these uncertainties, one must add the 
                                                 
81 Another possibility would be to have a ‘hybrid’ model. For example, a two-tier income support system would be 
composed of a more conventional work-tested or participation-tested tier and a time-limited unconditional basic 
income allowing one to draw out of the duty to contribute for a certain amount of time (e.g. 1, 3 or 5 years). (See White 
2003a: 170-175, 2003b: 86-93). 
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risk of misclassification, the legal challenges and grey areas associated with the participation income 
that would induce a high level of intrusiveness, a costly and complex bureaucracy that may 
overshadow existing work-conditional apparatus. In these conditions, the ‘pragmatic’ argument 
made in chapter two points to the following choice: a return to the previous narrowly-defined 
work-test or a loosening of the participation condition to move towards a UBI.82 Since a return to 
conditionality is unappealing given the injustice of the real-world economy, it seems fair to 
conclude that the UBI would provide an appealing option, despite its risk of free-riding. If these 
arguments hold, then, according to the circumstantial answer, the objection is, again, valid but not 
decisive. 
6. The self-respect answer 
The self-respect answer is also a concessionary view based on an argument of lexical priority. In 
this case, I show that there is a tension between two commitments of reciprocity-based justice, 
namely self-respect and reciprocity. If one accepts that the UBI favours self-respect in ways that 
conditional benefits cannot, then those who consider self-respect as a requirement of justice of 
primary value have to relax their exigence of reciprocity. 
6.1. The social bases of self-respect 
To develop this argument it is useful to rely primarily on the Rawlsian account of reciprocity-based 
justice and his ‘social bases of self-respect’ which are part of his index of primary goods (i.e. his 
interpretation of what the difference principle must maximin) (Rawls 1971: 92, 2001: 58-59).83 
Rawls claims that self-respect, which he defines as the sense one has of its own worth, is ‘perhaps 
the most important primary good’ (Rawls 1971: 440). The social bases of self-respect, then, are 
these aspects social institutions provide as opportunities for self-respect. As such, ‘[w]hen assessing 
social and political conditions as social bases of self-respect, we need to think about how they might 
assist or hinder people in the search for success according to their personal standards of excellence’ 
(McKinnon 2003: 147). In order to do this, one must consider both how resources serve as means 
for self-respect and according to which pattern of distribution they are distributed.  
More than just money, the UBI offers ‘access to other less tangible goods necessary for self-respect 
that cannot be distributed to persons directly’ (McKinnon 2006: 2). These can be regrouped under 
three main kinds of benefits: (i) freedom benefits: the UBI grants individuals an effective capacity to 
                                                 
82 There may be a third possibility: in return for the UBI, one would have to perform some kind of community service. 
André Gorz proposed such a system but then changed his mind in favour of an unconditional basic income. In his 
mind, if the UBI is given as a counterpart for some activity of public interest, it would commodify a good that should 
remain in the sphere of uncommodified goods and made accessible to all on a voluntary basis (Gorz 1997: 144).  
83 Note also that White derives his own view of ‘self-esteem’ on Rawls’ view of self-respect (White 2003a: 60-61). 
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choose quality work; (ii) leisure-quantity benefits: the UBI makes a greater quantity of leisure time 
available, which is recognized as being essential for one’s self-worth as it makes associational life 
possible; (iii) leisure-quality benefits: the UBI makes it possible to bear the costs of such associational 
life (McKinnon 2003: 148). 
Moreover, if justice does not only require that everyone receives its fair share of the resources 
collectively produced but also that this distribution of wealth is done without stigmatising or 
humiliating people in need, then, according to Blais (1999), this requirement provides a strong 
argument in favour of universal and unconditional transfers, as these treat everyone with equal 
respect as opposed to selective and conditional measures. Conditional transfers have systems of 
classifications of their recipients which can be associated with social markers of inferior status and 
produce problems of stigmatisation, as argued in chapter one and two. By contrast, with a UBI, 
those who are in need do not have to assert their right by proving they are a class apart. The basic 
income thus satisfies the exigence of subsistence of the worst-off while also promoting their 
opportunities for self-respect, in ways conditional welfare cannot, that is without causing trade-off 
between these two objectives (McKinnon 2003: 148-153; Birnbaum 2012: 51-52). In short, if one 
values the satisfaction of both economic security and self-respect for the least advantaged in 
society, then the exigence of reciprocity should be relaxed in favour of the UBI.  
Following McKinnon (2003: 156), then, those who hold that reciprocity plays a central role in 
justice but recognize the strength of self-respect-based arguments for the UBI must acknowledge 
that there is a tension between these two values. If, as Rawls, they consider that the social bases of 
self-respect are of paramount importance, then they must relax the exigence of reciprocity in favour 
of the UBI. It must nevertheless be noted that this conclusion is valid only to the extent that 
conditional benefits cannot be granted in such a way that it does not damage the social bases of 
self-respect for the least advantaged or that the UBI would not develop another kind of stigma 
associated with the development of a two-tier society, for instance between those who work and 
those live off their UBI. 
6.2. A leisure bias? 
A purely unconditional transfer may still pose a problem of perfectionistic bias in favour of ‘the 
lazy’, that is, an individual with a preference for leisure. Indeed, in the absence of leisure in Rawls’ 
index of primary goods, the difference principle seems to imply that people without income are 
among the least privileged and hence entitled to an income as high as sustainable (Musgrave 1974). 
To avoid justifying subsidising the surfers of Malibu with public resources, Rawls integrated leisure 
in his index by defining it as ‘twenty-four hours less a standard working day [such that those] who 
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are unwilling to work would have a standard working day of extra leisure, and this extra leisure 
itself would be stipulated as equivalent to the index of primary goods of the least advantaged’ 
(Rawls 1988: 257). 
From this, it seems that the Malibu surfers are no longer able to live off public funds since those 
who choose a life of full-time leisure can no longer be considered among the least advantaged. 
However, it can be argued that Rawls produces the opposite bias, in favour of ‘the crazy’, those 
with a preference for a higher income through more work (Van Parijs 1995: 90).84 Considering that 
it is the average value of the index achieved by the worst-off throughout their life that concerns the 
difference principle, any interpretation of this principle will depend on the relative weights ascribed, 
inter alia, to income and leisure (Van Parijs 2009: 6).  Adding leisure to his index of primary goods 
has actually made Rawls’ theory more sympathetic to the UBI, according to Van Parijs: ‘once the 
leisure enjoyed over their lifetimes by the incumbents of a social position no longer counts for 
nothing, surfers will have a higher rather than a lower chance of being justly fed according to Rawls’ 
Difference Principle’ (Van Parijs 2009: 6). If this is true, then my conclusion still holds: the UBI 
remains vulnerable to the objection of reciprocity but there are other justice-based arguments, 
grounded in self-respect, which make it a desirable policy from the standpoint of fair reciprocity, 
at least for those who hold that self-respect should be prior to the enforcement of the work-test. 
7. The independence answer 
In this section and the next I turn to two positive justifications of the UBI that consider that 
reciprocity plays a role only to the extent that other conditions are met or no role whatsoever. I 
start with the independence answer, which offers another lexically prior-kind of defence against 
the objection: demands of reciprocity, on this account, can only be enforced provided that each is 
guaranteed the means for material independence, which is best provided by the UBI. This time, 
thus, the UBI is defended as a ‘first best’ solution: it is seen as the best way to ensure an economic 
floor necessary for individual freedom and full citizenship. In other words, securing the means for 
economic security is a necessary condition for civic contribution. According to this view, then, the 
social rights element of citizenship must be unconditional, in a similar way to civic and political 
citizenship. 
 
                                                 
84 This also poses a problem for all those who hold that moving towards a post-productivist society (in the sense of 
moving beyond a work-based society and towards one that values unpaid activities and leisure time over formal 
employment thanks to increased productivity gains) is desirable either because work should not be a central pillar of 
society (Offe 1992; Gorz 1997) or for ecological concerns (Fitzpatrick 1999: ch. 9). 
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7.1. Republican freedom 
The priority of material independence over duties of reciprocity is well expressed by Casassas (2007: 
4) when he asks: ‘[c]an individuals be asked to deploy some kind of contributionist ethos without 
granting them an unalienable and politically secured social position that gives them material 
independence and, therefore, effective freedom of choice – as full citizens?’ This point is typically 
made by those defending the basic income from within the so-called republican tradition of 
theories of justice (Pettit 2007; Pateman 2004; Raventós 2007; Casassas 2007; Casassas and De 
Wispelaere 2016) as layed out, among others, by Pettit (1997). Broadly conceived, republicans 
understand freedom as the capacity to do what one wishes without being vulnerable to external 
interference. In other words, freedom is construed as the absence of alien control or domination.  
One’s set of opportunities to be effectively free, then, is delimited by the material property that 
enables one to control these opportunities and escape the ‘unreasoned control’ that others might 
exercise (Pettit 2007: 4). The guarantee of freedom as non-domination thus requires, among other 
things, that one enjoys ‘durable control over a set of material resources or assets that leverages 
one’s freedom in economic exchanges by effectively securing a bargaining power from other 
agents’ (Casassas and De Wispelaere 2016: 286). Without an economic floor, ‘asset poverty’ 
amounts to a direct reduction of freedom because it effectively limits the scope of actions that an 
individual may perform without the permission of others (Dowding et al. 2003a: 12).  
7.2. Universal property and civic possibilities 
Securing independence in priority is thus both a matter of private interest and collective self-
determination, for one to be able to exert ‘self-government’ and enjoy ‘full citizenship’. As noted 
by Pateman (2004: 91), ‘[s]elf-government requires that individuals both go about their lives within 
democratic authority structures that enhance their autonomy, and that they have the standing, and 
are able (have the opportunities and means), to enjoy and safeguard their freedom’. Full citizenship, 
then, means that ‘political freedom and the exercise of citizenship are incompatible with the 
relations of domination by which proprietors and the rich exert dominium over people who are 
not completely free and who are subject to all sorts of interference, whether in the sphere of 
domestic life or in the juridical relations pertaining to the civil sphere, for example work contracts 
or the buying and selling of material good’ (Raventós 2007: 64). In other words, the provision of a 
firm material basis is necessary to make political participation and democratic rights effective. 
In this sense, providing economic independence does not mean independence from socio-
economic relations. Rather, it is about providing a basic equal standing to enter such relations. 
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‘Basic [independence] can plausibly be regarded as one of the key requirements of a wider and 
more fundamental idea of equality of status, addressing all the conditions necessary to place people 
in a position from which they can interact as social and political equals’ (Birnbaum 2012: 49). 
Against this backdrop, the basic income is defended as a way to ‘universalise property’ (Raventós 
2007: 69) which helps expand personal and civic possibilities, in particular for most vulnerable 
individuals, whilst ensuring equality of citizens as a matter of right, not privilege: 
A universal right would mean that those who rely on the basic income – distinct from the 
independently wealthy – will not have to assert their right on the grounds of being a class apart: 
people who depend on others’ goodwill and are easier targets of control and domination. And a 
universal right symbolizes the fundamental equality of all in relation to the collective provisions of 
government; only some will depend on the basic income that all receive, but all can see that the 
income is there to depend on, should they themselves fall on hard times. (Pettit 2007: 5-6) 
7.3. Independence on the labour market 
The absence of work-test is also justified because republicans tend to place individuals’ interests to 
be part of civil society in relation to a wider framework of class analysis: ‘the differential ownership 
relations of a variety of economic assets entail a world marked by significant social division, typically 
one that divides itself along something akin to class lines’ (Casassas and De Wispelaere 2016: 286). 
From such a perspective, the UBI is defended for its capacity to foster meaningful contributions 
rather than exploitative or alienating ones, along the lines of the socialist tradition. For Wright 
(2004, 2006) for instance, a full UBI would support three central socialist challenges to the capitalist 
labour market.85 First, it would strengthen the power of labour relative to capital. Class imbalance 
would be reduced thanks to a greater bargaining position of workers at individual level while, at 
collective level, the UBI would work as a ‘strike fund’ providing labour unions with additional 
means to organise struggle for better working conditions.86 Second, a basic income would go in the 
sense of a decommodification of labour by ensuring the means for subsistence outside the market. 
Third, the UBI would provide the means to enlarge and strengthen social economy as an alternative 
way of organising production, such as cooperatives which are not subject to the logic of profit-
maximisation and labour-capital relation. The combination of these three effects is said to reduce 
exploitation and alienation since the dependence to capitalist employers is reduced and the power 
over one’s own activities and the fruits of production raised. Of course, the effectiveness of the 
UBI to actually reduce exploitation and alienation depends on its level, on the worth of the UBI as 
part of a wider republican package of policies and on the strength of labour unions (Birnbaum and 
                                                 
85 See also Barry (1997) for a similar Marxist argument and van der Veen and Van Parijs (1986) for a communist 
defense of the UBI. 
86 For a discussion of this argument, see Birnbaum and De Wispelaere (2016). 
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De Wispelaere 2016). But the important point here is that restoring the balance of power on the 
labour market is prior to the demands of reciprocity as these require people to be equally free to 
enter the kind of social relationships demanded by the contributionist ethos. 
7.4. Independence of women 
Finally, some republicans defend the UBI’s unconditionality from a feminist perspective.  The UBI 
might advance the independence of women, who are often among the most vulnerable groups, 
facing unequal prospects on the labour market as well as intra-household positions of material 
dependence. First, the UBI is better able to adapt to the changing realities in terms of types of 
cohabitation, especially with respect to the rising number of single-parent families headed by 
women (Raventós 2007: 70). Second, as already hinted at in section 4.2., the economic situation of 
women dependent on their partner would improve greatly, especially for those in the most 
precarious situations. The UBI being granted on an individual basis, contrary to existing means-
tested forms of social benefits which are calculated for the household as a whole and often given 
to the (male) head of the family, women would be able to access and control their own income. 
Third, as already noted, the UBI would provide an additional intra-household bargaining power 
which might modify possible relations of subordination between sexes by breaking ‘the long-
standing link between income and employment and end the mutual reinforcement of the 
institutions of marriage, employment and citizenship’ (Pateman 2004: 90). Again, as already noted, 
feminist critics of the basic income doubt that it would result in actual independence of women on 
its own. Wider cultural and social patterns producing gender role divisions and gender hierarchies 
are not addressed (Robeyns 2001). Republicans do not deny that – freedom as non-domination 
also demands republican legal, political and other economic institutions (e.g. in the form of services 
in kind as well) – but the UBI is seen as part of the solution to provide the means necessary (but 
not necessarily sufficient) for women to reduce dependence on the labour market and in the private 
sphere in order to allow them to contribute on an equal standing. 
For all the reasons mentioned above, according to the independence answer, the UBI constitutes 
the necessary starting point to ensure everyone the effective capacity to uphold its civic duty of 
contribution, as summed up by Casassas:  
[The UBI’s] implementation should not be seen as a threat to the stability of the republican polity 
but as the starting point for its constitution and for individuals’ civic commitment to its reproduction. 
Having spare time available for political participation and higher degrees of protection against 
possible threats coming from other parties, together with the awareness of the beneficial effects [the 
basic income] has in enhancing material independence and individual freedom, would support the 
kind of civic commitment that is needed from individuals to sustain such a republican regime. 
(Casassas 2007: 4, my emphasis). 
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8. The entitlement answer 
The entitlement answer provides another positive justification of the UBI but in this case, it is not 
merely permitted but required by justice. The basic income is defended on the grounds that certain 
kinds of ‘external assets’ which constitute a ‘reciprocity-free’ category of wealth ought to be 
distributed more or less equally to all members of society. According to this view, then, there can 
be no free-riding since the UBI amounts to the distribution of pre-institutional or pre-cooperative 
entitlements rather than a redistribution of the proceeds of fellow citizens’ labour contributions. 
The entitlement answer can be divided into two main versions, a left-libertarian and a real-
libertarian. The left-libertarian version is founded in the so-called historical-entitlement tradition of 
theories of justice which holds that certain natural rights pre-exist and constrain social institutions, 
that a just distribution depends on how that distribution came about, and more specifically whether 
it is the result of what qualifies as just transfers of property rights, rather than on a specific pattern 
(such as Rawls’ maximin principle). The real-libertarian version is more sophisticated in that it tries 
to reconcile entitlement-based and patterned approaches by applying Rawlsian principles of 
resource allocation to the distribution of these entitlements. Both versions defend the UBI as a 
requirement of justice, such that their justification lies outside the norms of reciprocity, at least 
until entitlements are secured (for real-libertarians). In both cases, each member of society ought 
to be granted its individual share of the justice-relevant and commonly owned assets in the form 
of a universal and unconditional income payment. However, on a left-libertarian account, the 
distribution of entitlements in the form of a UBI is grounded on some notion of rectificatory 
justice, while a real-libertarian conception considers a much broader scope of assets that are up for 
distribution by social institutions, in order to ensure a fair distribution of real opportunities, not 
because of some pre-institutional constraint. 
8.1. Libertarian historical-entitlements 
To understand how left-libertarians defend the UBI, it is useful to provide some background on 
the historical-entitlement tradition of libertarian theories of justice (Nozick 1974; Kymlicka 1990: 
ch. 3; Vallentyne et al. 2005). Libertarians hold that a society is just if it secures individuals the 
inalienable property rights to which they are entitled. In short, a just distribution is one that is the 
result of voluntary transactions and one that respects the right to hold property acquired on 
legitimate grounds. Justice is about respecting people’s right to self-ownership (i.e. the right to 
dispose of their own person as they wish) as well as to the full proceeds of their labour. In broad 
terms, then, there is no risk of violation of the reciprocity principle on a libertarian account because 
no redistribution of the proceeds of labour would arise in the first place or because the resources 
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considered exist independently of anyone’s labour efforts. These are typically natural resources, 
considered as things with no moral standing and which have not been improved. They include 
land, seas, air, as well as the resources beneath the earth’s surface, such as oil, minerals or precious 
metals, or those in the atmosphere. Most forms of libertarianism consider that these should be 
shared fairly according to some condition on appropriation and subsequent ownership (except for 
the most radical ones invoking a ‘first come, first served’ basis as a legitimate form of 
appropriation). In other words, a just distribution is yielded by voluntary transactions ‘only if they 
operate from a set of legitimate initial endowments [which] must ultimately originate in (initially 
unowned) nature’ (Van Parijs 1992a: 9). 
A libertarian case for the UBI must thus be grounded in rules governing the appropriation and 
ownership of these resources, as a compensation for those natural rights individuals have been 
unjustly denied. It consists in collecting a tax from those who benefit from these natural resources 
and to transfer it to their co-owners because ‘those who appropriate more than their fair share of 
natural resources owe a payment to others for their excess share’ (Vallentyne 2011: 3-4). The 
question, then, is how such a fair share should be defined and whether it requires an unconditional 
and universal on-going payment in the form of a basic income.  
The Lockean proviso stipulates that private acquisition of natural resources should ‘leave enough and 
as good’ for others, such that initial appropriation of natural resources can only be legitimate if no 
one is made worse off as a result of this privatisation (Nozick 1974: 176-178). A compensation is 
otherwise due to those whose welfare is lower than it would have been in the state of nature. In 
that case, the income transfer must be paid independently of one’s financial resources and without 
any work-related condition, but it does not entail that it should be distributed to all indiscriminately 
nor on a regular basis. On the contrary, it should be paid only to those who have been 
disadvantaged, up to the level of the welfare loss incurred and potentially only at time of 
appropriation.  
One way to justify the UBI is to consider that information is scarce and that it is impossible to find 
out what one’s welfare situation in the state of nature would have been nor to know the precise 
historical injustices which made some people worse off compared to the state of nature. The 
distribution of a UBI might thus work as an approximate rectification for past injustices, but it 
could as well be in the form of a lump-sum basic capital. Another way to approach the question 
can be found in Nozick’s (1974: 176-182) interpretation of the Lockean proviso, which considers 
that it imposes restrictions not only on the appropriation of natural resources but on their 
ownership as well. On this view then, compensating the disadvantaged would require a regular flow 
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of income transfer, such that the UBI would be required (and not merely permitted), by what can 
be termed a Nozickean right-libertarian conception of justice (Vallentyne 2011: 5-6). 
8.2. The left-libertarian version 
Left-libertarians start from the premise that the Lockean proviso as defined earlier is problematic 
and should be interpreted differently. Some people, such as handicapped persons, might have been 
unable to benefit from natural resources in the state of nature, such that they would actually be 
worse off in the state of nature than they are today and, therefore, entitled to nothing. But surely, 
there is something wrong with the denial of one’s entitlement because of a physical handicap (Van 
Parijs 1992a: 10-11). Instead, a left-libertarian conception understands the Lockean proviso as the 
constraint that ‘one leaves an equally valuable per capita share of the value of natural resources for 
others’ (Vallentyne 2011: 7). A left-libertarian conception thus grounds justice in moral property 
rights just as Nozickean libertarianism but assumes egalitarian ownership of natural resources (on 
the features of left-libertarianism, see Vallentyne, Steiner and Otsuka 2005).  
According to this view, then, the case for the UBI rests on the idea of a universal pre-existing 
ownership right to natural resources. If resources are originally owned equally by all, then society 
should provide each of its members with a cash equivalent of its entitlement share, logically 
financed by a tax on the value of the assets commonly owned, to ensure that co-owners who have 
been deprived of their just share will be fairly compensated. In short, the UBI is understood as a 
‘resource dividend’ (Carter 2012). The historical-entitlement conception of justice that 
characterizes such a libertarian justification of the basic income rests on some notion of 
rectificatory justice according to which mandatory redistribution in the form of ‘redress transfers’ 
is justified to restore a just distribution of property rights (Steiner 1994: 266). This demands the 
institutionalisation of a fund into which those holding an excess of their share of natural resources 
transfer the market value of the natural resource-constituent of their holdings, and which 
redistributes an equal share to all in order to undo past injustices. 
This is the view endorsed by Thomas Paine when he writes that ‘every proprietor … of cultivated 
lands owes to the community a groundrent … for the land which he holds; and it is from this 
groundrent that the fund proposed in [his] plan is to issue’ (Paine 1796: 8). This is ‘in lieu of the 
natural inheritance, which, as a right, belongs to every man, over and above the property he may 
have created, or inherited from those who did’ (Paine 1796: 11). It also constitutes the ethical 
rationale of the so-called ‘Alaska Model’, in which the tax funding the resource dividend represents 
a user fee for exploiting the community’s oil resources (Widerquist and Howard 2012). In this 
sense, this approach circumvents the contributionist ethos: rather than being presented as another 
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kind of social policy, the UBI is framed in as an entitlement of citizenship that has nothing to do 
with the labour of fellow citizens (which is also seen as politically more acceptable as the Alaskan 
Dividend’s popularity seems to suggest, see Widerquist and Howard 2012, and Goldsmith 2012). 
The UBI is thus not vulnerable to the reciprocity objection because it does not disregard civic 
duties: there is no free-riding as the UBI amounts to a distribution of property rights. 
The libertarian justification of the UBI, however, is not without problems, and two in particular 
stand out.87 A first one concerns the level of the basic income. Assuming that the conceptual and 
empirical difficulties of evaluating the fair value of resources can be surmounted, it is generally 
acknowledged that a resource dividend would be extremely modest (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 
2017: 149-152). If the objective of basic income supporters is not merely to distribute fairly a claim 
on resources but to ensure a modest but decent quality of life, then the libertarian justification 
might be insufficient. One way consists in trying to broaden the scope of the tax base that can be 
acceptable to libertarians by adding, for example, a tax on bequests and a tax on genetic 
endowments (Steiner 1992). Another, more promising, way might be to depart from a libertarian 
conception and to consider that the wealth produced and accumulated by earlier generations 
constitute a common inheritance, which should be generating a much broader base of entitlements. 
A second issue pertains to the relevance of dividing shares on an equal basis rather than on, say, a 
compensatory-sensitive criterion, taking into consideration one’s natural abilities. The real-
libertarian version of the entitlement answer, to which I now turn, tries to articulate both responses 
into one coherent justification of a UBI pitched at the highest sustainable level. 
8.3. The real-libertarian version 
In Real Freedom for All, Van Parijs (1995) offers a theory of justice called real-libertarianism entirely 
built in order to justify the basic income. His central argument is the following: social justice 
requires the maximisation of the minimum level of ‘real freedom’, a condition which can be 
achieved if a society guarantees the highest sustainable level of basic income to all its members. As 
we have seen, libertarianism relies on the idea of a system of pre-institutional entitlements, that 
social institutions must protect and uphold. A real-libertarian theory of justice does not operate in 
such a pre-institutional way but shares with libertarianism the idea that there are external resources 
to which everyone is entitled. Besides, it shares with a Rawlsian conception of justice the idea that 
justice-relevant resources should be distributed fairly according to a certain pattern, such that it 
                                                 
87 Other problems point, for example, to the desirability of funding a UBI out of polluting resources (e.g. oil) for 
environmental concerns, or to demands of intergenerational justice: since some natural resources are non-renewable 
and face unavoidable depletion, how should each generation treat the stock of resources available? 
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maximises the prospects of those with the least of them. Justice, then, is about the distribution of 
real freedom or, more precisely, of the gifts that constitute the substratum of real freedom. Real 
freedom is defined by the extent to which one is able to do the things one might want to do. This 
includes the formal freedom to do something, but also adds a requirement of material means to 
ensure the genuine opportunity to do so. The gifts that form the substratum of freedom are all 
those which stem from nature, technological progress, capital accumulation, social organisation, 
civility rules, etc. (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 105).  
According to real-libertarianism, a free society must satisfy three conditions (Van Parijs 1995: 25):  
1) There is some well enforced structure of rights (security) 
2) This structure is such that each person owns herself (self-ownership) 
3) This structure is such that each person has the greatest possible opportunity to do whatever 
she might want to do (leximin opportunity). 
Real-libertarianism thus broadly shares a Rawlsian framework and, in particular, the use of 
maxinimin and leximin criteria, which makes it a theory that is compensatory-sensitive rather than 
about the distribution of perfectly equal entitlement shares. With his maximin principle, Rawls 
assumes that a rational individual prefers a policy which makes the least desirable outcome the best 
possible, i.e. a maximisation of the minimum. The leximin criterion is a sequential version of the 
maximin principle, i.e. a lexicographic refinement. According to Van Parijs’ conception, a free 
society should prioritise the satisfaction of its conditions in the same order as they are stated, even 
if this lexicographic approach is ‘of a soft kind’ (Van Parijs 1995: 26). Once a society has secured a 
solid set of rights and guaranteed individual autonomy, justice is about the maximinning of the gifts 
that form the substratum of freedom, ‘that is, the maximisation of what is received by those who 
receive least by way of material basis for the exercise of their real freedom’ (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017: 106). Thus, the third condition mandates a basic income to guarantee everyone 
the real opportunity to choose to live according to his or her conception of the good life. 
To fund the UBI, the real-libertarian version endorses the left-libertarian argument of common 
ownership of natural resources but extends it radically to a bigger pool of commonly inherited 
external assets (i.e. the gifts): 
In all sorts of ways, but for most of us primarily as part of our earnings, we benefit very unequally 
from what was freely given to us by nature, technological progress, capital accumulation, social 
organisation, civility rules, and so on. What a basic income does is ensure that everyone receives a 
fair share of what none of us did anything for, of the huge present unequally incorporated in our 
incomes. (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 105) 
Moreover, to legitimate a tax on earnings Van Parijs argues that ‘job assets’ should be assimilated 
(at least partly) to gifts, such that everyone should have an equal endowment to the employment 
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rents available (Van Parijs 1995: ch. 4). From this perspective, jobs provide a major source of 
income and are life-chances determinants, but they are scarce resources unfairly monopolised by 
insiders on the job market. More specifically, part of their earnings (the difference between the 
effective salary and the hypothetical market-clearing wage) is assimilated to a privilege that is the 
result of the exclusion of outsiders. In other words, in the circumstances of job scarcity, part of job 
market insiders’ earnings constitute an employment rent unfairly captured that society would be 
justified in recovering through an income tax. As such, the basic income represents the distribution 
of a fair share of the gifts unequally incorporated in our earnings. It should be pitched at the highest 
sustainable level according to a principle of sustainable maximin in order to ensure that the least 
advantaged receive as much as is sustainably possible. 
Getting back to reciprocity, then, according to this approach a distinction should be made between 
cooperative justice, which is concerned with the fair allocation of benefits and burdens generated by 
social cooperation and in which reciprocity plays a central role, and distributive justice, which is 
concerned with the just distribution of inherited assets between all members of society without 
being subject to any duty of reciprocation (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 103). Contrary to 
Rawls’ or White’s conception of fair reciprocity, the UBI is about fair distribution, not fair 
redistribution: ‘the taxes that fund a basic income are not levies on what was created out of nothing 
by today’s producers, but rather fees to be paid by these producers for the privilege of using for 
their personal benefit what we have collectively received’ (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 107). 
In this sense, the UBI does not amount to a redistribution of the proceeds of one’s labour in the 
cooperative venture but as a distribution of a fair share of externalities we are not responsible for. 
As argued elsewhere, the distinction between a cooperative and a distributive conception of justice 
in order to justify the UBI as a distribution of non-cooperative entitlements is not free of tensions 
(Denuit and Sabaté 2018). But to the extent that this distinction holds, then, the principle of 
reciprocity plays a role in the allocation of assets that are produced in a cooperative venture only 
insofar as prior demands of distributive justice have been met, that is, once everyone has been 
granted its entitlement rights. In short, guaranteeing freedom-endowing resources as a matter of 
distributive justice is lexically prior to the duty to contribute demanded by cooperative reciprocity-
based justice. According to real-libertarianism, then, basic income recipients live off their fair share, 
funded out of commonly owned assets, such that they have no duty to reciprocate insofar as 
everyone is not guaranteed its entitlements, the cooperative surplus being redistributed afterwards, 
and the UBI is not vulnerable to the reciprocity objection. 
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9. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I addressed a principled objection made to the basic income which stands out in 
the literature and provides, for many, a knock-out argument against the idea: the UBI is ethically 
flawed because it allows the violation of a principle of fairness which holds that every (able-bodied) 
member of society must do its fair share in return for the benefits provided by social cooperation. 
I showed how this widely held notion of reciprocity plays a central role in theories of justice and 
how it poses a normative challenge to the UBI. I have then sought to provide a series of reciprocity-
based and non-reciprocity-based responses to the challenge at hand. I did not endorse a particular 
conception of justice but followed, instead, an ecumenical approach to show that there are good 
reasons to hold that the objection is not decisive, whether one considers reciprocity as a primary 
value or not.  
Is this answer satisfying? It all depends on one’s conception of justice and on what one holds to 
be its central currency. As Simon Birnbaum (2012: 24) rightly emphasizes, ‘[d]epending on whether 
we emphasize income, leisure, wealth, the social-bases of self-respect, or some other set of 
advantage(s) – such as welfare, resources, or capability to achieve certain valuable functionings – 
and depending on how we weigh the relevant advantages against each one another, we will arrive 
at different conclusions about the desirability of basic income’. The approach undertaken in this 
chapter thus provides democratic inputs that policy makers need to take into account. Even if the 
discussion is inconclusive in the sense that it does not allow one to say that UBI is morally required, 
it contains arguments that allow me to conclude that introducing it in a democratic society can’t be 
opposed solely on reciprocity-based grounds. That entailment holds because parties in a democratic 
society have to decide for themselves what stand they should take on the issues raised in the debate 
pro and contra UBI and, through it, to social citizenship. 
Insofar as one agrees with this conclusion, it is now possible to pursue with the evaluation of 
prospects of the UBI at European level. The next big challenge to the idea concerns the pursuit of 
social justice beyond national borders and whether we have good reasons for thinking that the UBI 
cannot be ruled out as an instrument of pan-European solidarity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CHALLENGE OF SOLIDARITY 
1. Introduction 
In chapter one, I argued that the current organisation of social protection in the EU is insufficient 
to protect all Europeans effectively against the risk of poverty and social exclusion, and that the 
proposal of a European UBI (EUBI) is a well-placed candidate to address the problem at hand. 
The institutionalisation of such a policy means that the EU takes on a distributive role currently 
reserved to its MS, even if it only acts in a complementary way. Yet, many argue that, in the absence 
of certain associational preconditions rooted in an ethic of membership and providing a motive 
for social sharing, demands of justice ought to remain confined within the nation state. In short, 
people must share social bonds, such as a common identity, mutual recognition as citizens of the 
same state or institutions providing the framework for social cooperative practices, to ‘accept the 
strains of commitment involved in building and maintaining a decent, good, or just society’ 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2017b: 7). On this account, the prospects for the EUBI thus depend on 
the potential limits set to the pursuit of social justice at EU level. With this in mind, ‘the challenge 
of solidarity’ reads as follows: the EU lacks certain preconditions necessary for the pursuit of social justice at 
the supranational level and, thereby, to justify an instrument of pan-European solidarity. Hence, the EUBI should 
be abandoned. 
I do not claim that this objection exhausts the range of challenges that the EUBI may face when 
considering questions of scope of justice, but it is key for the following reasons. First, the nation 
state has been and remains the primary vehicle of social justice. Given this dissertation’s concern 
with the current problem of poverty, it is interesting to depart from the proximity between what 
exists and the justification given for keeping it that way, to see whether even under these conditions 
we also have good reasons for introducing the UBI as a European instrument. Second, some of the 
arguments advanced by those making the pursuit of justice conditional on nationhood or on civic 
obligations have a special place for EU scholars. They resonate with other well-known debates in 
EU studies, such as the ‘no demos’ thesis (i.e. without a shared identity there can be no European 
democratic polity and without a genuine democratic federation there can be no EU-wide 
redistribution), such that they also relate to the deadlock of positive integration in the social field 
explained in chapter one. 
With this in mind, my central aim in this chapter is to show that the prospects for introducing a 
EU-wide UBI are not hindered by the challenge of solidarity, that is, that the objection is not 
decisive. Using a normative account of the EU as a demoicracy which defines it as a ‘union of 
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states and citizens’ who ‘govern together but not as one’ (Nicolaïdis 2012: 254), I show that the 
three different versions of the objection, to which I refer as the ‘common identity view’, the 
‘political view’ and the ‘social cooperation view’, are either invalid or not decisive. On that basis, I 
then propose a multi-tiered account of justice in the European Union, in which the EU plays a 
complementary role to its Member States to guarantee every European a social minimum. I do not 
claim that the EUBI is required by demands of justice at EU level. Instead, I defend a sufficientarian 
account of EU justice and argue that the EUBI would be desirable to preserve national 
redistributive capacities and strengthen EU social citizenship simultaneously. 
This chapter runs as follows. In section two, I provide a brief account of the global justice debate, 
as an account of EU justice must make use of the contentious discussion between the various 
positions on the pursuit of justice beyond borders, before presenting the three different views of 
‘bounded justice’ that underpin the objection. In section three, I present the normative demoicratic 
framework and address each objection in turn. I reject the common identity view as providing valid 
grounds for justice and show that the political and social cooperation views are not strong enough 
to confine demands of egalitarian justice at national level. In section four, then, I propose an 
account of multi-tiered EU justice based on a sufficientarian standard set at the poverty line. I show 
that the EUBI would help secure national demands of justice whilst preserving national collective 
autonomy in terms of welfare arrangement, before highlighting how the EUBI strengthens the 
transnational dimension of EU social citizenship. Section five concludes. 
2. Justice beyond borders 
As we saw in chapter three, whilst egalitarians may diverge in their account of the grounds of 
justice, they broadly share – at least, so I shall take for granted – the view that justice is about equal 
concern and respect for individuals and a fair distribution of resources among them. However, 
there is wide disagreement about whether obligations of justice extend beyond the borders of the 
nation state, even among those who share the same (for instance Rawlsian) grounds of justice. The 
debate on justice beyond borders, then, seeks to answer the following question: what do we owe 
to our fellow citizens and what do we owe to ‘outsiders’? It is thus concerned with the scope of 
justice (i.e. national, regional, global) and with the subjects of justice in the global realm (i.e. states, 
individuals, or both). This led to a particularly prolific literature in political theory on global justice, 
but scholars have much less focused on the specific case of EU justice, except for a few recent 
contibutions following the euro crisis (see e.g. Sangiovanni 2012, 2013; Viehoff 2014, 2016; de 
Witte 2015; Van Parijs 2015; Crum 2015, 2017; De Schutter 2017; Vandenbroucke 2017d). Any 
enquiry of the place of social justice in the EU must thus make use of the arguments involved in 
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the debate about global justice, as the EU is typically seen as a regional ‘midle-ground’ between 
domestic and global justice (Sangiovanni 2013: 5; Maffettone 2014: 135) or as a ‘laboratory’ for 
global justice (Crum 2015: 43; De Schutter 2017: 76; Vandenbroucke 2017d: 30). Therefore, I 
briefly present the global justice debate before turning to the specific views that I will address in 
the subsequent discussion. 
2.1. The global justice debate 
The global justice debate is generally viewed along the line of a dichotomy between statists and 
cosmopolitans. Statists typically hold that obligations of social justice only arise among those who 
live within the boundaries of the same state, whereas cosmopolitans argue that demands of justice 
hold among all human beings, regardless of the political community they belong to. Statists 
consider that only the nation state can provide the relevant form of association or membership 
that triggers the full scope of demands of social justice. They hold a ‘relational’ view of justice in 
the sense that the subjects of justice are united by common links by virtue of their co-membership, 
whether expressed with reference to cooperative practices (Rawls 1999), to the authority of political 
institutions (Blake 2001; Nagel 2005), or a common national identity (Miller 1995). In other words, 
statists hold that ‘the practice-mediated relations where individuals live determine the justification 
of the principles of justice’ (Maffettone 2014: 127). From this perspective, international justice is 
concerned with the ‘justice of societies’ rather than the ‘well-being of individuals’ (Rawls 1999: 119-
120). By contrast, cosmopolitans hold that individuals are the subjects of global justice. Relational 
cosmopolitans accept that justice requires certain kinds of relations between agents but argue that 
the relevant relations exist at the global level such that principles of domestic justice also apply 
globally (Beitz 1979; Pogge 1994). Non-relational cosmopolitans consider that humanity 
constitutes one ‘moral community’ and hold that obligations of justice are moral obligations that 
we owe to each and everyone as human beings, not by virtue of some criterion of membership or 
institutionally mediated practices (Caney 2005).  
Clearly, the dichotomy between statism and cosmopolitism is insufficient to capture the wide array 
of views on the matter such that intermediary positions are best appreciated alongside a spectrum 
of moral perspectives according to their proximity to one of these two ‘limit-cases’ (Ronzoni 2016). 
For instance, ‘transnationalists’ are ‘lax’-cosmopolitans since they consider individuals as the 
justice-relevant moral unit but hold that obligations of justice beyond borders come in varying 
degrees, depending on the existence of national, regional and global institutional frameworks and 
justice-triggering relations between individuals beyond borders (James 2012).  ‘Internationalists’ are 
‘mild’ statists who see the nation state as the primary locus of social justice but consider that there 
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may be obligations of justice beyond borders, generally between states and, under specific 
circumstances, between individuals as well (Risse 2012; Sangiovanni 2007, 2013). On this account, 
justice beyond borders is ‘categorically different from, and largely ancillary to, domestic justice [such 
that] the very point of justice beyond borders is to facilitate the achievement of justice within them, 
by securing those (individual and/or institutional) conditions that enable people to live in internally 
just societies’ (Ronzoni 2016: 8). 
How do these different views appreciate the guarantee of a social minimum beyond national 
borders? Besides the claim that duties of egalitarian justice may obtain on a global scale, some 
cosmopolitans extend the left-libertarian right to natural resources to a global scale, such that 
everyone would be entitled to a global ‘resource dividend’ (Pogge 2007). As for statists and 
internationalists, they typically hold that there are duties of ‘minimal justice’ which are only of about 
securing the basic needs for subsistence (Rawls 1999: 65; Nagel 2005: 131; Sangiovanni 2007: 3, fn. 
5; Miller 2009: 293).88 This means that the right to minimum economic security does not derive 
from comparative entitlements of distributive justice but from a non-comparative concern of a 
sufficientarian kind. 
Against this backdrop, in this discussion, I focus on (mild) statist perspectives. Engaging with the 
most ‘skepical’ views of ‘bounded justice’, rather than, say, starting off from a cosmopolitan or 
transnationalist perspective, allows me to show that, even from what appears from the onset as 
unfavourable grounds, we may still have reasons to develop instruments of pan-European 
solidarity. I now turn to these different views of ‘bounded justice’ and clarify the objection I wish 
to address. 
2.2. Bounded justice 
Against this backdrop, I focus here on three main statist or internationalist perspectives which I 
regroup under the heading of ‘bounded justice’ in the sense that these views share the premise that 
the contemporary nation state is the relevant site of justice because it is the place where certain 
justice-triggering relational ties exist. In other words, obligations of justice only arise in the presence 
of certain relational conditions of the kind we typically find among citizens of the same state. These 
views, which broadly share a liberal egalitarian conception of justice, differ in their account of the 
kind of associational ties which count as relevant grounds for demands of justice. Some appeal to 
the features of the nation, others to the features of the state. I refer to the former as the ‘common 
                                                 
88 It must be noted that for Nagel, for instance, the duty concerns people considered as individuals (Nagel 2005: 135), 
whilst for Rawls, the right to basic subsistence is derived from a duty of assistance on the part of liberal or decent 
societies towards burdened societies ( Rawls 1999: 118). 
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identity view’ whilst the latter can be divided into the ‘political view’ and the ‘social cooperation 
view’. 
The common identity view draws from Rawls’ understanding of a political community (i.e. a people) as 
one united by ‘common sympathies’, based on a common language and shared cultural and historic 
heritage (Rawls 1999: 23-24), but is most explicitly defended by Miller (1995, 2009). According to 
this so-called ‘liberal nationalist’ view, besides the need to be politically organised within a state, it 
is the nationhood in modern nation states which is key to realise the goal of social justice, because 
a common national identity, based on cultural similarity and mutual identification, is deemed 
necessary to foster a willingness to share: redistributive policies demand sacrifices which people 
accept to make, so it is argued, when they feel close enough to each other. As noted by Miller, ‘[a] 
shared identity carries with it a shared loyalty, and this increases confidence that others will 
reciprocate one’s own cooperative behaviour’ (Miller 1995: 92). Social sharing thus demands trust, 
trust requires mutual recognition, and mutual recognition is typically found in national political 
communities defined by shared history, symbolic elements and language, as well as a common 
public culture, and all connected to a particular territory (Miller 1995: 22-27). This view is thus built 
on an argument about motivation: justice rests on the readiness of citizens to abide by principles of 
social sharing because they feel they are part of a ‘community of fate’. In short, the key feature that 
triggers demands of justice, then, is a sufficiently strong feeling of identification with others or, in 
other words, a common ‘we-feeling’, which does not exist beyond the nation state. 
The political view, defended by Nagel (2005), holds that the state is morally unique because it makes 
obligations of justice possible among citizens who are both authors and subjects of coercive laws. 
As Nagel puts it, ‘sovereign states are not merely instruments for realising the preinstitutional value 
of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is precisely what gives the value of justice 
its application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not 
have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special 
standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice’ (Nagel 2005: 120). This view 
rests on the idea that political processes provide a source of legitimation for demands of justice, 
because the state owes its citizens a justification for the exercise of its authority: ‘In short, the state 
makes unique demands on the will of its members – or the members make unique demands on 
one another through the institutions of the state – and those exceptional demands bring with them 
exceptional obligations, the positive obligations of justice’ (Nagel 2005: 130). According to this 
view, then, redistribution is justified in virtue of joint determination under the authority of shared 
political institutions, a framework which does not exist beyond national boundaries. 
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Finally, the social cooperation view builds on Rawlsian reciprocity-based justice (see chapter three, 
section 2.1.) and holds that demands of justice rest on the existence of a scheme of social 
cooperation that is mutually beneficial for its participants. For instance, Sangiovanni holds that 
demands of justice ‘can be understood as demands for a fair return in the mutual production of 
important collective goods’ (Sangiovanni 2013: 217). This objective, so it is argued, is best 
facilitated by the state and its institutions as it has ‘basic extractive, regulative and distributive 
capacities’ as well as the ‘financial and sociological basis’ required to function effectively 
(Sangiovanni 2013: 20). In short, the state makes reciprocal contribution (from which demands of 
justice arise) possible because it provides the framework necessary for a fair system of cooperation. 
2.3. The objection 
Against this backdrop, each view makes the pursuit of social justice conditional on the existence 
of one of the features mentioned above. These different associational ties provide the motives for 
institutionalising solidarity: citizens recognise each other through their common identity, through 
joint determination as subjects sharing in a comprehensive set of political institutions, or as 
participants of a mutually beneficial social venture. Solidarity, then, should not be conflated with 
justice. It is rather linked with its actual pursuit as it involves ‘a readiness for collective action and a 
will to institutionalise it through the establishment of rights and citizenship’ (Stjernø 2005: 326).89 
According to a bounded conception of justice, then, the attainment of justice is dependent upon 
certain elements of social and political structuring that provide a justification for organising social 
solidarity.  
It is precisely this link that led many scholars, not only to argue that, in the absence of the right 
kind of social interactions, demands of justice ought not to arise beyond the nation state, but also 
to doubt the very possibility that the pursuit of international justice would ever be realisable. Crum, 
for instance, takes this view in relation to the European context when he notes that ‘the failure of 
a genuine Social Europe is not a matter of accident or perverse manoeuvring by political elites but 
rather explained by the absence of the effective societal preconditions and sentiments that would 
allow a substantial redistributive regime to develop’ (Crum 2015: 162). 
How does this relate to the EUBI? As an individual-centred instrument, the EUBI is de facto an 
instrument of EU-wide interpersonal solidarity. Thus, according to the different versions of 
                                                 
89 Solidarity is a contested and elusive concept, used in many ways in the literature. For discussions about the meaning 
of solidarity, see Stjernø (2005, 2011), Kolers (2012), Nicolaïdis and Viehoff (2012), and the various contributions in 
Banting and Kymlicka (2017a). For an analysis of solidarity in the context of the EU, see Borgmann-Prebil and Ross 
(2010), Ross (2010), Lamping (2010). 
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bounded justice, if the EU lacks the relational grounds necessary for demands of justice to apply 
at supranational level, then the EUBI must face a fatal blow. From this, one can understand ‘the 
challenge of solidarity’ as follows: the EU lacks the kind of prerequisites – which typically exist at 
national level – deemed necessary for the pursuit of social justice at the supranational level and, 
thus, to justify the institutionalisation of an instrument of pan-European solidarity. Hence, the 
EUBI should be abandoned.  
3. The pursuit of justice in the EU 
In this section, I start with a normative account of the EU as a demoicracy before addressing the 
three versions of the objection in turn. 
3.1. A normative framework: the EU as a demoicracy 
The idea of the EU as a demoicracy considers that the EU is neither an intergovernmental construct 
nor a federal state. It can be seen as a ‘third way’ escaping the ‘entrapping dialectic’ between 
nationalists and federalists but it is not a simple ‘in-between’ as it is normatively opposed to both 
(Nicolaïdis 2012: 254). The EU-as-demoicracy can be defined in the following terms: 
European demoicracy is a Union of peoples, understood both as states and as citizens, who govern 
together but not as one. It represents a third way against two alternatives which both equate 
democracy with a single demos: as a demoicracy-in-the-making, the EU is neither a Union of 
democratic states as ‘sovereigntists’ would have it, nor a Union-as-a-democratic state to be as 
‘federalists’ would have it. A Union-as-demoicracy should remain an open-ended process of 
transformation which seeks to accommodate the tensions inherent in the pursuit of radical mutual 
opening between separate peoples. (Nicolaïdis 2012: 254) 
This view still grants the state a special place but it seeks to move away from essentialist debates 
about what constitutes a ‘people’ (and thus the typical opposition between ‘peoples’ and ‘persons’) 
as it is able to accommodate an understanding of ‘peoples’ as ‘states’ or ‘nations’ with one 
considering them ‘as networks of persons endowed with individual rights and participatory claims’ 
beyond state boundaries (Nicolaïdis 2012: 257). The EU-as-a-demoicracy thus ‘displays a 
compound character – a polity of polities, a community of communities, an overlapping consensus 
of overlapping consensus90 which must amalgamate pre-existing political and social bargains while 
respecting the say of peoples-as-states (whereby interests have already been aggregated) and 
peoples-as-citizens (whereby disperse individual interests may or may not recognise themselves in 
pre-existing national bargains)’ (Nicolaïdis 2012: 258).  
                                                 
90 An ‘overlapping consensus’ refers to the idea that citizens with conflicting moral doctrines would support a shared 
political conception of justice (a core set of laws) for reasons internal to their own moral perspective (Rawls 1971: 388, 
1989, 1993: 133-168, 2001: 32-38). 
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In this sense, the EU can be understood as a federal union (Nicolaïdis 2012: 260). It recognises the 
distinctiveness of European identities, but it is more than an alliance of states as it emphasises a 
transnational dimension, providing it with a ‘transformative character’ (Nicolaïdis 2013: 353-4). 
The EU, then, cannot be reduced to a mere intergovernmental construct nor can it be equated with 
the project of ‘transcending’ the state in a ‘post-national constellation’ (Habermas 2001). Instead, 
it combines intergovernmental elements with supranational majoritarian politics, providing both 
an account of the EU as it is and as it ought to be, if one is concerned about the respect of national 
collective autonomy and transnational rights of EU citizens. But it is not trapped in the status quo 
because the EU-as-demoicracy is ‘an open-ended process of transformation’, as the definition 
above emphasises, ‘which seeks to accommodate the tensions inherent in the pursuit of radical 
mutual opening between separate peoples’. 
In light of this, how can we understand the EU in terms of ‘polity’ and ‘political community’? 
According to Bauböck, a polity is ‘a formal institutional structure’ whilst a ‘political community’ 
refers to ‘an identity shared by the citizens of a polity’ (Bauböck 2017: 80). On that basis, ‘a political 
community becomes a polity when a population supporting a claim for self-government succeeds 
in establishing a territorial jurisdiction, a citizenship status and government institutions; a polity 
becomes a political community when it is successful in creating a corresponding collective identity 
shared by its citizens’ (Bauböck 2017: 80). With respect to the former, the demoicratic character of 
the EU accomodates the view in social sciences which understands the EU polity as a complex and 
nested system of ‘multi-level governance’ (Hooghe and Marks 2001), as agreed by Nicolaïdis (2012: 
261) herself. With respect to the latter, when Nicolaïdis conceives of the EU as a ‘community of 
communities’, she means ‘a community of others’, that is, one ‘predicated on the mutual 
recognition of the many European identities – not on their merger’ (Nicolaïdis 2012: 267). 
Surely, there is more to say about the nature of the EU, but its different features will be mobilised 
along the rest of the discussion. It is sufficient for now to recall that the EU can be considered as 
an evolving multi-level polity encompassing different political communities which distinctiveness 
must be respected, whilst being more than the sum of its constituent parts, given its transnational 
dimension. With this in mind, I now turn to the different versions of bounded justice on which the 
objection rests and evaluate their claims. 
3.2. The common identity view 
I start with an assessment of the common identity view of which Miller (1995, 2009) is a prominent 
defender. His view posits, as was already explained, that the kind of prerequisite necessary for 
demands of justice to obtain is essentially based on a common identity, or nationhood, which itself 
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provides the motivational basis required for social sharing: the willingness to abide by principles of 
justice ‘depends on a belief that others will reciprocate [which is] powerfully affected by people’s 
sense of identity, by who they see as members of their community and who they regard as outsiders’ 
(Miller 2009: 303). In short, this view grounds justice in motivational sources necessary for acting 
in solidarity. 
The debate about whether or not there is a European identity (and its very definition) is a 
contentious one but it is clear that there is no such thing as a European national identity (see 
Checkel and Katzenstein 2009 for a review). Some argue that there are signs of an ‘emerging’ 
European identity associated with the progressive ‘thickening’ of the European public sphere (Risse 
2014). This may be true but it is too thin to qualify for Miller’s link between identity and political 
community (i.e. common history, public culture, symbolic elements, language, territory). As already 
pointed out, the EU is a ‘community of strangers’ which is ‘united in diversity’, as coined by the 
EU’s motto. The implications are clear: on these premises, without a shared EU national identity, 
no obligations of justice apply at the supranational level. Should we stop here? Not at all. 
A first (unsatisfying) answer relates to the very process by which nations came about. As noted by 
De Schutter (2017: 73), ‘states have actively attempted to create national cultures, by emphasising 
internal cohesion, by standardising the language, by designating an official language and by coercing 
public education to use it, or by emphasising the differences with other nations’. In light of this, 
one could argue, as De Schutter does, that we should engage in nation-building at EU level. But 
not only would this be inconsistent with my understanding of the EU as a demoicracy, this can 
only be a very long-term perspective which looks unpromising if one sees the need to secure a 
social minimum for all as a matter of urgency, as I do. Fortunately, there are other, more promising, 
answers to the objection. 
3.2.1. The mutiple identity answer 
A second answer concerns the compatibility of various national identities under a multi-level polity. 
The existence of multinational states seems to contradict the common identity requirement. 
Belgium or Switzerland for example have built their own system of redistribution despite different 
national identities. Miller would respond that these states are able to sustain redistributive 
programmes because they are not simply multinational as their citizens have developed a dual identity 
with corresponding institutional segmentation (e.g. at federal and regional levels) (Miller 1995: 96). 
This is true. But this entails that it is simply a matter of degree of identification and compatibility 
of identities. Processes of ‘fellow-feeling’ identification and mutual recognition can extend 
transnationally in complex and nested ways. For instance, Risse argues that, even at the heart of 
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the euro crisis, large majorities held ‘dual identities’ which revealed a ‘Europeanisation of national 
identities’ that was even, according to him, ‘sufficient to sustain carefully crafted (re-)distributive 
policies on the European level’ (Risse 2014: 1208). Notwithstanding the fact that it is not an easy 
task, if it can be justified and possible for a federal state as Belgium to organise redistribution 
despite encompassing multiple nationalities, there is (at least) no principled reason for not conceiving 
redistribution under the EU’s ‘community of communities’ framework. 
Thus, even if one concedes that the lack of a common identity of the kind that exists in 
contemporary nation states is not present at EU level, such that similar demands of justice do not 
apply, it is unclear why none can obtain. In other words, why should it be an ‘all or nothing’ matter? 
If what matters is a sufficient level of trust providing a motivational basis to act in solidarity, mutual 
recognition at EU level may fall short of the kind that exists between co-nationals but, as noted by 
Nicolaïdis and Viehoff (2015: 286), ‘the EU should be seen as much more plausibly as a possible 
future object for relations of solidarity than the relations amongst everyone on a global scale’. This 
is also the view taken by Sangiovanni when he argues that ‘there is no reason why weaker relations 
of solidarity that are more demanding than humanitarianism but less demanding than full equality 
cannot develop at European level’ (Sangiovanni 2012: 408). And he adds, ‘the argument that norms 
of distributive justice and solidarity cannot apply at the European level because there is no sense 
of shared identity grounded in a common nationality therefore fails’ (Sangiovanni 2012: 408). I 
agree. 
3.2.2. The ‘other motives’ answer 
Another answer worth considering has to do with the distinction between the different possible 
motives necessary for the pursuit of justice. For the common identity view, what actually matters 
is not a common identity per se, it is its capacity to provide people with a motive to share, that is, to 
act in solidarity. In other words, if nation-building is only instrumental, we may have other 
instrumental reasons to hold support for redistributive programmes. In practice, evidence shows 
that, notwithstanding the important role of common identies in supporting and sustaining 
redistributive programmes, redistributive systems can exist without a common national identity (see 
Banting and Kymlicka 2017a for a review). One possibility relates to the mutual recognition 
provided by a common citizenship regime (Bauböck 2017; Levy 2017). The co-determination of 
individuals living in a democratic system provides them with a source of ‘enlightened self-interest’, 
as citizens sharing a common project, a common destiny (Sterjnø 2005: 201). From this perspective, 
‘[c]ollective identities among citizens should not be understood as rooted in what makes them 
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similar to each other, but as narratives about their shared interests in membership’ (Bauböck 2017: 
100). 
How, then, does common citizenship translate in the European demoicracy? EU citizenship is 
derivative and additional in the sense that one becomes EU citizen only to the extent that one holds 
the nationality of a Member State (art. 20(1) TEU) and that both national and supranational 
citizenships co-exist. Compared to what exists at Member State level, then, EU citizenship is of 
course an ‘unfinished business’ but it has enhanced the scope of possibilities for individuals beyond 
the nation state in an unprecedented way. EU law has created what de Witte calls ‘aspirational 
solidarity’ between EU citizens who share in the benefits of EU integration through the right to 
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, the extension of their electoral rights at local and 
supranational level, or the access to social security in another Member State, for example (de Witte 
2015: ch. 5). The right to free movement, in particular, ‘extends the potential scope for the 
individual’s realisation of the ‘good life’ beyond a Member State’s spatial and normative boundaries, 
and as such can be understood to help overcome the limitations of the development of justice 
through national political structures’ (de Witte 2015: 61).  
Whether the EU citizenship regime can provide a motivational basis for social sharing is an 
empirical question which rests, ultimately, on how citizens regard themselves as connected to each 
other through the European project. Even if it falls short, again, of the kind of bonds sustained by 
national citizenship, the very existence of EU citizenship encompasses the idea that ‘fellow citizens 
are not strangers for the same reason and in the same way that fellow humans are strangers’ (Levy 
2017: 108). This does not prove that EU citizenship would be sufficient for egalitarian demands to 
obtain at EU level, but that the EU constitutes a middle-ground with respect to citizenship, 
between national (‘full’ citizenship) and global (no citizenship) levels. To the extent, then, that other 
motives for the actual pursuit of distributive justice can be identified, the link between justice and 
common identity becomes ‘merely historically contingent, and the pursuit of justice beyond the 
state remains possible’ (de Witte 2015: 28). 
3.2.3. The primacy of justice answer 
Finally, there is another, more fundamental, reason to reject the common identity view as a valid 
objection. This view considers, ultimately, that justice depends on the existence of a common ‘we-
feeling’ necessary for the pursuit of justice. But grounding demands of justice in feelings is, in itself, 
deeply problematic, as Van Parijs argues: 
how close people are to each other by virtue of their cultures and how much they identify with each 
other cannot sensibly provide an authoritative guide to choosing what criterion of justice should 
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apply to them. Whether or not there are ‘common sympathies’ between some country’s cultural 
majority and one of its cultural minorities, for example, cannot possibly determine whether the latter 
should, as a matter of justice, be treated as equals.  Feelings ought to be shaped by just institutions. 
They ought not to dictate which institutions should be regarded as just. (Van Parijs 2007: 644) 
Van Parijs’ view rests on Rawls’ ‘primacy of justice’ argument, which states that ‘[j]ustice is the first 
virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and 
economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how 
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.’ (Rawls 1971: 3). In 
other words, justice should take priority over other concerns when designing social institutions. 
Viehoff and Nicolaïdis concur: ‘after all, the fact that some people may fail to see and act on their 
duties of justice seems an improper basis to conclude that there are no such duties’ (Viehoff and 
Nicolaïdis 2015: 286). According to this perspective, then,  
rather than being conditional upon the prior existence of certain social bonds and relationships of 
mutual benefit, justice may motivate us to create and sustain such bonds and relationships once certain 
kinds of (institutional) interaction obtain between us. In other words, solidarity, properly 
understood, cannot be reduced to an ex-ante emotional attachment but can also be an ex-post effect 
of reflecting on how we should regulate our actually existing social and political interdependence. 
(Viehoff and Nicolaïdis 2015: 287) 
The historical contingency of redistributive systems takes all its sense here as the design and 
upholding of social institutions may be the result of an intentional exercise guided by a sense of 
justice that it is not dependent on some pre-existing ‘we-feeling’ bonds This argument does not 
mean that obligations of egalitarian justice obtain at EU level. But it rejects the need for a common 
identity as the grounds for justice, and hence the common identity view as a valid objection to the 
pursuit of EU justice. I now turn to the next two versions of the objection, which agree that just 
institutions ought to be prior to other concerns but justify the difference between issues of justice 
at national and European levels on other grounds. 
3.3. The political view 
Contrary to the common identity view, the political view, defended by Nagel (2005) in particular, 
is not concerned with mutual trust deriving from cultural bonds and historical antecedents 
necessary to act in solidarity. What matters, instead, is the sovereign power of the state and the 
duty of justice citizens owe each other through the comprehensive set of institutions which has a 
pervasive impact on their lives:  
Every state has the boundaries and population it has for all sorts of accidental and historical reasons; 
but given that it exercises sovereign power over its citizens and in their name, those citizens have a 
duty of justice toward one another through the legal, social, and economic institutions that sovereign 
power makes possible. This duty is sui generis, and is not owed to everyone in the world, nor is it an 
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indirect consequence of any other duty that may be owed to everyone in the world, such as a duty 
of humanity. Justice is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom 
we stand in a strong political relation. It is, in the standard terminology, an associative obligation. 
(Nagel 2005: 137) 
According to this perspective, then, demands of justice arise as a result of certain procedural 
requirements: the justice-triggering features derive from the nature of compliance mechanisms by 
which the joint production of social goods (and hence their distribution) comes about. In other 
words, if social institutions have effects ‘so profound and present from the start’ (Rawls 1971: 7) 
for those living under them, it is precisely because of the state’s capacity for coercion (Nagel 2005: 
128). Therefore, demands of justice cannot arise beyond the nation state, so it is argued, because 
‘[international rules and institutions] are not collectively enacted and coercively imposed in the 
name of all individuals whose lives they affect; and they do not ask for the kind of authorisation 
by individuals that carries with it a responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense equally’ 
(Nagel 2005: 138). There are two claims made here for egalitarian obligations to obtain: rules must 
be coercively imposed and justified (i.e. collectively enacted and authorised). I evaluate those two claims 
in turn. 
3.3.1. The non-voluntariness answer 
How should we understand a coercive imposition? For Nagel, the state is fully sovereign and its 
coercive nature is distinctive from that of the international order because, within the state, 
membership is non-voluntary (Nagel 2005: 128). First, the claim of full sovereignty is precarious in 
the case of the EU. Let’s recall that sovereignty is multi-layered and dispersed in the EU according 
to the conferral of competences and the principle of subsidiarity. The EU has given way to a 
comprehensive legal order, which has primacy over national law.91 It also has direct effect92 such 
that, even if a European directive does not confer rights or impose obligations on EU citizens 
directly, these flow from the measures enacted by MS which are required to implement EU law. 
Moreover, the EU has acquired exclusive competence in many key policy areas such as competition 
policy, monetary policy, and international trade. In social policy, depending on the field, the EU 
shares competence with its MS (e.g. social security and protection of workers) or supports the 
coordination of their policies (e.g. combating social exclusion). But, as was argued in chapter one, 
EU welfare states have also become ‘semi-sovereign’ (Hemerijk 2006) because they are embedded 
in a system of governance, biased towards market integration, which is partly responsible for the 
erosion of their redistributive capacities. Furthermore, EU legislation is backed by an independent 
                                                 
91 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 1251 
92 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1 
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Court of Justice and a system of sanctions in case of MS non-compliance with EU law (art. 260 
TFEU). Coercive laws are not the sole prerogative of MS and the EU supranational order has a 
pervasive impact on individuals living within its borders, as was argued at length in chapter one. In 
fact, the capacity for coercion must be seen in a multi-level fashion as Neyer helps summarise: 
‘[t]he democratic nation-state, with its characteristic mixture of representation, separation of 
powers, and checks-and-balances, is increasingly integrating into cross-border multilevel European 
structures in which new rules apply. To correctly assess political power today we must understand 
the nation-state as an integral component of larger multilevel systems’ (Neyer 2012: 12). 
What about voluntariness, then? From the analysis above, it seems untenable to reduce the EU to 
a mere intergovernmental organisation based on the sole consent of its MS.  Yes, they retain the 
possibility of exit. They are, at least nominally, free to leave and, in this sense, membership is 
voluntary. But exit involves massive costs (as the Brexit case exemplifies) which also affect citizens’ 
prospects. Sangiovanni agrees when he notes that ‘it seems clear that the EU is not voluntary in 
the relevant sense required for less demanding norms to apply: withdrawing carries large and 
significant costs for all of its members (for example, in market access); and the longer the 
membership the worse the costs (for example, given adaptation in the presence of legitimate 
expectations regarding market access). While it might be argued that the decision to join the EU 
for either the founding or acceding generation was voluntary in the relevant sense, this is certainly 
not the case for succeeding generations’ (Sangiovanni 2012: 393). In light of this, if coercion 
constitutes the relevant condition for obligations of justice to arise, under current circumstances, 
the objection does not seem strong enough to defeat the possibility of EU justice claims. What 
about Nagel’s second claim? 
3.3.2. The EU as fiduciary answer 
Citizens are not only the subjects of coercion, they are also ‘its putative joint authors’ (Nagel 2005: 
128). In other words, for coercive rules to trigger egalitarian demands, these should be the result 
of a democratic society: it is on that basis that Nagel explicitly rejects the possibility of demands of 
justice in the EU, at least as long as it is not ‘a genuine European federation with some form of 
democratically elected representative government’ (Nagel 2005: 144).93 The underlying assumption 
seems to be, at first sight, that democratic representation and majoritarian politics are necessary to 
legitimise the norm of justice jointly decided, in order to create a sense of obligation that ensures 
                                                 
93 This claim has also been made by others who reject the possibility of EU justice on the sole ground of its ‘democratic 
deficit’ (i.e. they do not consider coercion). As Joerges puts it, ‘democracy entails a mandate to define social justice and 
a chance of accomplishing politically defined objectives […] As long as the EU does not establish a comprehensive 
democratic order it cannot realise an equivalent to the democratic welfare states of its members’ (Joerges 2017: 98). 
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the citizens’ voluntary compliance with redistributive decisions (de Witte 2015: 23). Yet, the EU 
falls short of the features of the typical liberal democratic state.94 It is, by definition, a demoicracy, 
combining elements of supranational majoritarian politics with intergovernmental bargaining. On 
that basis, then, no claims of justice can be made at EU level. 
However, Nagel writes later that, even in the case of a colonial power, there are claims of justice 
for what is needed is ‘a broad interpretation of what it is for a society to be governed in the name of 
its members’ such that those claiming authority must do so ‘to serve their [citizens’] interests even 
if they are not its legislators’ (Nagel 2005: 129, fn 14, my emphasis). From this, rather than being 
co-authors of the laws, what matters is that citizens upon whom coercive rules are enforced be 
given a justification for the rules they are expected to comply with (Van Parijs 2007: 645).  
How does this hold in the EU context? Neyer argues that the EU already is, although still 
imperfectly, a ‘justified structure of justification’ because the constitutionalisation of European law 
has changed modes of representation from intergovernmental bargaining to transnational 
deliberations: 
The constitutionalization of justificatory requirements by means of European law changes the mode 
of representation from preferences and power to arguments and reasons and thus transforms 
intergovernmental bargaining into transnational deliberations. It provides safeguards against the 
impact of vertical power asymmetries on the justificatory discourse and exerts a compliance-pull by 
increasing the costs of non-compliance to powerful and weak states alike. The EU already possesses 
the initial elements of such a ‘justified structure of justification’ (eine gerechtfertigte Grundstruktur). It 
not only allows for and demands justifications, the EU itself is to some degree the product of a 
justificatory discourse. (Neyer 2012: 9) 
Viehoff makes a similar argument and helps clarifying the matter. According to him, the EU has 
fiduciary obligations towards individuals living within the EU, at least in the domains where it has 
acquired competences. EU supranational institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the 
European Commission or the Council of Ministers do not only have authority over individuals’ life 
prospects, they also ‘claim authority’ in the sense that they claim to be ‘morally entitled to create 
duties on behalf and for EU citizens’, such that they have a ‘distinctive normative relationship with 
each person for whom these duties are meant to be binding’ (Viehoff 2016: 10).  
                                                 
94 de Witte helps summarising the differences: ‘[t]he limited powers of the European Parliament (EP), as the body 
representing the European electorate, the insulation of the European executive and the agenda-setting from the vote, 
the entrenchment of national interests in the decision-making process, the digressively proportionate composition of 
the EP, and consequently its incapacity to guarantee simple majority decision making, the absence of genuine European 
political parties, the limited political participation in European elections, lack of accountability in the legislative process, 
and the absence of a European public sphere all severely restrict the legitimacy of Europe’s potential assumption of 
welfare competences’ (de Witte 2015: 55-56). 
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By having a pervasive impact on those living under its authority and by claiming authority over 
persons, rather than states, then, EU institutions must exercice public authority in a manner that 
displays equal concern. If this is so, ‘equal treatment [requires] at the very best that every person’s 
interest, including those who fare worst under the scheme, matter to some important degree [which 
means, ultimately] more than what is presentely provided by supranational economic institutions’ 
(Viehoff 2016: 10). On this account, the political view seems to be too weak to bound demands of 
justice at national level. I now turn to the third and last version of the objection. 
3.4. The social cooperation view 
According to the social cooperation view, the kind of interaction relevant for demands of justice is 
not that individuals share a common identity nor a set of institutions coercing them, but it is 
participation in a scheme of social cooperation, in the Rawlsian sense (see chapter three, section 
2.1.). As Freeman (2007: 266) helps to summarise, social cooperation relies on a set of publicly 
recognised rules that regulate the distribution of benefits and burdens among participants, it is 
voluntary and mutually beneficial, and the fair terms of cooperation involve an idea of reciprocity. 
When these conditions are met, participants owe each other a fair share of the social surplus they 
have jointly produced. To see how this view holds at the supranational level, I rely on Viehoff 
(2014: 92-102, 2016: 7-10) and Sangiovanni (2013) who both engaged with this view in the 
European context. 
3.4.1. An EU scheme of social cooperation 
According to Viehoff (2014: 93-95), these features are present at EU level in a similar way to the 
domestic case. Emphasising that the EU aims, inter alia, to realise ‘economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, and solidarity’ (art. 3(3) TEU), he argues that the EU was built ‘in the spirit of 
cooperation and with a view to generating various kinds of benefits for all participants’ (Viehoff 
2014: 93). This ambition is sustained by a highly developed and complex legal order, itself governed 
by principles of fair reciprocity, as exemplified by the rules underpinning the Structural Funds and 
the so-called ‘solidarity clause’ (art. 222 TFEU), as well as majoritarian decision-making procedures 
in key policy domains. Viehoff interprets this as ‘an expression of the participants’ trust that others 
do not use the institution merely strategically to rationally maximise their advantage [and that they] 
will act reasonably’ (Viehoff 2014: 94). In other words, ‘participating states see their commitments 
to the EU as one of fair cooperation [such that the EU can be considered as] a cooperative scheme 
in the normative sense’ (Viehoff 2014: 94). Moreover, their readiness to comply with accession 
criteria reflects Member States’ expectation to benefit from EU integration, thereby confirming the 
mutual advantage criterion of social cooperation. Finally, the choice for membership is voluntary. 
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There is, however, a major nuance: those fulfilling the requirements of social cooperation are states 
not individuals. Viehoff discards this, arguing that even if membership is not directly consented by 
each citizen individually (who may even have voted against membership), this is no less different 
in domestic institutions (Viehoff 2014: 94). This leads him to conclude that ‘all those who rely on 
the Rawlsian argument about fair cooperation domestically should be drawn to accept that 
substantive principles of justice apply at least to those goods that the EU jointly provides because 
arguments about fair reciprocity apply in this context’ (Viehoff 2014: 94). To understand, more 
specifically, what grounds the distribution of equal shares of resources to participants, and why 
some argue that this view justifies a bounded conception of justice, it is helpful to turn to 
Sangiovanni’s (2007, 2013) ‘reciprocity-based internationalism’, which he applied to the EU 
context. 
3.4.2. Reciprocity-based internationalism 
According to Sangiovanni, principles of fairness concern the distribution of benefits and burdens 
stemming from the joint production of a central class of collective goods ‘necessary to protect us 
from physical attack and to maintain and reproduce a stable system of property rights and 
entitlements’ (Sangiovanni 2007: 19-20). Individuals may interact and cooperate across borders, 
but what makes the state special – in the sense that it is the primary locus in which the full scope 
of egalitarian demands apply – resides in the fact that it has the ‘basic extractive, regulative and 
distributive capacities’ (Sangiovanni 2007: 20) necessary to provide the framework for the 
production of the goods up for distribution. Beyond state borders, then, demands of justice vary 
according to the kind of collective goods institutions generate as well as to the way these are 
produced (Sangiovanni 2013: 221). 
In light of this, Sangiovanni considers that interpersonal demands of justice do not arise at EU 
level like they do at national level. ‘The reason is that European citizens rely to a far greater extent 
on the contributions, participation, influence of their fellow residents and citizens than they do on 
the contributions, participation and influence of EU citizens and residents generally. This is 
reflected in the fact that European citizens do not provide each other with the same range of 
collective goods secured at the domestic level’ (Sangiovanni 2013: 229). To justify his claim, 
Sangiovanni lists a series of limits faced by EU institutions: a small number of civil servants, a tiny 
budget, a lack of taxation powers, a lack of army or police, limited competences in certain areas, 
etc. (Sangiovanni 2013: 229). In sum, ‘the EU, on its own, does not have the financial, legal, 
administrative or sociological means to provide and guarantee the goods and services necessary to 
sustain and reproduce a stable market and legal system, indeed to sustain (on its own) any kind of 
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society at all [whilst, comparatively,] without the EU, Member States would forego a range of 
benefits, but they would not lose the capacity to govern’ (Sangiovanni 2013: 17). But, whilst the 
same demands of justice do not hold, Sangiovanni identifies two different types of duties of justice 
at EU level: the first one applies to states, the second one to individuals.  
‘Member State solidarity’, as he calls it, concerns the obligations between states. Sangiovanni 
identifies the current EU justice-deficit in terms of unfairness in the distribution of benefits and 
burdens of European cooperation between Member States. MS differ in their level of development, 
demography, welfare regime, taxation structure and face, as a result of EU integration, different 
risks and distributional consequences (Sangiovanni 2013: 228). Under his internationalist 
perspective, in which the state remains central, the EU must ensure that each MS maintains its 
internal capacity to uphold its commitment to national solidarity. Sangiovanni recognises the 
asymmetry of EU integration, its market-making bias, and its effect on national social systems, as 
well as the risk involved by free movement of persons and capital which impinges the welfare 
states’ capacities to support generous redistributive schemes, as well as, finally, the risks involved 
with monetary integration (i.e. MS liability to exogeneous economic schocks) which produce 
tensions among MS (Sangiovanni 2013: 224-228). To guarantee fair terms of cooperation, then, 
MS should insure themselves against the risks and losses (i.e. economic disadvantages) associated 
with EU integration (Sangiovanni 2013: 230). In practice, this means that MS should act in 
solidarity with each other through specific funds, which would operate in a similar way to the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds and be triggered under specific unforeseen circumstances, in order 
to maintain domestic ability to pursue justice. For example, he suggests an insurance fund to cover 
the losses incurred in case of asymmetric economic shocks in the Eurozone. In short, Member 
State solidarity entails mechanisms of risk-sharing against the potential hurdles associated with EU 
integration. This demands that they mutualise resources at supranational level such that the EU 
can provide systemic support in times of need. 
Given the primacy of EU law over national law and its direct effect, as well as the civil, political 
and social rights associated with EU citizenship (see Bauböck 2017 for a review), Sangiovanni 
recognises that there are also transnational duties, that is to say, interpersonal duties between EU 
citizens (and residents) (Sangiovanni 2013: 232-233). However, the obligations of ‘transnational 
solidarity’ fall short of egalitarian demands of social justice. Rather, they simply entail that EU 
citizens should not impose an unreasonable burden on national systems of solidarity of other MS 
whilst enjoying their freedom of movement. To reconcile citizens’ interests (i.e. free movement) 
whitout placing a burden on national solidarity, he ends up by suggesting an EU-funded scheme 
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(i.e. based on MS solidarity) to compensate MS that are ‘net importers of social assistance recipients’ 
(Sangiovanni 2013: 240). 
3.4.3. The EU contribution answer 
Are we then left with no options for egalitarian demands at EU level? Perhaps so. But Sangiovanni’s 
conclusions may be nuanced. Let’s recall that reciprocity-based justice derives equal shares from 
the joint production of essential public goods, including the ‘protection from physical attack’ and 
‘a stable system of property rights and entitlements’. As Viehoff (2014: 95-98) argues in response, 
the EU provides a significant share of these goods. First, despite the lack of effective means for 
protection such as a police force or an army, through economic integration and integration by law, 
the EU has created the conditions for peace, which arguably plays an important role in protecting 
physical integrity. Second, through its internal market and its regulatory system (in particular its 
competition law), the EU surely contributes to the shaping of a system of property rights to an 
important extent:  
EU competition agencies break monopolies; EU intellectual property law settles who can own what 
in the domain of intangible assets; EU consumer regulation determines what may be sold to 
consumers; EU corporate law limits liability and settles important issues regarding the rights and 
duties of company owners vis-à-vis employees, and so forth. (Viehoff 2016: 9). 
Even if the EU does not have the same capacities for fiscal redistribution than its MS – recall that 
one of Sangiovanni’s argument is that the EU’s budget is too small95– it contributes nonetheless to 
upholding a system of cooperation shaping individuals’ opportunities within and across national 
borders, by other means. Taking all goods into consideration, then, it is fair to argue that the EU 
plays at least some role in upholding the relevant collective goods and in maintaining a scheme of 
social cooperation shaping the prospects of individuals directly, and not only through their Member 
States. As such, it seems implausible to claim that no interpersonal demands of distributive justice 
whatsoever can arise at EU level from the perspective of social cooperation. 
3.5. Summing up 
Until now, I discussed three different versions of bounded justice which underpin the challenge of 
solidarity. After relativising the common identity view, I rejected it altogether. When considering 
the political view and the social cooperation views, I showed that there are strong reasons to hold 
that the EU displays the preconditions demanded by these two versions of bounded justice. Even 
if these may be less comprehensive than those existing at domestic level, the discussion shows that 
                                                 
95 The EU budget is capped at 1,23% of EU GDP, whilst MS’ budgets, expressed in percentage of national GDP, are 
about 40 times higher (Sangiovanni 2013: 229). 
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the objections of bounded justice are not strong enough to discard any demands of justice at EU 
level. But it does not entail a transfer of welfare competences to the EU level. Instead, the 
discussion has opened the door for conceiving some distributive role at EU level, which I shall 
shortly determine in a conservative way. 
If some redistribution may be justified at EU level, the challenge, then, is to find a way to 
accommodate the demoicratic character of the EU. A multi-tiered conception of justice in which 
MS remain the central locus for the pursuit of justice whilst being supplemented by an EU welfare 
layer that remains non-intrusive in national welfare arrangements seems to provide a good avenue. 
And a modest European universal basic income offers just a suitable instrument to materialise such 
a conception, as I will now argue. 
4. The EUBI and multi-tiered EU justice 
So far, I was only able to show that the challenge of solidarity does not provide a knock-out 
argument against a more active and distributive role for the EU. In this section I wish to provide a 
sufficientarian perspective of EU justice, built in a mutli-tiered fashion, combining national and 
EU levels as two complementary layers. Given the indeterminacy of EU demands of justice, I take 
a conservative approach and argue that duties of justice at EU level should respect a sufficientarian 
standard, that is, making sure that all EU citizens and residents have ‘enough’ to live on or, in other 
words, that they can enjoy a social minimum. I suggest that the EU acts as a complementary welfare 
layer providing a modest EUBI such that, in combination with its Member States’ action, all 
Europeans meet the sufficientarian standard. I then show why the EUBI would be compatible with 
both international and transnational dimensions of the EU’s demoicratic framework. 
4.1. EU sufficientarian justice and the EUBI 
4.1.1. Defining the sufficientarian threshold 
From a sufficientarian perspective, what is morally objectionable is not that people have less than 
others but the fact that they have too little (Frankfurt 1987: 32-33). Sufficientarianism is thus 
preoccupied with the distribution of resources so that every individual is able to reach a minimal 
threshold satisfying a specific standard. As such, in analogy with Rawls’ maximin kind of 
egalitarianism, the sufficiency view rests on a satismin form of egalitarianism, that is a satisfaction 
of the minimum (Gosseries 2001: 467).96 Sufficientarianism may be more or less demanding 
                                                 
96 For those holding a sufficientarian conception of justice, above that threshold, the views diverge: some contend that 
there would be no obligation of justice whatsoever whereas for others demands of justice would be of a different kind 
(see Casal 2007 and Gosseries 2011 for a review). This is why the doctrine of sufficiency is also appealing to those who 
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depending on where the threshold is set (Widerquist 2010). I take it here that the right to a 
minimum level of resources, as proclaimed in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (art. 
34(3)), recommended by the Council (1992), and jointly proclaimed by the institutional triangle 
(EU 2017) when adopting the Social Pillar (art. 14), is a conservative measure for a sufficientarian 
standard, and a rather uncontroversial one at EU level. 
But more precisely, how should the sufficientarian threshold be defined? Although his proposal 
differs from mine, Ferrera has recently proposed a sufficientarian conception of the EU’s 
distributive role which aim is to offer a ‘benevolence-based solidarity anchored directly to the EU’ 
(Ferrera 2017: 65).97 He suggests that the minimum standard should be based on indicators of 
absolute poverty such as reference budget standards. I prefer a relative measure provided by the 
AROP threshold (i.e. based on 60% of the national median income). As the recognised standard 
poverty line, it encompasses a clear pan-European commitment to resorb poverty in a similar 
fashion throughout the EU, whilst taking into account the local standard of living. This makes 
sense if the idea is to guarantee a social minimum to all, in cooperation with MS. Moreover, the 
AROP indicator is not a threshold covering basic needs, but a gauge of the minimum necessary to 
participate in the life of each MS. As such, it takes income disparities into account and embodies 
an income-equivalent measure of social inclusion. More practically, whilst reference budget 
standards offer an accurate (possibly more demanding) measure of subsistence, the methodology 
for international comparative assessment of national reference budget standards is not yet 
operational (see Storms et al. 2013, Penne et al. 2016). The AROP threshold, by contrast, is already 
fully operative. 
4.1.2. The EUBI and multi-tiered EU justice 
Against this backdrop, the pursuit of a multi-tiered EU justice could be conceived in the following 
way. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States remain the primary locus for 
social protection (and can organise it as they see fit), but the EU completes their action by 
distributing a modest European universal basic income (EUBI) such that, together with its MS, 
they guarantee all Europeans a social minimum. In other words, MS preserve their national 
autonomy in defining how they wish to pursue their internal conception of justice, but the EU 
imposes a minimal sufficientarian threshold under which no one can fall, and to which it 
                                                 
consider that there might be more demanding obligations of social justice between citizens of a same state and only 
requirements of ‘minimal justice’ of a sufficientarian kind in the global context, as I already mentioned in section 2.1. 
97 Ferrera (2017) suggests an EU-wide last-resort social assistance scheme. Notwithstanding the improvement 
compared to the status quo, this scheme amounts to a European guaranteed minimum income fund of the kind I 
presented and evacuated as a less promising possibility than the EUBI in chapter one (section 6.2.2.). Therefore, I do 
not discuss this option here again. 
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contributes effectively. It should be clear, on that account, that the approach undertaken here is 
not predicated on the implementation of a basic income at national level, even if there may be a 
good case for it, as the discussions in the last two chapters have revealed. It is, instead, predicated 
on the idea that all Europeans should be guaranteed a decent standard of living, to which the EU 
would thus contribute by supporting MS on a systemic level via an EUBI. 
Bearing this in mind, then, the EUBI is a partial basic income granted to all Europeans, providing 
a minimum level of security to all and completed by national social models to meet the sufficiency 
standard. In light of the definition used in chapter two (section 3.2.), the EUBI can be defined as 
follows: 
The EUBI is a periodic and partial cash payment paid by the European Union to all citizens and 
legal residents living within its borders on an individual basis, without conditions of resources or 
work requirement. 
The EUBI should be partial as it is not the role of the EU to provide, on its own, an adequate 
social minimum. Moreover, just as the standard poverty line varies in each country, its level should 
reflect differences in purchasing power, whilst being uniform for all those residing in each Member 
State (see chapter five, section 4.2.). It should involve both citizens and legal residents since 
residents participate in the social scheme of cooperation upheld by the EU legal and institutional 
regime and are subject to the authority of EU supranational institutions. The EUBI’s double 
unconditionality (absence of means-test and work-test) is desirable for practical reasons, since it 
reduces the administrative costs that a means-testing instrument would entail and avoids the need 
to harmonise national eligibility conditions. But this is also necessary for the EUBI to be a 
minimally disruptive instrument, respectful of national autonomy in social matters (see next 
section). Furthermore, as highlighted in chapters two and three, the EUBI seeks to provide a more 
emancipatory and inclusive form of social support, avoids the typical problems faced by existing 
forms of guaranteed minimum income (GMI) such as social stigma and the poverty trap, and 
lowers the pressure of multidimensional forms of economic insecurities that typically characterise 
the precariat. As such, the instrument of pan-European solidarity embodies a drastic change of 
approach in EU anti-poverty policies. 
The pursuit of multi-tiered EU justice, then, combines national solidarity with pan-European 
solidarity. Since the EUBI is an individual-centred instrument, pan-European solidarity simply 
means transnational or interpersonal solidarity. If it is funded out of the EU’s own resources, pan-
European solidarity would gain in coherence as the funding scheme would relate to the argument 
that the EU contributes to the scheme of social cooperation in which EU citizens evolve. It is also 
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possible to fund it through national contributions. In this case, despite being an individual-centred 
device, pan-European solidarity becomes, in effect, a form of Member State solidarity. As 
Sangiovanni suggested, we have good reasons to organise inter-state transfers to maintain internal 
redistributive capacities. In the case of the EUBI, however, these transfers would not be based on 
an insurance device but on redistribution since it is, by definition, a permanent and regular payment 
(I discuss these differences in chapter five). 
How does this perspective of multi-tiered EU justice relate to the demoicratic character of the EU? 
According to Nicolaïdis (2012: 258), ‘there is no necessary tension between the preservation of 
pluralism and a common purpose expressed through common projects […]: the question is how 
such projects are implemented to respect the plurality of peoples’. With this in mind, I show in the 
next two sections, why the EUBI would be desirable to preserve domestic justice without infringing 
on national autonomy whilst strengthening the transnational dimension of the EU project by 
supporting EU social citizenship. 
4.2. Preserving domestic justice 
Preserving domestic justice is best understood through the internationalist lens according to which, 
in simple terms, the pursuit of justice beyond borders is to facilitate the achievement of justice 
within them (Ronzoni 2016: 8). From this perspective, then, states may agree to surrender formal 
sovereignty in certain fields if it allows them, through the newly created institutions, to gain jointly 
in problem-solving capacities, that is, in effective sovereignty (Ronzoni 2009). In other words, this 
means that states may agree to the development of supranational (regulatory or distributive) 
institutions if it can help to support their own welfare arrangement. This was the view of the 
founding fathers, for whom economic growth through integration in the single market would be 
accompanied with social progress and cohesion at national level (Vandenbroucke 2017d: 22). This 
is also the approach taken by Sangiovanni when he argues that the point and purpose of the EU is 
‘to strengthen its constituent Member States in an era of globalisation. It is, more precisely, an attempt 
to support the interests of each of its Member States in enhancing both growth and internal 
problem-solving capacity (including the domestic commitments to national solidarity) against a 
background of regional stability’ (Sangiovanni 2013: 228).  
From this perspective, then, the EUBI must offer a way to simultaneously respect Member States’ 
autonomy in designing their own social model and improve (or at least maintain) their very capacity 
to do so. Considering the former, an EUBI functions simply as an income floor on top of which 
and against which each national arrangement can be attuned. The EUBI is thus a minimally 
disruptive institutional device as it does not require the harmonisation of eligibility conditions nor 
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a common operational definition of income and is therefore compatible with a national collective 
autonomy in social matters. The level of its intrusiveness will, ultimately, depend on the funding 
scheme chosen but the cost that the latter might incur to MS must then be weighted against the 
benefits of the scheme which I shall specify shortly. Let’s note first that the EUBI’s respect for 
Member States’ autonomy is recognised by two known internationalists defending a demoicratic 
conception of the EU, Bellamy and Lacey (2018: 1418), who recognise that, ‘[b]eing set at a 
relatively low level, while claiming no other competences for welfare programmes supranationally, 
a European basic income would only modestly interfere with the national administration of welfare 
regimes, providing each state with a wide scope for adjusting its welfare policies’. 
With respect to the EUBI’s role in strengthening national capacities, two main reasons can be 
invoked. The first relates to the scheme identified by Sangiovanni, that is, a mechanism of risk-
sharing in face of asymmetric shocks in the Eurozone. I deal with this at length in chapter five, so 
I do not elaborate on it more than required here. It is simply necessary to note, at this stage, that 
the EUBI offers one way, among others, for MS to insure each other against the risks involved in 
monetary integration, which implies that MS have lost sovereignty over monetary policy, are 
vulnerable to financial market distrust, face the stringency of the EU’s macroeconomic governance 
and thus see their built-in shock absorbers severely constrained. 
The second reason relates to the pressures induced by EU free movement law. The legal 
enforcement of the four freedoms provides new ‘exit’ and ‘entry’ options in and out of national 
boundaries thereby constraining Member States’ capacity to ‘lock-in’ agents and to extract the 
resources required for redistributive policies. Looking first at the free movement of people, low-
skilled workers moving from a MS with lower social standards to another one with more generous 
welfare system may, in the absence of sufficient regulation, put pressure on local working 
conditions or result in an inflow of welfare recipients (‘benefit tourism’). The EUBI, then, would 
reduce incentives for migration by ensuring higher economic security in the country of origin. As 
such, the EUBI provides another, simpler, way to organise the second scheme proposed by 
Sangiovanni, that is, an EU-funded scheme to compensate MS that are net importers of social 
assistance recipients. This potential benefit of the EUBI is also emphasised by Bellamy and Lacey 
(2018: 1417-1418), who consider that ‘such a basic income would have the advantage of reducing 
the likelihood of some negative behaviour that a free movement regime might engender. For 
example, it would make ‘social dumping’ less attractive to workers and ‘benefit tourism’ less 
appealing to potential claimants’. 
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Another major source of pressure faced by national systems of solidarity relates to capital mobility. 
Faced with unfettered capital flows facilitated by technological progress and monetary integration, 
capital mobility limits national extractive capacities. But the distribution of the opportunity for exit 
is also unequal, leading more powerful actors to influence policy makers. As noted by Bartolini, the 
cost of exit ‘varies and, therefore, not all actors have the same possibilities and opportunities for 
exit. This leaves open the possibility that the dissatisfied-mobiles—those who might exit—make 
the organization particularly sensitive to their needs, and, indeed, so much so that the organizsation 
tries to anticipate the course of action that will most likely prevent their exit’ (Bartolini 2007: 34). 
The risk of fiscal dumping is also anticipated and internalised by policy makers: ‘the increased 
mobility of capital, that is, its capacity to skip (even virtually) between jurisdictions, […] has a direct 
effect on the willingness of nation states to enact (and on their capacity to enforce) legislation or 
regulations that restrict or temper the power and potential of capital’ (de Witte 2015: 32-33). 
Evidence shows that, under these circumstances, tax competition between EU Member States led 
to significant fall of effective corporate tax rates in the last decades (Streif 2015). 
All these different features affect the option span for policy choices in matters of tax and spending 
decisions and, through this, the effective pursuit of justice at national level, as these ‘structural 
processes have gradually divorced the political authority to answer the social question from the 
administrative control required to implement it’ (de Witte 2015: 32).  In face of these dynamics, in 
order to support national effective sovereignty – that is, to sustain its problem-solving capacity – 
it is necessary to lift some redistributive aspects at EU level. By providing another source of welfare 
at EU level, the strains of labour and capital mobility would be reduced. But the positive impact of 
the EUBI would be strengthened if it is funded out of the proceeds of a Europeanised corporate 
tax and a financial transaction tax for example. The strength of the EU’s systemic support in this 
case is double: the source of funding reduces the risk of fiscal dumping at its source and its 
redistribution through an EU-wide basic income helps to support national systems of solidarity, 
which would still face a series of other challenges already mentioned as well as the risk of capital 
exit at global level. 
Against this backdrop, it seems that a modest EUBI would be able to support European welfare 
states whilst respecting their plurality. As such, it offers a way to reconcile what Vandenbroucke 
(2017d: 41) calls the ‘irreducible dualism’ of national and transnational solidarities. 
4.3. EU social citizenship 
Until now, as noted by Ferrera (2015: 65), the ‘transnationalisation [of solidarity] has been 
produced, politically speaking, in a ‘parasitic way’: not through allocations, that is the creation of 
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new social entitlements supported by dedicated resources, but only through coordinative 
adjustments that have forced the opening of the national social spaces’. As an individual-centred 
device of pan-European solidarity distributed to all Europeans, the EUBI develops the 
transnationalisation of solidarity in a non-parasitic way (as shown above) whilst embodying a strong 
commitment to the social rights element of EU citizenship, which is currently lacking besides its 
economic and political dimensions. 
As shown by de Witte (2015: 51-52; 61-69), EU law has created a series of transnational claims of 
justice. In particular, the right to the freedom of movement embodies a commitment to individual 
freedom by extending the capacity for Europeans to pursue their own conception of the ‘good life’ 
through free movement beyond national borders. Moreover, the right to non-discrimination on 
the basis of nationality embodies a demand for equal citizenship. Thus, within the EU external 
borders, EU law has created a ‘social citizenship space’ in which all bearers of EU citizenship or 
long-term residents may enjoy access to benefits and services anywhere in the EU, according to 
local rules (Ferrera 2015: 49). 
Yet, access to the EU’s ‘opportunity structure’ remains unequal, as testified by the asymmetry 
between workers and non-workers’ right of free movement: European law allows the restriction of 
the freedom of movement if someone lacking sufficient resources risks becoming ‘an unreasonable 
burden’ for the host Member States’ social assistance scheme (Directive 2004/38/EC: recital 10). 
From a normative account of the EU as a demoicracy, this is legitimate: ‘EU citizenship should 
expand the rights, opportunities and obligations of all citizens via Europeanised national 
citizenships, without superimposing an autonomous new ‘citizenship granting and monitoring’ 
authority’ (Nicolaïdis 2013: 365). On this account, the EUBI would provide substance to EU social 
citizenship without infringing on national MS organisation of welfare rights, that is, without having 
social rights associated with national citizenship or residency be constrained by the demands of 
supranational citizenship. 
More fundamentally, the EUBI would grant a modicum of economic security that enables one, not 
only to decide to stay in her own country (as was suggested in the previous section), but also to 
have the real opportunity to move beyond borders if she wants to. As such, the EUBI may reduce 
emigration by constraint but support emigration by choice. In other words, the EUBI may 
accompany the aspirational promise of EU’s opportunity structure by making it a more tangible, 
or at least more secure, reality.  
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The expression of social citizenship via EUBI may be even more coherent and strengthened if the 
basic income is funded out of the EU’s (new) own resources, that is to say, resources linked with 
the benefits of EU integration. One can imagine the already Europeanised VAT, but also, as 
mentioned earlier, a European corporate tax or a financial transaction tax. In this way, the EUBI 
embodies a link between European integration and the distribution of its benefits to all Europeans. 
Establishing such a connection between resources and citizens is not only coherent in light of EU 
multi-tiered justice, it may also enhance the EU’s legitimacy, as argued by Maduro (2013: 118): ‘the 
easier (and more legitimate) path to European solidarity will come from establishing a link between 
the wealth generated by European integration and the requirement to distribute it fairly’. It also 
shows that the international and transnational dimension needs not be in conflict if the EU adopts 
a more active role through an EUBI on a sufficientarian basis. Of course, given the fact that the 
EUBI would be partial, it represents a modicum of social citizenship which would come nowhere 
close to what exist at national level. But it would be tangible, highly recognisable and express a 
direct link between EU institutions and those living within the Union’s borders. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I addressed the challenge of solidarity according to which the EU lacks the 
preconditions necessary to achieve distributive justice at the supranational level and argued that 
this objection was not decisive. I then defended a multi-tiered conception of EU justice 
characterised by national and pan-European solidarities and proposed a sufficientarian standard 
applying at EU level. I argued that a partial EUBI would support the internationalist aim of 
maintaining national commitment to domestic justice whilst providing substance to the EU social 
citizenship. I made no claim that the EUBI is the only desirable instrument in face of the 
vulnerabilities of MS under the current EU setting, but simply showed that, all other things kept 
equal, the EUBI may improve the situation in significant respects and, most importantly, that it 
fares well on a wide range of accounts. 
On that basis, if one accepts the arguments presented so far, it is now necessary to confront the 
EUBI to what the political economist would typically answer in face of current social imbalances: 
‘you may have shown that the EUBI cannot be ruled out at European level, but what is needed is 
not a pan-European instrument of redistribution. Instead, what is required is an an instrument of 
macroeconomic stabilisation’. With this in mind, I now turn to the ‘challenge of stabilisation’.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CHALLENGE OF STABILISATION 
1. Introduction 
I have now established that an EU-wide distributive role cannot be ruled out and argued that such 
an approach is best conceived in sufficientarian terms, with the EUBI acting as an instrument of 
both inter-state support and an instrument of individual emancipation within the ‘opportunity 
structure’ that the EU offers. It is now necessary to confront the perspective taken by many EU 
scholars and policy makers alike who consider that, to re-vamp the European social dimension, the 
European Union, and the Eurozone in particular, need not an instrument of redistribution but an 
instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation. In other words, they hold, from an economic 
perspective, that Member State solidarity in the form of an inter-state insurance mechanism is the 
key to support the Union’s welfare states. From this perspective, in face of the social disparities 
exacerbated by the euro crisis, convergence and stabilisation must go hand in hand, and 
redistribution is unnecessary. In light of this, the EUBI must now face ‘the challenge of 
stabilisation’, which runs as follows: to improve its social dimension, the EU needs to support national welfare 
states through an inter-state insurance device of macroeconomic stabilisation, not an instrument of redistribution. 
Hence, the EUBI is inappropriate. 
Dealing with this objection is key as illustrated by a broad literature on the need for a European 
fiscal capacity typically based on a mechanism of inter-state insurance in which the idea of a 
European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS) takes a central place.98 Moreover, basic income 
advocates claimed that the EUBI could play a role of macroeconomic stabilisation, despite being 
an instrument of redistribution (Van Parijs 2012a; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 230-241; 
Viehoff 2016: 16-17), an argument I also made in chapter four. Since the need for a fiscal union 
providing macroeconomic stabilisation is primarily associated with the need to ‘complete’ the 
EMU, this objection also allows me to relate the EUBI to current economic debates on the matter. 
In addition, it gives me an opportunity to develop further the distinction between Member State 
solidarity and transnational solidarity in a more concrete setting which can be characterised by two 
opposing views focusing primarily on economic stabilisation or on social cohesion. Finally, it allows 
me to clarify the place of the EUBI on the scope question, that is to say, the EMU-wide versus 
EU-wide perspectives. 
                                                 
98 See European Commission (2017c), Andor (2013, 2014a and 2017), Andor et al. (2014), Beblavý, Gros and Maselli 
(2015), Beblavý, Marconi and Maselli (2015), Claeys, Darvas and Wolff (2014), Dullien (2013, 2017), Lellouche and 
Sode (2014), Vandenbroucke (2017a,b,c,d and forthcoming), Vetter (2014). See also Moro (2016) for a survey of the 
literature. 
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Bearing this in mind, my central aim in this chapter is to show that the EUBI is not vulnerable to 
this objection for two main reasons. First, I argue that the EUBI does have a stabilisation impact, 
albeit minor, thereby relativising the strength of the objection. To make this claim, I rely on a 
comparative approach between the EUBS and the EUBI, as it offers a useful way to highlight the 
stance taken by those favouring insurance-based support and to reveal the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the EUBI on the matter. Second, I argue that the EUBI is not meant for stabilisation, 
it is by definition an instrument of redistribution designed for social cohesion, that is to say, to 
address social disparities within and between Member States.  
The chapter is organised as follows. In section two, I establish the case for a fiscal union in the 
Eurozone as it provides the grounds on which those advocating stabilisation rely, before spelling 
out the objection. In section three, I briefly present the EUBS and compare it with the EUBI based 
on a set of criteria typically advanced for an effective macroeconomic stabiliser. I end this section 
by arguing that stabilisation is necessary but insufficient given the limits of the stabilisation 
approach for social purposes. In section four, I then turn to what the EUBI is primarily made for: 
improving social cohesion through economic security. I show the impact of a modest EUBI at 
individual level, present a rough estimate of the cross-border redistributive effects, and argue that 
the EUBI offers a way to flesh out some of the principles of the European Social Pillar. In section 
five, I end this chapter with a brief suggestion to see the EUBS and the EUBI as complementary 
measures. Section six concludes. 
2. The case for macroeconomic stabilisation99 
Those arguing in favour of an instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation base their claim on the 
need to complete the monetary union. My aim in this section is thus to show why some kind of 
fiscal union, providing stabilisation, is a functional requirement in the EMU, and why it matters 
when it comes to improving the social dimension of the European project. 
2.1. The OCA theory and the EMU 
Much of contemporary discussions about the need to reform the governance of the Eurozone have 
been influenced by the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA).100 In short, OCA theory weighs 
the costs of surrendering control over monetary policy against the benefits of membership of a 
                                                 
99 This section relies mainly on Jager and Hafner (2013), De Grauwe and Ji (2017) and De Grauwe (2013, 2018). 
100 The theory was pioneered by Mundell (1961) and further developed by McKinnon (1963) and Kennen (1969). For 
a survey of the more recent development in the literature, see Mongelli (2002). See also Feldstein (2012) and De 
Grauwe (2013) on design failures of EMU. For a comprehensive analysis of the economics of monetary unions applied 
to EMU, see De Grauwe (2018). 
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currency union, which is to mitigate asymmetric shocks.101 An asymmetric (or idiosyncratic) shock 
occurs when some members of the monetary union experience a recession while others are 
relatively less impacted, left unaffected or experience an economic upturn. The theory stipulates 
three important conditions for a currency union to form an OCA.  
The first condition concerns the similarity of economic structure, that is, the degree of symmetry 
between economies joining in a monetary union, measured by movements in output, employment, 
wage and price levels. Asymmetry can be the result of differences in the rate of productivity growth 
or inflation, different trends of industrial specialisation, or other institutional and structural factors. 
Symmetry matters because divergent economic trends increase the vulnerability of member 
countries in face of idiosyncratic shocks and make a common response difficult given the 
heterogeneity of their preferences. The second condition concerns the degree of flexibility of labour 
and goods markets, characterised by the degree to which prices and wages can be easily adjusted 
and the degree of cross-border mobility of the labour force. These two conditions are best 
explained in terms of trade-off: the lower the degree of symmetry, the higher the need for internal 
adaptability (understood as price and wage flexibility and/or labour mobility), to make a monetary 
union economically attractive. Two strategies can be pursued at this stage to make a currency union 
less costly: increase the degree of symmetry or increase the degree of flexibility. 
In terms of symmetry, EMU countries display high differences in economic growth and inflation 
rates, in labour market productivity rates and governments’ debt ratios, they are characterised by 
important social imbalances in income levels and unemployment rates, and exhibit differences in 
legal systems (e.g. in mortgage systems) and in their labour-market institutions (e.g. the organisation 
of wage-bargaining systems), as well as in the organisation of tax-and-transfer systems and public 
spending (De Grauwe 2018: ch. 2). Moreover, the evidence shows that the introduction of the euro 
has increased industrial specialisation (Persson 2011), while the crisis has reversed the ‘convergence 
machine’ that the EU used to be (EC 2017b: 8). Assuming that there are limits to diversity a 
currency union might be able to accommodate, the first strategy recommends increasing 
convergence through, for instance, the establishment of common standards for labour market 
policies (Vandenbroucke 2017b). Yet, although increasing symmetry seems necessary, it is 
insufficient on its own given the diversity of European economies and may prove difficult to obtain 
in practice, because of the barriers to positive integration highlighted in chapter one. 
                                                 
101 The OCA theory is thus mostly concerned with the cost side of the cost-benefit analysis of joining a currency union. 
For an analysis of the arguments on the benefit-side, see De Grauwe (2018: 55-72). 
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The prospects for the second strategy are not much more promising. Despite the trend towards 
more flexibility highlighted in chapter one, European countries still have labour market rigidities 
because of the institutionalisation of minimum wages, the existence of unemployment benefits 
which create a range of differential reservation wage floors, as well as the importance of collective 
bargaining institutions. Moreover, labour mobility across EU borders is particularly low due to 
large institutional, cultural and linguistic barriers. This is one of the reasons why EU policy 
prescriptions on so-called ‘structural reforms’ to make labour markets more flexible are central in 
the Eurozone governance since the start of sovereign debt crisis in 2010. However, increasing the 
degree of flexibility in the EMU, although appealing from a purely economic perspective, is likely 
to produce important social costs for those who have to bear its consequences (i.e. face wage cuts 
and/or be forced to emigrate), even if some advocate be a ‘high road’ to labour market flexibility 
that would somehow mitigate these social costs (Vandenbroucke 2017d: 13).102 The third OCA 
criterion might offer a more promising avenue. 
The third condition for a monetary union to form an OCA rests on the existence of a fiscal union 
that is, a system of fiscal transfers from members of the union experiencing favourable economic 
conditions to those facing an economic downturn. Put differently, this points to the 
institutionalisation of some insurance mechanism of macroeconomic stabilisation at the level of 
the union. The existence of such a fiscal union implies a second trade-off: the higher the capacity 
of fiscal transfers to absorb asymmetric shocks, the lower the need for flexibility. In other words, 
despite low symmetry and low flexibility, the EMU can still form an OCA if it builds the adequate 
fiscal capacity. This also shows that increasing flexibility and instituting a transfer union are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. The EMU lacks such a mechanism and is typically considered as an 
‘incomplete’ monetary union (De Grauwe 2018: 83), which makes it vulnerable to financial markets 
and potentially unsustainable. 
2.2. An incomplete monetary union 
It was long assumed that making the EMU more sustainable could be achieved through structural 
reforms focused on increasing the degree of flexibility, that the European Central Bank’s focus on 
price stability would be sufficient to ensure financial stability and that Maastricht criteria would 
ensure convergence between economies of the euro area while a three percent budget deficit would 
                                                 
102 According to Vandenbroucke, these social costs depend on the kind of flexibility pursued: one should make a 
distinction between a ‘low road’ to labour market flexibility which points to the mere deregulation of labour markets 
and easy hiring and firing, and a ‘high road’ which is based on ‘a highly skilled and versatile labour force, adequate 
unemployment insurance and activation and training policies that facilitate transitions’ (Vandenbroucke 2017d: 13). 
While the latter approach is certainly more desirable than the former, it still needs to demonstrate how it can square 
the problems associated with the rise of the precariat in chapter one (section 3). 
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allow enough leeway to deal with asymmetric shocks at the national level (De Grauwe 2013). In 
short, besides stabilisation by the market, national automatic stabilisers would do the job, such that 
no fiscal risk sharing at EMU-level was deemed necessary. Whilst it is true that the stabilising effect 
of European unemployment benefits and income support schemes was crucial in the wake of the 
economic and financial crisis (Dolls, Fuest and Peichl 2012), their shock absorption capacity has 
also ‘systematically decreased’ since the introduction of the euro (Vandenbroucke forthcoming: 
10). More importantly, the euro crisis revealed the ‘fallacy’ of the Maastricht assumption: 
‘[e]ffectively, regional governments in a monetary union cannot provide a fiscal response to large 
and deep balance-sheet recessions because of the unwillingness of investors to finance external 
debt. National fiscal policy becomes ineffective’ (Wolff 2012: 5).  
This conclusion is drawn from the implications of a loss of monetary sovereignty on a country’s 
capacity to finance its budget deficit. To understand why, let’s consider the following scenario. 
When a country is hit by a large economic shock, it can only adjust through internal devaluation 
focused on cost competitiveness, since it has relinquished its capacity to perform currency 
devaluation. This can induce a recession, affecting its output and employment levels negatively. 
National automatic stabilisers will smooth the economic downturn by supporting its citizens’ 
purchasing power. But the decline in GDP is accompanied by a decline in tax receipts while the 
rise of unemployment increases public expenditures, leading to a larger public budget deficit. A 
‘stand-alone’ country can increase its debt to finance its deficit because its central bank will always 
be able to provide the necessary liquidity to repay bondholders. In contrast, for the member of a 
currency union, the situation is akin to that of a country issuing debt in a foreign currency as it 
cannot give its bondholders the guarantee that it will be able to pay them at maturity. If the shock 
is serious enough to have lasting effects, investors might fear government default and sell their 
bonds, thereby raising the interest rate and precipitating a liquidity crisis, which can in turn lead to 
a solvency crisis. With the rise of its debt burden, the government might be forced to institute 
budgetary austerity (i.e. reduce expenditure and increase taxation) in a recessionary context, which 
means switching off its automatic stabilisers (‘sudden stop’) and, in so doing, further amplify the 
recession. Given the political cost of austerity programmes, the government might stop servicing 
its debt and declare a default.103 
This scenario has important implications. First, in the absence of a transfer union, financial markets 
have more powers vis-à-vis national governments when they are in a currency union than when 
they stand alone. The lack of trust of financial markets indeed plays a crucial role in this situation 
                                                 
103 For more on monetary integration and debt dynamics, see De Grauwe (2018: 8-19; 111-120). 
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as it is at the basis of the self-fulfilling dynamics at play. Second, in an economically integrated area, 
there is a risk that a demand shock in one country spreads to other countries through ‘spill-over 
effects’ (Beblavý Marconi, and Masselli 2015: 5). Third, it is likely that liquidity outflows in the 
country hit the hardest become inflows in countries of the union hit the least (‘capital flight’), such 
that the economic condition of the latter improves at the expense of the former. If this is so, not 
only does the debt crisis intensifies the initial negative shock for the country hit, it also amplifies 
disparities between Member States, making the whole system even more unsustainable. In an 
incomplete monetary union, this divergence becomes a source of polarisation which produces 
political problems: ‘the Eurozone became a club of creditors and debtors, which significantly 
enhanced the dominance of core countries, and especially those with AAA rating, over the deficit 
countries’ (Andor 2017: 149). Finally, an increase of divergence may lead to financial instability, 
which itself results in low investment, low economic growth, more competition between Member 
States and, ultimately, to the erosion of welfare states’ capacities. If a government loses the capacity 
to stabilise its economy and to protect its citizens against social risks – which are the essential roles 
of advanced welfare states and is therefore likely to affect its legitimacy – it is reasonable to ask 
whether such an incomplete monetary union is worth having at all. For all these reasons, the 
argument seems compelling: it is necessary to complete the currency union with a governance 
structure that would maintain and support national automatic stabilisers.104 
A final remark should be made here regarding the very nature of economic shocks in the Eurozone 
before turning to the objection. De Grauwe and Ji (2017) show that, since the introduction of the 
euro, growth variations in GDP were mainly driven by cyclical boom-and-bust dynamics and that 
these temporary business cycles were highly correlated (except for Germany). The asymmetry 
between ‘peripheral’ and ‘core’ countries of the Eurozone thus lies in the intensity (or the variance) 
of cyclical movements rather than in their lack of correlation. In other words, business-cycles move 
together for all member states but differ greatly in their amplitudes. While these findings do not 
make flexibility irrelevant, they have two important implications for the governance of the 
Eurozone that strengthen the case for a fiscal union: ‘[these findings] lead to the conclusion that 
efforts to stabilise the business cycle should be strengthened relative to the efforts that have been 
made to impose structural reforms’ (De Grauwe and Li 2017: 176). Second, since economic cycles 
are synchronised (i.e. correlated), a transfer union should not only be able to attenuate asymmetric 
                                                 
104 Other important factors played a role in the euro crisis such as the lack of an integrated transnational capital market 
and the so-called ‘deadly embrace’ between national banks and national governments (i.e. national banks were the main 
bondholders of their national governments, while the latter were responsible for insuring their own banks, which raised 
financial market distrust). Thus, a capital market union and a (completed) banking union, designed to prevent the 
spread of a banking crisis across the union, would provide additional cross-borders insurance mechanisms (Juncker et 
al. 2015; European Commission 2017c). 
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shocks between countries, it should also be equipped with a capacity for intertemporal stabilisation 
of the business cycle. This points to the need for the fiscal union to accumulate surpluses in good 
times and deficits in downturns (i.e. a capacity to issue debt). 
2.3. The objection 
Against this backrop, if the analysis is right, the case for a fiscal union appears compelling. Through 
the establishment of an insurance at the supranational level, the EU can uphold national social 
capacities for redistribution, sustain aggregate demand and prevent short-term economic shocks 
from turning into long-term divergence. There are various possibilities for a fiscal capacity in the 
Eurozone, but the European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS), to which I shall turn shortly, 
takes a central place among those who support a fiscal capacity with explicit social purposes. The 
perspective adopted is one of convergence through stabilisation, that is, the adoption of an inter-
state insurance mechanism designed to provide macroeconomic stabilisation supplemented by 
minimum requirements for national social protection policies in terms of ‘activation’, coverage, 
and adequacy (see e.g. Vandenbroucke 2017a, 2017b, 2017d, forthcoming; Andor 2017; Andor et 
al. 2014). From that view, then, what is required to support the European social dimension is 
a union of national welfare states [which] primary purpose is not to organise interpersonal 
redistribution between individual European citizens across national borders; the main mechanisms 
of solidarity that the EU now needs to develop are between Member States; they should refer to 
insurance logics rather than redistribution […]. (Vandenbroucke 2017d: 4) 
This echoes what I discussed in chapter four in terms of Member State solidarity versus 
transnational solidarity, but the discussion is now placed in the more concrete realm of economic 
arguments. In light of this, an instrument of redistribution such as the EUBI is both more 
demanding in terms of solidarity and arguably less efficient in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilisation. As Vandenbroucke (2017c: 21-22) argues, ‘a pan-European basic income is mainly a 
redistributive instrument, with at most a minor stabilising impact; a European re-insurance of 
national insurance schemes is a cooperative scheme based on the mutual benefit of insurance, and 
explicitly not redistributive’.  
From this, it is possible to spell out what I refer to as the ‘challenge of stabilisation’: to improve its 
social dimension, the EU needs to support national welfare states through a macroeconomic 
stabilisation device, which is best conceived as an inter-state insurance mechanism completed with 
minimum social standards, not an instrument of redistribution. Hence, the EUBI is inadequate. 
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3. The EUBI and macroeconomic stabilisation 
To address this claim and assess the strength of the EUBI as a macroeconomic stabiliser, I now 
compare it to the EUBS. I start this section with a justification of my choice to use EUBS for 
comparative purposes and explain the main features of its two variants. I then establish a series of 
criteria necessary for an efficient macroeconomic stabiliser and evaluate how the EUBI fares 
according to them relatively to the EUBS. 
3.1. The European unemployment benefit scheme 
3.1.1. Why focus on the EUBS? 
Among the various measures proposed to establish a European transfer union, the European 
unemployment benefits scheme (EUBS) has become particularly popular among politicians and 
academics.105 The basic idea of the EUBS is to organise EMU-wide (or European-wide) support to 
national unemployment insurance schemes, that is, to establish a public inter-state insurance 
mechanism. Such a mechanism makes sense because labour markets constitute one of the main 
sources of divergence between E(M)U countries. Furthermore, according to Beblavý, Marconi and 
Maselli (2015: 11), the EUBS is considered as the most attractive option among the array of possible 
instruments of macroeconomic stabilisation for the following reasons.106 First, it is a type of 
expenditure which is typically anti-cyclical, as unemployment tends to rise in economic downturn. 
Second, it provides a quick and automatic way to support income when recession kicks in. Third, 
it represents a kind of expenditure that (presumably) has a high ‘multiplier effect’ because, by 
providing a replacement income, it allows households to sustain their consumption levels. 
In addition, compared to other potential instruments that could play a role of stabilisation, the 
EUBS is not only (arguably) a more efficient solution, it also aims to provide a new role for the 
EU in social matters, just as the EUBI, because it ambitions to support those who bear a large part 
of the social costs in a recession, embodying something like a European social safety net. Moreover, 
since the EUBS is typically accompanied with minimum requirements for national systems of social 
protection, the comparison offers an opportunity to clarify whether the EUBI would also require 
minimum standards to work effectively. 
                                                 
105 See European Commission (2017c), Andor (2013, 2014a and 2017), Andor et al. (2014), Beblavý, Gros and Maselli 
(2015), Beblavý, Marconi and Maselli (2015), Claeys, Darvas and Wolff (2014), Dullien (2013, 2017), Lellouche and 
Sode (2014), Vandenbroucke (2017a,b,c,d and forthcoming), Vetter (2014). See also Moro (2016) for a survey of the 
literature. 
106 For a comparison with other kinds of stabilisers, see e.g. Beblavý, Marconi and Maselli (2015), D’Alfonso and 
Stuchlik (2016) and Wolff (2012). For example, one of the previously much discussed alternative, the ‘output gap’ 
alternative, seems to have been discarded as an unreliable mechanism (Dullien 2017: 161).  
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3.1.2. Genuine and equivalent variants 
There are two main variants of the EUBS. A ‘genuine’ EUBS provides financial transfers directly 
from the supranational level to unemployed individuals. It partially replaces national 
unemployment insurance by providing benefits to short-term unemployed individuals during a 
limited period (between six months and a year depending on the versions) as a percentage of past 
earnings (figures vary between 40% and 50%) (see Dullien 2013 and Andor 2014a respectively). 
National welfare states remain free to top up the amounts and extend them in time according to 
their local standards. The scheme is focused on short-term unemployment because it mostly 
reflects cyclical movements, and leaves the responsibility of structural unemployment, which is 
assumed to be associated with skills obsolescence or ill functioning labour markets, to national 
authorities (D’Alfonso and Stuchlik 2016: 13). The scheme could be financed by transferring a 
share of workers’ contributions (payroll tax) – as proposed by Dullien (2013) and Andor (2014a) – 
or of employees’ contributions (corporate tax) – as proposed by Pisani-Ferry et al. (2013). It is, in 
effect, a genuine insurance because it ties the worker or employer’s contribution directly with the 
benefit paid to the unemployed worker.  
The ‘equivalent’ EUBS or ‘reinsurance’ model organises financial transfers earmarked for 
unemployment support between the supranational level and Member States (Beblavý, Gros and 
Maselli 2015).  The European fund is alimented by national contributions, based on a percentage 
of GDP (or another variable), and provides lump-sum transfers to MS in case of severe economic 
shocks. It is thus based on a trigger which is activated when the unemployment rate in a MS has 
reached a specific threshold. In short, the equivalent model is designed to absorb very large shocks 
only. 
The two models offer different perspectives. The genuine variant aims at overall cyclical stability 
and thereby fares better with respect to the absorption of small national shocks. The reinsurance 
model is focused on major asymmetric shocks and would thus be activated only in specific 
circumstances, such that it would provide a much larger stabilisation effect for a smaller budget 
(Carnot 2017). In order to mitigate volatilities (intertemporal smoothing), both schemes would 
have to be able to accumulate surpluses and incur debt to finance deficits, but this is arguably easier 
to do in the case of reinsurance (Vandenbroucke 2017a). With respect to the social dimension, 
because it is based on a claim right for individuals, the genuine model is stronger and offers a more 
direct link between EU institutions and citizens. In terms of their scope, both schemes can be 
conceived at EU and EMU level. The functional requirements of monetary integration make it 
indispensable in the Eurozone in priority, but a larger pool of countries offers more risk mitigation. 
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The social dimension (more present in the genuine version) seems to be more closely associated to 
EU social citizenship and would therefore favour an EU-wide scheme. However, whether the 
EUBS is a euro area-specific or EU-wide scheme, it should be mandatory, as voluntary participation 
would create an adverse selection bias (Beblavý, Marconi and Maselli 2015). 
3.2. EUBI vs EUBS 
It is clear that, without a precise well thought through policy proposal, it is difficult to offer a robust 
analysis of the EUBI as macroeconomic stabiliser. However, the proposal made by Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght provides a useful basis, sufficient to assess a number of features of the EUBI: it fits 
the definition made in chapter four (i.e. a partial UBI in complement to national social models) and 
these scholars have themselves claimed that it would be a good way to establish a transfer union 
(Van Parijs 2012a; Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 230-241). The two scholars propose to fun 
the EUBI via an increase of the EU-wide VAT rate (from 0,3 to 19%) applied to the harmonised 
value added tax base of all EU Member States. Such a scheme would generate an amount of 200€ 
per person and per month. This is an average figure such that it would be adjusted according to 
national purchasing power and, therefore, higher in Luxembourg and lower in Romania for 
instance. This amount combined with national schemes may fall short of my sufficientarian account 
but, to assess the claim that the EUBI can play a role of stabilisation, what matters mostly are its 
defining features, not just its level. 
To assess the relative strengths of the EUBI, one needs to identify the desiderata set for a union-
wide shock absorber which primary objective is to support national stabilisers in face of country-
specific and/or area-wide shocks, that is, to provide economic stabilisation. According to first-order 
parameters, the quality (efficiency) of a European macroeconomic stabiliser should fulfil the 
following conditions: it needs to be anti-cyclical, it needs to be automatic and its size should be 
sufficient to mitigate shocks. Its robustness can then be further evaluated in face of second-order 
obstacles including its capacity to mitigate the risk of moral hazard and ‘permanent’ transfers, as well 
as the degree of harmonisation or convergence necessary. It must be noted that, when referring to 
macroeconomic stabilisers, the expression ‘permanent transfers’ (or ‘lasting transfers’) means that 
transfers would be going in one direction only, from net contributors to net beneficiaries, over a 
certain period of time, because the asymmetry would be lasting. The aim should rather be, so as 
the argument goes, to have a scheme that is budgetary neutral in the long run (Beblavý and Lenaerts 
2017: 25-27). With this in mind, I evaluate these criteria in turn. 
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3.2.1. Anti-cyclicality 
The case for the EUBS was made on the grounds that unemployment benefits are anti-cyclical in 
nature: a serious deterioration of economic conditions will tend to produce a rise of the 
unemployment rate and, thereby, a loss of income. A scheme designed to trigger transfers in the 
event of this negative state of affairs by providing a replacement income is thus inherently anti-
cyclical. By contrast, the universal basic income is a constant flow of income given periodically and 
unconditionally to all members of a political community. Surely, an EUBI would support aggregate 
demand by providing additional purchasing power to everyone, in or out of employment, and 
would also support wages in case of a country’s internal devaluation. But it is not directly tied to 
unfavourable circumstances nor to the country’s wage levels, such as other forms of income 
replacement, and has, therefore, less impact on stabilisation, as pointed out by Vandenbroucke 
(2017c: 20): ‘a transfer that always supports household incomes, whether or not people are hit by 
unemployment, has much less power in terms of stabilisation: the benefit provides a steady stream 
of income, but the income loss, created by the loss of one’s job, is not compensated for’. At first 
sight, given its inherent characteristics, the EUBI seems to score low on anti-cyclicality. 
Nevertheless, this statement can be modestly nuanced. The aim of an anti-cyclical scheme at 
European level is to support aggregate demand by maintaining national automatic stabilisers, that 
is, to avoid their ‘switching off’ when governments face a rise of their budget deficit and are forced 
into austerity. The EUBS achieves this by providing direct funding of individual benefits (genuine 
variant) or through a dedicated lump-sum transfers (reinsurance variant). The extent to which the 
EUBI can constitute an anti-cyclical measure should thus be appreciated through its capacity to 
support existing systems of social protection. In their proposal, Van Parijs and Vanderborght 
imagine the following scenario, which is worth quoting at length: 
The dividend will form the bottom layer of all existing benefits, with the rest subsisting, if their 
current level is higher, in the form of conditional tops-ups […] it can be viewed as equivalent to a 
uniform tax credit that would replace standard tax exemptions on the lower income brackets of 
every income tax payer. Hence, national budgets would benefit from no longer having to cover the 
bottom 200 euros of all benefits, and from the suppression of corresponding expenditures […] [In 
case of an asymmetric shock], the fall in [public] revenues is reduced because part of the reduction 
in the yield of the country’s VAT is spread all over the European Union. And the increase in 
expenditure is reduced because the bottom layer of the incomes of households hit by unemployment 
takes the form of a eurodividend funded at EU-level, with only the country-level top-ups needing 
to come out of national revenues. Thus, the fact that the volume of EU-funded benefits paid out in 
a country hit by a shock would remain unchanged does not prevent the scheme from having a 
stabilising effect. (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 240) 
In this case, the EUBI can indeed have an anti-cyclical stabilisation effect. However, it is likely to 
remain less efficient than an EUBS, as pointed out by Vandenbroucke: 
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With a view to stabilisation, VAT is less adequate than funding systems based on personal income 
taxation or social security contributions … VAT is in a more or less linear way related to 
consumption expenditure. Hence, to the extent that people reduce consumption during a period of 
crisis, there is a certain (Keynesian) stabilisation effect because government revenue declines whilst 
the associated government expenditure (basic income) is not diminished. However, the stabilization 
impact of personal income taxation or social security contributions is much stronger. The 
progressive character of income taxation directly mitigates the income shock hitting people when they 
lose their job. And, qua government revenue, both progressive income taxation and social security 
contributions react in a stronger, non-linear way to employment shocks than VAT. (Vandenbroucke 
2017c: 21) 
According to anti-cyclicality, then, the EUBI does fare well but it fares lower than the EUBS. 
However, this is valid only so long as it is not funded on another source, such as the corporate tax. 
The latter may, as argued in chapter four (section 4.2.), reduce instability at its source by containing 
the risk of fiscal dumping. The strength of the EUBI as macroeconomic stabiliser thus also depends 
on the type of instrument used for funding it. 
3.2.2. Automaticity 
The automaticity of the stabiliser refers to its responsiveness to shocks with no room for discretion, 
such that transfers from participating countries in favourable economic circumstances and transfers 
to participating countries in unfavourable circumstances are made automatically. This enhances the 
scheme’s effectiveness because delays may hinder its stabilisation function, and its credibility 
because the predictability of the scheme reduces temptations of renegotiating prior arrangements 
if they become inconvenient (e.g. when a country is a net contributor; Carnot, Kiziore and Mourre 
2017: 9-10). According to this criterion, the EUBS fares well because the triggering of payments is 
based on the rate of changes in the (short-term) unemployment rate or on other macroeconomic 
indicators. A related feature of this condition, which is also associated with the anti-cyclical nature 
of unemployment benefits, is the temporariness of the scheme, in the sense that transfers kick in 
and stop according to the changes of circumstances. The genuine variant is likely to experience 
time lags as it takes time to collect and analyse the data on which the scheme is triggered. It is, 
therefore, less automatic than its equivalent counterpart. By contrast, the EUBI is constant, by 
definition. Van Parijs and Vanderborght’s long quote supra explained sufficiently well how 
adjustments will be automatic in that case for me not to expand further on this here. If they are 
right, there is no decisive case in favour of the genuine EUBS or the EUBI according to 
automaticity and both are superior to the reinsurance variant. 
3.2.3. Size 
The size of the budget is also relevant to the performance of the scheme. According to an 
estimation by the Bruegel think tank, a budget of 1% of euro-area GDP would be necessary to 
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perform cross-country stabilisation and an additional 1% would be necessary for intertemporal 
stabilisation, such that a budget of 2% of euro-area GDP would be ‘sufficient to support a 
significant capacity to fund asymmetric shocks [and] to give sufficient credibility to borrow in the 
market to address area-wide shocks’ (Wolff 2012: 11). In the case of the EUBS, Beblavý, Marconi 
and Maselli (2015: 24) show that the different versions of the scheme would cost less than 1% of 
EU output and will be able to have a fiscal multiplier effect over 20%. If these figures are right, the 
EUBS would thus be adequate to fulfil its purpose. 
As concerns the EUBI, according to Vandenbroucke, a basic income of 200 euros would be 
insufficient to provide a valuable stabilisation effect: ‘in the richer countries of the EU, 200 euro 
per month (with upward adjustment on the basis of purchasing power parities), is, qua level of 
benefit, too low to have a meaningful stabilisation impact when their economies are hit by a cyclical 
shock’ (Vandenbroucke 2017c: 20). If Vandenbroucke is right, then, the EUBI would need to be 
set at a higher level – and therefore represent a higher gross cost than the EUBS in terms of GDP-
based contribution – to have a sufficient stabilisation impact.107 In the case of a high EUBI versus 
a low and short-term EUBS, the former might actually offer a stronger stabilisation effect but the 
relative superiority of one scheme over the other depends on its level. And this has a price: a much 
higher EUBI would be much less cost effective, because it is a universal measure affecting also 
those people that are not in need.108 
However, what Vandenbroucke seems to minimise is, precisely, the flipside of this argument. 
Because the EUBI is unconditional, universal and individual, it has much wider coverage and 
affects people who are in need of social support but may not be eligible for unemployment support. 
For instance, the EUBI would reach elderly people who receive pensions, which are typically the 
kind of benefits affected by cuts in public expenses in reaction to economic shocks (Peña-Casas 
2017: 190-193). In this sense, the EUBI forms a buffer of income that cannot be cut, no matter 
where one derives the rest of her income from. By contrast, the EUBS only affects those 
households where a person in need is eligible for unemployment benefit. Barring extensive 
minimum requirements in coverage, the EUBS does not maintain income levels for other needy 
                                                 
107 A simple math shows that a EUBI of 200 euros per person is about 7,5% of the EU GDP and 7,2% of the euro 
area GDP (Eurostat, figures 2017). Comparatively, a budget of 2% of euro area GDP would only yield an EUBI of 
54,6€/month/capita. Although not adjusted to purchasing power parities, these very rough estimations provide an 
order of magnitude of the gross cost of a 200€ EUBI which provisionally allows me to conclude that it would represent 
far more than the EUBS in percentage of GDP. 
108 And this is only for stabilisation in space. To smooth volatilities over time, it would need to be based on fund 
capable of incurring debt, which is much more likely in the case of a reinsurance fund for instance. 
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individuals. The cost-efficiency analysis must thus also take into account the strength of the EUBI 
in terms of its effectiveness to sustain aggregate demand in economic downturns. 
This said, it seems that, according to this rough analysis of the three first-order parameters, the 
EUBI appears as a second-best solution for economic stabilisation, at least in the case of the VAT-
funded proposal on which this discussion is premised. It scores lower on anti-cyclicality, equally 
well on automaticity, and lower in terms of cost-efficiency, despite significant nuances. I now turn 
to the two main obstacles one needs to take into account when designing an supranational 
stabiliser. 
3.2.4. Moral hazard and permanent transfers 
A scheme working on the basis of fiscal transfers between countries may create a problem of 
institutional moral hazard (or ‘country gaming’), which points to a situation in which an institution 
takes more risks because another institution is bearing the costs of the risks. A Member State might 
simply decide not to implement unpopular reforms or be reluctant to improve the quality of 
unemployment support (e.g. in terms of coverage, adequacy or activation policies) because it knows 
that the EU will provide the necessary transfers in case of need. In other words, the very existence 
of a risk-sharing mechanism changes the incentive structure as it may reward those who have less 
effective policies. This may thus lead to a situation in which transfers would be permanent.  
The risk of moral hazard and permanent transfers is probably the main challenge faced by the 
EUBS. There are several ways to mitigate this problem, using experience-rating, a clawback 
mechanism, or a trigger designed for only extremely severe shocks (at the risk of losing efficiency) 
for instance.109 Others, such as Vandenbroucke, argue that the best way would be to establish 
compulsory minimum requirements regarding policy inputs and procedural standards 
(Vandenbroucke 2017a, 2017b). Minimum standards for coverage and generosity of benefits would 
improve shock absorption capacity at national level and provide positive externalities for other 
members. In other words, if a country is properly ‘vaccinated’, it lowers the risk of contagion and, 
in so doing, lowers the cost of the ‘curative’ operation (through fiscal transfers) such that ‘risk 
reduction and risk sharing reinforce each other’ (Vandenbroucke 2017a: 157). In light of this, the 
genuine variant would require harmonisation of some sort, while some form of procedural 
convergence would be sufficient in the equivalent model. 
                                                 
109 For more on these mechanisms, see Dullien (2013), Andor (2014a), Beblavý, Marconi and Maselli (2015), Beblavý, 
Gros and Maselli (2015). 
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While MS have policy-levers to influence their ‘insured risk’ in an EUBS because the employment 
rate is dependent on a lot of national policies (such as activation policies, but also economic 
development policies and other parts of the welfare state such as social assistance), the risk of moral 
hazard is lower in the case of the EUBI as governments do not have a direct impact on its level. 
The EUBI is based on demographics, which might in abstracto be influenced by social policy, but is 
much more difficult to manipulate in order to maximise the flow of European money into a 
country. In sum, there is much less risk of a havoc in the incentive structure with the EUBI. 
However, this latter point also leads to the conclusion that the EUBI is more likely to introduce 
permanent transfers, in the sense of a lasting net balance from contributors to beneficiaries, given 
the diversity of economies and the absence of conditionality for triggering the transfers.  
3.2.5. Harmonisation/convergence 
Given the diversity of national unemployment insurance schemes in terms of eligibility rules, 
replacement rate and duration of benefits, the genuine version demands a certain degree of 
harmonisation of labour markets to ensure that EU citizens would be treated according to the same 
rules. Comparatively, in principle, the reinsurance version does not demand any form of 
harmonisation, but convergence is desirable to mitigate the risk of moral hazard. Administratively, 
the genuine version would also demand considerable efforts to organise the collection and 
distribution of funds at individual level, even if the transfer is mediated by national authorities, 
while attribution of unemployment benefits would remain the sole competence of Member States 
in the equivalent version. 
Comparatively, a European basic income would provide a non-intrusive way to provide 
stabilisation thanks to its unconditionality, as I argued in chapter four: the EUBI constitutes a floor 
against which existing welfare arrangements can simply be adjusted and does not require radical 
modifications of long-lasting national welfare traditions such as their eligibility rules, their 
operational definitions of income, etc. However, this statement should be nuanced. Whilst the 
EUBI does not demand minimum requirements for its establishment as a supranational instrument, 
it might still need the Europeanisation of its funding instrument, if it is based on a (more) 
harmonised VAT or on some other scheme such as a European corporate tax. This would certainly 
provide positive effects (as I argued in chapter four) and would be less problematic than the 
harmonisation/convergence of national unemployment insurance schemes, but it still leads to the 
conclusion that the EUBI is not a completely ‘harmonisation-free’ policy.  
More fundamentally, it appears that some minimal standards may be desirable for its well-
functioning. Given that the goal of the EUBI is to provide additional economic security, MS should 
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not be allowed to merely use it as a way to reduce their own public expenses, that is to say, to lower 
the amount of national social benefits by the level of the EUBI.110 In this case, the basic income 
would still have an impact for those in employment but it would not improve the situation of those 
entitled to social benefits, at least so long as they do not take a job, in which case the EUBI still 
works as a top-up of other sources of earnings. Minimum standards in terms of adequacy, based 
on the sufficientarian threshold specified in chapter four, thus appear to make sense for the EUBI 
to be effective. MS would not necessarily be obliged to reach the adequacy threshold on their own, 
but they would have to provide enough to ensure that the EUBI guarantee (which amount would 
be known) would simply top-up the level of national minimum income benefits, to guarantee 
altogether an adequate level of resources. 
Overall, the EUBI scores well on the need to preclude moral hazard and harmonisation 
requirements but is more likely to induce permanent transfers precisely because, at the risk of 
oversimplification, it is a redistributive instrument and not an insurance-based mechanism. Despite 
the EUBI’s capacity to face obstacles better, given the fact that the EUBS can be associated with 
other measures to reduce its risks, it remains sub-optimal. However, this discussion has clearly 
shown that the EUBI may play some role of macroeconomic stabilisation, one that may be stronger 
depending on the level of payment and alternative sources of funding. In other words, at this stage, 
the objection is valid but not decisive: if stabilisation is the only aim, then the EUBI is not a priority. 
If stabilisation is instrumental to other social purposes, as EUBS supporters claim it is, then it must 
be strongly relativised, as I now argue. 
3.3. Limits of the stabilisation approach 
The discussion in section two showed that there is a compelling case for an E(M)U-wide fiscal 
union providing stabilisation support to national systems of solidarity in face of asymmetric shocks 
and the pursuit of EU integration. Andor is thus right when he notes that ‘the functioning of the 
single currency (especially at a time of crisis) makes the Europe 2020 [poverty] target de facto 
unattainable, even with a big delay. A stronger social dimension, which is crucial for the legitimacy 
of the European project, requires a fresh look at the original design of the single currency’ (Andor 
2017: 147). Against this backdrop, I agree that a stabilisation device is both necessary and desirable, 
if we do not want to see short-term crises affecting one Member State turn into long-term E(M)U-
                                                 
110 This is different from moral hazard as the Member State is not trying to receive more from the common pool, but 
simply to lower its expenses. In case of an economic shock, the state would thus lose the benefit provided by the 
EUBI. 
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wide recessions. But claims made by EUBS advocates regarding the strengthening of the EU’s 
social dimension remain unsatisfying for the following reasons. 
First, the sort of minimum requirements that accompany the EUBS is mainly seen as a necessity 
to reduce moral hazard, as a measure of prevention or a ‘compulsory vaccination programme’ 
(Vandenbroucke 2017b: 24), necessary to build robust national shock absorbers and reduce the 
risk of permanent transfers between participating countries. Minimum standards are thus primarily 
assessed in terms of ‘activation quality’ and ‘stabilisation quality’ (Vandenbrouckke 2017d: 10) 
necessary to address the ‘limits to diversity’ (Vandenbroucke 2017b: 5-8).  Unemployment benefits 
should be ‘generous enough to have a stabilising impact, without creating inactivity traps’ 
(Vandenbroucke 2017b: 22-23). Although the aim is inter alia to improve generosity and coverage, 
to build more effective national shock absorption (and thus quality of social support when most 
needed), no reference is made to the prime aim of securing an adequate standard of living. 
Second, the EUBS is based on a triggering mechanism in times of economic downturn and its 
support is limited in time. Notwithstanding the considerable improvement that this would make 
compared to the status quo in terms of financial support for MS redistributive capacities, it is 
primarily meant to address social difficulties in times of crisis. This fails to recognise the urgent need 
for European-wide action even in the absence of asymmetric shocks. As an instrument limited to 
the purpose of economic recovery, it is unclear how the EUBS would have an effective impact in 
terms of upward convergence in the long run. In addition, as highlighted in chapter one, the 
employment route is necessary but insufficient to address the problem of poverty, such that an 
instrument like the EUBS is not sufficiently equipped to address the shortcomings of the European 
social dimension. In fact, it is precisely what makes the EUBS a more efficient macroeconomic 
stabiliser that makes it a less interesting instrument for social purposes. The EUBS is thus primarily 
designed for the former objective, not the latter. 
Finally, the EUBS owes its place in European debates as one prominent solution designed first and 
foremost to complete the EMU. Interests in such a tool derives mainly from the acknowledgement 
by scholars and policy makers alike that European economic and monetary integration is not viable 
with wide persistent social imbalances. References to the introduction of the mechanism on an 
EU-wide basis are only made tangentially (if at all), as its rationale rests of the functional 
requirements of monetary integration. In other words, it is precisely because social imbalances 
became a threat to the viabiliby of the European project that a renewed concern with the social 
dimension entered the picture, as side constraints to wider economic objectives. The same could be 
argued about the emergence of the European Social Pillar given its prime focus on the euro area, 
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as it embodies in certain respects the convergence-based (i.e. to increase symmetry) corrolary 
instrument to the fiscal capacity requirement (i.e. to increase stabilisation). To illustrate, in its 
Recommendation on the Social Pillar, the Commission notes: ‘[a] stronger focus on employment 
and social performance is particularly important to increase resilience and deepen the Economic 
and Monetary Union. For this reason, the European Pillar of Social Rights is primarily conceived for 
the euro area but it is applicable to all Member States that wish to be part of it.’ (EC 2017b, §13, my 
emphasis).  
I hope the reader will not misunderstand my claims. I do not deny the need for social convergence 
in the EMU nor do I see the Social Pillar or the EUBS as misplaced initiatives, to the contrary. My 
claim is rather that, by putting the emphasis on the economic requirements of monetary integration, 
EU scholars and policy makers fail to recognise the larger EU-wide social problem, risk creating 
two classes of citizens in terms of access to social rights and fail to appreciate social matters as self-
standing aims. In other words, on these grounds, recognising the need for a fiscal capacity via inter-
state insurance does not preclude the need for other elaborate instruments of redistribution. For 
all these reasons, I contend that the objection is misplaced: stabilisation is necessary but insufficient 
to foster improvement in the European social dimension and hence, ensure, at the very least, a 
social minimum to all. Making social rights effective demands more direct action at EU level – this 
is why I conceive the EUBI as a Union-wide scheme and not as an EMU-specific instrument – 
rather than just an inter-state insurance device working under specific unfavourable economic 
circumstances. But this is also what makes the EUBS and the EUBI compatible, as I will argue in 
the last closing section of this chapter. Before doing so, I now turn to evaluate the EUBI’s role as 
a social cohesion policy. 
4. The EUBI and EU-wide social cohesion 
In this section, I evaluate how the EUBI fares with respect to the objective of social cohesion, 
understood as the reduction of social disparities, thanks to its capacity to secure basic economic 
security throughout the EU. Then, I provide an illustration of the EUBI’s impact at individual level 
(for those benefitting of last-resort safety nets in particular) and an evaluation of the scope of its 
EU-wide cross-borders redistributive effects. Finally, I argue that the EUBI offers a way to flesh 
out the social pillar. 
4.1. Social cohesion 
Social cohesion is a poorly defined concept. At EU level, it is often used without precise meaning 
to point to the EU’s action to reduce disparities in wealth between countries, regions, social groups 
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or individuals (see also chapter 6, section 2.5.1. for a legal analysis of the concept). As Molle (2007: 
5) helps clarifying, ‘[c]ohesion is now understood as the degree to which disparities in social and 
economic welfare between different regions or groups within the EU are politically and socially 
tolerable’. The rationale for action is thus to address these disparities that are socially and politically 
untolerable. I take it here, according to my sufficientarian basis, that disparities in wealth are 
untolerable at EU-level when some people are at risk of poverty or social exclusion, as defined in 
the introduction and outlined in chapter one. From this, the EUBI’s contribution to EU social 
cohesion must be assessed in line with its capacity to resorb the problem of poverty.  
With this in mind, I look at the claims made in chapter two when establishing the superiority of 
the EUBI over its rivals, namely its capacity to foster economic security and social participation 
writ large, and nuance their scope in the case of a partial basic income. The EUBI is a partial basic 
income, which means that it is likely to have only a more modest impact than a full basic income. 
However, contrary to a situation in which it would be ‘the only game in town’ (i.e. a partial basic 
income replacing other benefits), an EU-wide partial basic income provided as complement to 
national welfare schemes may still provide significant improvements with respect to the status quo.  
In chapter one, I showed that the rise of the precariat – a growing and heterogenous class-in-the-
making of individuals affected by various forms of economic insecurity – was a growing concern. 
The combination of the demands of labour market flexibility, of technological change and of the 
rise of inequalities increased the segmentation of the labour market and the risk of job automation, 
radically transformed working life, labour market statuses and types of contracts, increased in-work 
poverty, as well as stress and anxiety at work, and put pressure on the redistributive capacities of 
welfare states. Depending on its level, a partial basic income may mitigate these effects by providing 
an unconditional and regular income flow. It provides a cushion to those facing precarious labour 
contracts and chronic insecurity and contributes to the reduction of in-work poverty by supporting 
low wages. It also ensures the breadth of coverage necessary to reach those people failed by national 
social protection schemes because their status does not fit existing checkboxes (such as ‘atypical’ 
workers) or because conditions for access are too stringent. It may also make it easier for those 
with other sources of income to engage in part-time work or to engage in other activities such as 
training or voluntary work in a flexible manner according to life events and choices. 
However, the claim, typically made by basic income advocates when considering a full UBI, that it 
would enhance the bargaining power of those at the lower end of the labour market vis-à-vis 
employers, making it easier for them to refuse badly paid job or bad employment conditions, can 
only be limited in the case of a partial EU-wide basic income. The argument rests on a capacity to 
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exit the labour market or, in other words, to have sufficient economic security to ‘say no’ to a badly 
paid job. It may be argued that, all other things kept equal, it may have some effect in terms of 
autonomy in particular for low-skilled workers in poorer EU member states, and that it can 
improve the situation with respect to the status quo in countries with more elaborated welfare 
states (in which, for instance, the ‘reservation wages’ already provide a certain level of 
independence). But since, by definition, the EUBI is partial and adjusted according to the local 
standard of living, it would not be sufficient to provide genuine decommodifying effects. 
Morevoer, the bargaining power in industrial relations is never fully individual, such that it must be 
placed in the local institutional context and assessed in relation with the strength of labour unions 
and the development of labour market regulation, such as the statutory minimum wage. Just as I 
highlighted that minimum requirement in terms of adequacy at national level may be necessary to 
avoid social cuts of the size of the EUBI, its positive externalities would be best unleashed if the 
EUBI is accompanied by an environment favourable to strong collective bargaining and high 
minimum wages. 
With respect to national welfare states’ arrangements, the EUBI may tame some of the negative 
effects of means-testing and activation policies. As discussed in chapters one and two, the use of a 
means-test is a prime reason for persistent and significant rates of non-take-up of minimum income 
schemes as well as its lack of coverage since it can be badly calibrated, set too low, discouraging 
given its complexity, or considered as stigmatising. For those eligible but not effectively benefiting 
from social provisions, the EUBI would tame the intensity of poverty. For those on welfare, the 
argument about self-respect can only be very modest as the EUBI would not obviate the kind of 
institutional judgments based on needs and deservingness that exist at national level. However, the 
EU-wide principles of universality and unconditionality would send a strong signal as the EUBI 
embodies the idea of a basic equality of standing for all Europeans. With respect to the objective 
of return to employment, although it does not completely remove the unemployment trap, the 
latter would be mitigated by the EUBI because it provides an additional purchasing power which 
can be topped up at will by other sources of income, making it also more acceptable to ‘say yes’ to 
a desirable job.  
4.2. Joint action for poverty relief: an illustration of impact 
Besides these various dimensions, the main strength of the EUBI lies in its effect as an anti-poverty 
policy, understood in its narrowest sense of providing enough monetary resources to bring 
individuals above the poverty line. Here, I concentrate on those individuals receiving minimum 
income protection at national level, which is typically set below the poverty line, and show that 
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they would see their situation improved, wether they live in MS with an advanced welfare state or 
not, although it is likely to have the most impact where social assistance schemes of this kind are 
less developed or absent.  
Let’s consider again an EUBI set at 
200€/person/month in average, as it allows me to 
(roughly) assess the prospects of the proposal made by 
Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 235-241), with the 
wider aim of economic security this time. To evaluate its 
effect, I assess it in relation with the levels of the 
guaranteed minimum income (GMI) in each country 
and compare it, when additioned to the local GMI, with 
the at-risk-of-poverty threshold set at 60% of the 
national median equivalised income (my sufficientarian 
standard). All amounts are adjusted to purchasing power 
parities (PPP) to provide an adequate basis for 
comparison.111 I do not suggest this as a fine-tuned 
analysis but, rather, as an illustration of the potential 
effects the EUBI all other things kept equal, as shown in 
Table 4. 
For an EUBI of 200€ in average, figures vary between 
85€ in Bulgaria (lowest figure) and 273€ per month per 
capita in Denmark (highest figure). As the EUBI is 
higher than the local GMI (76€), the Bulgarian would see 
her total benefit raised up to more than double (161€), 
just below the poverty threshold. Similarly, in Romania, 
the EUBI (92€) is more than double the size of the local 
GMI (43€) and provides a total income of 135€, higher than the poverty line (116€). In Poland, the 
EUBI (103€) is just beneath the level of the local GMI (130€), such that it would nearly double for 
                                                 
111 Purchashing power parities (PPP) and AROP thresholds are based on figures for the year 2015 (Eurostat 2015). 
The reason is that it was the available data at time of compilation for simulation of macroeconomic effects made in 
2016. As far as national GMI’s are concerned, the only available data available is from 2012 (Frazer and Marlier 2015: 
41). Despite this small incoherence, the comparison is still useful to provide a rough illustration of the effect of the 
EUBI, according to cross-country differences. 
Table 4: GMI, EUBI and AROP per 
Member State expressed in €/person/month 
(PPP adjusted) for the year 2015 (except 
GMI for 2012)111 
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a total not far from the poverty line either (278€). In these countries, the EUBI offers a very 
significant improvement compared to the existing situation. 
What about Southern European countries? In Italy, for example, the EUBI amounts to 198€, a 
little less than half of the local GMI average (445€), such that the total level reaches 643€, about 
150€ less than the poverty line: a significant improvement but not enough to lift people out of 
poverty.112 The residents of Greece, by contrast, would see their situation much more improved as 
there is currently no national minimum income scheme.113 An individual would receive 166€, a little 
less than half of the poverty line (366€). Considering that more than a fifth of the population is at 
risk of poverty (chapter one, section 2.1.), this seems to be a considerable improvement. 
In countries of the liberal welfare model, an individual in the UK would see her situation very much 
improved, as the sum of the local GMI (545€) and the EUBI (215€) amounts to 760€, even if the 
total remains nearly 300€ below the poverty line. Ireland offers an interesting case as the sum of 
the two schemes (1,251€) is above the sufficientarian threshold (1,084€). 
In continental Europe, a Belgian, for instance, who receives a minimum income scheme of 700€ 
would receive an EUBI of 215€ and thus reach a total of 915€, which is still below the poverty line 
(1,083€) but a major progress towards the sufficientarian threshold. In Germany, an EUBI of 201€ 
combined with the local GMI of 559€ would bring the individual to 760€, still more than 300€ 
lower than the poverty line. However, considering the gap without the EUBI, it seems that even 
in Germany, which is likely to be a net contributor as we will see shortly, the policy would make a 
significant difference in terms of individual economic security. The situation is similar in France, 
finally, where the EUBI (206€) combined with the GMI (655€) reaches an amount of 861€, still 
200€ below the poverty line. 
Finally, a resident of Sweden would now have a total of 894€, which remains significantly lower 
than the poverty threshold (1265€) but an improvement of about half the size of the existing GMI. 
Similarly, a resident of Denmark would now have a disposable income of 1,057€, about 400€ lower 
than the sufficientarian standard. In both cases, however, the improvement is significant as well. 
In very rough terms, this illustrates well how the EUBI may provide an additional source of income 
to those benefiting from social payments underneath the poverty line and, if not reach it, at least 
approach the sufficientarian threshold in each MS. It also shows how individuals living under 
                                                 
112 At the time of writing these lines, there is no national GMI yet but only regional schemes in Italy and the figure of 
445€ is an average of them. See Frazer and Marlier (2015) for more on the Italian case. 
113 At the time of writing these lines, Greece is experimenting a pilot scheme. See Van Lancker (2017) for more an 
evaluation of the Greek case. 
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different welfare arrangements varying in terms of levels of payment and standard of living would 
benefit from the scheme. Someone living in the new Member States such as Romania, or in 
countries from Southern Europe such as Greece, may see their earnings significantly improved. 
Someone living in a country of Continental Europe may also still benefit signicantly from the 
EUBI, although the difference is less significant. But this shows that, even if transfers are 
permanent, flowing from net contributors to net beneficiaries, those living in net contributing MS 
would be able to share in the benefits of the EUBI as well. In sum, the EUBI is likely to have more 
impact on the ‘doubly worst-off’, that is, the poor in the poorest MS, but it would be beneficial, 
even if to a lesser extent, to all Europeans at risk of poverty. 
4.3. Cross-border redistributive effects 
Social cohesion policies are based on redistribution, by definition. European Structural and 
Cohesion Funds typically work on the basis of pre-identified goals associated with the overarching 
aim of convergence and a series of conditions for allocation of resources (Molle 2007: ch. 7). By 
contrast the EUBI operates without any condition. My aim here is to specify the macroeconomic 
redistributive effects such a scheme may lead to on an EU-wide basis. Again, this is not aimed at 
providing a fine-tuned economic analysis but, rather, a rough simulation of the scope of 
redistribution. I distinguish between two main possibilities based on the same amount of 200€. In 
one case, it is funded out of national contributions, expressed in percentage of the gross national 
income (GNI) and adjusted to purchasing power parities (figure 1). In the other case, it is the VAT-
based model, with a harmonised tax of 14,5%.114 Net contributions are also expressed in terms of 
percentage of GNI and adjusted to PPP (figure 2). 
 
 
                                                 
114 According to my calculations, the European harmonised VAT rate is lower than in Van Parijs and Vanderborght’s 
(2017: 39) proposal which was based on a harmonised VAT of 19%. See appendix for a description of the methodology 
used. 
Figure 1: EUBI financed by national contribution - Net contribution as % of GNI PPP adjusted 
   188 
This graph shows that inter-state redistribution roughly reflects East-West and North-South 
dividing lines (with the surprising place of the UK as net beneficiary), and reveals that countries 
benefiting the most are also in the majority of cases those in which the EUBI has the strongest 
impact as an antipoverty measure, such as Bulgaria, Romania, but also Greece or Portugal. On the 
other hand, France and Germany would be net contributors, but the amount of their contribution 
would not be more than, respectively, 0,6% and 1,6% of their GNI. while, comparatively, their 
current share to the Union’s budget amounts to less than half of these figures. This remains 
substantial but a fair evaluation of a member state’s contribution must weigh the scheme’s costs 
against its expected benefits for national citizens and against the potential positive effects of cross-
border redistribution in terms of overall economic stability, its impact on aggregate demand, on 
consumption, etc. 
 
 
This second graph shows that the VAT-funded EUBI displays a similar pattern to the national 
contribution model but that the scope of redistribution is lower, with net contributors and 
beneficiaries respectively paying or receiving less in proportion of their GNI in most cases. 
Bulgaria, for instance, would now benefit of an amount up to 7,5% of its GNI (compared to 9,1% 
in the national contribution-based scheme) while, on the other extreme, Luxembourg would now 
be a net contributor by up to 1,1% of its GNI, which is 1,6% lower than in the other scheme. In 
this case, France is not a net contributor anymore as it breaks even, but Germany faces a similar 
situation with a contribution of 1% of its GNI (compared to 1,6%).  
Overall, this rough illustration shows that for the same amount given to all Europeans, the 
redistributive effects on national budgetary balances differ according to the funding scheme 
chosen. Most importantly, it highlights that, besides its impact on individuals, the EUBI can play a 
role of reduction of regional disparities. 
Figure 2: EUBI financed by VAT - Net contribution as % of GNI (PPP adjusted) 
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4.4. A tangible Social Pillar 
To conclude this section, in light of the arguments developed above concerning the EUBI’s 
strength as an EU anti-poverty policy, it embodies a European-wide form of social protection and, 
as such, offers an opportunity to flesh out some of the rights of the Social Pillar (EU 2017).  
Under its Chapter III, the Social Pillar focuses on social protection and social inclusion. Article 12 
on social protection states that ‘[r]egardless of the type and duration of their employment 
relationship, workers, and, under comparable conditions, the self-employed, have the right to 
adequate social protection’. In light of the rise of the precariat, facing multiple insecurities in the 
labour market and often lacking access to social protection, the EUBI gives meaning to this article 
by ensuring everyone an access to at least the European minimum. 
Moreover, as already mentioned, article 14 of the Pillar asserts that ‘[e]veryone lacking sufficient 
resources has the right to adequate minimum income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages 
of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services’. The EU involvement in social 
protection with the EUBI is premised on this very idea: providing a social income to all. The EUBI 
would thus primarily provide substance to this right by giving a meaning to what ‘a life in dignity 
at all stages’ means, that is, a social minimum based on the relative poverty line effectively 
guaranteed by EU and MS together to ensure the minimum threshold of resources necessary to 
participate in the life of a MS in particular, and the EU in general.  
Finally, since the EUBI is a benefit granted to all Europeans from the cradle to the grave, the EUBI 
expresses the EU’s concrete commitment to ensure that ‘[c]hildren have the right to protection 
from poverty’ (art. 11(b)) and that ‘[e]veryone in old age has the right to resources that ensure living 
in dignity’ (art. 15(b)). 
Overall, considering that the rights proclaimed in the Social Pillar are non binding and primarily 
designed to respond to the economic problem generated by social imbalances between EMU 
countries (as argued in section 3.3.), the EUBI strengthens the social purpose of the Pillar in a 
tangible way throughout the EU. By establishing an explicit link between social rights and an 
individual, universal and unconditional cash flow distributed by the EU, the Union may thus also 
gain in legitimacy for taking a more protecting role than it currently does. In other words, the EUBI 
embodies the idea of a ‘caring’ Union which materialises its commitment to social rights in a highly 
visible manner for all Europeans. 
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5. EUBS and EUBI: the compatibility view 
Now that we have a clear idea of the strengths and weaknesses of the EUBI as a macroeconomic 
stabiliser and as an instrument of redistribution primarily focused on social cohesion, I come back 
to the EUBS and close this chapter by arguing that, rather than seeing them as mutually exclusive, 
they are complementary. To make my case, I focus on the reinsurance variant, as it is the one which 
fares better with respect to large asymmetric shocks, it is less demanding regarding the need for 
convergence, allows more room of manoeuvre to mitigate the risk of moral hazard and seems to 
be a less complex option overall. 
The introduction of a system of reinsurance of national unemployment schemes aims primarily at 
mitigating major idiosyncratic shocks. If it is capable of accumulating surpluses and incurring debt, 
then it can perform both cross-country shock absorption and intertemporal smoothing of business-
cycle volatilities. It also plays a role of prevention, in two ways. First, the existence of a scheme 
with a predictable and automatic trigger is reassuring for financial markets who know that there 
will be a mechanism of solidarity in case of economic downturn, thereby limiting the risk of 
negative debt dynamics for the country hit. Second, the introduction of minimum requirements to 
ensure a sufficient stabilisation capacity in each member state improves national shock absorption 
and limits the risk of contagion. 
The EUBI has a relatively lower stabilisation capacity but it is likely to be a good shock absorber 
for small cyclical shocks rather than large asymmetric shocks. In this sense, both schemes can play 
a complementary role on stabilisation. Moreover, the EUBI adds a firm and permanent basis of 
economic security to all Europeans, not only in difficult times. Its aim is primarily focused on 
fighting poverty and social exclusion and, as such, improve social cohesion in the EU. The 
combination of a stable economic environment in which MS are insured against the risks associated 
with their interdependence with an effective anti-poverty policy expressing EU-wide social rights 
would provide a powerful basis to resorb the social deficit of European integration. This is, of 
course, a principled view. Feasibility concerns may potentially limit this ‘compatibility view’ and 
lead to a trade-off. In that case, given that the EUBI can simultaneously provide a shock absorption 
and support social rights, it is to be preferred, provided that its funding scheme is optimally 
calibrated to support both purposes. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chaper, I have addressed the challenge of stabilisation according to which an instrument of 
redistribution such as the EUBI is inappropriate to resorb the social deficit. Instead, so as the 
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argument goes, an instrument of inter-state insurance providing an environment of economic 
stabilisation to all EU welfare state, combined with minimum requirements to foster convergence, 
is what is required. Notwithstanding the compelling case for a fiscal capacity at E(M)U level, I first 
argued that the EUBI would also have a stabilisation effect, although it is likely to be lower than 
the instrument at the center of discussions on the matter, namely the European unemployment 
benefit scheme (EUBS). I then showed that this legitimate focus on stabilisation is insufficient to 
address the social ills identified in chapter one, such that the objection is misplaced: stabilisation is 
necessary but insufficient. Against this backdrop, I analysed the prospects of the EUBI with respect 
to its main objective of ensuring basic economic security. I nuanced some of the claims made with 
respect to a full UBI in chapter two and then showed, according to rough illustrations, the effects 
of an EUBI of 200€ both at individual level and in terms of cross-border redistribution. I then 
ended the chapter by suggesting that the EUBI and the EUBS are best seen as complementary 
policies. 
The EUBI can now face a final challenge which concerns the difficulties associated with its 
implementation, and more particularly with its legal feasibility within the complex EU multi-level 
polity and legal order. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE CHALLENGE OF FEASIBILITY 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I deal with a last challenge to the EUBI that EU scholars would typically regard as 
a crucial test given the constraints placed on the design of policies at EU level, namely its legal 
feasibility. At its most general, ‘a state of affairs is feasible if it is one we could actually bring about’ 
(Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012: 809). Determining whether a social policy is feasible or not 
thus demands an investigation of the different factors that hinder the prospects of the policy to be 
put in place. These constraints, or ‘feasibility tests’, range from those relating to the availability of 
legal, financial and administrative resources to those pertaining to the public acceptance of a 
policy’s underlying norms and values, and the strategic building of coalitions among political actors 
to enable legislation in modern-day democracies (Majone 1975; Brennan and Pettit 2005; Hood 
2010; De Wispelaere and Noguera 2012; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012; Torry 2016; Hamlin 
2017).  
In this chapter, I focus on the EUBI’s legal feasibility concerned with the legal bases necessary to 
implement the proposal. In light of this, the ‘challenge of feasibility’ reads as follows: the EUBI is 
unfeasible because the EU does not have the legal capacity to implement it. By addressing this last objection, 
my aim is thus to examine whether the EUBI can be put in place (if at all) within the current legal 
architecture and to explore the various possibilities for its financing.  
I do not claim that responding to this challenge is sufficient for the proposal to become actualised 
but, rather, that the legal feasibility of the EUBI should be investigated as a matter of priority as it 
constitutes a key background condition for its overall feasibility. Why is that so? At European level, 
given the complex distribution of legal competences and the limited resources available, 
institutional constraints play a determining role in a policy’s political feasibility. If a policy cannot 
be put in place without, say, treaty change, it may not mean that it is unfeasible per se but its 
probability to raise interest among stakeholders and to reach the EU policy agenda would be 
significantly affected. Examining whether there are routes and avenues for the EUBI’s legal 
feasibility is thus one of the ‘criteria for survival’ for a policy that must be anticipated before 
advancing it in the political arena (Kingdon 2014: 131). To put it in the language of EU agenda-
setting literature, ‘building credibility’ in the eyes of policy makers is an essential component of any 
political strategy at EU level (Princen 2011: 930-931). 
Against this backdrop, I argue that the EUBI is not exposed to the objection because it is possible 
to find a suitable legal base within existing Treaties. I distinguish between the legal constraints and 
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options on its payment side and those on its funding side. On the payment side, the legal base is 
constituted by the combination of articles 175(3) and 352(1) TFEU. Alternative possibilities are 
enhanced cooperation or the establishment of an intergovernmental treaty. On the financing side, 
there are legal bases to finance the EUBI either from within the Union’s budget, based on national 
contributions earmarked for the EUBI or through the EU’s own resources, or from outside the 
Union’s budget, through the set up of a separate agency or a European fund on the basis of an 
intergovernmental agreement. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, it must be noted that this chapter relies on the work of Beblavý 
and Lenaerts (2017) and Repasi (2013, 2017) in particular who focused on the legal feasibility of 
the European unemployment benefit scheme. My conclusion obviously differs from theirs given 
the differences between the two schemes, but their method and analysis of a series of legal bases 
is useful for assessing the legal prospects of the EUBI. With this in mind, this chapter is structured 
as follows. In section two, I start with an overview of the compatibility of the EUBI with the EU’s 
objectives, values, and fundamental rights, and I recall the distribution of competences in social 
matters. I then analyse to what extent the Treaties can provide a legal base for establishing the 
EUBI on the payment side. In section three, I look at the potential legal bases for its funding side. 
Section four concludes. 
2. Legal feasibility: establishing the payment of the EUBI 
Before exploring the various legal options and constraints for the establishment of the payment 
side of the EUBI, I briefly clarify the proposal’s compatibility with the Union’s values, rights and 
objectives, and recall how social competences are distributed between the EU and its MS. 
2.1. Values, fundamental rights and objectives 
As we have seen in previous chapters, the basic income embodies a citizenship-based organisation 
of solidarity with equal respect to different individual conceptions of the good life and is typically 
justified as a policy aiming at guaranteeing income security to every member of a political 
community to ensure a decent life and support social participation. The EUBI is thus respectful of 
the fundamental values of the Union as stated in article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union 
(TEU), which includes respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, 
solidarity and gender equality.  
Besides, the EUBI would support the rights and liberties proclaimed by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whether they demand ‘negative’ freedoms (i.e. 
absence of interference) or a ‘positive’ intervention to be effectively enforced. As a non-intrusive 
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policy, the EUBI would be respectful of privacy (art. 7, Charter), living arrangements (art. 9) and 
individual moral doctrines (art. 10), and would not discriminate on any grounds such as sex, race, 
colour or social origin (art. 21). But the EUBI would go a step further by providing effective support 
to social rights, and in particular entitlements to social security and the right to social assistance so 
as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources (art. 34). 
Moreover, as was shown throughout this dissertation, the EUBI is a priori well placed to support 
the Union’s aim to promote the well-being of all Europeans and its commitment inter alia to full 
employment, social progress, combating social exclusion and discrimination, promoting social 
justice, gender equality, social, economic and territorial cohesion, as well as the solidarity among 
MS (art. 3 TEU). 
The EUBI’s compatibility with – and support of – values, rights and objectives certainly constitutes 
a necessary requirement for its establishment given their important place in the EU’s hierarchy of 
norms,115 but it is far from sufficient. Values do not provide any legal base and, as far as objectives 
as concerned, article 3(6) TEU states that ‘[t]he Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate 
means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties’. Similarly, 
article 6(1) TEU explicitly states that ‘the provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the 
competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties’. This is reaffirmed in article 51(2) of the 
Charter: ‘[t]he Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of 
the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined 
in the Treaties’. In short, to be legally feasible within existing Treaty provisions, the EUBI must 
find a legal base in accordance with the competences of the Union. Before exploring potential legal 
bases, then, it is necessary to recall which competences are enjoyed by the EU and its MS in the 
field of social protection. 
2.2. EU competences in social protection 
The principle of conferral is an essential principle of EU law as it strictly circumvents EU action 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to 
attain the objectives set out therein (art. 5 TEU). For the aspects defined in the Treaties, social 
policy is a shared competence between the EU and its Member States (art. 4(2)(b) TFEU). More 
precisely, with the view of achieving the objectives stated in article 151 TFEU of promotion of 
employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection and the combating 
                                                 
115 For instance, the respect of values is a condition for joining the EU (art. 49 TEU), while failure to meet these 
requirements can lead to sanctions (art. 7 TEU). 
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of social exclusion (among others), the EU shall support and complement the activities of its Member States 
(art. 153(1) TFEU, my emphasis). 
In fields such as ‘social security and social protection of workers’ (art. 153(1)(c) TFEU) and ‘the 
integration of persons excluded from the labour market’ (art. 153(1)(h) TFEU), the EU can take 
measures to ensure the coordination of national policies (art. 153(2)(a) TFEU) and adopt directives 
setting minimum standards (art. 153(2)(b) TFEU). In the fields of ‘combating social exclusion’ (art. 
153(1)(j) TFEU) and ‘the modernisation of social protection systems’ (art. 153(1)(k) TFEU), the 
EU can only facilitate the coordination of its member states policies. Article 153 TFEU also 
imposes a series of limits. Even when a legal act can be adopted, it shall not affect the so-called 
‘constitutional saving clauses’, expressed by article 153(4) and article 153(5) TFEU. According to 
the former, the act adopted must not undermine the right of MS to define the fundamental 
principles of their social security systems, it must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium 
of national systems of social protection, and it shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with the Treaties (art. 
153(4) TFEU).116 According to the latter, the legal act adopted may not apply to pay, undermine 
the right of association, the right to strike or impose lock-outs. In short, social protection remains 
primarily a competence of the MS which decide the fundamental principles of their social 
protection systems, the level of benefits, and the substance of national social legislation while the 
EU takes a subsidiary role, by introducing binding minimum requirements and/or encouraging 
coordination depending on the sub-fields of social policy considered. 
Article 153 thus embodies the principle of subsidiarity, according to which in areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level (art. 5(3) TEU). The 
principle of subsidiarity does not aim to modify the rules governing the attribution of competences. 
Rather, it distinguishes between the conferral of competences and the power to act, such that even 
when the EU is competent in a certain field, it cannot necessarily use all the powers available (Dony 
2014: 89). Thus, even when the EU has a competence to legislate, it must still prove that its action 
would be more efficient than that of the MS. Similarly, the principle of proportionality, which 
applies to all types of competences, states that the content and form of Union action shall not 
                                                 
116 Note that the reference to ‘more stringent protective measures’ points to the liberty for MS to adopt higher protective 
standards than those set by EU law (Repasi 2017: 13). 
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exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties (art. 5(4) TEU).117 In light of all 
this, do the Treaties allow the EU to take a role in social protection that is distributive and in direct 
relation with individuals? 
2.3. Method 
To respond to this question, it is useful to quote at length Repasi’s reference to European case law 
as it provides the procedure required to find a suitable legal basis for a new EU policy:  
The choice of legal basis for a measure is based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial 
review. Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure. A purely ancillary 
aim of a measure cannot legitimately be used to justify the choice of legal basis…If a Union measure 
pursues several aims that can be linked to several Union competences and if one of those aims is 
identifiable as the main one, whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure must be founded 
on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant aim. With regard to a 
measure that simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, which are inseparably linked without 
one being incidental to the other, the Court has held that, where various provisions of the Treaties 
are therefore applicable, such a measure will have to be founded, exceptionally, on the various 
corresponding legal bases. Such a conjunction of legal bases is, however, excluded if limitations of 
the one competence are not contained in the other. Therefore a legal base that, for example, excludes 
legal harmonisation may not be combined with a legal base that allows for harmonisation. (Repasi 
2017: 7) 
In light of this, to find a suitable legal base one should start by identifying the aims of the scheme 
considered and establish a hierarchy between them to assess which is the predominant one. Based 
on the arguments developed throughout this dissertation, the EUBI aims at fighting poverty and 
social exclusion by providing additional income security to all Europeans. It also participates to the 
integration of persons excluded from the labour market by reducing the scope of unemployment 
and poverty traps of national social protection systems. As a supplement to national social benefits, 
it supports national systems of social security and the social protection of workers. Moreover, given 
the new social risks associated with demographic changes, changes on the labour market and 
technological progress, the EUBI accompanies the modernisation of social systems of social 
protection in face of these new risks. Finally, it performs a stabilisation function in face of adverse 
economic shocks and constitutes one way to establish a fiscal union in the E(M)U. 
2.4. Article 153 TFEU 
Let’s first consider that the predominant aim of the EUBI is to combat social exclusion, such that 
other objectives are incidental. In this case, can article 153 provide a suitable legal base? According 
to this article’s provisions, the EU can only play a role of coordination in the field of combating 
                                                 
117 This is also confirmed by article 296 TFEU: ‘Where the Treaties do not specify the type of act to be adopted, the 
institutions shall select it on a case-by-case basis, in compliance with the applicable procedures and with the principle 
of proportionality’. 
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social exclusion (art. 153(2) TFEU) as it does not have the competence to introduce legally binding 
minimum requirements in this subject-matter. A pan-European basic income is, by definition, an 
EU-wide distributive scheme and not a harmonisation of national policies, but this does not change 
the fact that, under the provisions of this article, the EU does not have the capacity to legislate. In 
short, if the EUBI’s main aim is to combat social exclusion, then, the establishment of the scheme 
requires treaty change as the EU cannot do more than coordinate national social policies in the 
field. 
Moreover, where the EU does have a competence to legislate, article 153 only allows for legal acts 
in the forms of directives. As noted by Repasi (2017: 16), ‘[d]irectives do, in principle, not contain 
individual rights but oblige Member States to create individual rights within their national legal 
orders’. In other words, ‘the Union legislator may not establish, on the basis of directives, Union 
bodies or Union funds as well as legal claims for individuals against Union bodies or funds’ (Reapasi 
2017: 16). Thus, even in the fields where the EU is allowed to establish a legal act (e.g. art. 151(1)(c) 
TFEU), article 153(2) does not grant it the power to introduce the kind of EU-wide distributive 
schemes that we are concerned with. 
Going back to the list of objectives of the EUBI, then, is there another possibility? First, it is clear 
from the analysis undertaken in chapter five that the EUBI’s macroeconomic stabilisation function 
constitutes a positive spillover effect but cannot be considered as its main objective.118 Second, 
since the EUBI is not conditional on national authorities pursuing changes in the provision of 
social policies, its role in accompanying the modernisation of social systems is also incidental. 
Third, it cannot be considered as a policy primarily aiming at the social security and the social 
protection of workers119 because it is not targeted at the social risks faced by workers only. Nor can 
it be predominantly considered as a policy primarily designed to integrate people excluded from 
the labour market since it is not conditional on any work test. Similarly, despite the arguments 
developed in this dissertation in favour of the EUBI as an instrument to fight EU-wide poverty 
and social exclusion, the same logic could be applied for those in social assistance schemes because 
                                                 
118 Even if the EUBI’s main objective was to act as a macroeconomic stabiliser, it would face sever hurdles. Article 
122(2) TFEU allows the EU to grant financial assistance to a MS which finds itself in difficulties that are beyond its 
control. However, the EUBI would not comply with the requirements of this article because (i) it is directed at 
individuals, (ii) it is a permanent scheme, and (iii) it is granted without any conditions. For more on the legal options 
for establishing a fiscal capacity for the euro area, see Repasi (2013) and Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017). 
119 In EU law, ‘social security’ is defined on the basis of article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) n°883/2004 on the coordination 
of social security systems as covering the following items: (a) sickness benefits; (b) maternity and equivalent paternity 
benefits; (c) invalidity benefits; (d) old-age benefits; (e) survivors' benefits; (f) benefits in respect of accidents at work 
and occupational diseases; (g) death grants; (h) unemployment benefits; (i) pre-retirement benefits; (j) family benefits. 
‘Social protection’ is broader since it also encompasses ‘schemes relating to the obligations of an employer or 
shipowner’ (art. 3(2)) and ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ (art. 3(3)), thereby including also those relevant to 
‘social assistance’ (art. 70). 
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the EUBI is not specifically targeting people identified as being at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion. If this is correct, the EUBI should rather be considered as pursuing all these objectives 
simultaneously (i.e. social security and social protection of workers, integration of people excluded 
from the labour market, and combating social exclusion). According to European case law, then, 
the EUBI should be founded on all their corresponding legal bases. However, this approach also 
reaches a dead-end since article 153 (to which all objectives refer) is not suitable. Fisrst, because 
there must be coherence between the various legal bases, such that some of legal bases cannot 
undermine the limitations set by others. In this case, the provisions concerning the objective of 
combating social exclusion limits the use of other provisions which allow the EU to legislate. 
Second, because the kind of legal act necessary to implement an independent EU-wide scheme is 
not provided by article 153 TFEU, as already mentioned. 
2.5. Article 175(3) TFEU 
There is another legal base possible if it can be shown that the EUBI’s main aim is to strengthen 
social cohesion. The objective of ‘social cohesion’ is proclaimed by article 3(3) TEU and 
implemented by article 175(3) TFEU. The use of article 175(3) is envisioned as a legal base to 
establish a European unemployment benefit scheme by Repasi (2017) and Beblavý and Lenaerts 
(2017). It was also used to establish the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EU 2013b). 
According to the provisions of article 175(3), then, the European Parliament and the Council can 
decide to adopt ‘specific actions outside the Funds’ with their own eligibility criteria if these actions 
prove necessary to attain the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion set out in article 
174 TFEU, which itself defines the prerogatives of the EU with respect to the objectives of social, 
economic and territorial cohesion.120  
                                                 
120 Article 174 TFEU reads as follows: 
In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the 
strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and 
the backwardness of the least favoured regions. 
Among the regions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, 
and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost 
regions with very low population density and island, crossborder and mountain regions. 
And article 175 TFEU states: 
Member States shall conduct their economic policies and shall coordinate them in such a way as, in addition, to attain 
the objectives set out in Article 174. The formulation and implementation of the Union's policies and actions and the 
implementation of the internal market shall take into account the objectives set out in Article 174 and shall contribute 
to their achievement. The Union shall also support the achievement of these objectives by the action it takes through 
the Structural Funds (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section; European Social Fund; 
European Regional Development Fund), the European Investment Bank and the other existing Financial Instruments.  
The Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions every three years on the progress made towards achieving economic, social and 
territorial cohesion and on the manner in which the various means provided for in this Article have contributed to it. 
This report shall, if necessary, be accompanied by appropriate proposals. 
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2.5.1. Understanding ‘social cohesion’ under EU law 
Before looking at whether the EUBI can legitimately be enacted on that basis, two preliminary 
difficulties must be overcome (Repasi 2017: 21). First, can ‘social cohesion’ be understood as a 
stand-alone objective amongst the triple aim of ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ and 
second, what are the kind of measures allowed with respect to the rather vague notion of ‘social 
cohesion’? The first difficulty demands an assessment of the possibility to disentangle social 
cohesion from economic and territorial cohesion as an independent goal, the alternative being that 
the EU can only implement a measure that should promote the three objectives altogether. In the 
latter case, the scope of EU action is delimited by its capacity to address inter-regional disparities 
rather than EU-wide disparities between social groups or individuals. 
Repasi (2017: 21-23) provides a series of arguments against this view. First, whilst the objectives of 
‘economic and social cohesion’ were present in previous Treaties, ‘territorial cohesion’ was only 
introduced in the Lisbon treaty, which signals that they are distinctive objectives. Second, paragraph 
two of article 174 TFEU stipulates that, in order to promote the triple objective of cohesion, ‘[i]n 
particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the 
various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions’ (my emphasis). The use of ‘in 
particular’ clarifies that measures aiming at economic and social disparities writ large are also 
possible independently of those focusing on territorial disparities. Third, there is a precedent 
confirming this thesis: the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) established on the 
basis of article 175(3) extends its action beyond region-specific problems since it aims at providing 
support for workers who become redundant as a result of major structural changes in world trade 
patterns due to globalisation ‘provided that these redundancies have a significant adverse impact 
on the local, regional or national economy’ (EU 2013b: art. 2(2), my emphasis).  
More importantly, the European Social Fund (ESF), which is one of the structural funds dedicated 
to the EU’s cohesion policy, is the Union’s main instrument to tackle social disparities. According 
to article 162 TFEU, the ESF aims to improve employment opportunities, the standard of living, 
as well as the geographical and occupational mobility of workers, whilst the second recital of 
Regulation 1304/2013 on the ESF adds that it should ‘strengthen social inclusion, fight poverty, 
[…] and develop active, comprehensive and sustainable inclusion policies […] and thereby contribute 
to economic, social and territorial cohesion in accordance with Article 174 TFEU’ (my emphasis). The 
                                                 
If specific actions prove necessary outside the Funds and without prejudice to the measures decided upon within the 
framework of the other Union policies, such actions may be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions. 
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Regulation also states that the ESF should contribute to the implementation of the EU 2020 
strategy and its flagship initiatives including ‘the European Platform against Poverty and Social 
Exclusion’ while taking into account the requirements of the ‘horizontal social clause’121 (EU 2013: 
third recital). In order to do so, the ESF shall benefit ‘people of all ages facing poverty and social 
exclusion’ (EU 2013: art. 2(3)) and ‘at least 20% of the total ESF resources in each Member State 
shall be allocated to the thematic objective ‘promoting social inclusion, combating poverty and any 
discrimination’’ (art. 4(2)). The ESF is thus based on the EU’s cohesion policy but not exclusively 
focused on inter-regional disparities.   
Finally, article 174(1) stipulates that EU actions in the field of cohesion should be pursued ‘[i]n 
order to promote its overall harmonious development’. In other words, the effects of the Union’s 
policies should be assessable at EU level which means that the goal of cohesion can provide a 
suitable base for EU-wide policies. Then, according to Repasi (2017: 23), ‘[a]gainst the background 
of these arguments, the Union legislator may adopt measures that primarily aim at promoting social 
cohesion as a part of the objective to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion without 
being limited to only addressing region-specific problems’.  
The second difficulty relates to the kind of policies that can be pursued under the notion of ‘social 
cohesion’. Whilst the legal texts available in EU primary and secondary law do not provide a clear 
definition of the terms, let’s recall that cohesion may be defined as ‘the degree to which disparities 
in social and economic welfare between different regions or groups within the European Union 
are politically and socially tolerable’ (Molle 2007:5). In short, the ‘strengthening of cohesion’ stated 
in article 174(1) TFEU means a reduction of these disparities over time. But how should we 
understand disparities that are not ‘politically and socially tolerable’? Repasi distinguishes between 
a procedural and a substantive dimension. Regarding the procedural perspective, ‘there would be a 
presumption that disparities are politically and socially intolerable when the Council adopts a 
specific action with the necessary majority’ whilst, according to the substantive dimension, there is 
a ‘presumption that the disparities cannot effectively be reduced at Member States level when there 
is an increase in disparities before the adoption of a specific action’ (Repasi 2017: 27). In other 
words, the definition of EU action in the field of social cohesion must be in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
                                                 
121 The so-called ‘horizontal social clause’ states that the EU shall take into account requirements linked (inter alia) to 
the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, and the fight against social 
exclusion in the definition and implementation of its policies and activities (art. 9 TFEU). 
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Against this backdrop, one first needs to show that the policy action proposed is appropriate for 
the objective pursued, which is itself defined with respect to indicators relevant to assess social 
disparities that are considered intolerable. Then, article 175(3) allows the EU to undertake a specific 
policy action outside EU funds to strengthen social cohesion at the level of the EU to improve its 
‘overall harmonious development’ (art. 174(1))122, provided that MS cannot effectively tackle the 
disparities identified. In other words, it must be shown that the policy envisioned respects the 
principle of subsidiarity. Finally, the use of article 175(3) can only constitute a suitable legal base if 
it does not undermine other limitations provided by constitutional saving clauses and procedural 
requirements. 
2.5.2. The EUBI as an instrument to strengthen social cohesion 
Given these considerations, does article 175(3) TFEU provide a suitable legal base for the EUBI? 
In this case, the EUBI’s main objective is to strengthen social cohesion by reducing social 
disparities between groups throughout the EU. Given the EUBI’s objectives, the indicators 
relevant to analyse disparities and their evolution in time are provided by the at-risk-of-poverty-or-
social-exclusion rate (AROPE) and the unemployment rate. The EUBI’s ability to deliver on its 
expected positive impacts remains contingent on empirical demonstration and it is difficult, in the 
absence of a precise proposal, to establish to what extent the EUBI would perform well with 
respect to the objective of reducing disparities on an EU-wide basis. Nonetheless, the analysis in 
chapter five showed that it is well placed to improve the indicators identified and thereby 
strengthen social cohesion, thanks to both its intrinsic policy characteristics and its incidental 
effects. For instance, it can be expected that poverty rate would fall as a result of improved coverage 
and higher income adequacy, whilst unemployment levels may decrease thanks to the removal of 
the poverty trap. Moreover, these effects are expected to be higher in countries with less advanced 
welfare states, thereby reducing both inter-group and inter-regional disparities, and further 
reinforced by the EUBI’s macroeconomic stabilisation function in support of national 
redistributive capacities.  
If this holds, then, the EUBI would improve the EU’s ‘overall harmonious development’ not only 
because of the nature of its monetary transfers but also thanks to its broader role on a systemic 
level, precisely because it is a pan-European redistributive scheme or, to put it in the wording of 
the subsidiarity principle, ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action’ (art. 5(3) TEU). 
                                                 
122 Note that it does not follow from the necessity to have ‘an EU-wide overall harmonious development’ that the 
action envisioned cannot concern a subset of the Union if it proves necessary to reduce economic and social imbalances 
(Repasi 2017: 25-26). 
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In relation to the limits set by the principle of subsidiarity, then, it was argued in chapter one that 
the current organisation of social welfare in the EU is insufficient to protect EU citizens against 
the risk of poverty and social exclusion effectively. In other words, the EU’s objective of lifting 20 
million people out of poverty by 2020 cannot be sufficiently achieved by the MS alone, at least not 
without addressing the tensions of European integration which constrain their redistributive 
capacities. It was also highlighted in chapter five that this is especially true within the monetary 
union in which MS have relinquished their capacity to pursue nominal devaluation and can only 
rely on ‘internal’ devaluation in order to respond to asymmetric economic shocks, which can 
ultimately lead to a rise of unemployment and of the risk of poverty. Moreover, MS also face 
constraints in their financing capacities especially with regards to the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. On these grounds, then, the EUBI is well placed to reduce EU wide social disparities 
over time and thereby strengthen social cohesion whilst respecting the principle of subsidiarity. 
2.5.3. Facing the limitations of other Treaty provisions 
If this argument is correct, it must be shown that the EUBI does not undermine other limitations 
provided by the Treaties. These concern the constitutional savings clauses and procedural 
requirements linked with the adoption of a decision by the Council. According to the former, article 
153(4) TFEU limits the scope of EU action in order to avoid intrusion from EU law: it must not 
undermine the right of MS to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems, it 
must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium of national systems of social protection, and 
it shall not prevent any MS from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures 
compatible with the Treaties. Similarly, article 153(5) TFEU states that a legal act adopted must 
not apply to pay, nor undermine the right to association, to strike or to impose lock-outs. 
With regards to the first set of limits provided by article 153(4), it is important to remember that 
the EU already impacts national systems of social protection’s fundamental principles through its 
stringent macroeconomic governance and through its strategy of convergence within the social 
OMC, according to which the ‘modernisation’ of social systems is largely envisioned through the 
prisms of financial viability and flexibility. In other words, while EU action vis-à-vis national 
systems of social protection respects a principle of neutrality (i.e. MS remain formally sovereign in 
the field), it is not impartial in practice (i.e. the effective sovereignty of member states is limited). 
An explicit EU role in social protection might at least have the merit of escaping the current 
hypocrisy at play.  
This said, the EUBI is not vulnerable to the limits set by constitutional savings clauses as it is not 
an instrument of harmonisation that would de facto impact national principles of social security. It 
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is able to accommodate a wide variety of social models, does not preclude any member state to 
introduce more protective measures, and would support the financial viability of national social 
systems precisely because it constitutes an unconditional ‘add-on’ to national social benefits. Thus, 
there seems to be no contradiction between the introduction of the EUBI and the preservation of 
national autonomy in designing policies of social protection. As far as article 153(5) is concerned, 
the establishment of the EUBI does not have any legal incidence on pay, nor on the right of 
association, the right to strike or to impose lock-outs. 
Similarly, the EUBI respects the principle of proportionality which states that the content and form 
of Union action shall not exceed what is necesary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties (art. 5(4) 
TEU). According to Repasi (2017: 43), the constitutional saving clauses embody the principle of 
proportionality in the field of social protection. If this is true, then, the EUBI respects the principle. 
But, to make sure, it is interesting to look at the case law. According to a first interpretation by the 
Court, when a choice is available between various legal options, the principle of proportionality 
must be in favour of the less constraining legal option and the potential inconvenience caused by 
the policy must not exceed what is required to meet the set goals (Dony 2014: 99; Omarjee 2018: 
30). In another reading related to its ex post jurisdictional control (i.e. when a measure has already 
been implemented), the Court has established that the only criterion that matters is not whether 
the legislator has made the best choice among the options available but whether the measure 
adopted is appropriate with respect to set goals (Dony 2014: 99). On the basis of the first interpretation, 
whilst constraining legally, the EUBI remains less so than, say, the EUBS which imposes minimum 
requirements, since it leaves an important room of manoeuvre to national welfare states. It is 
unclear, however, to what extent it can be interpreted as a policy that does ‘not exceed what is 
required to meet the set goals’ given its universal and unconditional nature. Yet, on the basis of the 
(less demanding) second interpretation, I already showed that the EUBI is a measure appropriate 
for the aims underlying the strengthening of social cohesion, where ‘appropriate’ means ‘fit for 
purpose’. 
2.5.4. A procedural impediment 
The last problematic aspect concerns the procedural requirements associated with the voting 
procedure to establish the policy action. Article 175(3) states that such action may be adopted 
according to ordinary legislative procedure, which means that it would be based on qualified 
majority voting (QMV) in the Council. However, even if the EUBI itself does not undermine the 
various constitutional saving clauses in substantive terms, a legal procedure based on QMV in fields 
related to member states’ system of social protection may procedurally undermine their right to define 
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the fundamental principles of their social security systems. Indeed, a pan-European redistributive 
policy of an interpersonal kind as the EUBI is de facto a top-up of national provisions of social 
protection. From a legal standpoint, it is implausible to have such a scheme implemented without 
providing each MS a say in its adoption, even more so considering that article 153 TFEU states 
that the Council must vote unanimously in matters of social security and cannot even legislate at 
all in matters of combating social exclusion (even if these provisions point to directives focused on 
minimum requirements). In short, even if one accepts that the goal of social cohesion is the 
appropriate one, it seems insufficient with respect to its voting procedure. A unanimous vote seems 
essential to implement a distributive scheme directly distributed to all European citizens. If this is 
not the case, article 175(3) might suffice on its own to establish the payment of an EUBI. If this is 
indeed problematic as I contend it is, there is a way to overcome this difficulty by combining article 
175(3) with article 352(1), to which I now turn. 
2.6. Article 352(1) TFEU 
The provisions of the so-called ‘flexibility clause’ stipulates that 
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the 
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided 
the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. (art. 
352(1) TFEU) 
Thus, for this article to constitute a suitable base for the EUBI, it must be shown that (i) the EUBI 
is necessary and appropriate to attain the objectives set out in the Treaties as provided by article 3 
TEU in particular, (ii) that the necessary powers do not exist to achieve these objectives, and (iii) 
that the establishment of the EUBI does not undermine other limitations set by the Treaties.  
With respect to point (i), it was already argued in section 2.1. that the EUBI supports the objectives 
of the EU provided by article 3(3) TEU which include, among others, social progress, a high level 
of protection, combating social exclusion, promoting social justice, and social, economic and 
territorial cohesion as well as solidarity among member states. These aims are also supported by 
article 34 of the Charter and article 14 of the Social Pillar on the right to a decent minimum income 
and must be understood in conjunction with the horizontal social clause of article 9 TFEU. 
Considered as a whole, these provisions can be assimilated to the objective of social cohesion as 
defined supra, which enables the EU to adopt a specific action to strengthen social cohesion in 
relation to poverty, social exclusion and unemployment.  
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As far as point (ii) is concerned, the reference to the lack of powers necessary to achieve the set 
objectives points to the insufficiency of explicit or implied competences in the Treaties.123 
However, the article does not allow to circumvent the structure of the Treaties in matters 
expressively prohibited by the Treaties: it may not provide a legal base to harmonise matters 
explicitly excluded by other treaty provisions, and it may not constitute a disguised treaty 
amendment or provide a new competence precluded by the Treaties. This is not an issue in our 
case since the insufficiency only concerns procedural legal frictions (i.e. the possibility of QMV in 
article 175(3) may undermine Member States’ sovereignty in social security matters).  
Then, how does article 352(1) helps to compensate for the weakness of art. 175(3)? When joining 
two different legal bases, their decision-making procedures are combined: while article 175(3) relies 
on an ordinary legislative procedure (and thus QMV), article 352(1) relies on the special legislative 
procedure (and thus unanimity), such that their combination leads to the ordinary legislative 
procedure with a unanimous vote (Beblavý 2017: 41). In short, by ensuring a unanimous vote in 
the Council, article 352(1) protects MS procedurally since it grants them a veto power in case they 
would consider the policy proposal against their interest.  
With respect to point (iii), it was already shown that the EUBI does not undermine other limitations 
set by the Treaties in the area of social security law. Yet, there is one last article that limits the scope 
of article 352(1) and thus potentially bounds the possibility to implement the proposed action. 
Article 125(1) TFEU, also known as the ‘no bail-out clause’, states that ‘[t]he Union shall not be 
liable for or assume commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public 
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State’. In 
other words, this means that the EU is not allowed to finance MS which remain the sole responsible 
entities for their budgetary commitments.  
As pointed out by Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017: 60-61), two arguments can be invoked in response 
when considering the establishment of a pan-European distributive measure. First, the EUBI 
works independently of the financial commitments of MS since its purpose is not to be a substitute 
of national social protection schemes nor to assume Member States’ financial commitments, even 
if it might indirectly support their capacity to do so. Yet, this argument may still remain insufficient 
                                                 
123 Implied or implicit competences refer to the extensive view of competences set by the Court of Justice in its 
‘teleological’ interpretation of the principle of conferral which is focused more on the finality rather than on the letter 
of the texts; in other words, the ECJ has developed ‘a theory of implicit competences’ rejecting the interpretation 
according to which competences can only be based on the explicit provisions expressed by the Treaties (Dony 2014: 
77). The EU is thus able to extend the scope of its powers within set competences if ‘necessary for the exercise of 
express powers or indispensable for a Union institution in order to carry out a task conferred upon it by the Treaties’  
(Repasi 2017: 37). 
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when considering the interpretation of article 125(1) in the case law according to which its main 
objective is to ensure the financial stability of the monetary union. It does not prohibit financial 
assistance if there is a legal base for it but the scope of that legal base is restricted by certain 
conditions, as clarified by the Court: ‘Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial 
assistance […] provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that 
Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy’ (CJEU 2012: §136). Thus, and this is the 
second argument, it must be shown that the EUBI does not provide an incentive for Member 
States to escape their budgetary requirements. This is, in effect, a problem of moral hazard. 
Considering that Repasi (2017: 45-46) and Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017: 60-61) argue that the EUBS 
would not be vulnerable to the limit set by article 125(1) if the latter is accompanied by clawback 
and experience-rating mechanisms and considering that it was shown in chapter five that the risk 
of institutional gaming is lower in the case of the EUBI than in the EUBS, it can be assumed by 
transitivity that the EUBI is not vulnerable to this article either.124 Not only can it be argued that 
the EUBI involves a lower risk of producing disorder in Member States’ incentive structure, it can 
also work as a tool accompanying the pursuit of a ‘sound budgetary policy’ given its positive 
externalities as a macroeconomic stabiliser. 
If these arguments hold, then, the combination of article 175(3) and article 352(1) TFEU seem to 
constitute an appropriate legal base for the adoption of the EUBI. If they do not, one has to look 
for alternative options, which fall into two main categories: differentiated integration, which 
includes the possibility to adopt the EUBI through enhanced cooperation or an intergovernmental 
treaty among willing member states, and treaty change. I briefly consider these three possibilities 
in turn. 
2.7. Differentiated integration 
Given the highly controversial idea of giving ‘something for nothing’ (see chapter three on 
reciprocity), institutionalising the EUBI on the legal bases identified above may prove to be a 
difficult strategy if it cannot find sufficient political support among all MS. If this is so, enhanced 
cooperation or the establishment of an intergovernmental treaty among willing parties may 
constitute a plausible option for a subset of Member States convinced by the proposal. However, 
in light of my preference for an EU-wide proposal, this constitutes a drawback in the sense that 
social rights enjoyed by Europeans would vary depending on country of residency, producing in 
                                                 
124 It was shown that governments cannot easily influence the level of payments, its coverage or its triggering 
mechanism since it is a fixed, uniform, permanent, unconditional and universal payment (see chapter five, section 
4.2.5). 
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fact two different classes of EU citizens. Moreover, existing EU-wide social imbalances may also 
deepen between participating and non-participating countries, possibly making it more difficult for 
other Member States to join at a later stage. With this in mind, I explore it nonetheless as a potential 
option, starting with enhanced cooperation. 
2.7.1. Enhanced cooperation 
The procedure of enhanced cooperation is proclaimed by article 20 TEU and its requirements for 
implementation are provided by the articles 326 to 334 TFEU. The provisions of enhanced 
cooperation allow MS which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves in areas 
that do not fall within the scope of the EU’s exclusive competences to pursue further integration, 
under a series of conditions which can be summed up as follows. Enhanced cooperation must 
favour the realisation of the Union’s objectives, protect its interests and reinforce its integration 
process, it must involve at least nine Member States, and must remain open to all other member 
states which desire to join at any stage (art. 20 TEU). It must respect the Treaties and Union law 
and may not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion or 
constitute a distortion of competition (art. 326 TFEU). It must respect the competences, rights 
and obligations of member states that do not participate (art. 327 TFEU). Finally, it must be used 
as a solution of last resort only if it has been established that the objectives of such cooperation 
cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the EU as a whole (art. 20(1) TEU). If these 
conditions are met, the Council shall adopt the procedure of enhanced cooperation through QMV 
while the participating MS may agree on the action through the procedural requirements provided 
by the Treaties in the fields concerned by the subject-matter (Dony 2014: 105-106). 
It follows from the analysis undertaken in previous sections that the legal bases supporting the 
EUBI fall within the scope of non-exclusive competences (i.e. shared competences), that the policy 
proposal would support the Union’s objective to ensure proper social protection and strengthen 
social cohesion and that it would not undermine the competences, rights and obligations of other 
Member States since it is an unconditional scheme that does not impact the distribution of 
competences nor the right to define national fundamental principles of social protection. 
According to Repasi (2017: 57), the prohibition to undermine the internal market or the threefold 
objective of cohesion ‘is to be understood that provisions adopted under enhanced cooperation 
just as national law may affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms’. It seems fair to assume 
that an unconditional scheme providing additional income security to combat poverty, social 
exclusion and unemployment would, to the contrary, act as a catalyst for fundamental freedoms. 
Moreover, the EUBI will not impact social cohesion in non-participating member states but 
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reinforce it between partaking countries. In sum, enhanced cooperation provides another feasible 
legal route provided that there is sufficient political will among a minimum of nine Member States. 
2.7.2. Intergovernmental treaty 
Another possibility consists in establishing an international agreement between willing Member 
States, outside of the existing legal framework. Such an inter se agreement would be constitute under 
International law. The most notorious and recent example of the use of this intergovernmental 
method is provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) instituted by 19 Member States 
in reaction to the euro crisis.  
However, the European legal framework limits Member States’ capacity to use international 
agreements. In his analysis of the matter, Repasi concludes that member states may settle a legally 
valid intergovernmental treaty under international law provided that: 
(i) Intergovernmental inter se agreements may not modify Primary law if concluded outside of 
Article 48 TEU;  
(ii) Intergovernmental inter se agreements have to be in compliance with existing Primary and 
Secondary law;  
(iii) Intergovernmental inter se agreements are pre-empted within the scope of  
o exclusive Union competences or of  
o shared Union competences to the extent that the Union has exercised them;  
(iv) Intergovernmental inter se agreements of all Member States may only be concluded if a Union 
legislative procedure failed or is likely to fail; 
(v) Intergovernmental inter se agreements of a subset of Member States may only be concluded 
if an Enhanced Cooperation failed of is likely to fail;  
(vi) Intergovernmental inter se agreements may not circumvent Union legislative procedures if 
there is a Commission proposal on the basis of a shared Union competence. (Repasi 2017: 
60) 
Based on these considerations, the EUBI may be established through an intergovernmental treaty 
since the only uncertainty comes from points (iv) and (v). If the conclusions of sections 2.3.3. and 
2.3.4 are correct, a Union legislative procedure can be envisaged on the basis of existing treaty 
provisions and enhanced cooperation constitutes a potential alternative legal route. Thus, an inter 
se agreement can only be legally valid if these failed or are likely to fail. This has yet to be 
demonstrated125 but this conclusion has the merit of clarifying the temporal sequence in which an 
intergovernmental agreement might be envisaged as an alternative option for the EUBI’s legal 
feasibility. 
                                                 
125 One could argue, as Repasi (2017: 60) does in the case of the EUBS, that given the complexity of combining legal 
bases with different procedures (i.e. article 175(3) based on ordinary legislative procedure and article 352(1) based on 
special legislative procedure), the Union legislative procedure could face important difficulties. If Member States willing 
to enhance cooperation use the same legal base, one may come to similar conclusions. 
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2.8. Treaty change 
The ultimate possibility for establishing the EUBI is the amendment of the Treaties. Three 
procedures are possible for treaty revision: the ordinary revision procedure (art. 48(2-5) TEU), the 
simplified revision procedure (art. 48(6) TEU), and the use of the so-called ‘clause passerelle’ (art. 
48(7) TEU). The ‘clause passerelle’ deals with the modification of decision-making procedures 
from unanimity to QMV and is thus not relevant here. The two other revision procedures can be 
envisaged but the simplified revision procedure appears as the best candidate for treaty change in 
order to establish the EUBI. 
The ordinary revision procedure constitutes the ‘big bang’ option as it is used to extend (or reduce) 
the competences of the Union. However, this is neither desirable nor necessary. It is not desirable 
because the aim is not to establish a new exclusive competence for the EU in social protection: this 
would prove to be difficult given the wide variety and the great complexity of national social 
protection systems and could risks lowering social standards in Member States with the most 
comprehensive welfare states. Rather than replacing national social models, the EUBI is to support 
them in their diversity while contributing to upward social convergence in a non-intrusive way. The 
ordinary revision procedure is also not necessary because the simplified revision procedure 
provides a way to increase powers within set competences such that the EU would be able to take 
a more active role in social protection without making it an exclusive competence.    
The simplified revision procedure only concerns the internal policies and actions of the Union 
which belong to part three TFEU and include article 153 on social protection as well as articles 174 
and 175 on cohesion. The EUBI could thus be established by amending these provisions. In other 
words, the treaty reform should be focused on extending the scope of the Union’s powers within 
set shared competences so as to allow it to take a distributive complementary role to Member States’ 
prerogatives in social protection. Depending on how the objectives of the EUBI are framed, this 
could mean amending article 153 to allow other forms of legal acts than directives in the field of 
combating social exclusion and social security in order to establish legal claims for individuals 
against Union bodies or funds. It could also mean amending article 175(3) in order to make clear 
that the EU is allowed to take such an active role in providing social transfers to strengthen social 
cohesion considered as a stand-alone objective. It might also demand a clarification of the cases in 
which the EU can introduce financial assistance to Member States to ensure a proper social 
protection and a decent minimum income which means, in effect, a reform of the no bail-out clause 
(art. 125 TFEU). Finally, to be effective, treaty reform must be adopted by the European Council 
unanimously before being ratified in all Member States. 
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Whichever route is followed, treaty reform is a long and difficult political process. This is why it 
was argued in the introduction that the likelihood of the EUBI to be implemented is much higher 
if it can be shown that it can be done within the current legal framework. However, even if one 
considers that there is no suitable legal base for the EUBI within the Treaties, treaty change always 
remains a possibility for the adoption of the EUBI. In other words, if the last resort option is to 
amend the treaties, this only (arguably) reduces the scope of the EUBI’s probability to be 
implemented given its dependence on achieving wide political support – and therefore demands 
an assessment of other feasibility constraints such as public opinion acceptance or strategic 
coalition building – but it does not constitute a knock-out argument against its legal feasibility per 
se. 
In sum, it has been shown that the combination of articles 175(3) and article 352(1) TFEU may 
provide a suitable legal base for the establishment of the payment side of the EUBI within the 
existing legal framework of the Union. The latter may also be established according to two different 
approaches of differentiated integration: through article 20 TEU which allows Member States to 
enter the framework of enhanced cooperation or through an intergovernmental treaty to the extent 
that the Union’s legislative procedure and enhanced cooperation have failed. Finally, treaty 
amendment through the simplified revision procedure constitutes another, lengthier and more 
complex, possibility for the scheme’s legal feasibility.  
3. Legal feasibility: establishing the financing of the EUBI 
Besides the legal base necessary for the payment of the EUBI, one still needs to analyse the legal 
feasibility of its financing side. This aspect refers to the budgetary rules under EU primary and 
secondary law concerning the resources that the EU can mobilise to finance the EUBI. This section 
thus explores the potential suitable legal bases for the EUBI’s financing, either within the Union’s 
general budget or through a specific fund dedicated to the scheme outside EU budget.  
3.1. Within EU budget 
The legal framework surrounding the Union’s financial resources and its general budget is provided 
by articles 310-326 TFEU, the Council Decision on the system of the European Community’s 
Own Resources (EU 2007, hereinafter: Own Resource Decision) and the Regulation No 966/2012 
on financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (EU 2012). 
The financial resources of the Union must respect a series of principles among which one can find 
the ‘principle of adequacy of the means’ which states that ‘[t]he Union shall provide itself with the 
means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies’ (art. 311(1) TFEU). The 
   211 
‘principle of autonomy’ states that ‘without prejudice to other revenue, the budget shall be financed 
wholly from own resources’ (art. 311(2) TFEU); EU 2007: art. 1(2)).126 In other words, there are 
two main sources of revenues, ‘own resources’ and ‘other revenues’, with the former dedicated to 
financing the general budget is financed while the latter can be earmarked to finance exclusively a 
specific purpose.127 The ‘principle of equilibrium’ imposes that the budget is always balanced 
between revenues and expenses such that the Union may not borrow to cover its expenditures. 
This is reaffirmed differently by the ‘principle of sound financial management’ which states that 
the Union’s expenditure shall be financed ‘within the limit of the Union’s own resources and in 
compliance with the multiannual financial framework’ (art. 310(4) TFEU) established for five years 
in order to ‘ensure that Union expenditure develops in an orderly manner’ (art. 312(1) TFEU). 
Protocol n°28 on economic, social and territorial cohesion also provides a ‘principle of solidarity’ 
which is to be understood as Member States’ intention to take into ‘account the contributive 
capacity of individual Member States in the system of own resources’. Besides, the budget itself is 
regulated by a ‘principle of unity’, stating that all expenditure and revenues shall enter a single 
budgetary document, and which incorporates a ‘principle of completeness’ according to which the 
budget includes every predictable revenue and expenditure. Moreover, the ‘principle of accuracy’ 
means that the EU shall not spend more than necessary, the ‘principle of universality’ stipulates 
that all (own) revenues are pooled to finance expenditure without distinction, and the ‘principle of 
specification’ means that each expenditure appropriation must have a given purpose and be 
assigned to a specific destination objective (EU 2012: 18-26).  
Against this backdrop, the Regulation on financial rules (EU 2012) and article 314 TFEU provide 
the legal base for the introduction of a new budget line in the general budget. In this framework, 
the main difficulty for the EUBI derives from the fact that its financing would go beyond the 
current financial capacity of the EU.128 In other words, its expenditure would exceed the EU’s 
revenues and thus be in breach of the principle of equilibrium (EU 2012: art.17(1)) unless new 
financial sources can be found. Additional budgetary income can be raised as ‘own resources’ with 
the Own Resource Decision as legal base (as stated by art. 311 TFEU), or as ‘other revenue’ if a 
legal base can be found in the Treaties, such that it is directly linked with EU policies and 
                                                 
126 This principle should be relativised given the way it is implemented in practice: real autonomy would mean that the 
EU depends exclusively on its own revenues through a proper fiscal capacity but in reality only one source of revenue 
constitutes a genuine EU own resource, the so-called ‘traditional own resources’ constituted by duties on imported 
goods from third countries. The two others are, in essence, national contributions: a share of national VAT revenues 
and a share of member states’ gross national income. See EU (2007: art. 2 and 3) and EU (2012: 1). 
127 This is still different from the establishment of an agency outside the scope of EU budget. 
128 This might not be a problem if the EUBI is funded through the reallocation of (part of) existing funds but it might 
only raise a meagre basic income and thereby constitute an unappealing solution from the perspective of financial 
feasibility. 
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competences (EC 2017: 9). Moreover, new budget revenues may be based on additional 
contributions from member states or new EU-wide taxes. I evaluate the legal bases for establishing 
the financing of the EUBI according to these two possibilities. 
New financial contributions from Member States would have to be specifically dedicated to the 
funding of the EUBI. Article 21(2) of the Regulation on financial rules provides the basis to classify 
financial contributions from MS as ‘external assigned revenue’ earmarked to finance specific items 
of expenditure and would thus enter the Union’s budget as ‘other revenue’. Since it does not fall 
under the scope of the Own Resource Decision, it needs to be associated with a Union’s 
competence. Moreover, similarly to the analysis done for the payment side, the budgetary 
sovereignty of MS needs to be respected such that the procedure needs to be based on unanimity. 
Given these considerations, the financing of a new Union action such as the EUBI may be based 
on article 352 TFEU which offers both the competence and a unanimous procedure (Repasi 2017: 
49). This means that the adoption of the payment and the financing of the EUBI can be done in 
the same legal act. 
The EUBI may also be financed by introducing new categories of EU own resources through EU-
wide taxes. The European Commission has recently made a proposal in this sense, suggesting that 
the EU could create a new basket of resources based on a common consolidated corporate tax 
base, a contribution from the EU emission trading system and a plastic packaging waste-based 
resource (EC 2018a). EU own taxes need to be established on the basis of a Union competence 
and included in the Council Decision on the system of EU Own Resources (EU 2007) as specified 
in the procedure provided by article 311(3) TFEU.  
With this in mind, I now evaluate the possibility to raise new EU own resources through EU wide 
taxes according to the various fields of taxation. In indirect taxation matters, article 113 TFEU 
allows the Council to adopt provisions for the ‘harmonisation of legislation’. Harmonisation of 
legislation is not exactly the same as creating an EU own tax which needs to be established by a 
Regulation (Repasi 2017: 51). However, it allows the EU to establish a uniform levy (or ‘call rate’) 
on national VAT which proceeds then generate revenue for the general budget, as is currently the 
case within the multiannual financial framework since 1980. Moreover, the European Commission 
has recently issued a Communication for an ‘action plan on VAT’ in order to establish single EU 
VAT area (EC 2016d), making it easier to levy a uniform call rate on a standard rated base for all 
EU countries, as suggested in the Commission proposal for a new Council Decision on the system 
of Own Resources (EC 2018a: 6). While a legal base for collecting all VAT revenues at Union level 
does not exist, the existing framework may be amended by further harmonising national VAT and 
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by raising the EU levy to provide for the financing of the EUBI, if adopted through a Council 
Decision. 
Under this possibility, a European call rate of 1% to the standard VAT rate applied to the final 
consumption of goods and services could yield up to 20,9 billion euros (2009 prices) or, if further 
harmonisation of VAT rules between MS is done, up to 50,4 billion euros (Monti et al. 2016: 55). 
In GDP per capita, for a total population estimated at 512 million (Eurostat, figures 2018), this 
means an average of 40,8€/year and 98,5€/year and per capita. We are far from the 
200€/month/citizen in average suggested in chapter five. This requires more harmonisation: in 
appendix, I show that an EUBI of that amount requires an effective Europeanised tax rate of 
14,5% (when adjusted to PPP). 
The European Commission also issued a proposal for a Council Directive on a common system 
of financial transaction tax (EC 2011) on the basis of article 113 TFEU, which it reiterated two 
years later under the procedure of enhanced cooperation (EC 2013b) and which is still an on-going 
process. While this proposal deals with a harmonisation of legislation, Repasi argues that part or 
all of its revenues could be possible under EU Treaties on the basis of article 352 TFEU (Repasi 
2017: 51, fn 118). Under this possibility, Van Parijs and Vanderborght calculated that the EUBI 
could only yield ‘under fairly optimistic assumptions’ a basic income of 10€/person/month (Van 
Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 237). 
In matters of direct taxation, article 115 TFEU only allows to issue directives when ‘approximation’ 
of national laws, regulations or administrative provisions is required to ensure the functioning of 
the internal market. The Commission has made proposals in this sense concerning a common 
corporate tax base and a common consolidated corporate tax base (EC 2016e and 2016f). Similarly 
to the way the EU aliments its own resources through a call rate on indirect taxation revenues, the 
EU issued a proposal for a common consolidated tax rate-based own resource (EC 2018a: 7). 
Again, an EU-wide corporate income tax is not allowed by the Treaties but, if a common 
consolidated tax base is adopted, it would be possible to apply a call rate on that base, provided 
that the Council integrates this new own resource in a new Own Resources Decision.  
To yield sufficient revenues for an EUBI, however, it seems that the European corporate tax rate 
itself should be Europeanised, which would require treaty change. Van Parijs and Vanderborght 
(2017: 238) suggest that a harmonised corporate tax set at an EU-wide rate of 30% could yield an 
EUBI of 100€/person/month. The argument made in chapter five, about the coherence between 
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the source of funding and its redistribution as a benefit for EU citizens thus demands more 
substantial legal changes.  
In matters related to environmental and energy taxes, articles 192(2)(a) and article 194(3) TFEU 
provide the legal bases to establish ‘provisions’ and ‘measures’ respectively when they are ‘primarily 
of a fiscal nature’. Contrary to EU powers in indirect taxation, this allows the Union to establish a 
Regulation, and thus an EU-wide tax. A carbon tax or an aviation tax can thus be envisaged on this 
legal base. Again, the Commission made a proposal to allocate a share of certain revenues from the 
total of allowances available for auctioning to the Union’s budget (EC 2018a: 8). It also suggested 
the introduction of a dedicated new tax on plastic packaging waste proportional to the quantity of 
non-recycled plastic packaging waste in each member state (EC 2018a: 8). Concerning the funding 
of the EUBI via environmental or energy taxes, Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 237, esp. fn 
47, p. 321) consider that a carbon tax could yield about 17€/person/month. 
Overall, while the Treaties do not allow the EU to adopt its own tax in most fields, it can still rely 
on various mechanisms to generate new EU own resources and include them in the Own Resource 
Decision. These would then be part of the Union’s general budget (principle of universality) and 
their expenditure assigned to the EUBI (principle of specification). However, it seems that, under 
realistic assumptions, we are far from a substantial EUBI unless more harmonisation is done on 
the financing side, such as a harmonisation of the corporate tax rate, not simply a common 
consolidated tax base on which a call rate is applied, or further harmonisation of the VAT. 
3.2. Outside EU budget 
A final alternative consists in establishing the financing of the EUBI outside of the Union’s general 
budget, which may be done in two different ways (Repasi 2013: 11; Repasi 2017: 52-54; Beblavý 
and Lenaerts 2017: 62). A first way consists in creating an EUBI agency with its own legal 
personality and budget. Such a separate agency could be created on the basis of article 352(1) TFEU 
and could have its own budget committee composed by representatives of Member States. This 
may be a promising approach to establish an EUBI of about the 200€ on the basis of national 
contributions (for an average homogenised levy of 8% of GNI, see appendix). 
The second approach follows from the example of the European Development Fund (EDF) such 
that a dedicated fund may be established by MS through an intergovernmental agreement and based 
on its own financial rules. Following the legal framework already explained above, such an 
international agreement can only constitute a solution of last resort. In other words, it is permitted 
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only to the extent that the Community method and the procedure of enhanced cooperation has 
failed or is likely to do so. 
These two approaches nevertheless fail to satisfy the principles of unity and completeness of the 
Union’s budget which consider that all revenue and expenditure should be integrated into one 
budget and be clearly identified and predictable. The purpose of these principles, however, is to 
safeguard the budgetary control of the Council and the European Parliament. Since the Council 
(in the first case) or the participating member states (in the second one) will necessarily be involved 
in the procedure setting up the agency or the dedicated fund, it is necessary to give the European 
Parliament the capacity to act as a supervisory body and the discharge of the fund’s financial 
management. This would respect its democratic control over the Union’s resources and its 
budgetary sovereignty rights. 
Overall, the analysis of the financing side reveals that it is legally feasible to fund the EUBI at EU 
level. The objection must thus be rejected. However, under the legal options currently available or 
in the Commission’s ‘pipeline’, the EUBI may only be set at a fairly low amount. My calculations 
in appendix, used to provide an example of an EUBI of 200€ in chapter five, would thus require 
more harmonisation on the financing side. 
4. Conclusion 
The exploration of legal feasibility has shown that the Treaties may provide a suitable legal base for 
the establishment of the EUBI. In case one considers that these arguments do not hold, it has also 
shown what alternatives can be envisaged outside the legal framework provided by EU primary 
and secondary law, either through intergovernmental agreements or through the procedure of 
treaty change. The exploration of the financing side has shown that the EUBI may be established 
within or outside the EU budget. However, a rough look at realistic funding opportunities seems 
to show that these remain unsatisfying unless more harmonisation of the funding sources can be 
achieved.  
Overall, the analysis of legal feasibility opens the door to further research in terms of financial 
feasibility – how much can the sources of funding identified with valid legal bases yield? –, in terms 
of administrative feasibility – how is the EUBI to be operationalised between the EU and its MS for 
its distribution to the citizens? – and finally, its political feasibility – how can it be put on the political 
agenda?  
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CONCLUSION 
1. What have we learned? 
In this thesis, I sought to answer one central question: to what extent, if at all, is the European 
universal basic income a worthwhile policy to address the problem of poverty in the European 
Union?  
I defined this problem as a deficit of social protection. In other words, the current organisation of 
social welfare in the EU is insufficient to protect all Europeans effectively against the risk of 
poverty and social exclusion. This negative state of affairs is the result of a series of trends, 
dynamics and shortcomings which render the prospects of the EU poverty target, aiming to lift 20 
million of Europeans out of poverty by 2020, particularly dim at this point. A growing part of the 
population is affected by new and multidimensional forms of economic insecurity resulting, inter 
alia, from the demands of labour market flexibility. Minimum income schemes, which constitute 
the typical last-resort safety net to prevent individuals from falling into poverty, face important 
shortcomings in terms of coverage, adequacy and take-up. The destructuring impact of European 
integration, marked by a neoliberal bias in favour of market-making policies, affects national 
redistributive capacities, while positive integration in social protection must face major political 
barriers associated with the wide diversity of Member States’ social models and their importance 
as a source of legitimacy. The lack of consensus has resulted in a social deficit at the heart of the 
European project whilst the development of EU macroeconomic governance policy favoured 
tightened activation policies and limited public expenses at the national level. All these factors 
combined provide the environment in which one in four Europeans remain at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion.  
In light of this and against the backdrop of my normative account of a multi-tiered Social Europe 
based on a sufficientarian principle, my examination of the EUBI, defined as a partial cash payment 
distributed to all citizens and residents living in the EU on an individual and unconditional basis, 
revealed that there are powerful motives to consider it as a good candidate to mitigate the problem 
at hand. I identify three main levels of action: individual, national and supranational. 
The EUBI can primarily be understood as a radically novel form of EU anti-poverty strategy aiming 
at providing, in combination with national social models, a social minimum to all its citizens and 
residents. As a complement to national social benefits or to earnings from other sources, its amount 
is simply added to one’s disposable income. Someone living a precarious life on the labour market 
may thus see it as a cushion, providing an additional source of income that offers not only more 
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money but the assurance of a regular and permanent income flow, thereby reducing, even if 
modestly, the strains of precarious and uncertain lives. For someone benefiting from minimum 
income protection, even an EUBI set at a level of 200€ in average may bring a Romanian or 
Bulgarian above the poverty line, and meaningfully improve the situation of those on welfare in 
France or Germany. Its impact in this case is likely to be more important for the worst-off residing 
in countries with less advanced welfare states, but it would be significant throughout the EU. 
At Member State level, the EUBI provides an instrument of stability for national social models in 
a context marked by important interdependencies and, therefore, significant risks. National social 
models are integrated in a common market and, for a majority of them, in a monetary union, such 
that asymmetric shocks hitting one country may lead to negative externalities in other Member 
States as well. As a supranational shock absorber based on cross-border transfers, the EUBI thus 
also responds, albeit potentially with moderate effects, to one of the functional requirements of 
economic integration and, more specifically, monetary integration, that is, the need for a fiscal 
union.  
At EU level, the EUBI embodies a commitment to expanding the EU’s ‘opportunity structure’ to 
all those not effectively enjoying its perks. Whilst the EU legal order has provided individuals the 
formal capacity to pursue their conception of the good life beyond national borders, they face 
unequal prospects in their genuine ability to do so. For instance, Member States can still reduce 
access to their social assistance schemes if a national from another country becomes a ‘burden’. By 
providing a benefit attached to EU citizenship and legal residency, then, the EUBI may be the basis 
of a new level playing field providing a more secure access to the effective enjoyment of the 
freedom of movement, as well as the freedom not to move if one wishes so. Similarly, it offers a 
way to flesh out the Social Pillar by making some of its social rights and principles both tangible 
and de facto Europeanised. Whilst one may argue that these benefits of the EUBI pertain to the 
individual level, my emphasis here is on the transnational aspect of the EUBI: it is a policy that is 
European in scope and substance which materialises European social citizenship. 
If the EUBI is funded out of resources that can be associated with market integration, such as a 
European corporate tax, the VAT or the financial transaction tax, it would have two additional 
effects on the national and transnational dimensions. By europeanising the corporate tax, MS may 
see the stability of their encompassing environment increase as the risk of fiscal dumping may be 
tamed. At EU level, it establishes a clear link between the benefits of European integration and 
European citizens. As such, by increasing the coherence between funding source and instrument 
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of payment, and by providing a tangible, visible, and regular benefit, the EUBI may, arguably, 
increase the legitimacy of the EU, perceived as a more caring Union.  
This said, throughout the dissertation, I focused on how the EUBI may improve the social 
dimension of European integration, all other things kept equal. Other measures may be necessary 
with or without the introduction of the EUBI. For example, a framework directive on adequate 
minimum income protection would ensure that all individuals receive a sufficient level of resources. 
Yet, it is likely to demand some form of redistribution to help countries for whom this requirement 
would be most difficult to achieve. The EUBI could well offer this support in a more direct and 
effective way. If implemented together, then, the minimum requirement prevents MS from 
lowering their benefits by the amount of the EUBI unleashing its full potential as a complementary 
measure. Similarly, the introduction of a European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS) may 
improve significantly the stability of European economies but, again, if combined (in its reinsurance 
version) with an EUBI, then both schemes may offer complementary forms of stabilisation, the 
former being focused on large asymmetric shocks, and the latter on smaller cyclical shocks. 
The EUBI is not the panacea. But it has the advantage to score well on a wide range of issues and 
to prompt mutually reinforcing effects at the different levels (individual, national, European) of the 
EU polity. It is not only a desirable solution to address the current negative state of affairs. It is also 
a feasible one, at least if feasible means legally feasible, as there is a case for it to be established on 
the basis of existing Treaties, by combining articles 175(3) and 352(1) TFEU. 
On these grounds, the EUBI does provide a worthwile answer to the problem of poverty in the 
EU as it tries to address the challenge of building an inclusive society in which the values of equality, 
dignity and solidarity take a central place. As such, it cannot be ignored by EU scholars and policy 
makers alike. 
2. Pathways from here 
By undertaking an interdisciplinary research, my aim has been to clarify the main debates 
surrounding the idea of a distinctively European UBI and to see how it relates to a number of 
puzzles: the social deficit of European integration and the shortcomings of EU anti-poverty 
approach, issues of justice in the EU, stabilisation in the Eurozone, and institutional feasibility. By 
opening all these different doors, I tried to establish a comprehensive groundwork for further fine-
tuned analysis in each of them. 
It will now be the task of scholars to dig deeper into the following areas. First, researchers may 
take on issues related to the implementation of the EUBI, starting with the very specifics of 
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concrete policy proposals, through more thorough analysis of funding sources, the level of payment 
or the criteria necessary to differentiate payments between countries or between regions. Whilst 
the various funding avenues need further exploration, it is important to note that financial concerns 
are not just a matter of ‘finding the money’. Each funding scheme means a different normative 
approach of EU social and fiscal justice and would lead to different outcomes. The EUBI does not 
operate in an institutional vacuum and the choice of the funding source is never a neutral operation. 
What is needed is a coherent vision overall of the policy’s goals, justifications, and funding schemes, 
and a fine-tuned assessment of its potential risks, expected outcomes and implementation 
requirements. 
Reesearchers may also be interested to further explore the macroeconomic effects of the EUBI, 
taking into account different tax sources for instance, and widen the scope of the analysis, to look 
at its multiplier effect, its impact on aggregate demand and on inflation. More fundamentally, an 
enquiry into possible tax-and-transfer recalibration at national level would be useful, as the scheme 
may produce adverse effects. For instance, I showed in chapter five that there is a risk of national 
downward adjustments if the EUBI is not accompanied by a requirement of adequacy on the part 
of MS. If the EUBI replaces national benefits, it reduces the stringency of EU’s rules for public 
finances. But if this is done at the cost of guaranteeing a minimum threshold of resources, then the 
EUBI loses its role and becomes a mere form of public budget support. 
Moreover, I have suggested an EUBI paid to all citizens and residents alike, but it would be 
interesting to see how the EUBI may be differentiated across age groups, possibly to implement it 
in different steps, focusing first on children or young people for example, who are among the most 
vulnerable in terms of poverty and, as concerns the youth, in terms of unemployment as well. A 
step-by-step approach may also arguably improve the legitimacy of the scheme. A European child 
basic income would resemble the kind of universal child benefits that already exist at national level 
in many MS, does not face the reciprocity objection, and may thus be perceived as more acceptable. 
An EUBI centred on youth could be seen as an extension of EU action through the ‘youth 
guarantee’ which aims at supporting MS in training and integrating young people in the labour 
market, thereby supporting a population typically affected by the insecurities of the precariat.  
Another aspect related to implementation points to the organisation of the system of transfers. I 
mentioned a ‘direct link’ between the EU and its citizens but the question remains as to whether it 
should be transferred directly by an independent European agency or mediated via national 
agencies, and if so, which ones? One can imagine that EUBI recipients would be identified on the 
basis of their national social security number or through electoral registers, the former being 
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arguably more comprehensive. If a European agency is set up, it could make the payments directly 
on all bank accounts. Another way would be to transfer European funds to national (regional 
/local) public authorities who would then make the payment on the basis of their information. The 
first option is demanding in terms of institutional set-up but creates the direct link between the EU 
and its citizens in practice while reducing the risk, more present in the second option, that payments 
be diverted from their purposes.  
Finally, a sociological analysis of the different actors, for instance distinguishing between the 
positions on the EUBI of those at the ‘core’ (European institutional actors), at the ‘semi-periphery’ 
(civil society organisations, such as the European anti-poverty network) and at the ‘periphery’ 
(citizens) could be one way to address the question of its political feasibility. 
Bearing this in mind, this thesis can be seen as a door-opener, which shows why the idea of a 
European basic income deserves more interest. At the political level, surely, the will for such a 
controversial idea may still default, not only because of its very nature which means ‘giving 
something for nothing’ to many, but also precisely because it is about pan-European solidarity.  
Nevertheless, it is also when the right background conditions lack cruelly that it is all the more 
necessary for academics to investigate the potential of realistic utopias. This is what I tried to do in 
this dissertation.
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY USED FOR SIMULATIONS 
The calculations have been performed on the Microsoft Excel software. All data used, unless 
explicitly expressed, are coming from the Eurostat database and are for the year 2015.129 The 
calculations can be divided into two parts: 
The first part relates to the expenses of the organization in charge of implementing such a 
redistributive scheme (in our case the European Union). These expenses are driven by the amount 
redistributed to the citizens involved in the scheme, amount which have been fixed by the 
researcher. This amount can be fixed or adapted to the purchasing power of every country involved 
in the scheme. 
 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 ×  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖  (1) 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 × 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (2) 
Where N is the number of countries participating to the scheme, transferi the amount transferred to 
country i, popi the target population of the scheme in country i, amounti the amount received by each 
recipient, and Expenses the total amount of money transferred in the scheme 
In the case of a fixed amount for all countries, 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 × ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (3) 
Where amount is the amount fixed by the researcher. 
In the case of an amount adapted to the purchasing power parity, 
 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝐼  (4) 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 × ∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (5) 
Where PPI is the Purchasing Power Parity (EU28 = 1) in euros 
The second part of the calculation relates to the needed revenues to finance such a scheme. To do 
that, we link Expenses and Revenues by making the hypothesis of a « null sum game » (each euro 
received by the revenue streams modelled is indeed used to finance the scheme): 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 (6) 
We have modelled two different possible revenue streams: a national contribution-based financing 
and a VAT based financing.  
For the national contribution-based financing, we calculated the ratio giving the number of sums 
of GNIs (which basically represent the maximum available budget in the most extreme case) 
necessary to finance the scheme among participating countries: 
 𝑟𝐺𝑁𝐼 =  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
∑ 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
  (7) 
We then apply the obtained percentage to all GNIs individually 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 =  ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (8) 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (9) 
                                                 
129 The data compilation and simulation as well as the methodological clarifications have been done in close 
cooperation with Jean Mansuy, doctoral researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). 
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 𝑟𝐺𝑁𝐼 × ∑ 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (10) 
 
 ∑ 𝑟𝐺𝑁𝐼 × 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (11) 
 
Which in the end gives for each country 
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖 =  𝑟𝐺𝑁𝐼 × 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖  (12) 
The second revenue type considered is a european VAT. To model the revenue stream coming 
from such a tax, we used the total household expenditures as a tax base. 
 𝑉𝐴𝑇 =  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
 (13) 
Were expenditurei is the final consumption expenditure of households in country i 
We then apply the obtained ratio to all total household consumptions individually 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 =  ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (14) 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 = ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (15) 
 
 𝑉𝐴𝑇 ×  ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (16) 
 
 ∑ 𝑉𝐴𝑇 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (17) 
 
Which in the end gives for each country 
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖 =  𝑉𝐴𝑇 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖  (18) 
We then deduce the Net Contribution of each country to the scheme from contributions and 
transfers. 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖  (19) 
By including (1) and (12) in equation (19) we obtain the Net Contribution for a national 
contribution-based financing. 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖 = 𝑟𝐺𝑁𝐼 × 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖 − 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 ×  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 (20) 
 
Or, as a ration of GNI, 
 𝑟(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖) =
𝑟𝐺𝑁𝐼 × 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖 − 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 ×  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
 (21) 
 
 𝑟(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖) = 𝑟𝐺𝑁𝐼 −
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 ×  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
 (22) 
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By including (1) and (18) in equation (19) we obtain the Net Contribution for a VAT based 
financing. 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖 = 𝑉𝐴𝑇 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 − 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 ×  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖  (23) 
Or, as a ratio of GNI, 
 𝑟(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖) =
𝑉𝐴𝑇 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 − 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 ×  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
 (24) 
 
Average homogenised levy 
  Without PPP With PPP   
From national contribution 8,3% 8,0% % of GNI 
From European VAT 15,2% 14,5% 
% of final consumption  
expenditure of households 
 
EUBI financed by national contribution (as % of GNI) 
 
Net contribution as percentage 
of GNI 
Countries Without PPP With PPP 
Belgium -2% -1% 
Bulgaria 32% 9% 
Czech Republic 8% 2% 
Denmark -3% -1% 
Germany -2% -2% 
Estonia 7% 3% 
Ireland -2% -1% 
Greece 6% 4% 
Spain 2% 1% 
France -1% -1% 
Croatia 15% 6% 
Italy 1% 1% 
Cyprus 3% 2% 
Latvia 11% 5% 
Lithuania 11% 3% 
Luxembourg -4% -3% 
Hungary 14% 4% 
Malta 4% 2% 
Netherlands -2% -1% 
Austria -2% -1% 
Poland 14% 3% 
Portugal 6% 3% 
Romania 22% 6% 
Slovenia 5% 2% 
Slovakia 9% 3% 
Finland -2% 0% 
Sweden -3% -1% 
United Kingdom -2% 0% 
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EUBI financing by European VAT (as % of GNI) 
 
Net contribution as percentage of 
GNI 
Countries Without PPP With PPP 
Belgium -1% 0% 
Bulgaria 30% 8% 
Czech Republic 9% 2% 
Denmark -2% 0% 
Germany -1% -1% 
Estonia 8% 3% 
Ireland -1% 1% 
Greece 5% 3% 
Spain 2% 1% 
France -1% 0% 
Croatia 14% 6% 
Italy 0% 0% 
Cyprus 1% 0% 
Latvia 10% 4% 
Lithuania 10% 2% 
Luxembourg -3% -1% 
Hungary 15% 5% 
Malta 4% 2% 
Netherlands -1% 0% 
Austria -2% -1% 
Poland 13% 3% 
Portugal 4% 2% 
Romania 21% 5% 
Slovenia 5% 3% 
Slovakia 9% 2% 
Finland -2% 0% 
Sweden -1% 0% 
United Kingdom -3% -1% 
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Additional expenditure for a VAT-based financing compared to national contributons 
Net receivers do not inevitably become net contributors, they can still be net receivers but with X% less 
  Additional financing 
Countries VAT vs fixed %GNI 
Belgium -10% 
Bulgaria 19% 
Czech Republic -6% 
Denmark -17% 
Germany -7% 
Estonia -7% 
Ireland -15% 
Greece 22% 
Spain 3% 
France -5% 
Croatia 5% 
Italy 10% 
Cyprus 26% 
Latvia 9% 
Lithuania 20% 
Luxembourg -21% 
Hungary -10% 
Malta -4% 
Netherlands -20% 
Austria -6% 
Poland 10% 
Portugal 18% 
Romania 13% 
Slovenia -6% 
Slovakia 2% 
Finland -4% 
Sweden -22% 
United Kingdom 15% 
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Et pour ceux qui veulent et qui comprennent, je terminerai, comme à l’accoutumée, simplement par ceci : « méfait accompli » ! 
